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NOTE
Towards the middle of November 1967 > 1 became aware
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baggage, in Australia. All that I know of her work is 
that it covers roughly the same incidents, from the 
British point of view, using only British sources. 
Relevant dates with regard to my own work are as follows? 
(l) I gave a seminar paper at the Australian National 
University, on 9 November 1966 outlining some of my ideas 
on the channels of communication theme 5 (2) My first
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January 196?» (3) The chapter was in its final form by
the end of September 1967? (4) I first heard of Dr
Lettice’s work in November 1967*
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above statement by the candidate is an accurate account
D. WRIGHT.
of the facts.
J.A . LA NAUZE
Professor of History
vii
SUMMARY
The birth of the Commonwealth of Australia, on 1 
January 1901, added a new Government to the six already 
existing within the continent. The new Government had 
jurisdiction over the whole of the territory occupied by 
the six established Governments and removed, either at 
once or after an interval, some of the powers which they 
had previously exercised. Yet the Constitution did not 
set out to establish a hierarchy of Governments beneath 
the Imperial Government. The Commonwealth and State 
Governments were to be independent and equal within their 
own spheres. It is the working out of this plan for co­
ordinate federalism, during the first decade of its 
operation, which is studied here. The seven Governments 
are observed as they learn to live together in their new 
constitutional relationship.
Even before federation was a fully accomplished fact, 
dispute arose over the right of the States to communicate 
directly, through their Governors, with the Secretary 
of State for Colonies. This dispute had several aspects. 
The States retained the right of unsupervised 
communication in general matters, except where they 
involved federal interests, when copies of despatches 
were to be sent to the Governor-General. In 1902-3, it 
was ruled, by the Secretary of State, that all 
communications concerning external relations should pass 
through the Governor-General, since, with regard to
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foreign nations, Australia was said to have become a 
single political entity. This was not altogether in 
line with Australian thinking at the time and, while 
the theory was re-affirmed several, times, it proved 
difficult to insist on it in practice and some tacit 
withdrawals were in fact made. In matters of imperial 
affairs, the States were able to maintain only in part 
their right of direct communication. The failure of the 
States to maintain fully this right of direct 
communication led to some loss of political status and 
did much to place them in a position inferior to that of 
the Commonwealth.
The long and bitter feud between New South Wales 
and the Commonwealth over the capital site sprang largely 
from the old rivalry between New South Wales and Victoria. 
It raised no vital issues, but, because the State chose 
to regard it as the touchstone by which the working of 
the federal system must be judged, the question did much 
to poison relations generally between the two Governments 
until it was finally settled. The dispute between South 
Australia and the Commonwealth over the transfer of the 
Northern Territory illustrates the difficulties which 
arise when a nascent sense of national responsibility 
clashes head on with parochial self-interest.
Sometimes, problems which were quite small in 
themselves become magnified in the prevailing 
atmosphere of the times. The determination to expel the 
Kanakas, as part of the ’White Australia’ policy, caused 
bitter resentment at the beginning because of its effect 
on sectional interests in Queensland and its unfortunate
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co-incidence with a period of economic depression due to 
drought. Better conditions, Commonwealth assistance, and 
a change of State Government to one more in harmony with 
national sentiment led to co-operation over the actual, 
expulsion. This question provided an opportunity to 
test the right of the Commonwealth Parliament to act 
independently of the State in a matter which, although 
it affected the interests of a State, fell within the 
ambit of Commonwealth powers. The field of 
encouragement of immigration illustrates the difficulty 
of getting co-operation in matters of national 
importance when they are subject to divided control.
The dispute over the provision of a second residence (in 
Sydney) for the Governor-General and over the payment of 
his fares on the State railways sprang largely from the 
failure to satisfy the aspirations of New South Wales 
over the capital site and demonstrated the need for 
making intergovernmental agreements clear and definite.
In many matters of day to day administration the 
seven Governments co-operated readily and shared 
facilities. This was what made the new system work. 
Co-operation became more difficult as the attempt was 
made to move from specific acts towards more general 
administrative integration. The States feared the 
possible surrender of powers not committed to the 
Commonwealth by the Constitution. While there were some 
problems associated with the transfer of departments , the 
general attitude was helpful. The transfer of property, 
which raised problems of definition, and of the payment 
of compensation, was less harmonious, partly because of 
the financial questions raised.
XAlthough the Constitution forbad the taxing of each 
other1s property or agents by either Commonwealth or 
State Governments it was still necessary to determine 
when an officer was acting as the agent of his 
Government and when a tax was being imposed on property. 
The High Court complicated the issues by importing, 
unnecessarily, the American doctrine of implications from 
the nature of federalism. Conflict between the High 
Court and the Privy Council led to doubt being cast on 
the right of the former to be the final arbiter of the 
Constitution in inter se questions. The States lost 
legal status both because they were not exempted from 
the payment of customs duties on their own imports and 
because they retained the power to tax Commonwealth 
officers, members of Parliament and Ministers only by the 
grace of the Commonwealth and not by right.
Financially, the Constitution secured the States 
adequately for the first decade and then left them at 
the mercy of the Commonwealth Parliament. In spite of 
this, they attempted consistently to dictate terms to 
the Commonwealth, which was almost always ready to 
discuss the question with them. As the Commonwealth 
used more of the powers committed to it, its needs 
became greater and it served notice in 1908 (by the 
Surplus Revenue Act) that the States must expect a 
smaller return when section 87 of the Constitution ceased 
to be obligatory. The interim solution of I9IO left the 
States (which had rejected earlier, more favourable, 
offers) in a position of financial dependence.
By the end of the first decade it was becoming clear 
that the power of the Commonwealth was likely to continue
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to grow and that of the States to decline. They had not 
been able to maintain the equal and independent status 
given them by the Constitution. Politically, legally 
and financially, they were already finding it difficult 
to keep pace with the Commonwealth. Initially, the power 
of the Commonwealth was strongly resented, but by the 
end of the decade it had to be accepted. The strange 
mixture of co-operation and of dogged opposition 
reflected the forces which caused federation, a 
compromise between unity and disunity, to be chosen as 
the system of government most acceptable to the 
Australian Colonies.
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INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday 1 January 1901, the Commonwealth of 
Australia was proclaimed in Sydney amidst great 
rejoicing. The weather was bright and hot and the 
brilliantly decorated streets were filled with a vast 
crowd of people who displayed unbounded enthusiasm. A 
new century and a new nation had been born together.
The dream of Australian nationalists, 'One continent, 
one people’ , had at last been fulfilled. For them, this
(Iwas the climatic event of Queen Victoria’s long and 
almost completed reign.
There was every reason for federalists to rejoice. 
Federation had been a topic for discussion for many 
years, and more than ten had passed since the Melbourne 
Premiers' Conference of I89O had inaugurated the most 
important phase of the movement. The wait had been 
long and many disappointments had been overcome; the 
stillbirth of the I89I draft Constitution5 the 
considerable delays before further action could be taken; 
the absence of Queensland from the 1897-8 Conventions; 
the failure of the I898 referendum in New South Wales; 
the delay before Queensland and Western Australia 
decided to join and the difficulties which had surrounded 
the passage of the Constitution Bill through the Imperial 
Parliament. On 1 January 1901, all this was behind them.
2The framework of nationhood had been created and it 
remained to breathe life into it.
Even on the inaugural day there were those who 
realized that many difficult problems would have to 
be solved before the new political machinery settled 
down and the old and new Governments learned to work 
together reasonably amicably, if never in perfect 
harmony. Alfred Deakin, one of the most ardent of the 
federalists and a central figure in the story which 
follows, recognized that ’the Commonwealth [would] not 
begin its reign without much friction, much 
misunderstanding, and much complaint’. Antagonisms 
existed which could not be overcome by an Act of the 
Imperial Parliament.
The Union, as begun, will be formal and legal 
rather than vital. In a few years, no doubt, 
common interests will supply links capable of 
standing the strain of local divergences, and 
by degrees party lines will be drawn, 
determined, not as at present largely by 
geographical considerations, but by principles 
of national import.P
Before long, it came home clearly to the States that 
they no longer enjoyed their former independence, and 
they resented it. By the first anniversary of
1
Morning Pos t , 8 January 1901 (Sydney, 4 December 1900), 
D.P., A.N.L., MS,154o . Deakin’s articles in the Morning 
Pos t were written anonymously. Though they carried a 
Sydney headline, the articles were written in Melbourne. 
See J.A. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, 2 vols, Melbourne,
1965, vol.2 , ch.15.
3federation, Deakin1 2s prophecy had been fulfilled. On
that day an intelligent observer, a member of the
Conventions and of the first Commonwealth Parliament,
noted in his diary that if the question of federation
were again submitted to the people it was likely that
the vote would go against it . ^  After five years,
another observer described federation as ’like a foreign 
2occupation’ .
Politically, the period 1901-10 saw the discussion 
and settlement, on the federal level, of a number of 
important questions. The machinery of the new 
Government had to be established. Existing departments 
were transferred from the States and made to function as 
a unit. New departments were created. A public service 
was established. A national executive Government had to 
be made to work. A new judicial system was inaugurated 
and, in part, integrated with the old. The machinery 
itself was, for the main part, familiar enough, but the 
scale of its operation was new and provided many 
difficulties. In itself, the integration of disparate 
administrative methods was no easy business. The fiscal 
question had to be settled and a decision made between 
free trade and protection since the tariffs, a perpetual 
source of strife between the various Colonies, were now
1
P. McM. Glynn, diary entry, 1 January 1902, Glynn 
Papers, A.N.L., MS.558.
2
Sir Samuel Way to Lord Tennyson, 9 January 1906, 
Tennyson Papers, A.N.L., MS.479/5/181.
4a matter solely for the Commonwealth. The financial 
needs of the States, five of which had long depended 
heavily on customs revenue and which were to receive 
back three-fourths of the net customs and excise 
revenue of the Commonwealth for the first ten years/ 
partly pre-determined this question. Sufficient room 
for manoeuvre was left to ensure that the old fiscal 
rivalry between New South Wales and Victoria would be 
transferred to the Commonwealth Parliament for a time. 
Once protection had been more or less firmly adopted, 
the question of ' new protection* , the passing on of the 
benefits of ’old protection’ to the worker as well as the 
manufacturer, was raised more or less urgently both by 
the Victorian liberals and by the Labor Party. The 
question of immigration restriction which, despite its 
neutral name, meant the exclusion of coloured peoples, 
was regarded as urgent and occupied much attention for a 
time. Later in the decade, defence became an issue 
which concerned the Parliament closely.
All these were important questions, but none was 
more important than the need to define the relations 
between the States and the Commonwealth. On 31 December, 
there were in Australia six separate political 
communities, each enjoying sovereignty, subject to the 
imperial veto, over the full range of political subject 
matter except, in practice, external relations with
Constitution, section 87.
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5foreign countries. Five of them had existed for nearly 
50 years and the sixth for ten years. They had 
different histories and, sometimes, divergent policies. 
There had been limited co-operation between them, but 
rivalry was a more characteristic mark of their 
relations. From 1 January 1901, a new Government was 
added, but the six did not cease to exist. The new 
Government had jurisdiction over the whole territory 
occupied by the other six. It immediately removed some 
areas of power from their control: the customs power was
transferred at once and defence and post and telegraphs 
followed soon afterwards. Other agreed areas of power, 
such as the control of quarantine and immigration 
restriction, could be removed as soon as the Commonwealth 
Parliament could legislate on them. Even in these areas, 
there was the possibility of both human and definitional 
conflicts, but the example of the United States showed 
that it was probable that the Federal Government and 
Parliament would encroach in unforeseen ways on still 
further areas of power. This was known to those who 
were familiar with the constitutional history of the 
United States, but few men concerned with practical 
politics and administration were students and this 
encroachment would cause deep resentment.
A wide range of matters brought the Commonwealth 
and State Governments into executive and administrative 
contact, much, but not all of it, happy and fruitful. 
Departments had to be transferred from the control of
6one Government to the other. When this was virtually 
immediate and automatic there were few difficulties, 
but in other cases there was sometimes much friction 
before a modus vivendi was reached. Governments 
performed services for each other on a reciprocal basis, 
or lent each other buildings, to minimize costs. This 
was the kind of co-operation that made federation work.
Other, more fundamental, questions caused serious 
friction. Among the most important of these were the 
dispute over the channel of communication to be used by 
the States in their dealings with the Imperial 
Government, a dispute which raised the whole question of 
the political status of the States vis-ä-vis the 
Commonwealth; the power of the Federal and State 
Governments to tax each other’s property and servants, 
which raised questions of legal status, and the return of 
revenue to the States and the control of State debts, 
which raised questions of financial power.
It is with the discussion of such matters as 
problems of executive administration that this thesis is 
concerned. It is a study of what happens when six old 
and established Governments have to learn to co-exist with 
a new one which removes some of their powers. There is 
no attempt to deal with matters which, although they may 
have involved the limits of Commonwealth and State powers, 
were fought out in the High Court between the Commonwealth 
and, say, a company, as in the Harvester c a s e /  or
1
Harvester Case, see 2 Commonwealth Arbitration Reports 
1 and King v. Barger, 6 C . L , R . ^ 1 G. Sawer, Australian 
Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929» Melbourne" 195^ > pT83. 
The question concerned the Commonwealth’s power to 
implement the 'new protection’ policy by use of its excise 
power.
7between employers and employees as was the case with
questions relating to the arbitration power.“*“ It is
not concerned with ’politics’ in a party or group-
interest sense; the arguments discussed are those
carried on from Government to Government, albeit with
different emphases at times, whatever their party
composition. Still less is it concerned with matters
which remained essentially disputes between the States
themselves, as did the long and involved discussions
between South Australia, New South Wales and Victoria
2over the use of the Murray waters.
The events discussed will sometimes seem esoteric 
and remote simply because they were basically politico- 
administrative questions, questions of executive 
government with little or no relation to party-political 
issues. Few of them were of interest to ordinary people 
or were given much space in the newspapers of the day, 
although the selection of a site for the federal capital 
was an exception to this rule, in New South Wales at
1
See Jumbunna Coal Mining N.L, v. Victorian Coal Miners’ 
Association  ^ C.L.R, 309? Federated Saw Miller etc. 
Employees Association of Australasia, v. James Moore & Sons 
Pty. Ltd., 8 C.L.R. 465; Sawer, Australian Federal 
Politics and Law 1901-1929, p.85«
2
This matter only concerned the Commonwealth marginally 
and at the end, it was not involved in the basic 
negotiations. See the excellent file in S.A.A., G.R.G. 
24/6, 02/1164; R.L. Reid, ’South Australia and the First 
Decade of Federation', M.A. thesis, University of Adelaide, 
1954, ch.4; G. O’Collins, Patrick McMahon Glynn,
Melbourne, 1965, ch.l6; A. Deakin's(anonymous) article 
in the Morning Post, 23 January 1903 (Sydney, l6 
December 1902).
8least. If the Premier of New South Wales sent carters 
and police to remove wirenetting from the control of the 
Federal Customs Department without paying duty, and 
without authority, it made a good story,'*’ but few were 
interested in the principle which lay behind the action 
and which had caused a long and difficult dispute 
between the Governments. This should not surprise. 
Federation, in the early years, affected the life of 
the ordinary citizen of Australia very little. It 
affected the lives of politicians, and especially 
ministers, very much. It is one of the attributes of 
the federal form of government that it restrains sharp 
breaks and decisions within a framework of legalism and, 
consequently, the area into which ’political’ arguments 
are projected is not fixed but fluid. The relations 
between States and Commonwealth have changed greatly 
since 1901, but this has not often been the result of 
political argument decided by the people, but by 
administrative action and judicial decision, or simply 
by the inescapable facts of finance. This largely 
unseen area of argument has a vital importance which 
cannot be judged by the lack of interest of the people 
in it .
The study goes beyond 1910 only when it is necessary 
to discuss the solution of some problem which arose 
before that date but overlapped it. Many of the issues 
which were important in the early years had been settled 
by 1910 or soon after. The territory for the seat of
See any major Australian newspaper for 22-3 August 1907•
1
9government of the Commonwealth and the Northern Territory 
were transferred to the Commonwealth on 1 January 1911$ 
the channels of communication debate was largely settled 
by then; the Surplus Revenue Act 1910 had put financial 
relations beyond the realm of dispute for ten years; the 
taxation or mutual non-interference question was all but 
solved and the main departments subject to transfer had 
been transferred, with one exception. New men, who had 
had nothing to do with the making of Constitution, were 
assuming control of affairs. A new class of dispute was 
about to begin which was less concerned with the 
definition of the Constitution than the alteration of it, 
a class of dispute which was to be settled by political 
argument within the Commonwealth Parliament, by public 
dispute and by referenda, not by executive action. In 
any case, the introduction, from 1910, of a permanent 
pattern of division in Commonwealth politics by a 
dichotomy of parties with different social philosophies 
made removal of debate to the public sphere more likely. 
The many referenda, mostly unsuccessful, between 1901 
and 1968 have been partly concerned with Commonwealth- 
State issues but have partly represented differences of 
social attitude in the electorate."*" They have divided 
the people of Australia rather than State and Commonwealth
1 f
The referenda of I9H  and 1913 concerned with 
Commonwealth industrial powers come into this category.
See La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, vol.2, pp.6l4-5; L.F.
Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes, vol.l., Sydney,
1964, pp.262-3; see also C. Joyner, Holman Versus Hughes, 
Gainesville, 1961.
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Governments as such. It is this element which 
distinguishes them clearly from the issues discussed 
in this thesis and which makes 1910 a satisfactory 
terminal date.
Nearly 60 years have passed since the matters 
discussed here were live issues requiring solution. 
Today, any politically conscious Australian knows that 
there is still continual argument about Commonwealth- 
State relations: apparently this is a necessary 
accompaniment of the federal system of government. But 
today, the States’ complaints against the Commonwealth 
frequently take the form of resentment of its failure to 
exercise its power sufficiently in the ways that they 
desire. The existence of Commonwealth power is accepted 
without question. In looking at the first decade of 
Australia’s federal history, great care is needed to 
avoid anachronism. The superior power of the 
Commonwealth could not then be accepted automatically 
but had to be contested by the executives or in the 
courts when it seemed to overstep what the State 
ministers thought were its clear limits as agreed in 
the Constitution. It was not a case of one new, 
progressive Government trying to make six old and 
conservative Governments recognize the ineluctable facts 
of twentieth century political life. There were seven 
Governments, sometimes, but not always, pulling in 
different directions as they struggled to adjust 
themselves to a new and complex system of government,
11
the pattern of which had been laid down in general terms 
only and which was, as a consequence, capable of 
differing interpretations. External factors, the 
influence of the courts or of the sovereign Imperial 
Government, drought and the facts of geography, the 
personal necessity of every politician always to appear 
to win any dispute, or to yield only to force majeure 
after having fought long and hard, all played their 
part. It will sometimes be apparent that decisions, 
which now seem to have been inevitable, did not appear 
so then, that other solutions were sometimes possible 
and may even have been closer to the strict letter of 
the Constitution than those which were finally accepted.
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CHAPTER 1
CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT
Not even the inaugural day of the Commonwealth was 
entirely free from the shadow of dispute. On that day, 
the first signs of one of the major constitutional 
debates of the first decade became evident. It concerned 
the right of the States to communicate directly with the 
Imperial Government.
Within the federal system, most disputes over the 
meaning of the Constitution are ultimately settled by 
the High Court. When the channels of communication 
dispute first arose there was no High Court. In any 
case, the dispute was unusual. It involved the interests 
of a third party, the Imperial Government, as well as 
those of the Commonwealth and State Governments of 
Australia. Ultimately, the settlement of large areas 
of the dispute depended on the will of the paramount 
power, Britain. The issue was of the utmost importance. 
The whole question of the political status of the States 
within the Federation was bound up with the simpler 
question of the channel of communication and was, to a 
considerable extent, settled by it.
Initially, the debate arose as a dispute over the 
right of the States to communicate directly, by means of 
their Governors, with the Crown in routine matters.
Later, it assumed more specialized forms. A long and
13
bitter discussion developed over the channel to be used 
when a foreign government complained about the action of 
State officials or when an Australian citizen wished to 
protest against his treatment by a foreign government 
(that is, in matters of external affairs). A variant of 
this was the dispute over which Government should give 
permission for the landing of the crews of foreign 
warships docked in Australian ports. The channel to be 
used for communications concerning imperial affairs (as 
in the recommendation of honours) and the question of 
State representation at the Colonial Conference of 1907 
were also strongly contested.
The dispute arose first in South Australia, but 
quickly involved all States in at least some of its 
aspects. Throughout, South Australia, New South Wales 
and Queensland took the lead in the argument for the 
States against the Commonwealth and the Colonial Office.
The Draft Constitution of I89I contained a clause 
which required all communications between the State 
Governments and the Colonial Office to be sent through 
the Governor-General.^ He was to be the sole channel 
of communication with the Imperial Government. The 
clause, which was inserted by a majority of 16 votes to 
six, had drawn the support of such strong champions of 
State rights as Sir Samuel Griffith and Mr (later Sir 
Richard) Baker who seemed to feel that this single
1
Chapter V, clause 5«
l4
channel was to be a great symbol of Australian unity.
The clause was omitted from the original draft of the 
Constitution presented to the Adelaide Convention in 
1897» and Deakin, strongly supported by Edmund (later 
Sir Edmund) Barton, fought to have it re-inserted.
Deakin*s aim was to prevent conflicting views reaching 
England without the knowledge of the Governor-General.
He believed that such a provision was essential to the 
proper administration of Australian affairs on a national 
scale. C.C. Kingston, Premier of South Australia, 
expressed a more correctly federal view when he argued 
that, while the Commonwealth Government should speak for 
Australia in national affairs, local matters should be 
left to the States. Deakin*s proposal was defeated 
without a division.^
There was no room for doubt that the Constitution 
in its final form embodied Kingston* s view and not 
Deakin’s . The failure to include a clause similar to 
that in the I89I Draft Constitution meant that the power 
of each State Executive to communicate directly with the 
Imperial Government, in all matters which came within its3purview, was left absolutely unimpaired. It is against
T
N .A .C .D ., 1891> pp.850-64; J. Quick and R.R. Garran,
The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 
Sydney and Melbourne, 1901, pp.931-2.
2
N.A.C.D .A ., 1897, pp.1177-81; Quick and Garran, 
Annotated Constitution, p.932.
3
See also Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, 
p.931; W.H. Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, first edition, London, 1902, p.288.
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this background of discussion in the Conventions that 
the subsequent debate must be seen.
As part of his preparations for federation, Joseph
Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, took
up the question of communication between the seven
Governments of Australia and the Imperial Government. He
drew up a procedure which he submitted to the Governor-
General designate, Lord Hopetoun, for comment and approval
before he informed the Colonies.“*' Chamberlain realized
that Australian opinion required the continuance of
direct communication between the State Governors and the
Secretary of State on all matters of purely State concern,
while matters of general Australian interest should be
dealt with through the Governor-General. However, he
believed that the Governor-General would not be able to
perform his duties satisfactorily unless he were aware
of all the correspondence passing between the States and
the Colonial Office. Because of this, he had decided to
send the Governor-General copies of all public and
confidential despatches from himself to the Governors.
He directed them to take similar action with their own
despatches and to forward to the Governor-General copies
2of both inward and outward cables.
1
Lord Hopetoun to Under-Secretary of State for Colonies, 
30 September 1900, A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 2137, C.O. 4l8/8, 
no.31920.
2
S. of S. to Gov. N.S.W., 2 November 1900, copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A8,02/403/1.
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Chamberlain apparently had no doubt that both the 
Governors and their Ministers would see the necessity 
for the arrangement if Commonwealth efficiency were to 
be maintained. He does not seem to have considered that 
the sending of copies to the Governor-General might be 
regarded as a breach of the privilege of direct 
communication.
Chamberlain's meaning was clear enough, but some
States questioned whether secret despatches were
included in the direction^ and Queensland wondered
whether there was any need to send copies of despatches
to the Governor-General until their subject matter had
actually come under the administrative control of the 
2Commonwealth. In the light of later Queensland3protests, this may be seen as a cautious probing of 
Chamberlain's intentions, a hint of State disapproval, 
giving him an opportunity to modify his position without 
loss of face. If so, Chamberlain did not heed it. The 
South Australian authorities had no doubt about 
Chamberlain's meaning. They recognized the importance of 
the question at once and the Governor, Lord Tennyson,
1
G.G. to O.A.G. T a s ., 26 February 1901, T.S.A., G.O.
20/1 .
2
Gov. Qld. to S. of S., 10 January 1901, cable, A.N.L., 
A.J.C.P. 2l4l, C.O. 418/12, no.1285.
3
A. Prem. Qld. to Gov. Qld., 12 March 1901 (with Gov. 
Qld. to S. of S., 14 March 190l), ibid., no.14737-
4
Minute on Gov. Qld. to S. of S . , 10 January 1901, 
ibid., no.1285-
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appears to have let Hopetoun know that, rather than send
copies of confidential despatches to him, the State
Ministers would use their Agent-General as their channel
of communication. Hopetoun had to take time off from
the festivities of the Inauguration to ask Chamberlain to
deprecate strongly the proposed action.’*' Chamberlain was
inclined to regard Tennyson's warning as an idle threat
2and did nothing.
Hopetoun was apparently determined to make 
Chamberlain’s instruction work and, early in February 
1901, he drew the attention of the Governors of 
Queensland and South Australia to the fact that he had3not received the copies of any despatches from them. 
Tennyson's reply, for South Australia, was blunt. His 
Ministers regarded the matter as a 'grave constitutional 
question'. They were anxious to maintain the independence 
of the State in all matters not transferred to the 
Commonwealth and felt that Chamberlain's instruction 
came close to infringing the right of direct 
communication which had been preserved by the 
Constitution. The question was likely to assume special 
importance if the State communications involved any 
matter where State and Commonwealth interests were in
_
G.G. to S. of S . , 1 January 1901, cable, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P. 2138, C.0.418/9, no.54.
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See minutes on ibid.
3
G.G. to Govs. S.A. and Qld., 9 February 1901, copy,
C.A.O., C.P.78/II, vo1.1, pp.185-6.
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conflict. Tennyson was prepared to send Hopetoun copies 
of covering despatches and formal acknowledgements, but 
nothing of a secret or confidential nature.^
Hopetoun seemed a little stunned by the suddenness
and force of this attack. He felt incompetent to
discuss the legality of Chamberlain's instruction with
Tennyson and passed the whole matter over to the
Secretary of State for decision. In doing this, he
pointed out that he foresaw difficulties in carrying out
his functions properly if he did not have a full
knowledge of all communications going to the Colonial
Office. The procedure proposed by Tennyson would reduce
the whole business to a farce. Hopetoun believed that
it was especially important that he should see all
despatches relating to recommendations for honours and
2to disputes between the States.
Meanwhile, F.W. (later Sir Frederick) Holder, 
Premier of South Australia and, afterwards^ first Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, was attempting to 
persuade the other States to join South Australia in 
its opposition to Chamberlain's instructions of 2
ONovember 1900. The response was good (from his point
T
Gov. S.A. to G.G., 19 February 1901, A.N.L., A.J.C.P* 
2138, C.0.418/9, no.12336.
2
G.G. to Gov. S.A., 26 February 1901, copy, C.A.O.,
C.P.78/11, vol.l, pp.254-5; G.G. to S. of S ., 4 March 
1901, copy, C.A.O., C.P.78/8 , vol.l, p.60.
3
Prem. S.A. to all Prems., 20 February 1901, copy,
S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/28, vol.20, p.66.
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of view). Most of the States informed the Colonial 
Office, through their Governors, that they supported 
South Australia.
Sir John Anderson, a senior official in the Colonial 
Office, felt that the South Australians were ’very 
obstructive'. He argued that each State was trying to 
get ahead of its fellows in local matters and that the 
Imperial Government was entitled to the advice of the 
Federal Government on the issues involved if it wanted
The first two points were just, but the third was 
not. Anderson clearly had an imperfect understanding of 
the basic purpose behind the Australian Federation and 
of the nature of the Constitution by which it had been 
established. It had been expressly framed to avoid 
Commonwealth intervention in local matters and there 
would have been few in Australia who would not have felt 
that the ’advice’ which Anderson wanted was interdicted 
by the Constitution. Anderson was to give successive
1
Various letters, February and March 1901, S.A.A., 
G.R.G.24/6, 01/327; Prem. Vic. to Lt . Gov. Vic. (for 
S. of S.), 1 March 1901, copy, ibid.; Gov. S.A. to S. of 
S., 1 March 1901, cable, A.N.L., A . J .C’. P . 2142 , C.0.428/13, 
no. 7849; Prem. Qld. to Gov. Qld.., 26 February 1901, (with 
Gov. Qld., to S. of S., 4 March 190l) , A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 
2l4l, C.0.418/12, no.12952.
2
Minute by Sir J. Anderson, 4 March 1901, on Gov. S.A. 
to S. of S., 1 March 1901, cable, A.N.L., A .J.C.P .2142,
C.0.418/13, no.7849.
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Secretaries of State much advice on Australian matters 
during the first decade, some of it of the same low 
standard as this.^
On this occasion, wiser counsels prevailed. It was 
recognized that if, after a further explanation, the 
States continued to reject the Colonial Office's
2reasoning, they could not be forced to send copies.
Accordingly, Chamberlain informed Tennyson on 11 March
1901 that he had no desire to subordinate the States.
Despatches of general interest must be sent in copy to
the Governor-General, but, if the State Government
adhered to its view, he would not insist that the same
should be done with those confined to local affairs. He
did, however, reserve the right to consult the Governor-
General before replying if he considered that federal3interests were involved.
This was the only sanction which Chamberlain applied. 
It did place a certain limitation on the Governors' 
discretion, and, no doubt, was intended to ensure that, 
whenever there was any reasonable doubt whether federal 
interests were involved, they would send a copy of the 
despatch to the Governor-General.
1
It is, perhaps, reasonable to assume that the despatch 
of 2 November was based on Anderson's advice.
2
Minute (writer's initials illegible), A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 
2142, C.0.418/13, no.7849.
3
S. of S. to Gov. S.A., 11 March 1901, cable, draft, 
ibid.
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South Australia, a little unreasonably, interpreted
Chamberlain’s despatch as a definite approval of the
principle that copies of despatches dealing with local
affairs need not be sent to the Governor-General. The
Commonwealth Government had been invited to give its
views. Barton stressed the difficulty of making a
division between ’local* and ’federal’ matters and made
it clear that, while he did not wish the Governor-
General to be the only channel of communication, he was
not prepared to accept the State Governors as sole
arbiters of whether federal interests were affected. In
view of the position taken by Chamberlain, Barton could
not very well reject the proposal, but he accepted it as
an interim measure which would continue only if it
2worked satisfactorily.
On 21 June 1901, the Colonial Office made official
the compromise foreshadowed on 11 March, with the
provision suggested by Barton that it should be regarded3as an interim arrangement and subject to modification.
The officials had some private reservations and held the 
vain hope that when the Commonwealth Government,and 
Parliament were in full working order they would be able 
to bring more pressure to bear on the States. They
1
Gov. S.A. to S. of S . , 21 March 1901, ibid., n o .10468.
2
P.M. to G.G. (for S. of S.), 1 April 1901, copy,
C.A.O., C.R.S. A8,02/403/1.
3
S. of S. to Gov. Vic., 21 June 1901, V.S.A., G.O., 
Despatches vol.78; S. of S. to G.G., 21 June 1901, draft, 
A.N.L., A.J.C.P.2138, C.0.418/9, no.16706.
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planned to adopt a suggestion, made by Hopetoun in a
private letter to Chamberlain, to ask new Governors
leaving for Australia to try to carry out what they
described as 'our policy1 2 in the matter.^ At the same
time they set aside a worthwhile suggestion made by
Tasmania that, just as the States were to send the
Governor-General copies of despatches bearing on
federal interests, he should send to each State copies
of his correspondence with the Imperial Government which
2concerned the State.
In the light of the rejection of the Tasmanian 
suggestion and the proposal to gain the co-operation of 
future Governors, the modification of Chamberlain's 
original instruction appears grudging. There can be no 
doubt that the Colonial Office desired to confine its 
communications with Australia, as far as possible, to 
one channel, and that such concessions as were made to 
the States were made from necessity and in the hope that 
a way would be found around the difficulty later. In 
spite of the Constitution, the Imperial Government wished 
either to strengthen the position of the Commonwealth 
at the expense of the States or to adopt the course 
most convenient to itself.
1
Minute by A.C., 22 May 1901, ibid.
2
Prem. Tas. to O.A.G. Tas., 21 March 1901 (with O.A.G. 
Tas. to S. of S., 6 April 190l), A.N.L., A .J.C.P .2l43, 
C.0.418/14, no.16751.
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Since February 1901, all States except South
Australia had sent copies of general despatches to the
Governor-General^ and when that State readily accepted
the compromise of 21 June, and showed its satisfaction
by sending copies of both general and secret despatches
2which related to federal interests, the Colonial Office 
felt that its troubles were over. The ringleaders were
3* coming round* and there would be few more difficulties.
This satisfaction was premature. In a private
letter to Sir Samuel Griffith, Lieutenant-Governor of
Queensland, Tennyson expressed the hope that the States
would always protest strenuously against sending copies
of all despatches to the Governor-General. He feared
for the independence of the Governors, as well as for
State rights, and urged Griffith to give a lead in the
4matter as his opinion would have * great weight’ .
Griffith, who was administering the Government of
5Queensland at the time, accepted the June compromise 
but later sent dire, if vague, warnings to England that 
any substantial departure from the methods of dealing
1
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with the States before federation would strain the 
relations between the State and Commonwealth Governments 
and jeopardize the continuance 'of the existing warm 
regard for the Mother Country'. He pointed to the 
difference in status between the Canadian Provinces and
Australian States and expressed the fear that it might
v lnot be sufficiently recognized in England.
It is clear that by mid-1902 the compromise was
2firmly established and working satisfactorily. The 
first phase of the debate was complete. The Colonial 
Office had made demands which were constitutionally 
unjustifiable and which showed little appreciation of 
Australian thinking. It was natural that the Commonwealth 
should support a move which was to its advantage and 
equally natural that the States should oppose it. That 
the States were prepared, within six months, to accept 
a compromise solution was probably due to the expectation 
that they would not be involved in much correspondence of 
federal interest. Aspects of the Vondel. case (discussed 
later in this chapter) suggest that South Australia, at 
least, saw 'federal interest' as being confined to 
matters specifically transferred by the Constitution and 
subject to Commonwealth legislation.
The compromise remained undisturbed as long as 
Hopetoun and his successor, Tennyson, who had both been 
involved in working it out, remained as Governors -
1 Lt. Gov. Qld. to S. of S., 21 March 1902, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2152, C.0.418/21, no.16463.
2
A. Hunt to A. P.M., 9 May 1902, C.A.O., C.R.S. A8,
02/403/1.
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1General. It was challenged as soon as Tennyson was 
succeeded by Lord Northcote early in 1904.
Northcote had been in office little more than two
weeks when he sent a strongly worded despatch to the
Secretary of State (by this time, Alfred Lyttl.eton)
informing him that Chamberlain's instructions of 1
February I9OI (a despatch explaining and confirming that
of 2 November I9OÖ) were not being complied with
satisfactorily. He repea,ted all the old arguments and.
pointed out, that the Federal Government must see that it
was not impeded, perhaps unintentionally, by the State
Governments in the exercise of its duties. He believed
that many proposed State Acts must be of a doubtful
character and might trespass on the sphere of the
Federal Government. That Government's greater knowledge
would assist the Colonial Office to make decisions about
2them. He wanted Chamberlain's instructions repeated.
It was an incredible despatch. Northcote was 
apparently totally unaware of the compromise hammered 
out between March and June I.9OI ., and finally approved in 
Chamberlain's despatch of 21 June, yet that compromise 
drastically modified the earlier instructions. With his 
despatch, he enclosed a memorandum by his Official
________
Hopetoun resigned for financial reasons in mid~1902 
( La. Nauze , A lfred Deakin , vol . 1 , pp . 301=3 ) • He was 
succeeded by Tennyson Tennyson was Acting Governor“ 
General until the end of 1902, then held the full title 
until he left in January 1904 .
2
G.G. to S. of S,, 8 February 1904 , A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 
2164, C.0.418/31, no.9044.
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Secretary which purported to show that the States were 
not complying with the instruction of 1 February I.9OI ., 
but which probably showed that three States (South 
Australia, Queensland and Tasmania) were complying with 
the compromise of 21 June 1901 and left the position 
with regard to the other States an open question.'*" The 
proposal that the Commonwealth Government should offer 
advice on State acts revealed an abysmal ignorance of j v / .  ^  
the Australian Constitution. Indeed, only limited 
categories of State acts were subject to the Imperial. 
Government's veto and possible interference with federal
V
responsibilities was certainly not a ground for its 
exercise. Such interference was a ground for an appeal 
to the High Court, if a test case arose.
Sir John Anderson, who had perhaps told Northcote
the Colonial Office's real attitude in the question,
hoped that the Commonwealth would 'bring the matter to a 
2head' , but his colleagues recognized both the extent of
Northcote's blunder and the impossibility of effecting
his desire. Northcote's attention was drawn to the
compromise and he was informed that the Secretary of3State was not prepared to attempt to change it.
Time did not teach Northcote wisdom. In June I905> 
he again drew attention to the 'fact' that New South
1
Memo., 8 February 1904 , by Official Secretary to 
G.G., with above, ibid.
2
Minute by Sir J. Anderson, 21 March 1904, on above, 
ibid.
3
S. ofS. to G.G., 31 March 1904, draft, ibid>
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Wales, Victoria and Western Australia had not, during 
that year, complied with the instructions of 1 February 
1901. The other States had only complied in part.
Because of this, he often found himself with the Colonial 
Office’s answer to a despatch but not the despatch 
itself. Governors had always complied with his requests 
for copies but they could do this as a courtesy rather 
than in obedience to instructions. The instructions of 
1 February 1901 should be repeated or cancelled.^
The Colonial Office doubted whether the States were
more likely to accept the original instructions in 1905
than they had been in 1901, but felt bound to make
enquiry since Northcote had raised the question again 
2so strongly. It was pointed out to the Governors that
the arrangement had only been accepted as a provisional
measure and that it was causing the Commonwealth
inconvenience. To accept the original instructions would
not bring the States any more under Commonwealth control
and the Governor-General would be under no obligation to3show the correspondence to his Ministers. Northcote was 
told what action had been taken and his attention was
1
G.G. to S. of S., 30 June 1905, A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2169, 
C.0.418/36, no.28154. The fact that the Secretary of 
State had apparently not thought it necessary to consult 
the Governor-General about any State despatches (other 
than the initial despatch in the Benjamin case, 
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’federal’ and ’local’ matters.
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drawn, for the second time, to the compromise of 2 1 June 
1901 which had superseded the earlier instructions.^
The action of the Colonial Office fell far short of
what Northcote wanted and, in the circumstances, was little
more than a polite way of avoiding the necessity of
refusing his request outright. The States were not
prepared to agree to the change and, after an interchange
2of letters among themselves, all indicated this to the
Secretary of State. In South Australia, the Price
Government, assisted by the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir3Samuel Way, resisted an attempt by the Governor, Sir4George Le Hunte, to persuade them to yield.
When the Governor of Victoria sent Northcote a copy 
of his reply, the Governor-General again showed how 
little he understood the business in which he was meddling. 
He claimed that his only objects in asking for the 
instructions to be enforced were to save time and ’ to 
facilitate a good understanding between the Governor- 
General and any State Governor who may be corresponding 
with the Secretary of State on a matter of common 
interest....’ The States were adequately protected 
against Commonwealth interference by the Constitution. 
While it was natural for them to try to retain all the
1
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power, real or apparent, that they could, it was the 
'inevitable corollary' of the Constitution that he 
should be sufficiently informed about the affairs of 
the States to be able to judge advice given him by his 
Ministers on such matters. Northcote believed that the 
instructions of 1 February 1901 should be enforced by 
the threat that, if they were not carried out, the 
Colonial Office would delay its reply until the Governor- 
General had seen the whole correspondence.^
This bad advice was perhaps the 'inevitable 
corollary' of Northcote's faulty reasoning. In spite of 
two reminders, he again ignored the existence of the 
compromise of 21 June 1901. There was no reason for him 
to expect advice on State affairs from his Ministers and, 
in the circumstances which existed, it was absurd to 
claim that his proposal would foster 'a good 
understanding'. His despatches were a more than 
adequate indication that there was a kind of encroachment 
against which the Constitution would provide no adequate 
safeguard if once the States agreed to send copies of all 
their correspondence to the Governor-General.
The Colonial Office, aware in 1906 as in 1901 that
compliance must be by consent and not by compulsion,
refused to fight a pitched battle with all six States at
2once and informed the Governor-General accordingly. At 
the same time, it urged the Governors to take great care
1
G.G. to S. of S., 24 October 1905, A.N.L., A.J.C.P.
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to ensure that copies of all material bearing in any way 
on federal interests should be sent to the Governor» 
General.^ This was a re-assertion of the compromise of 
June 1901.
Northcote's personal part in the disucssion, to
this point, is of the greatest interest. His general
reputation, won both in Bombay and Australia, seems to
preclude the conclusion that he simply bungled the
2matter from personal incompetence. Since it was made 
so soon after his arrival in the country, his first move 
may have been made in partial ignorance, although his 
Official Secretary, who was able to tell him to what 
extent the States had complied with the original 
instruction, should have been able to direct his 
attention to the correspondence over the compromise. If 
he acted in ignorance, the question still remains why he 
acted so hastily.
During his time in India, he had had considerable
experience in the matter of relations between a
provincial and a central government, as it was a time
when the power of the Central Government, under Lord3Curzon,was growing rapidly. He seems to have brought 
very definite notions concerning the powers of the 
Federal Government to Australia with him. Shortly after
1
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the first despatch referred to, in February 1904, an 
incident occurred with Western Australia over the issue 
of a proclamation of neutrality in the Russo-Japanese 
War. The State Governor challenged him on the channel 
through which the proclamation should have been issued. 
Northcote, on his own initiative, correctly asserted 
Commonwealth competence and commented in a letter to 
Deakin that ? a fight on such a question between State 
& Federal Govts would not be a bad thing for us. . . . ’ ^
This was a bold action and statement for a Governor- 
General still in his first month of office.
The evidence does not allow a decision whether
Northcote confided in Deakin at all. Deakin’s diaries
reveal that he met Northcote shortly before each despatch 
2was sent but there is no indication of the subjects
discussed, and on the second occasion (30 June 1905)
Deakin was not in office. The two men met so often that
the mere fact that they did meet at the right time is
insufficient to prove collusion. Yet the intimacy and3general accord which quickly grew up between them makes 
it difficult to believe that Deakin remained ignorant 
of the correspondence until he began to take a formal 
and open part in it in 1906.
1
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The Secretary of State's refusal to do battle with 
the States caused Northcote to seek Deakin's active 
assistance. He sent him the refusal for comment. 
Deakin's memorandum in reply was in his worst styles 
longwinded, full of flabby reasoning and contradictory 
arguments. He repeated all the old, pointless, and 
already rejected, assurances about the friendly feelings 
that the Commonwealth Ministers had for the States. 
Deakin argued that, although the Constitution demanded 
the surrender of powers by the States, it was inevitable 
that State Ministers who had previously exercised these 
powers would resist their surrender. He believed that 
State Governors, whose experience was necessarily 
confined to one State, would never be able to appreciate 
federal principles and, therefore, should not be allowed 
to determine what despatches were sent in copy to the 
Governor-General. On the other hand, the Governor- 
General's occasional journeys through the States were 
said to give him an 'intimate' knowledge of all 
Australian affairs, including State politics. He 
admitted that 'The Commonwealth Constitution is 
necessarily general in its language, and therefore 
affords abundant scope for diverse readings of its 
provisions' but went on to claim that, because of their 
attitudes in the Vondel and Benjamin cases (both to be 
discussed later in this chapter), the State Governors 
and Ministers had shown themselves incapable of judging 
when a matter involved federal interests. The 
reservation of the right by the Secretary of State to 
refer to the Governor-General matters which seemed to 
bear on federal interests was inadequate because the
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officers advising him were unfamiliar with Australian 
conditions. Only the Governor-General could decide 
whether federal interests were involved. He would 
determine by his own judgement whether a despatch should 
be referred to his Ministers. If, occasionally, they 
were allowed to comment on some matter which did not 
really concern them, no harm would be done.
Commonwealth interests suffered if the Government’s 
right to comment were delayed even for a time. Deakin 
stressed that, if the practice were changed, the 
Governor-General would act, not as the official head of 
the Federal Government, but as the personal representative 
of the King, ’entirely independent of Government,
Ministers and parties’. ^
The fallacies and inconsistencies of the Prime 
Minister's memorandum are obvious and it is unnecessary 
to labour them. It is astonishing that Deakin, an 
intelligent man constantly and intimately involved in 
public affairs, could have believed it worthwhile to 
make his final suggestion in the atmosphere of suspicion 
and mistrust which pervaded the relationship of the 
Commonwealth and States in 1906. Since he must have 
known that no State would willingly have adopted the 
proposal, it must be assumed that his aim was to gain 
the support of the English officials (his experiences in 
the Vondel case would have made this appear a real 
possibility) so that they would order the States to 
comply. The correspondence which followed showed that
T
P.M. to G.G., 7 March 1906 (with G.G. to S . of S., 7 
March I9O6), A.N.L., A .J.C .P.2176, C.0.418/44, no.12371-
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Deakin would have regarded this action as perfectly 
reasonable and very desirable.
The officials doubted whether they could
legitimately instruct the Governors to adopt such an
arrangement'*' and Lord Elgin, the Secretary of State,
accepted the advice that the scheme could only be
implemented if the States agreed to it. He informed
Northcote that Deakin’s proposal seemed reasonable and
suggested that, as negotiation from England was difficult,
it would be best for the Governor-General to consult the
2State Governments through the Governors.
The Colonial Office had no time to waste on hopeless 
causes. The Commonwealth Government was being told quite 
clearly and firmly that if it wished to upset the 
established compromise of June 1901 it could persuade the 
States itself.
At their Conference in I9O6 , the Premiers discussed
the Secretary of State’s earlier request (31 August
1903) that they should reconsider their position and send
copies of all correspondence to the Governor-General.
As a consequence, the Premier of New South Wales, J.H.
(later Sir Joseph) Carruthers, protested strongly on3behalf of all States. Deakin described the attitude of 
1
See the various minutes on ibid.
2
Minute by Elgin, 12 May 1906, ibid. The despatch was 
sent 24 May I9O6.
3
Prem. N.S.W. to Gov. N.S.W., 23 April 1906 (with Gov. 
N.S.W. to S. of S., 27 April 1906), A.N.L., A.J.C.P.
2177, C.0.418/46, no.21668.
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the Premiers as ’uncompromising' and felt unable, in the 
face of it, to advise Northcote to undertake the 
negotiations which Elgin had suggested. He claimed that 
the States were persistently ignoring the Secretary of 
State’s request to observe carefully the terms of the June 
1901 compromise and that for the Commonwealth to 
initiate a correspondence would cause further 
unpleasantness. The only solution was for Elgin to 
issue the necessary instructions.^
The States were uncompromising, but so was Deakin.
He was harking back to the notions of I89I, which had 
been firmly rejected at the Adelaide Convention in 1897* 
The validity of Deakin’s claim that the States were not 
complying with the compromise of June 1901 is at least 
dubious. Perhaps he had not bothered to check the facts, 
although they were available. With Deakin’s memorandum, 
Northcote forwarded a document, prepared by his Official 
Secretary, showing the despatches which each State had 
sent in copy to the Governor-General. If it showed 
anything at all, it was that only Victoria was being 
unco-operative.^
1
P.M. to G.G., 23 October 1906 (with G.G. to S. of S . ,
23 October 1906), A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2177, C.0.418/45, 
no.43464.
2
The return gave only the number of despatches sent to 
the Governor-General by each State. To be sure that the 
States were co-operating fully, all the despatches not 
sent would have to be seen, but this is no longer possible. 
The men at the Colonial Office were satisfied with the 
action taken by all States except Victoria, see minutes 
by Dale (29 November) and Elgin (6 December) on the despatch. 
Deakin may have felt that Queensland's failure to send 
copies of the papers in the Benjamin case justified his
(continued p.36)
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No one at the Colonial Office was prepared to
quarrel with the States for the sake of the ’beaux yeux'
of the Commonwealth. Dale and Cox would have had Elgin
suggest Deakin’s proposal to the States so that the
Secretary of State could feel that he had done his utmost."*"
But Elgin recognized that the correspondence was
’ perfectly futile’ . He was satisfied that all States
except Victoria were behaving well in the matter, and he
was thoroughly peeved with the persistent nagging of
Northcote and Deakin. He believed that his suggestion
that Northcote should consult the State Governors should
never have been shown to Deakin and the fact that it had
been had destroyed the possibility of Northcote
exercising a personal and independent influence. He
hoped that the forthcoming Commonwealth election would
bring a change of Government and he simply marked the
2correspondence 5 Put by' .
In spite of strong attacks by the Commonwealth, the 
States had maintained the compromise of 21 June 1901 and,
2 (continued from p.35)
view that the States were not co-operating. When this 
case is discussed (later in the chapter) it will be 
argued that it was reasonable, in the circumstances, for 
the State to think that there was no need to send a copy. 
That Deakin’s conduct of the debate at this stage lost 
much of its usual moderation is probably due to the 
effect on him of the whole range of arguments between the 
Commonwealth and States. But this particular question 
was not a good one on which to make such high demands.
1
Minutes by H.E. Dale and H.B. Cox, 29 November I9O6 , 
on G.G. to S. of S., 23 October 1906, A.N.L., A.J.C.P.
2177, C.0.418/45, no.43464.
2
Minute by Elgin, 6 December 1906, ibid.
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with it, the right of direct communication with the 
Imperial Government. This right was limited only by the 
need to send copies of despatches to the Governor- 
General if the State Governor thought they bore on 
federal interests. His judgement might be overruled by 
the Secretary of State, but, from the State’s point of 
view, this was not as bad as being overruled by the 
Commonwealth.
In itself, the compromise was politically sound and 
in accord with the spirit of the Constitution. There 
were admitted difficulties in operating it, but these were 
not insurmountable and were likely to become less as time 
passed and politicians and Governors were more and more 
able to make their decisions in the light of established 
and acceptable precedent. The latter phase of the debate, 
1904-6, should never have arisen, due as it was to the 
failure of Northcote to appreciate the Australian 
situation and the desire of Deakin (perhaps partly the 
result of provocation by the Premiers) to extend 
Commonwealth powers as far as possible, even to the 
extent of reviving the long rejected ideas of I89I. In 
staving off this unwarranted challenge, the Colonial 
Office was a loyal ally to the States, though, it would 
seem, more from a desire to avoid fruitless wrangling 
than from any belief in the rightness of their position.
The question of the channel for communications 
concerning external affqirs arose in 1902. Section 51 
(xxix) of the Constitution gave the Commonwealth power 
to ’make laws for the peace, order, and good government 
of the Commonwealth with respect to...external affairs’
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Quick and Garran, authorities on the new Constitution,
regarded this power as ’singularly vague’ and likely to
prove 'a great constitutional battleground’ . They
thought it probably covered the external representation
of the Commonwealth through High Commissioners, the
negotiation of commercial treaties and international
extradition. They did not think that the Imperial
Parliament had transferred its power over ’foreign
affairs’ . ^  Professor Moore, another authority, was in
2general agreement with them.
This doubt concerning the meaning of the 
Commonwealth’s external affairs power underlay the 
discussion on the channel for communications in matters 
of external affairs. Several incidents bearing on the 
question occurred in the period lQOl'-lO. Three of these 
were argued fully at the time. The case of the ship 
Vondel concerned the protest of a foreign government 
against the alleged refusal of assistance under treaty 
arrangements by an Australian State. The cases of 
Messrs Benjamin and Weigall involved claims by individual 
Australians against foreign governments. The first two 
cases will be discussed fully and the third in so far as 
it differs from the second. In addition, there was some 
debate over the channel of communication to be used by 
the Imperial Government when foreign consuls were 
appointed to act in an Australian State.
1
Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, pp.631-2.
2
Moore, Commonwealth of Australia, first edition,
pp.142-3.
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A further matter must also be discussed because of 
its relation to external affairs, although it differs 
markedly from the cases already mentioned. It was the 
question of whether the State Governor or the Governor- 
General was the correct authority to authorize the 
landing of soldiers or sailors from fo>reign warships 
visiting Australian ports.
The Dutch ship Vonde1 visited Adelaide in August
1901 and the Master had trouble with certain of his crew
who refused duty. He asked the State Authorities for
help under the terms of the Anglo-Netherlands Convention
of 1856^ but it was refused on the ground that the
Convention did not provide for assistance in the existing
circumstances. When the men deserted, the Master
requested their arrest and imprisonment. This was also
refused because the Convention provided only for ’arrest
2and surrender5 . The Netherlands Consul in Adelaide 
informed his Consul-General and, through him, the
1
The Colonies were automatically bound by British 
commercial treaties concluded before I878. Thereafter 
they had the right to adhere if they wished. J.A. La 
Nauze, ’Australian Tariffs and Imperial Control’, Economic Record, vol.24, 1948, p.225.
2
See J.H. Gordon’s ’Report to the Imperial Government 
regarding the Action of the S.A. Authorities in 
Connection with the Crew of the Ship Vondel’, 29 
September 1902 , S .A .P.P. , 1902, vol.2, no.84, p.l.
4o
Netherlands Government, which approached the Imperial 
Government with a complaint against the South Australian 
oificials.
In April 1902 , the Foreign Office asked that the
Governor-General of the Commonwealth should be requested
to report on the incident. The Colonial Office considered
the correctness of the course proposed and decided to
2comply with the request. The task of approaching the 
South Australian Government fell to Deakin, who was acting 
as Prime Minister while Barton was in England for the 
Coronation of Edward VII.
Deakin wrote to Jenkins, the South Australian
3Premier, on 29 May 1902 but, in spite of several
reminders, he received no reply of any kind until 2
August. No discourtesy was intended, the wheels of
government were simply turning slowly. Jenkins pressed
his Attorney-General, J.H. (later Sir John) Gordon, to
4deal with the matter promptly. Gordon, who had been a
1
Short accounts of the incident can be found in La 
Nauze, Alfred Deakin, vol.l, pp.266-70; G. Sawer, 
Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-19291 Melbourne, 
1956, p p .31-2;A .B . Keith, Responsible Government in the 
Dominions , 2 vols. , second edition, Oxford, 1928, vol.2, 
pp .' 6l 1-5 •
2
Under-Secretary Foreign Office to Under-Secretary C.O., 
12 April I902 and minute thereon, 15 April 1902, A.N.L., 
A. J.C.P.2155, C.0.418/23, no.14224; S. of S. to G.G., 1.8 
April I9O2 , copy, A J . L .  , A .J .C .P .2153 , C.0.418/21, 
no .43427•
3
A.P.M. to Prem. S.A., 29 May 1902, C.P,P., 1903, vol.2, 
p.1149. 
k
Prem. S.A. to Attorney-General, 1 August 1902, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2153, C.0.418/21, no.43427; Prem. S.A. to A.P.M., 
2 August 1902, ibid.
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notable fighter for the rights of South Australia at the
Federal Conventions and who was later to become a judge of
the State Supreme Court, moved Jenkins to send Deakin a
provocative refusal to provide the information. The State
Government would be glad to assist the Secretary of State
when he approached it through the constitutional channel,
1the South Australian Governor.
Deakin, who was anxious to avoid the constitutional 
issue, refused to be provoked. He did not question that 
Chamberlain might have approached South Australia directly 
but merely asserted that it was within the function of the 
Commonwealth to report and that the Government would 
comply with the Secretary of State's request, even if it 
had to investigate without the assistance of the State, 
which had been sought as a matter of courtesy and not of 
necessity.
Unofficially, Deakin suggested that Jenkins should
settle the constitutional question with Chamberlain. He
presumed that the Federal Government's right to deal with
the case was not questioned as he believed that this was
assured under the power to deal with trade and commerce
with other countries, shipping and navigation and external3affairs. But Jenkins did question the Commonwealth's 
right and felt that his own Government had been slighted.
1
Minute, Attorney-General S.A. to Prem. S.A., 5 August
1902, ibid.; Prem. S.A. to A.P.M., 13 August 1902, C.P.P.,
1903, vol.2, p.1151.
2
A.P.M. to Prem. S.A., 19 August 1902, ibid.
3
Deakin to Jenkins, 8 September 1902, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6,
02/651.
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He was prepared to instruct his officers to disregard any
command issued by another Government with respect to their
1official duties. Even the threat that the Commonwealth
might use a royal commission to get the information it
2wanted failed to move him. The use of the threat was 
unwise on Deakin1s part, as it was likely to make the 
already obstinate South Australians even more difficult.
On 18 September 1902, the Lieutenant-Governor of
South Australia, Sir Samuel Way, informed Chamberlain by
cable that his Ministers refused to report through the
Governor-General but would do so at once through him, if
3requested. In a further despatch on the same day, he 
indicated that, while he had only recently found out about 
the incident by accident, he agreed with his Ministers 
that the matter was one of State administration and State 
law. It did not relate to one of the transferred 
departments and there was no legislation affecting it
4under section 51 ol the Constitution. Chamberlain
5readily accepted Way's proposal,' but reserved his opinion 
on the constitutional issue until he had received a full
1
Jenkins to Deakin, 10 September 1902, ibid.
2
Deakin to Jenkins, 12 September 1902, ibid.; Jenkins to 
Deakin, 19 September 1902, ibid.
3
Lt.Gov. S.A. to S. of S., 18 September 1902, cable,
c .p .p ., 1903, V01.2, p.1153.
4
Lt.Gov. S.A. to S. of S,, 18 September 1902, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2153, C.0.418/21, no.43427.
5
S. of S. to Lt.Gov. S.A., 19 September 1902, C.P.P., 
1903, vol.2, p.1153-
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expression of the State's views on the question of the
1channel of communication.
The Commonwealth Government had made a first statement
of its position to Chamberlain. It claimed that, as treaty
obligations were involved, the consular representative at
Adelaide should have approached the Commonwealth, rather
than the State, in 1901 and that all such representatives
should be instructed to act in that way in future.
Apparently still unaware that Chamberlain had sanctioned a
direct report by South Australia, it proposed to appoint a
2royal commission to inquire into the incident. The
Secretary of State deprecated the appointment of a royal
commission, which he felt the South Australians would
flout, and expressed the view that if consuls sent all
communications to the Federal Government it would be unable
3to get answers and would be humiliated.
To throw further light on the question, the Colonial 
Office asked the Foreign Office what course it would 
follow with regard to the United States if the British 
Government had grounds for complaint against one of the
4States of the Union. The reply cut across the claims of
1
A.G.G. to Minister for External Affairs, 2 October 1902, 
ibid., pp.1157-8 .
2
A.G.G. to S. of S., 22 September 1902, copy, C.A.O.,
C.P.78/10, p . 3 •
3 Minute, Anderson to Chamberlain, 23 September 1902, 
A.N.L., A.J.C.P.2131, C.0.418/19, no.39484; S. of S. to 
A.G.G., 25 September 1902, ibid.
4
Under Secretary, Colonial Office to Under Secretary, 
Foreign Office, 3 October 1902, A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2131,
C.0.418/19, no.40302.
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both Commonwealth and State. Official representations 
about complaints could only be made to the Federal 
Government through the Embassy at Washington. When a case 
required local enquiry or action, it was often found more 
convenient to instruct the local consul to communicate 
with the State Government without the intervention of the 
Federal Government. The Foreign Office believed that this 
procedure was 'viewed favourably' by the Federal 
Government and was preferred by the States.^
Clearly, the Commonwealth’s proposal that all 
representations by consuls should be made to it was 
untenable and it was so informed.^ The arguments in 
favour of the South Australian position were made the 
stronger when it was realized that in the United States 
the Federal Government was the sovereign Government of an 
independent nation. This was not true of the Commonwealth 
Government in 1902.
The South Australian Government believed that the 
Commonwealth was the proper channel of communication for 
all matters concerning departments actually transferred 
and for all those matters upon which it had power to make 
laws and had actually done so. In all other respects, the 
situation had not been changed by federation. If imperial 
interests were to be protected, the channel of 
communication had to be one which held some power of 
action relative to the subject of the communication. The
1
Under Secretary, Foreign Office to Under Secretary, 
Colonial Office, 21 October 1902, A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2155, 
C.0.418/23, no.43595.
2
S. of S. to A.G.G., 5 December 1902, draft, ibid.
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Commonwealth had no power of action in external affairs or 
the position of consuls. The vague power given in section 
5l(xxix) might mean that it could make laws to enforce 
imperial treaties and punish State officers who violated 
them, but it had not done so. The Commonwealth could not 
even call upon a State officer for an explanation of his 
action in such a case, let alone punish him. To make it 
the channel of communication was absurd and an indignity 
to the State which did have the power and was 
responsible.
This was a forceful statement of a case which was far 
from unreasonable. Its most serious weakness was the 
view that Commonwealth responsibility was limited to 
transferred departments and matters upon which it had 
power to make laws and had actually done so. This was to 
forget that some matters, of which 'external affairs' is 
one, are subjects for executive rather than legislative 
action.
At the Colonial Office, H.E. Dale agreed with the
attitude taken by the South Australian Government. The
concurrent right of dealing with 'external affairs' was
preserved to the State by the Constitution. That the
State had not lost all relations with external governments
was shown by its continued direct correspondence with the
Secretary of State and the continued appointment of
2Governors from England. The Secretary of State could 
_
Memo, from S.A. Ministers to Lt.Gov. S.A. (for S. of S.), 
23 September 1902, C ,P .P ., 1903 , vol.2, pp.1154-5*
2
This view has been supported more recently by G. Doeker, 
The Treaty-Making Power in the Commonwealth of Australia, 
The Hague, 1966, p.212.
•
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address either Commonwealth or State as the circumstances
required. In the case of the Vondel it should have been
the State, because the complaint was against State
officials and the Commonwealth had 'no authority
whatever*. The only ground on which the Imperial
Government could decide to communicate with the
Commonwealth alone on such matters was the hypothesis that
'to everyone outside Australia the [Commonwealth]
Government is the only representative of each and every
part of Australia'. That hypothesis Dale believed to be
1contrary to the spirit and letter of the Constitution.
Sir John Anderson asserted that at its proclamation
the Commonwealth had become responsible for such matters
as external affairs even though its power might not have
been exercised at once. He could see 'no reason for the
S of S indulging in a diet of "humble pie" in this
matter'. His draft reply to South Australia was approved
2by his superiors without material alteration.
The Anderson-Chamberlain despatch of 25 November 1902 
strongly asserted that, at federation, the Commonwealth 
had been given paramount power in all political matters 
arising between the States and other parts of the Empire 
or, through the Imperial Government, with foreign powers. 
In all matters of federal concern, the Commonwealth 
Government was immediately responsible to the Imperial
1
Minute, H.E. Dale to Sir J. Anderson, 7 November 1902, 
A.N.L., A.J.C.P.2153, C.0.418/21, no.44120.
2
See Minutes by (l) Sir J. Anderson, 15 November 1902, 
(2) H.B. Cox and Sir M. Ommanney, 17 November 1902, (3 )
J. Chamberlain, 18 November 1902, ibid.
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Government whether it made special federal provision for 
the discharge of its responsibility or left it to the 
State machinery for the time. This was a matter of 
internal arrangement which did not affect the question of 
responsibility. For the Imperial Government to communicate 
directly with the States on such matters would involve 
ignoring the 'obvious intention' of the Constitution to 
make the Commonwealth finally responsible for them.^
Anderson did not even understand his own despatch.
He told Barton that it did not go beyond Deakin's 
contention, in a letter to Jenkins, that in matters 
between His Majesty's Government as the Central Government 
of the Empire and the whole or any part of Australia,
2communications should be sent through the Commonwealth. 
Deakin had, in fact, only claimed that the Commonwealth 
had the power, if asked, to act in such a case.
Anderson's view went much further towards a unitary 
interpretation of the Constitution. His claim that Quick 
and Garran took practically the same view is not 
substantiated by reference to those authors.
Deakin, as Attorney-General, set out a detailed 
statement of the Commonwealth's views in November 1902.
He argued that, under section 61 of the Constitution, the 
Commonwealth had an executive power derived immediately 
from the throne and independent of and antecedent to 
legislation. This executive power extended to every
1
S. of S. to Lt.Gov. S.A. , 25 November 1902, C,P .P . , 
1903, vol.2, pp.II63-5.
2
Anderson to Barton, 21 November 1902, Barton Papers, 
A.N.L., MS.51/1/548.
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matter to which the legislative power extended and the 
executive power of the States was correspondingly reduced. 
It certainly extended to external affairs but was not 
needed in the Vondel case. The action of the Commonwealth 
in that case could only be questioned if its Executive 
lacked authority to enquire into facts affecting its own 
reputation, and involving international relations, under 
its trade and commerce power. The Commonwealth’s power 
over external affairs might not be exclusive, but it was 
certainly paramount. Deakin did not claim any power of 
punishment or control over State officers but only that 
the Commonwealth was a correct channel of communication in 
such a matter.^
This was a more moderate and intelligent claim and a
better argument than the Colonial Office had offered and
showed a far deeper appreciation of the Australian
political situation. Indeed, it may also be contrasted
with the attitude Deakin took as Prime Minister in 1906
on the general question of channels of communication. In
1901 he had the advantage of the advice of R.R. (later Sir
Robert) Garran, Secretary of the Attorney-General’s
Department, and it is clear from Garran’s joint work with
Dr Quick that his views on such a subject were not likely 
2to be extreme.
J.H. Gordon, the 'brains’ of the Jenkins Government, 
was not a man to be put down easily, and in February 1903»
1
Attorney-General to P.M., 12 November 1902, with P.M. to 
A.G.G. (for S. of S.), 21 November 1902, C.P.P., 1903,
vol.2, pp.II6O-3 .
2
See Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, pp.631-2.
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as Acting Premier, he launched a further assault on the 
Colonial Office. He was anxious to maintain the lines of 
demarcation between the Commonwealth and State spheres of 
action quite unblurred because he believed that there was 
already a move to destroy the federal compact. In effect, 
his argument now amounted to a statement that the Vondel 
case was only an 'external affair’ as far as the Empire 
was concerned; from the State’s point of view it was an 
5 imperial affair’ and the State’s responsibility must be 
to the Imperial Government alone. The Commonwealth
1Government was simply not involved in the matter at all.
Chamberlain still held to the view that the 
Constitution had created in Australia, so far as other 
communities were concerned, a single political community 
for which the Commonwealth alone could speak. The Federal 
Government was responsible for everything occurring within 
its territory which affected any external State or 
community and no such community could take notice of the 
distribution of powers between the Federal and State 
Governments as this was purely a matter of internal 
concern. If the Crown were concerned in a matter solely 
in its capacity as part of the Constitution of a State, 
communications should go directly from the State to the 
Imperial Government. If it were concerned as ’the central 
authority of the aggregate of communities composing the 
Empire’, they should pass through the Federal Government. 
In the Vondel case, the Crown was involved in the latter 
capacity.^
1
A. Prem. S.A. to Lt.Gov. S.A. (for S. of S.), 13
February 1903, C.P.P., 1903, vol.2, pp.1165-7.
2
S. of S. to Lt. Gov. S.A., 15 April I903, ibid.,
pp.II67-8.
50
Clearly this view was not developed from a close 
consideration of the Australian Constitution, which lent 
no support to the hierarchical relationship of Governments 
envisaged by Chamberlain. It may be that he (and his 
permanent officials) did not sufficiently appreciate the 
differences between the Australian and Canadian 
Constitutions. A federal constitution must always present 
difficulties for men accustomed to a unitary system of 
government. Not that these suggestions adequately explain 
Chamberlain's attitude; the feeling persists that 
Chamberlain, or the Colonial Office, had a private 
conception of Empire into which the Australian 
Constitution had to be fitted. But the research involved 
in this thesis is not of a kind to allow such a suspicion 
to be proved.
Sir Samuel Way, Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Justice 
of South Australia, a man whose legal ability was highly 
respected, was prepared to concede that many of the 
arguments used in the Anderson-Chamberlain despatches of 
25 November 1902 and 15 April I903 would have been sound 
if Australia were an independent and sovereign nation. 
However, under international law, it was simply a part of 
the Empire without separate international existence. The 
Commonwealth had not been given any supervisory power over 
the States (as in Canada) and no change had been made in 
municipal law under which the South Australian Government 
and its officers were charged with carrying out the 
Merchant Shipping Act which created the Australian 
obligation in the Vondel case. It followed naturally 
enough from these arguments that he should believe that 
the true test by which the Colonial Office should
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determine whether to communicate through the Governor or
Governor-General was whether the subject of the
communication was of Commonwealth or State concern. In
1the Vondel case, it was clearly a State matter.
Way had not answered the main argument and claim
raised in Deakin's memorandum of 12 November 1902, but he
had dealt very satisfactorily with the emanations from
Downing Street. But, in mid-1903, the Secretary of State
had no greater liking for a diet of 'humble pie' than he
had shown in November 1902. Caesar had spoken and none
2could gainsay his word.
In the circumstances, it was probably no great
consolation to South Australia that the Colonial Office
accepted its explanation of the action taken in the Vondel
3affair as quite adequate.
The view of the Commonwealth's power and 
responsibility enunciated in Chamberlain's despatches of 
25 November 1902 and 15 April 1903 was wide, and its 
constitutional justification dubious. That Deakin was not 
prepared to make a comparable claim is evidence that he 
felt that such a view was not likely to be acceptable to4the majority of politically conscious Australians.
1
Lt.Gov. S.A. to S. of S . , 18 June 1903, copy, S.A.A.,
G.R.G.24/6, 02/651.
2
S. of S. to Gov. S.A., 1 August 1903, copy with N.S.W. 
no.10 of 1907 in N.S.W.A., G.O., Despatches 1907» vol.l.
3
Minute, H.E. Dale, 7 November 1902, A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2153, 
C.0.418/21, no.45300.
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Professor Sawer also supports this view. Sawer, 
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Furthermore, as A.B. Keith, a man with legal training and
experience in the Colonial Office, later pointed out,
1Chamberlain's reasoning left much to be desired. Keith 
was inclined to support the reasoning in Sir Samuel Way's 
despatch of 18 June 1903, both with respect to the method 
of determining the correct channel of communication and 
the Commonwealth's responsibility in 'external affairs'.
He pointed out, fairly, that no foreign power would have
looked to the Commonwealth for redress at least until the
2 3 4 5Treaty of Versailles. Moore, Sawer and Doeker have
also lent some support to the view that, in the context of
the times, Chamberlain's view was unsound. Doeker, while
accepting the view that the States still retained some
competence in 'external affairs', gives specific support
to the moderate position adopted by Deakin in the
correspondence.^
Both South Australia and the Colonial Office made 
extreme claims. Of the two, the South Australian position 
was the more in harmony with the Constitution, although it 
involved certain political difficulties which were lacking 
from Chamberlain's and which might have caused trouble
1
Keith, Responsible Government, vol.2, p.6l4.
2
Ibid.
3
W.H. Moore, Commonwealth of Australia, second edition, 
Melbourne, 1910~ pp . 347-8 .
4
Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929>
p p .31-2 .
5
Doeker, Treaty-Making Power, pp.88, 212.
6
Ibid., p .88.
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later. It was the height of unwisdom for the Colonial
Office to assert its view in November 1902, when there was
a strong reaction against federal power and people were
beginning to think of it, in terms used later by Way, as
’like a foreign occupation8. Deakin1s view did no
violence to the Constitution and made no inroads into
South Australia’s undoubted right to control the conduct
of its own officers. Above all, it had the greatest
potential for development with the growth of national
sentiment. It is interesting to notice that in a later
parallel case of a complaint against a State by a foreign
power, involving Western Australia, the Colonial Office
was content, while still asserting the principle laid down
in the key Vondel despatches, to obtain the reports it
required directly through the State Governor. The
2Commonwealth did not object to this procedure.
The position of consuls in Australia was discussed to 
a limited extent in the Vo ridel case. As a result of the 
case, the question of the channel of communication to be
1
Way to Tennyson, 9 January 1906, Tennyson Papers, A.N.L., 
MS.479/5/181.
2
The case concerned the claim of an American company 
against the Government of Western Australia for payment 
for flooring for railway trucks, supplied in error. The 
correspondence took place between June 1905 and February 
1906. The main references are: A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2170,
C.0.418/37, n o.27330; A .J .C .P .2174, C.0.4l8/4l, no.19729;
A.J.C.P.2173, C.0.4l8/40, no.41059; A.J.C.P .2176,
C.0.418/44, no.11397; C.A.O., C.P.78/14, vol.3, pp.110-1.
54
used between the Imperial and State Governments for the 
notification of the appointment of consuls was also raised.
In May 1903» the Governor-General, Lord Tennyson, 
informed the Lieutenant-Governor of South Australia and the 
Governor of Victoria of the appointment of a new consul in 
each State. Victoria acquiesced in the appointment without 
demur, but Sir Samuel. Way indicated that the South 
Australian Government was not prepared to accept the 
Governor-General as the constitutional channel of 
communication between itself and the Imperial Government 
on such a question.^
After the establishment of the Commonwealth, the old
practice had continued for some time and communications
from the Colonial Office enquiring about the person whom
it was proposed to appoint or notifying the issue of an
exequatur had been sent to the State Governors rather
than the Governor-General. In October 1902, probably as a
result of the Vondel case, Sir John Anderson gave verbal
instructions that in future such communications were to go
to the Governor-General. In the case under review, the
Colonial Office had mistakenly made its initial enquiry of
the Lieutenant-Governor, who had indicated that the State
had no objection to the appointment in question. When the
appointment was made it was notified through the Governor-
2General, with the result already indicated.
1
G.G. to S. of S., 19 July 1903 , copy, C.A.O., C.P.78/8 , 
vol.3, pp.217-8 .
2
Colonial Office memo, (writer's initials illegible), 6 
August 1903, A.N.L., A.J.C.P.2160, C.0.418/27, no.28822.
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It was evident that the South Australian Government 
was likely to know more about an Adelaide resident 
proposed as consul than the Commonwealth would. A further 
difficulty for the Colonial Office arose from the fact 
that the Foreign Office did not permit its consular 
officers to correspond directly with the Government of the 
country in which they resided but only with the local 
authorities, to whom their appointment was also announced. 
There was much in favour of sending such communications to 
the State Governments so that the position of foreign
1consuls in the Colonies would not be unduly magnified.
The Colonial Office was clearly caught on the horns
of a dilemma of Sir John Anderson's making, and it was
perhaps fortunate that Deakin offered a compromise
solution. He pointed out that there was no legal
necessity for consuls to be recognized by Governor or
Governor-General, but that it was convenient for them to
have some standing with a Government with which they might
have to communicate. In Australia, because of the dual
system of government, it would be as well if both State
and Federal Governments were asked to approve appointees
and received notification of their appointment. In any
matter concerning the treatment of foreigners under State
or Commonwealth law, correspondence from the Colonial
Office should be to the Governor-General alone, on the
understanding that he would obtain the views of the State
2Governments affected.
1
Ibid.
2
P.M. to G.G., 21 June 1904 (with G.G. to S. of S., 23 
June 1904), A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2164, C.0.418/31, no.27l65.
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The Imperial Authorities accepted this suggestion.
In 1913> the Secretary of State was able to say that the 
practice had been followed without exception since 1904. 
The only problem that had arisen was that while the 
Commonwealth, before indicating its approval or 
disapproval of an intended appointee, invariably consulted 
the State concerned, the States did not always do this 
a nd, as a result, some confusion had occurred in the 
Colonial Office. An instruction had to be issued that 
mutual consultation should always take place before a 
reply was sent."'
The business of appointing consuls was not of any 
great importance in itself, but, in the circumstances, the 
dispute could easily have developed into one of major 
importance. Deakin1s compromise solution was one which 
suited the realities of the Australian political situation 
and which gave offence to no one's dignity. Acceptance of- 
that solution by the Colonial Office was wise, though it 
does seem to mark a slight retreat from the principles laid 
down with so much force in the Vondel case.
As each phase in the debate over channels of 
communication in external affairs ended, a new one began. 
From 1905 to I907» attention was drawn to the channel to 
be used for correspondence with the Imperial Government
1
S. of S. to G.G., 12 August 1904 , draft, ibid.
2
S. of S. to O.A.G. Tasmania, 11 April 1913» T.S.A.,
G .0.4/3.
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about the complaints of individual Australians against 
foreign governments.
On 4 March 1905, G.J. Benjamin, a Queenslander, left 
Brisbane for the United States. At San Francisco, after 
what he described as a series of 5 cursory8 examinations, 
Benjamin was refused permission to land on the ground that 
he was suffering from trachoma, a serious and infectious 
disease of the eye. The immigration authorities were 
unmoved by the independent evidence of two specialists who 
attested that he did not have the disease. He was refused 
permission to fight his case in the courts. Benjamin was 
kept under strict watch while the ship was in port and, on 
the last day, was locked up. When he arrived back in 
Brisbane, he appealed to the Premier of Queensland, Arthur 
(later Sir Arthur) Morgan, to make representations to the 
United States Government for redress. What with his 
passage, the loss of time, 8 the indignity of being placed 
under restraint8 , and the effect of the knowledge of his 
supposed illness on his prospects, he considered himself 
entitled to £200 compensation.^
Morgan ascertained the truth of the facts, as far as
he could, and urged the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Hugh
Nelson, to bring the case to the attention of the
2Secretary of State. At that stage, Benjamin, like the 
ship, Vondel, ceased to be of any importance.
_  _
Official deposition of G.J. Benjamin, 24 May 190.5, Q.S.A., 
Pre/A246, O7/OI652. Copies of medical evidence are 
included in the file.
2
Memo., Prem. Qld. to Under Secretary, 26 May 1905? ibid. 
The Queensland Premiers of this period often signed their 
correspondence as “Chief Secretary8, although they also 
held the title 'Premier8. Inward correspondence was 
normally addressed to the “Premier8. The more familiar 
title, “Premier8, is used through this thesis.
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Nelson forwarded the papers to the Colonial Office 
and, apparently assuming on his own initiative that the 
matter was not of federal interest, marked on the despatch 
that no copy had been sent to the Federal Government. At 
the Office, it was decided to order the Lieutenant- 
Governor to send a copy of the despatch and papers to
Northcote and to seek the concurrence of the Commonwealth
2in the Queensland request. This concurrence was readily 
given (during the course of the correspondence the 
Commonwealth showed itself eager to urge maximum effort on
OBenjamin's behalf) and the Imperial Authorities took
4action. Morgan must have been surprised to be informed
by Deakin, in December 1905 ? more than six months after
his first representation, of the communications between
5the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth.
More polite than the South Australians, Morgan 
thanked Deakin for the efforts he had made on Benjamin'sß
behalf. At the same time he asked the Governor to 
transmit a strongly worded memorandum to the Secretary of
1
Lt.Gov. Qld. to S. of S., 7 June 1905, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2171, c.0.418/39, no.24923.
2
S. of S. to Lt.Gov. Qld., 20 July 1905 . draft, ibid.;
S. of S. to G.G., ibid., reel 2172.
3
G.G. to S. of S., 14 December 1905? copy? C.A.O.,c.p.78/8 , voi.4, pp.691-3 .
4
G.G. to S. of S., 8 August 1905? cable, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2170, C.0.418/37, no.28215.
5
P.M. to Prem. Qld., 16 December 1905? Q.S.A., Pre/A246, 
07/01652.
6
Prem. Qld. to P.M., 8 January I906, copy, ibid.
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State, Lord Elgin, deploring the action taken. Morgan 
held that this action (taken by Lyttleton, Elgin's 
predecessor in office) was a slur on the Government of 
Queensland. Federation had not taken away the right of 
direct communication in such cases and to suggest that it 
had, or that the right was exercisable only with the 
concurrence of the Commonwealth Government, was contrary 
to the spirit of the Constitution and incompatible with 
the direct appointment by the Crown of the State Governor 
to be the channel of communication between the State and 
Imperial Governments on all matters not specifically 
vested in the Commonwealth Government.
Deakin saw a copy of Morgan's memorandum and
expressed the view that it had probably been written
without knowledge of the Vondel correspondence. The
circumstances of Benjamin's case were the reverse of those
in the Vondel but he believed that the same principles
applied; the Commonwealth alone could speak for Australia
2in any transaction with foreign countries. Elgin was
happy to have the matter settled for him and replied to
the Queensland Government by sending it a copy of
Chamberlain's despatch to South Australia on 1.5 April 1903*
3He stated that he accepted its reasoning.
1
Prem. Qld. to Gov. Qld. (for S. of S,), 10 January 1906, 
copy, ibid.
2
PoM. to G.G,, 7 February 1 9 0 6 (with G.G. to S, of S., 7
February 1 9 0 6 ), A.N.L., A .J .C „P .2176, C.0.418/44, no.8 6 6 0 .
3
S. of S, to Gov. Qld,, 19 March 1 9 0 6 , Q 0S.A., Pre/A246, 
07/01652.
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It will be noticed that Deakin had shifted his ground 
in the three years that had passed since he had stated his 
position in the Vondel controversy. In 1902-3 he was only 
prepared to assert that the Commonwealth was a proper 
medium for such communications. By 1906 he was claiming 
that it was the only permissible channel. In making this 
change, he was only accepting the superior status offered 
to the Commonwealth by Chamberlain“s dicta in his key 
Vondel despatches of 25 November 1902 and 15 April 1903.
At the beginning of I9 O6 , Morgan resigned the 
Premiership of Queensland and it passed to his coalition 
partner and Treasurer, William Kidston, one of the 
strongest and ablest of Queensland's political leaders in 
the first decade. Kidston entirely rejected the idea that 
the Vondel affair had any relevance to Benjamin's case.
He pointed out that any British subject who believed that 
he had been ill-treated by a foreign power had the right 
to ask the Imperial Government to prosecute his claim for 
redress without the concurrence of the Government of his 
own country. He had to look for protection to the power 
which could enforce his claim if it were just. In the 
case of a Queenslander, that power was the Imperial 
Government. The only reason for consulting his home 
Government was to establish the character of the claimant. 
The Queensland Government had done that. Had Benjamin 
chosen to appeal directly to the Imperial Government, and 
had it sought information from the Commonwealth,
Queensland would willingly have provided the latter with 
any help desired. While Australia remained part of the 
British Empire, a. citizen must have the right of appeal to
61
V
\
the Imperial Government through whatever channel of
1communication was most convenient to him.
Kidston had chosen his ground carefully. His claim 
avoided the extreme position taken up by South Australia 
in the Vondel affair and rejected Chamber!ainss settlement 
of that case as inapplicable as well as wrong. His 
attitude had much in common with that first adopted by 
Deakin in the Vondel correspondence. He was prepared to 
allow that the Commonwealth was a legitimate channel of 
communication with the paramount and responsible power, 
Britain, but also claimed that the State Government was an 
equally legitimate channel.
Both Deakin and his Attorney-General, I.A. (later Sir 
Isaac) Isaacs, were inclined to stress that federation had 
created a dual citizenship and that in matters of external 
relations the Commonwealth citizenship alone applied. It 
may have been true, as Isaacs claimed, that it was for the 
Imperial Government to determine the channel to be used 
for such communications.' This was not an argument, on 
the basis of pre-federal history, which should have led
fthe Commonwealth to expect that it would be made the sole 
channel. The Attorney-General of New South Wales, C.G. 
(later Sir Charles) Wade, established clearly, in 
connection with other similar cases, that hitherto an 
aggrieved British subject had enjoyed the right of 
communicating with the Secretary of State through whatever
T~ _ _ _ _ _
Prem, Qld. to Gov.Qld. (for S. of S.), 31 May I906, ibid.
2
See enclosures to G.G. to S. of S„ , 23 October 1906,
A .N .L ., A.J.C.P.2177, C,0.418/45, no.43463.
6 2
channel was most, convenient to him. Both men begged the 
central question raised by Kidston, that in such matters 
men were to be regarded neither as Queenslanders nor as 
Australians, but as British subjects.
Elgin again took refuge in Chamberlain's familiar 
despatch of 15 April 1903 and asserted that the criterion 
by which the channel of communication was to be determined 
was whether the Crown was concerned in its capacity as 
part, of the State Constitution or as 1 2345the central
2Authority of the aggregate communities of the Empire“.
3It was in vain that Kidston renewed his protest. Elgin’s 
reasoning was not irresistible, but his authority was.
The United States Government proved equally obdurate and, 
as the Imperial Authorities were apparently not willing to 
undertake a Benjamin's Eye“ war, Mr Benjamin did not get4his compensation.
In principle, the case of A.R. Weigall was identical 
with that of G.J. Benjamin, but there were some
1
See the opinion of C.G. Wade, 3 January I907, with Gov. 
N.S.W. to S. of S., 15 January 1907, A.N.L., A.J.C.P.2184, 
C.0.418/53, no. 6l64.
2 S. of S, to Gov. Qld., 14 December 1906, Q.S.A. Pre/A246,
O7/OI652.
3 Prem. Qld. to Gov. Qld., 12 February 1907 (with Gov. Qld.
to S. of S. , 21 February 1907), A.N.L., A .J.C.P . 2185,
C.0.418/54, no.Il608.
4
U.S. Department of State to British Ambassador at 
Washington, 7 October I.905 . copy, Q.S.A. , Pre/A.246,
O7/OI652.
6 3
differences in its conduct which must be discussed 
separately.
Wei gall, the son of the Headmaster of Sydney Grammar 
School, with his wife and party, was travelling through 
Korea on a surveying mission in December 1905 when they 
were seriously molested by some Japanese soldiers.
Wei gall complained to the British Ambassador at Tokyo who 
made representations to the Japanese Authorities, The 
soldiers were punished in a very mild fashion. In spite 
of Weigall's requests, the Ambassador refused to take 
further action in the matter.
Weigall was not satisfied with the efforts made on
his behalf and, in April 1906, approached J.B. Suttor,
Commercial Agent for New South Wales at Kobe (Japan) with
the details of his case and the request that they should
be brought to the notice of 'the Australian Government'
2for such action as it might see fit to take. Suttor, as
the agent of the New South Wales Government, did the only
thing he could and transmitted the papers to the State
3Government. The Premier, J.H. Carruthers, asked the
4State Governor to forward them to the Colonial Office.
1
A full account of the incident and Weigall's first 
attempt to obtain redress can be found in A.N.L.,
A,J.C.P.2177 > C.O.418/46, no,28955.
2
A.R. Weigall to J.B. Suttor, 19 April 1906, ibid. He 
addressed Suttor as 'Commercial Agent to the New South 
Wales Government'.
3
J.B. Suttor to Prem. N.S.W., 23 May I906, R,E., N.S,W,Aa, 
Treasurv, V59^1? 06/B6153.
4
Prem. N.S.W. to Gov. N.S.W. , 25 June I9O6 (for S. of S. ), 
N.S.W.A,, G,0,, Despatches 1907. vol.3*
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No copy of the papers was sent to the Commonwealth, but, 
as in the Benjamin case, the Colonial Office insisted that
this should be done and sought the concurrence of the
1Federal Government before it took action.
When Deakin saw the papers he began an acrimonious 
exchange of letters with Carruthers which lasted 
throughout October and November 1906. The burden of 
Deakin's argument was that Carruthers had deliberately 
'intercepted' an appeal for help specifically directed to 
the 'Australian Government', that is, the Commonwealth 
Government. He demanded an explanation of this conduct 
and, when challenged, hotly asserted his right, and even 
his duty, to demand it. Naturally, he insisted that 
Weigall's case was comparable with the Vondel affair and 
that the question of the channel of communication had been 
settled by Chamberlain in connection with that incident.2
Carruthers was belligerent in reply, asserting that 
Deakin simply did not understand (indeed, that he was 
incapable of understanding) the position taken by the 
States over the channels of communication question. At 
first he followed Kidston's argument that it was for the 
aggrieved subject to choose the channel by which he would 
communicate, but later he asserted that the communications 
must be through the constitutional channel, the State, no
1
See Colonial Office minutes and drafts, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2177, C.0.418/46, no.28955.
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 9 October 1906, copy, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A 3 3 j vol.l6, p p .195-195a; P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 23 
October 1906, ibid., pp.304-5; P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 31 
October 1906, ibid., pp.4o8-9*
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matter what the subject wanted. Perhaps, in a rare 
moment of humility, it had occurred to Carruthers that 
when Weigall wrote of 'the Australian Government' he might 
not necessarily have meant the Government of New South 
Wales.' Not surprisingly, he utterly repudiated Deakin's 
right to ask him for an explanation of his conduct.^
There are a number of interesting features to this
case. The Colonial Office entered the debate only at the
last stage, and then only to send New South Wales a copy
of a despatch to Queensland with reference to the Benjamin 
2affair.' For the rest, the argument was conducted 
entirely within Australia. Deakin was increasingly 
willing to take up the cudgels on behalf of the 
Commonwealth, partly, no doubt, because he knew that he 
could rely with absolute confidence on the support of the 
Secretary of State. But he was also becoming more 
assertive in his own right, as his demand for an 
explanation of Carruthers' conduct suggests. The 
constitutional basis for such a demand is, at best, 
dubious. Frustration over the persistence of the question, 
the unwillingness of the Colonial Office to meet his views 
in the question of the channel for general communications 
and the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations over the 
capital site must all have combined to produce the 
outburst. Carruthers was perhaps the only Premier who 
could make Deakin really angry.
_
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., l6 October 1906, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2177, C.0.418/45, no.47452; Prem. N.S.W. to P.M.,
25 October 1906, ibid.; Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 7 November 
1906, ibid.
2
Minute, G.N. Johnson to H.B. Cox, 2 January 1907» ibid.
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It is not possible to be sure why Carruthers had 
Weigall's appeal to 'the Australian Government' sent to 
the Colonial Office by the State Governor. It could have 
been a deliberate act of interception, as Deakin thought. 
More likely, Carruthers genuinely believed that, in a case 
of this kind, the State Government was the relevant 
Australian Government. After all, Queensland had not 
thought it necessary to send a copy of the Benjamin 
correspondence to the Governor-General. There is no need 
to impute a bad motive to Carruthers in this instance.
A striking feature of the incident is that no one 
denied the right of Weigall to make his initial request 
for redress directly to the British Ambassador at Tokyo. 
This was close to being a de facto admission that the 
subject could seek the assistance of the Imperial 
Government through whatever channel was most convenient to 
him, an admission destructive of the claim that the State 
Government was not a proper channel of communication in 
such a case.^
At the end of October 1906, Carruthers drew the 
threads of the channels of communication in external 
affairs dispute together. He was anxious that the other 
Premiers should join him in standing firm against this 
encroachment by the Federal Government on what he regarded 
as the sphere of the States. If the States accepted the
1
Weigall gained no further satisfaction, despite the 
furore. Under-Secretary, Foreign Office to Under­
secretary C.O., 31 May 1907 > copy with S. of S. to G.G., 
6 June 1907, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 1 , 07/6659.
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position taken by the Commonwealth, they would be
perilously close to admitting its right to supersede them
in matters quite outside federal politics.^ Kidston
shared Carruthers1 23 fears and his desire to maintain the
status of the States, but differed from him in placing the
blame for the encroachments already made on the Colonial
Office rather than the Commonwealth. The Federal
Government had, unwisely, accepted opportunities for
aggrandisement created in England. He believed that it
might be necessary for the States to refuse to recognize
communications from the Colonial Office unless they were
2sent through the State Governor.
Earlier in the year the Governor of Queensland, Lord
Chelmsford, had drawn attention to the serious situation
which existed. The Labor Party was, in his opinion, 'the
backbone of the Federal spirit', yet Kidston, a Labor
Premier, had told him that he could easily 'raise the
3whole of Queensland in a flame against Federation'. 
Chelmsford now pointed to the serious consequences for 
relations between the Imperial Government and States 
should Kidston's new threat be carried out and suggested a
1
Minute by Carruthers, 30 October 1906, with Prem. 
N.S.W. to Prem. Qld., 31 October 1 9 0 6 , with Gov. Qld. to 
S. of S . , 8 December 1 9 0 6 , A.N.L., A . J .C .P .2178,
C.0.418/47, no.1590. This was apparently sent to all 
Premiers.
2
Prem. Qld. to Prem. N.S.W., 28 November 1 9 0 6 , ibid.
3
Gov. Qld. to S. of S . , 3 July 1 9 0 6 , copy, C.A.O.,
C.P.7 8 / 2 1 , B.3 8 .
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meeting between the Premiers and a high imperial official 
to clear the air.^
In January 1907 , New South Wales launched another
2assault on the Colonial Office. But it was too late to
go back. Deakin wanted to carry the battle a step further
into the enemy camp. He would have had Elgin inform the
States that no communication dealing with external affairs
would be considered unless it was sent through the3Commonwealth. At the Colonial Office, this was 
recognized as needlessly provocative and no one was 
prepared to issue the order. A.B. Keith made the sensible 
suggestion that New South Wales should be told that action 
would not be taken in such cases until the Commonwealth 
had been heard. By this means, the States would be left 
with the option of adopting the procedure applying to other 
communications of federal interest and so preserve their 
right of direct communication, while the Commonwealth 
preserved the right to be consulted. Elgin, who did not 
share Keith's interpretation of the Constitution, decided
4to maintain the position already taken.
1
Gov. Qld. to S. of S., 8 December 1906, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2178, C.0.418/47, no.1590.
2
Gov. N.S.W. to S. of S., 4 January 1906 [so dated, but, 
clearly, 1907 is meant], cable, A.N.L., A .J.C.P.2184, C.O. 
418/53, no.359; Gov. N.S.W. to S. of S., 15 January 1907 
(with enclosures) ibid., no.6l64; Prem. N.S.W. to Gov. 
N.S.W., 18 March 1907 (with Gov. N.S.W. to S. of S., 20 
March 1907), ibid., no.15101.
3 P.M. to G.G., 6 February 1907 (with G.G. to S. of S., 7 
February I907), A.N.L., A .J.C .P .2183, C.O.418/52, no.97^0.
4
See various minutes and S. of S. to Gov. N.S.W., 12 
April 1907, draft, ibid.
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Carruthers regretted that the States were to be cut
off from direct access to the Imperial G o v e r n m e n t  and
forced to deal with the janitor. He thought it impolitic
for the Imperial A u t h o r i t i e s  'to stifle the B r i t i s h
sentiment in its people who are citizens of the States of
Australia. . . . ' But there was n o t h i n g  he, or the other 
2Premiers, could do about it.
In d e a ling with a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  w h ich arose while 
he was Gov e r n o r  of N e w  South Wales, Sir G e r a l d  Strickland 
po i n t e d  out in 1914 that C h a m b e r l a i n ' s  r u l i n g  in the 
Vondel case h a d  b e e n  g r e a t l y  m o d i f i e d  by  subsequent events 
and with the a c q u i escence of the Colonial Office. The 
appointment of f o r eign consuls and the g a z e t t i n g  of their 
c o m i n g  and g o ing was cl e a r l y  'i r r e c oncilable wit h  the rule 
pr o p o s e d  by  M r  C h a m b e r l a i n ' . He also p o i n t e d  out that the 
H i g h  Court had made it clear that the F u g i t i v e  Offenders 
Act was a State matter, while the Federal A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  
h ad rec o g n i z e d  in a Press r e lease that it was w i t h i n  the 
ambit of State functions to e s t a b l i s h  Prize Courts. 
S t r i c k l a n d  claimed that the e x i s t i n g  practice in 
co r r e s p o n d e n c e  was an 'understanding' rather than a rule 
and quoted A.B. K e i t h  as saying (in the first edition of 
his book) that all that h ad b e e n  settled was that the 
C o m m o n w e a l t h  must not be ignored. The only effective rule 
was that the S e c r e t a r y  of State would not r e p l y  to some
1
Prem. N.S.W. to Gov. N . S . W . , 18 M a r c h  1907 (with Gov. 
N.S.W. to S. of S . , 20 M a r c h  1907), A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2184, 
C . 0.418/53, n o . 15101.
2
Memo, by all Prems, to S. of S . , copy, n . d . , S . A . A . , 
G .R.G.24/6, 07/340.
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communications until he had obtained the Governor- 
General's opinion. This was an effective limitation on 
the discretion of a Governor and ensured that he would 
send copies of everything likely to be useful to the 
Governor-General 'without recognising such habitual 
subjection to the Federal Authority as would not be 
reconcilable with the "sovereignty" of the State...or with
1a Governor's obligations under the State Constitution....'
There was much truth in what Strickland wrote.
Chamberlain's ruling in the Vondel despatches of 25
November 1902 and 15 April 1903 was not officially
altered. Indeed, it was specifically maintained. But, in
practice, exceptions were made, as in the matter of
foreign consuls and in a much later minor incident
2concerning Victoria. In cases like those of Benjamin and 
Weigall it was impossible, given Elgin's refusal to make 
the rule sought by Deakin in 1907, to prevent the States 
communicating directly, although the Colonial Office could 
refuse to act until it had consulted the Governor-General.
In 1968, it seems surprising that the channel of 
communication in matters of external affairs could ever 
have been in question. But the arguments of the 
participants, notably Gordon, Way and Kidston, supported 
by Keith, showed that in the first decade of federal
1
Gov. N.S.W. to S. of S. , 3 September 1914, copy with 
Gov. N.S.W. to G.G., 3 September 1914, C.A.O., C.P.78/21, 
B.5 0 , 'Governor-General's Correspondence, 1.
Correspondence with State Governors', printed paper, n.f.n. 
2
See report of Premiers' Conference, May 1918, S .A .P .P ., 
1918, vol.3 > n o .46, pp.18-21.
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history it was reasonable to consider the matter as, at 
least, arguable. A recent writer has stated that 'As a 
matter of bare legal power, the conclusion is inescapable
that the States continued [that is, after federation] to
1have some concurrent competence in external affairs'.
What was unreasonable was the extent of the claims 
sometimes made and the ferocity with which they were 
argued. These things are understandable only against the 
whole background of Commonwealth-State relations in the 
decade, 1901-10.2
Early in 1907, it became necessary to decide which 
Government, Commonwealth or State, should grant or refuse
1
Doeker, Treaty-Making Power, p.212.
2
One matter of external relations was settled without any 
friction at all: the question of the channel for
communications dealing with commercial treaties. It was 
agreed (in 190l) that, when a treaty dealt with a subject 
on which the States retained the legislative power, the 
Commonwealth would be named in the treaty and would handle 
all communications but the States would be consulted 
before action was taken. In 1907, it was decided that the 
States might adhere separately (through the Commonwealth) 
to treaties, the subject matter of which was under State 
jurisdiction, provided that the Commonwealth did not 
object. In 1909» the States permitted the Commonwealth to 
ask the Imperial Government to negotiate withdrawal from 
treaties to which they had adhered independently before 
federation. The position of the Commonwealth was 
strengthened in this matter by its specific power, section 
3l(i), over 'trade and commerce with other countries'. 
Aspects of the question are discussed in D.F. Nicholson, 
Australia's Trade Relations, Melbourne, 1955; Doeker, 
Treaty-Making Power; J.A. La Nauze, 'Australian Tariffs 
and Imperial Control', Economic Record, vol.24, 1948.
Much relevant information will be found in A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 
2183, C.0.418/32, nos.20331 and 38OO9 . See also T.S.A.
G.0.7/3 and C.A.O., C.P.78/8 , vol.l, p.244, v o l .7, pp.236- 
8, vol.8, p.137; C.R.S. A.33, vol.27, p p .468-70.
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permission to land to crew members of foreign warships 
calling at Australian ports. The key issue was whether 
the granting of permission to land was an exercise of the 
defence power, which obviously belonged to the
Commonwealth, or of the power to maintain civil order,
1which, equally clearly, belonged to the States, or both. 
The question of responsibility might have been decided 
without undue difficulty had not the need for either the 
Governor-General or a State Governor, representing the 
Crown in Australia, to receive communications from a 
foreign power been involved. As it was, the argument 
dragged on until I9H.
Before federation, permission to land had been sought
from the Governor of the Colony concerned and had normally
been granted to unarmed parties, in numbers specified by
the Governor, for recreation and drill, and for saluting
2parties at civil or military funerals. In December 1905,
the Commonwealth made a provisional statutory rule on the3subject under the Defence Act 1903. It confirmed this4in June 1906, notified its intention to repeal it in.
5 6 November 1906  ^ and repealed it in January 1907* Until
1
See section 119 of the Constitution.
2
See Colonial Defence Committee 1885-1901» memo, of 19 
July 1899, no.186M, C.A.O., C.P.601/2.
3
Statutory rule no.80 of 1905, Commonwealth Gazette, 1905» 
p.1000.
4
Statutory rule no.48 of 1906, ibid., 1906, p.834.
5
Ibid., p.1348.
6
Statutory rule no.3 of 1907» ibid., 1907» p.448.
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1907 the conditions laid down for the landing of foreign 
crews were unaltered except that application had to be 
made to the Governor-General. From their silence, it
appears that the States probably did not become aware of
1the action taken by the Commonwealth at this stage.
The new regulation of 1907 was based on a revised
memorandum from the Colonial Defence Committee, issued in
July 1906, which liberalized the conditions on which
foreign crews might land. Unarmed sailors were to be
allowed to land without seeking permission. If large
numbers were to be landed, the local civil authorities
should be notified and unarmed pickets landed to assist in
maintaining order. Permission still had to be sought
2before armed parties could be landed.
On 6 March 1907» Deakin sent each Premier a copy of
the relevant part of the new memorandum and sought his
co-operation in offering all possible facilities to
foreign crews and his consent to the landing of unarmed3pickets, when required, to assist local police. A day 
later, all consular representatives were informed of the 
changes and told that, in the case of armed parties,
1
This is quite possible. Only the intent to make a rule 
was gazetted. The subject of the rule would not be known 
unless a copy was sent by the Commonwealth or purchased 
from the Government Printing Office, Melbourne.
2
Memo, by Colonial Defence Committee, 19 July 1906, with 
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 6 March 1907» S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 
07/284.
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 6 March 1907» ibid.3
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applications should 'continue to be addressed to the
1Governor-General1 234.
Carruthers asked the Premiers to delay action on the
question until it could be discussed at a Premiers'
2Conference and requested Sir John Forrest, acting as
Prime Minister while Deakin was at the Colonial Conference
of 1907, to continue the 'former* practice until after the
Premiers' Conference. The consent of the States was
necessary before the proposed change could be made and it
was desii’able that the decisions of the States should be
3unanimous. For reply, he received only a formal
4acknowledgement.
Plainly, the Commonwealth did not mean the States to 
comment on the proposed changes in practice, nor to do 
other than acquiesce in them. The consular 
representatives were informed of the changes before most 
of the Premiers would have received their notification. 
Probably Deakin did not foresee any objection. It was 
more than a year since the Commonwealth had made its first 
provisional regulation on the subject. From his point of
1
Official Secretary to G.G. to all consular 
representatives, 7 March 1907, copy with S. of S. to Gov. 
Tas., 19 March 1909, T.S.A., G.0.4/2.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 19 March 
1907, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 07/284.
3
Prem. N.S.W. to A.P.M., 8 April 1907» copy with S. of S. 
to Gov. Tas., 19 March 1909, T.S.A., G.0.4/2.
4
Hon. J. Ashton (N.S.W.) at Premiers' Conference, 1907» 
S.A.P.P., 1907, vol.3, no.77, p.272.
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view, the Government was simply varying procedure in a 
matter over which it had exercised effective control for 
some time.^
That the States did not see it in the same light is 
obvious from the nature of Carruthers1 letter to Forrest.
He believed that the consent of the States was necessary 
before the 'former* practice could be changed. This view 
was only possible if the subject were one over which the 
States exercised, or were believed to exercise, some 
control. This re-inforces the view that it is probable 
that the States were not aware of the regulations made by 
the Commonwealth in 1905-6.
The issue was discussed at the Premiers' Conference
(27 May to 3 June 1907). There was some disagreement over
the central issue of responsibility for granting permission
to land. The Attorney-General for Western Australia, MrA/.
J\ Keenan, held that the matter was essentially one of 
external affairs and defence and within the province of 
the Federal Government. Most members would have agreed 
with Kidston that it was not a matter of protecting the 
States against invasion but of making the necessary 
safeguards against domestic violence and social disorder, 
a matter reserved to the States. Kidston was intensely 
concerned with a number of practical issues raised by the 
new regulations: the possibility of trouble in smaller
1
This view is supported by the tone of the letter to the 
consular representatives on 7 March 1907 (T.S.A., G.0.4/2) 
and a memo, by the Attorney-General, L.E. Groom, 27 
November 1907 (with S. of S. to Gov. Tas., 19 March 1909)» 
ibid.
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outports if local authorities were given no control over 
the number of unarmed men able to land at one time, and 
the fact that the civil authorities were only authorized 
to assent to the landing of unarmed pickets. Eventually, 
the Conference resolved that permission to land armed 
parties should be sought through the State Governor. 
Unarmed parties, up to 30 in number, might be landed 
without permission but should it be desired to land a 
larger party, or should the local police seek the 
assistance of unarmed pickets, consent must be sought in 
the same way as for armed parties.^
By deliberately adopting a resolution so much at 
variance with the procedure laid down by the Commonwealth, 
the States had clearly determined to steer a collision 
course. They had, however, directed attention to a real 
problem, the need for local authorities to feel confident 
that they could cope with any breach of the peace which 
might arise from the landing of foreign sailors. Because 
of this, it was at least arguable that the States had as 
much interest in the proper control of these landings as 
the Commonwealth had.
Much later, the Commonwealth Attorney-General, L.E. 
(afterwards Sir Littleton) Groom considered the resolution 
and set out the Commonwealth's case clearly. Deakin used 
his memorandum as the basis of his correspondence with the 
Premiers on the subject. Groom had no doubt that the 
Commonwealth had authority to deal with the question in 
dispute. This authority came from its naval and military
_
See the discussion at the 1907 Premiers' Conference, 
S.A.P.P., 1907, vol.3, no.73, pp.271-6.
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defence power, given in section 5l(vi) of the Constitution, 
under which Parliament had already passed legislation and 
the Government had exercised its executive power. It also 
came from its external affairs power, section 5l(xxix).
The Vondel case had settled that the Commonwealth's 
executive power was co-extensive with its legislative 
power. This matter fell within its legislative power so 
there could be no doubt of its executive power. Any 
regulation of a State Government inconsistent with one 
made by the Commonwealth Government must give way to the 
latter (under section 109). Groom acknowledged that once 
foreign sailors had landed their conduct on shore might 
involve questions of civil order. State Governments had 
both the right and the duty to maintain that. However, 
the conditions governing the landing of foreign crews and 
those imposed on them to maintain civil order after they 
had landed were quite separate. The fact that the State 
Governments were responsible for the second aspect did 
not give them any control over the first. He recognized 
that the co-operation of the States was necessary if the 
recommendations of the Colonial Defence Committee were to 
be carried out in their entirety, otherwise the 
Commonwealth would have to act through its own officers 
rather than the local civil authorities. In Groom's 
opinion, the procedure outlined in the Premiers' 
resolution was likely to cause 'difficulties' - he did not 
specify what they were - and should not be adopted. The 
procedures outlined in the letters to the consuls and 
Premiers were a sufficient publication of the
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determination of the Commonwealth, though they could
1easily be embodied in regulations if necessary.
The major weakness in Groom’s argument was his 
attempt to make a division between responsibility for 
regulating the landing of foreign sailors and soldiers and 
responsibility for regulating their conduct once they had 
landed. No doubt the distinction could be justified 
theoretically, but in practice the line would be difficult 
to draw. The attempt to make a rigid division along these 
lines may have led to trouble had it been tried. It would 
also be interesting to know what difficulties Groom 
anticipated if the Premiers’ scheme were tried. There 
would not seem to have been any which had not existed in 
the pre-federal system, which had apparently worked 
satisfactorily.
C.G. Wade, who had succeeded Carruthers as Premier of 
New South Wales, exploited this weakness, pointed to the 
Commonwealth’s complete lack of control over the sailors 
once they had landed and urged that, in promulgating its 
recommendations, the Colonial Defence Committee had 
rightly designated the Governor of the State as the 
proper person to give consent when it was required. The 
Commonwealth’s power to protect the country against attack 
could hardly be extended to include control of the 
conditions on which foreign troops might land on the
1
Memo, by L.E. Groom, 27 November 1907 (copy with S. of S. 
to Gov. Tas., 19 March I9O9), T.S.A., G.0.4/2; see also 
P.M. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 18 December 1907, 
S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 07/284.
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1shores of a State in time of peace. Kidston took up the 
2same point and the Tasmanian Premier, Captain Evans,
argued that the State Governments determined the size of
the police force and they should not be asked to accept
3more men on shore than they could cope with.
That Queensland, at least, had no wish to be 
arbitrary in its behaviour was shown in February 1908.
The German consul at Brisbane requested that the Governor- 
General should grant permission for an armed party to land 
to fire a funeral salute. When the Queensland 
Authorities were informed they accepted the situation
4without protest.
Groom, rightly, refused to accept the use of the word
'governor* in the memorandum from the Colonial Defence
Committee as significant because it was a general
5memorandum to all Colonies. But Deakin was unwilling to 
carry the argument any further on his own account and had 
the correspondence sent to the Secretary of State with the 
request that he should make a decision on the points at
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 24 December 1907 (copy with S. of 
S. to Gov. Tas., 19 March 1909), T.S.A., G.0.4/2.
2
Prem. Qld. to P.M., 9 April 1908, ibid.
3
Prem. Tas. to P.M., 11 January I9O8 (copy with Prem.
Tas. to Prem. S.A., 13 January 1908), S.A.A., G.R.G. 2.4/6, 
07/284.
4
The correspondence is in C.A.O., C.P.78/2 , 1907-8, 
folder 1, misc. 253*
3
Memo, by L.E. Groom, 19 June 1908 (with S. of S. to Gov. 
Tas.,; 19 March 1909), T.S.A., ‘G.0.4/2.
No doubt heissue between the Commonwealth and States, 
did this the more confidently because of the support he 
had received from that quarter in the Vondel, Benjamin and 
Weigall incidents. If it seems strange that he was 
diffident about carrying on the fight himself in this case 
when he had done it willingly enough in the Weigall affair 
the explanation may well be that he realized the possibly 
unfortunate consequences for British sailors, as well as 
embarrassment for the Imperial Government, if the matter 
were decided in Australia in a spirit of rancour.
Within the Colonial Office, the view had already been 
expressed that the Commonwealth's case was ’very weak*, 
because of its dependence on the division of
responsibility, and that it would only be able to override
State regulations ’by stretching the construction of the 
2Constitution'. The Secretary of State, Lord Crewe, was 
not prepared to discuss the 'complicated and difficult' 
constitutional questions involved. He recognized that the 
dual responsibility of the Federal and State Governments 
for defence and internal security was the heart of the 
problem. Because of this, he believed that the matter was 
one which should be settled by compromise. Crewe proposed 
that in the case of the landing of armed men, application 
should be made to both the Governor-General, representing 
the Commonwealth control of defence, and the State 
Governor, representing the State control of police
1
P.M. to G.G. (for S. of S.), 15 July 1908, copy, ibid.
2
Colonial Office minute (writer's initials illegible), 25 
February 1908, A.N.L., A .J.C.P.2193, C.0.418/64, no.6324.
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arrangements. When large numbers of unarmed men, or 
pickets to assist the police, were involved, it would be 
sufficient to apply to the local civil authorities. If 
this were not acceptable, the arrangements should be as 
for armed men. He hoped that if the States insisted that 
a limit on the number of unarmed men to be on shore at 
once was necessary, they would raise it from 30 to 100.^
It was a sensible compromise and the States accepted
it without question. If the whole matter had not been
left entirely to them, as they would have preferred, at
2least they retained the power of veto. Deakin, who had 
submitted the question to Crewe 'for decision’, and who 
had, in the past, maintained the Secretary of State's 
right to settle such matters, would have had to accept the 
compromise. But his Government fell a few days after 
Crewe’s message arrived in Australia. His successor, 
Fisher, was not so bound. Before the new Government got 
around to considering the theoretical aspects of the 
question, a concrete case arose which caused some 
embarrassment.
Just before Christmas 1908, Lord Dudley, relatively 
new to the post of Governor-General, received an urgent 
request from the Consul-General for Germany to allow 102 
time-expired crew members of a German ship to travel by
_
S. of S. to Gov. Tas. (also to G.G. and all Govs.), 23 
September 1908, T.S.A., G.0.4/2.
2
See Prem. S.A. to all Prems., 2 November 1908, telegram, 
copy, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 07/284; replies from Tas. (3 
November), Vic. (lO November), W.A. (l2 November), N.S.W. 
(l6 December), ibid.; Gov. N.S.W. to S. of S., 13 February 
1909, cable, P.R.O., C.0.532/11, no.5360.
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train from Sydney to Adelaide to join a steamer bound for 
Germany. They were to bear arms but not to carry 
ammunition. The request was both urgent and unusual.
Dudley communicated it to Fisher who approved it on 
certain conditions. The Governor-General sought the 
advice of the Secretary of State, both with regard to the 
carrying of arms and the need to seek the approval of the 
Governors of the three States through which the men would 
pass. The Secretary of State agreed that this permission 
should be sought. Before Dudley received his reply it 
had become necessary to inform the Consul-General that he 
should seek the approval of the States. All gave 
permission for the men to travel.^
Fisher, whose Government had finally decided that it 
did not regard Crewe’s compromise proposal as satisfactory, 
protested. He intended to deal with the whole question by 
Commonwealth regulations because he believed that it was 
undesirable that a foreign power should become aware that 
the matter was subject to divided control. The compromise 
was opposed to the doctrine laid down by Chamberlain in 
the Vonde1 despatch of 15 April 1903> that Australia was 
one political community as far as foreign nations were 
concerned and the Commonwealth alone could speak for it. 
Chamberlain had also insisted that no external country 
could take notice of the distribution of power within the 
Commonwealth. Both Dudley’s action with regard to the 
crew of the ship Planet and Crewe’s compromise proposal 
required such cognizance to be taken. If the request to
1
Memo, by Official Secretary to G.G., 11 January 1909 
(with G.G. to S. of S., 13 January 1909)5 P.R.O.,
C.0.532/11, no.55^9-
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the States were merely formal it was unnecessary^ if they 
had real discretion, it was destructive of the
1independence and prestige of the Commonwealth.
Fisher (more than likely acting on advice given by 
Garran to Hughes, the Attorney-General) was correct to 
point out that the compromise proposal was another 
retreat from the famous Vondel principles. But he had 
little cause for complaint about Dudley’s behaviour in the 
Planet incident. Dudley had been faced with an urgent 
situation and had no precedent to guide him. His 
Ministers had not expressed an opinion on Crewe’s 
compromise. In the circumstances, he could hardly reject 
the guidance given by the Secretary of State, even though 
it had been offered as a suggestion and not a direction.
Dudley impressed upon Fisher the need for clear and
unequivocal action to be taken. As the Government
rejected Crewe’s compromise, the only document which could
be taken as a guide to conduct was the letter sent to
consular representatives on 7 March 1907* But the States
had rejected those regulations. The question required
early settlement if the prestige of the Commonwealth were
2not to be affected. Crewe indicated that if the 
Commonwealth wished to go ahead on its own he would not 
object. However, in such a matter, it was ’peculiarly 
undesirable’ that difficulties should arise from friction 
between the Commonwealth and States. The Imperial
1
P.M. to G.G., 8 January 1909 (with G.G. to S. of S., 11 
January 1909), P.R.O., C.0.532/11, no.55^8.
2
G.G. to P.M., 26 January 1909, C.A.O., C.P.78/14, vol.4, 
pp.598-6OI.
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Government was bound to deprecate any steps which might 
lead not only to justifiable complaints from foreign 
powers but to difficulties for British sailors at foreign 
ports. If any such problems did arise, the Commonwealth 
would be held responsible and expected to find a 
satisfactory way of overcoming the embarrassment of the 
situation.^
Fisher had already told the States that the
Commonwealth would draw up provisional rules but that the
States would be allowed to comment on them before they
were adopted finally. He indicated what their general
lines were likely to be. The question of unarmed parties
would be left to be arranged between foreign officers
commanding and local authorities. The Governor-General
would grant permission for armed parties to land, though
in the case of funeral parties State Governors would act
2as his deputies.
The Prime Minister had recognized the reasonableness
of one of the compromise proposals, by giving local
authorities control over unarmed parties, and the States
could not see why he rejected the others. They were
dubious about their Governors acting as deputies for the
3Governor-General.
1
S. of S. to G.G. , 19 March 1909, P.R.O., C.0.532/11, 
n o .5549.
2
P.M. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 6 February 1909? 
S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 07/284.
3
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., draft, n.d. (with Prem. N.S.W. to 
Prem. S.A., 12 February 1909)? ibid.5 Prem. Tas. to P.M., 
2 March 1969, T.S.A., P.D.l/209/l; Prem. Vic. to P.M., 29 
March 1909? P.D.V.O.L., vol.176, pp.44-6.
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The Commonwealth did not even wait for replies to 
Fisher's letter before it issued statutory rule no.31 of 
1909 in the terms foreshadowed by the Prime Minister. A
1copy of the rule was not sent to the States until later.
At the very least, in view of the correspondence which had 
taken place , it was discourteous of the Commonwealth to 
publish the rules without waiting for the comments which 
it had stated it would seek. In spite of the power given 
under section 126 of the Constitution, in the general 
context of the times and in relation to the specific issue 
under discussion, it was a piece of executive lunacy to 
name the State Governors as deputies for the Governor- 
General without the clear consent of the States.
There was something to be said for the view that the
States would be able to deal with urgent cases more quickly
than the Commonwealth and that they were unlikely to act
in an arbitrary fashion because of the risk of retaliation
by foreign powers. While the State Governors had been
appointed Governor-General’s deputies, it was unlikely
that they would act in that capacity without the consent
2of their Ministers.
The fusion of the Deakin-Cook-Forrest factions in 
mid-1909 saw them oust the Labor Government and assume 
office with Deakin as Prime Minister. Before long, he was 
approached by Kidston who pointed out that he had only
1
Statutory rule no.31» 19 March I9O9 » copy in S.A.A., 
G.R.G.24/6, 07/284; see also P.M. to Prem. N.S.W. , 27 May 
1909 (copy with P.M. to Prem. S.A., 27 May I9O9 ), ibid.; 
Prem. N.S.W, to P.M., 27 May 1909 , copy, ibid.
2
A. Prem. Tas. to P.M., 2 June 1909» T.S.A., P.D.l/209/l*
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discovered Fisher's rule by accident. He suggested Deakin
should amend it to embody the Crewe compromise of 23
September 1908.^ In July, the Governor-General pointed
out that the question was still unsettled. Rule 31 of
1909 named the Governors as his deputies, but they had
not been officially appointed and he understood that at
least some would refuse to act. The rules were 
2inoperative.
By early August, Deakin had approached Wade with
proposals which seemed likely to form the basis of a
satisfactory settlement. There was no need for a rule
dealing with unarmed parties of less than 100. In the
case of saluting parties at funerals, the interests of
States and Commonwealth could be protected without
foreigners being made aware of dual control if foreign
commanders communicated with the Governor-General alone
but he consulted the State concerned before granting
permission. For unarmed parties of more than 100,
application should be made to the appropriate State
Governor. Local authorities could request the assistance3of unarmed pickets if they thought it necessary. The 
terms of the compromise were apparently agreed to at the 
Premiers' Conference of August 1909, although the official
1
Prem. Qld. to P.M., l4 June 1909 (copy with Prem. Qld. 
to Prem. S.A., l4 June 1909), S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 07/284. 
2
Walter Callan to P.M., 2 July 1909, C.A.O., C.P.78/14, 
vol.4, p.746.
3 Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A.,
G.R.G.24/6, 07/284.
5 August 1909, S.A.A.,
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minutes do not record the Tact. J After some unimportant
2difficulties, the rule was duly published as n o .29 of
3I9IO on 8 April 1910. It was a compromise which gave all 
parties everything that was important to them.
Five days after the rule was published, the Fusion
Government was heavily defeated at a general election and
was succeeded by Fisher 5s second Labor Government. No
further action was taken on the question until November
1910, when the Governor-General sent the Governors a copy
of new regulations about to come into force. From the
States' point of view, they could not have been worse.
When it was desired to land unarmed parties of more than
100 or unarmed pickets to assist police, foreign commanders
had only to notify local civil authorities, not seek their
permission. For the purpose of granting permission for
saluting parties, the Military Commandant of each State
4was appointed the Governor-General’s deputy.
These proposals were so extreme, and there were such 
good reasons against them, that it is legitimate to 
wonder whether there was any serious intention to 
implement them. More likely, they were intended to 
frighten the States into agreeing to the kind of
1
Minute by Prem. Tas., 18 October 1909, T.S.A.,
P.D.I/209/I.
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P.M. to Prem. S.A., 23 November 1909? S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 
07/284; Prem. S.A. to P.M., 13 January 1910, ibid.; P.M. 
to Prem. S.A., 23 April 1910, ibid.
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regulation that the Government really wanted. There was a
howl of protest1 234 and, without great delay, the Acting
Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, forwarded a greatly revised
draft. Applications for large unarmed parties, pickets,
and saluting parties were to be made to the State
Governor, as the Governor-General’s deputy, and all other
applications to the Governor-General. Pickets were only
2to be landed when requested by the local authorities. 
Later, it was agreed that when applications were directed 
to the Governor-General he should, if he authorized the
3landing, immediately inform the State Governor.
The States gradually acquiesced more or less4graciously in the inevitable, though it was clear they 
were not really happy with the situation. The proposals 
were embodied in rule n o .29 of I9H  and each Governor was
1
For the protests of N.S.W. (l6 November 1910) and S.A.
(l December 1910) see S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 07/284; the 
Tasmanian protests (17 and 26 November 1910) are in T.S.A., 
P.D.1/217/1.
2
A.P.M. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 21 December 1910, 
S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 07/284.
3
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 13 February I9H , ibid. This was in 
response to pressure from S.A. and Queensland, see Prem. 
Qld. to P.M. , 5 January I9H  (with Prem. Qld. to S.A. , 5 
January I9U ) ,  ibid, and Prem. S.A. to P.M. , 10 February 
I9H ,  copy, ibid.
4
See A. Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 23 February I9 H  (with 
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A. , 28 February I9H ) ,  ibid.;
Prem. S.A. to Prem. N.S.W., 8 March 1911, copy, ibid.;
Prem. Tas. to Gov. Tas. , 19 January I9II , T.S.A. , G.0.20/3; 
Prem. Vic. to P.M., 15 February I9H , copy, P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.183, p.837.
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formally appointed to act as the Governor-General’s 
deputy.^
The dispute was long and difficult and was made more 
complex by the changes of Government which brought to 
power in the Commonwealth men with different concepts of 
what was appropriate in the circumstances. At times, both 
Deakin and Fisher gave too little consideration to the 
needs of the States which had to feel sure that they could 
effectively maintain internal order. They had to try to 
force recognition of their constitutional position and, 
more importantly, of the practical wisdom of leaving a 
measure of control with the body exercising the police 
power. Apart from their initial protest, they generally 
showed greater moderation and understanding than the 
Commonwealth. To some extent, they were able to protect 
their vital interests, although not so far as they would 
have liked, nor so far as Crewe’s realistic proposals of 
September 1908 would have permitted. Under Fisher, the 
Commonwealth showed itself far more eager to maintain the 
Vondel principles than did the Colonial Office. The final 
solution was heavily weighted in favour of the 
Commonwealth, but it did not entirely disregard real State 
interests. They had at least asserted their right not to 
be overlooked in such matters.
There was a third class of affairs about which 
communications had to pass between the State Governments 
and the Colonial Office. These may be conveniently
G.G. to Gov. Tas. , 5 May I9II , T.S.A., G.0.20/3.
1
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classed as 5 imperial affairs' , since they concerned the 
State in relation to the Crown, or the rest of the Empire. 
The most enduring of these was the practice of recommending 
citizens for honorary distinctions (honours) to be 
conferred by His Majesty for services to the State. This 
was really a question of political patronage, and the 
preservation of the right of direct communication was 
important to the States because of its influence on the 
prestige of the State and the Governor. The question also 
arose of the right of the States to participate directly 
in the deliberations of the Colonial Conference of 1907*
To some extent, or so it appeared to them, the real power 
of the States was at stake in this, since some of the 
subjects discussed were within either their concurrent or 
sole legislative competence. But, in the main, it was 
their status which was being questioned, their right to 
maintain relations outside their own confines, and their 
position as quasi-sovereign bodies.
The dispute over the channel of communication for the 
recommendation of honours began strangely, and, it would 
seem, mainly at the instigation of Lord Hopetoun. In 
October I.9OI, he expressed his satisfaction with a cable 
Chamberlain had sent to the Lieutenant-Governor of New 
South Wales pointing out that such recommendations should 
be sent through the Governor-General. Hopetoun felt that 
it would prevent future embarrassment if a similar 
instruction were issued to the other State Governors.^
1
G.G. to S. of S., 24 October 1901, extract only, C.A.O., 
C.P.78/4, vol.l.
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Chamberlain apparently responded to this by urging on the 
Governors the desirability of 'adhering to the 
understanding' that recommendations for the bestowal of 
honours in the States should be made through the Governor- 
General.^
Lord Tennyson, in South Australia, had never heard of 
the 'understanding5 referred to by Chamberlain and was of 
the opinion that any attempt to give effect to it would 
give 'great offence' to the State Governments. It would 
mean a Commonwealth monopoly of honours, which would 
probably go to supporters of the Federal Government. The 
general attitude of the States was 'jealous watchfulness 
on behalf of Imperial interests and on behalf of their own 
State rights', and the federal power should be allowed to 
grow only slowly to avoid undue friction. Recommendations 
for honours for purely State services should go directly to 
the Crown from the State Governors who might
simultaneously send a copy to the Governor-General for his2 3information. Queensland supported his view.
Tennyson had shown up honours for what they were: 
political patronage. His proposal for preventing 
difficulties was really identical with that for general 
communications relating to federal interests. In the face 
of the June compromise on general communications,
1
Gov. S.A, to G.G., 10 December 1901, copy, Q.S.A.,
Gov./48.
2 Gov. S.A. to S. of S., 4 December 1901, copy with ibid.
3 Lt.Gov. Qld. to Gov. S.A,, 19 December 1901, copy,
Q.S.A., Gov./49, p.182.
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discussed earlier in the chapter, it is surprising that 
Chamberlain was prepared to suggest that communications 
concerning honours should be sent through the Governor- 
General .
The South Australian Ministers (the Jenkins
Government) arranged for a united protest to be sent
through the Governor of the senior State, New South Vales,
against what they saw as an unconstitutional proposal.
Some other States sent individual protests to the
Secretary of State. The Governor of Tasmania, Sir Arthur
Havelock, argued that, by long and uninterrupted usage,
the power exercised by the States of making
recommendations for honours had grown into a
constitutional privilege. There was nothing in the
Constitution which affected the privilege. It would be
both expedient and good policy to retain the old system;
expedient, because the State Governor, having a better
knowledge of the value of services given by the public men
of the State, would be a better channel of communication
than the Governor-General., and good policy because
additional subordination of the States would cause
irritation and opposition to a Commonwealth Administration
2which was already ’beset with difficulties'.
1
Prem. S.A. to all Prems., 5 December 1901, telegram, 
copy, S.A.A., G.R.G. 2-4/28, vol.20, p.328^ Prem. S.A. to 
Prem. N.S.V., 16 December 1901, copy, ibid., p.339> L t . 
Gov. N.S.V. to S. of S., 23 December 1901, copy with 
private letter to Tennyson, 24 December I9OI, Tennyson 
Papers, A.N.L., MS.479/5/43.
2
Gov. Tas. to S. of S., 21 December 1901, copy, T.S.A., 
G.0.27/1, pp.427-8.
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Havelock's arguments from policy and expediency were 
indisputable. That from constitutional privilege also 
carried considerable weight, though it had to be 
remembered that the new conditions created by federation 
might require changes in old procedures. Of course, the 
real fear of the States was that the Governor-General 
might turn to his Ministers for advice concerning their 
honours lists. This would, in their eyes, have 
constituted a real interference.
Chamberlain willingly accepted Tennyson's compromise
proposal.,' a fact which greatly pleased the somewhat vain 
2Governor. At the same time, he asked the Governor- 
General to continue to forward his personal observations 
on the State recommendations." He was anxious to have the 
recommendations considered from the standpoint of the 
whole country as well as that of the individual State. In 
theory, this was a sound idea. In practice, it was likely 
to be of little value because of the Governor-General’s 
lack of knowledge of the men recommended.
An untoward incident occurred late in 1902 when New 
South Wales requested, through the State Governor, that 
the Mayor of Sydney should be granted the title 'Lord
1
S. of S. to all Govs., l4 March 1902, copy, C.A.O., 
C.P.78/4, vol.l.
2
Diary entry l4 April 1902, Tennyson Papers, A.N.L., 
MS.479/2.
3
S. of S. to G.G., l4 March 1902, C.A.O., C.P.78/4, 
vo1.1 .
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Mayor'. The Colonial Office sought the views of the 
Commonwealth which concurred, provided only that the 
distinction was conferred on Melbourne at the same time. 
The Colonial Office took this as a formal request and 
granted the title to each city without consulting the 
State Government of Victoria. Both the Premier, W.H. 
(later Sir William) Irvine, and the Governor protested 
vigorously at this further manifestation of a growing 
tendency to belittle State Authorities. Tennyson, the 
Acting Governor-General, claimed that he had 'informed' 
the State Governor of his intentions. What the State 
Authorities wanted was not to be informed’ but to be 
allowed to recommend the granting of the honour. Although 
the action was unquestionably well-intended, the incident 
was one of those unnecessary slights which did much to 
aggravate the unpopularity of the Commonwealth.
Sir Samuel Way had the last, and best, word on the
incident. In a private letter to Sir John Forrest, he
chuckled over the 'delicious' Victorian protest and
wondered what their attitude would have been had the
honour been given to Sydney alone. He had suggested to
2the Sydney people that they should seek, the title.
1
1
The main references for the correspondence are: A.N.L., 
A.J.C.P.2151, C.0.418/19, nos.45665 and 519; A .J.C.P .2152, 
C.0.418/20, no.444o6; A.J.C.P.2154, C.0.418/22, no.53258; 
A.J.C.P.2161, C.0.418/28, no.17187; see also Prem. Vic. to 
Gov. Vic. (for S. of S.), 25 November 1902, P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.134, pp.648-50.
2
Sir S. Way to Sir J. Forrest, 1 December 1902, Forrest 
Papers, Battye Library, 766A.
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It appears that in April 1904 Lord Northcote
submitted at least a Queensland honours list to Deakin lor
1advice. The Secretary of State, Alfred Lyttleton,
pointed out to him that it was the comments of the
Governor-General alone that were wanted to help decide
between the claims of the various States. He should be
guided by confidential communications with the State
2Governors rather than by the Prime Minister. Northcote,
whose mistake was of a piece with his desire to have all
State communications sent through him, found the situation
absurd. He presumed that the State Governors listed their
recommendations in order of merit. He did not know the
men. If he did not go to the Prime Minister his advice3must be worthless. Thereafter, he obeyed the ruling and
in 1906 he was able to assure the Governor of New South
Wales, Sir Harry Rawson, that any comments he offered were
4made on his ’sole personal responsibility’.
In June I9O8, Deakin told the Governor-General elect 
that the prestige of his office would be seriously 
diminished by the honours list about to be issued. The 
Imperial Authorities had violated an undertaking given by 
Elgin to Northcote, in a private letter, that they would 
accept no State recommendations against which the
1
Northcote to Deakin, 18 April 1904, D.P., A.N.L., MS. 
1540/3900.
2
S. of S. to G.G., 8 July 1904, C.A.O., C.P.78/4, vol.1.
3
G.G. to S. of S., 15 August 1904, copy, ibid.
4
G.G. to Gov. N.S.W., 23 June 1906, copy, in D.P., A.N.L., 
MS.1540/3928-30.
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Governor-General advised. The whole of the Commonwealth
recommendations, which Tor two years had been "practically
put aside1 23 4, were, on this occasion, "absolutely ignored".
Several State recommendations expressly opposed by the
Governor-General had been accepted.^ Atlee Hunt,
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs,
complained to Sir Francis Hopwood of the Colonial Office
that the list had caused consternation in federal circles.
More specifically, he pointed to the K.C.M.G. to J.H.
Carruthers as a "blow to federal prestige". That a man
who, a year before, out of jealousy of the Commonwealth,
had removed a load of wirenetting from the wharves without 
2paying duty should be honoured by the King was "a thing 
that ordinary reasonable men [failed] to understand".^
In 1903, Deakin, writing as 'Australian Correspondent* 
of the Morning Post, had claimed triumphantly that the 
success of the States in persuading Chamberlain to let 
them send recommendations direct and only to submit copies 
to the Governor-General was "illusory*. Awards would be
4conferred only with the Governor-General’s approval. 
Something had gone wrong. Deakin had evidently 
misunderstood imperial intentions and it was no wonder he 
complained so bitterly to Dudley.
1
Deakin to Dudley, 22 June 1908, draft, D.P., A.N.L.,
MS.1540/6605.
2
This incident is discussed in chapter 5*
3
A. Hunt to Sir F. Hopwood, 1 July I9O8 , A. Hunt Papers, 
A.N.L., MS.52/782.(draft).
4
Morning Post, 4 March 1903 (Sydney, 19 January), D.P., 
A.N.L., MS.1540.
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Crewe insisted on maintaining the established
practice. If the Governor-General objected to a man
recommended by one of the States, his reasons would be
considered, but the responsibility for the final decision
remained, with the Secretary of State.^ To grant the
Governor-General an absolute veto would be close to an
infringement of State rights and the prerogatives of the
2King who was the ’fountain of honour’. His predecessor,
Lord Elgin, was unable to understand how Northcote had got
3the idea that he was to be given such a veto.
From a general consideration of Northcote's part in 
the whole channels of communication debate, it is clear 
that he would have needed no great encouragement to 
formulate such an idea. It was one which both he and 
Deakin would have adopted on slender evidence, because it 
seemed to them a proper course.
The only other modification made to procedure within 
the period 1901-10 came as the result of a Queensland 
suggestion. It was decided that when the Federal 
Government recommended an honour for a person unconnected 
with the Commonwealth, for services not confined to one 
State, the Governor of the State in which he resided
1
S. of S. to all State Govs. , 18 August 1908, C.A.O. ,
C.P.78/4, vol.l.
2
S. of S. to G.G., ibid.
3 Crewe to Deakin, 21 August 1908, D.P., A.N.L., MS.1^40/ 
1339» See also P.M. to G.G., l4 July 1908 (copy with G.G. 
to S. of S., 14 July 1908), C.A.O., C.P.78/4, vol.l.
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should have the opportunity to comment for the Secretary 
of State.^
The States had the best of the debate over the
channel for communications recommending honours. The
solution was just. A.B. Keith was clearly right when he
claimed that it was 'straining the imagination
excessively' to maintain that the Federal Government, or
even the Governor-General, had any locus standi as far as
honours for services to a State were concerned.^ It is
doubtful whether it was even justifiable to send copies of
the State lists to the Governor-General. Certainly, the
value of his comments on the relative merits of the
persons recommended was likely to be negligible. The best
solution to the whole problem was one which would perhaps
have appealed to Deakin, the abolition of this form of 
3patronage.
The question of the participation of the States in 
the Colonial Conference of 1907 was fought out between 
June 1906 and March 1907» but its roots went back almost 
to the beginning of federation. In conjunction with the 
Coronation of Edward VII, a meeting of colonial Prime
1
Prem. Qld. to Gov. Qld., 8 December 1908 (with Gov. Qld. 
to S. of S., 11 December 1908), P.R.O., C.0.447/80, no. 
2142; S. of S. to Gov. Qld., 11 February 1909 (copy, with 
S. öf S. to Gov. Tas., 11 February I9O9)» T.S.A., G.0.4/2. 
2
Keith, Responsible Government, vol.2, pp.6l7-8.
See La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, vol.1, pp.202-4.3
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Ministers was held. The Premiers of the Australian States 
were not invited to this. Indeed, their invitation to the 
Coronation was only half-hearted. They were not to be 
official guests of the Imperial Government, but if they 
happened to be in England at the time, they were welcome 
to take part in the ceremonies. The invitation was issued 
through the Governor-General. All Premiers refused to 
attend.^ When it became clear that they would not be 
invited to attend the 1907 Conference, this, along with 
their other experiences in the channel of communication 
debate, made the Premiers the more willing to protest with 
the utmost vigour.
The Premier of New South Wales, J.H. Carruthers,
based his protest on the statement of the Under-Secretary
for Colonies that no subject would be barred from the
discussions. If this were so, matters within the sole
control of the States would be considered. There were
grave objections to allowing a Commonwealth representative
2to speak for the States on such matters.
Although the other Premiers supported Carruthers
3strongly, the Imperial Government was not to be moved.
1
G.G. to Gov. Tas., 11 February 1902, T.S.A., G.0.29/1; 
West Australian, 3 February 1902$ Keith, Responsible 
Government, vol.2, p.6l5.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to Gov. N.S.W. (for S. of S.), 1 June 1906 
(copy with Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 6 June 1906), S.A.A.,
G.R.G. 24/6, 06/519.
3
See the various letters between the State Premiers and 
between the Premiers and their Governors during June-July 
1906 in ibid.$ also in P.D.V.I.L., P 07/2086 and N .S.W.A., 
Treasury, V 5^94 (R.E.s.).
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The 1907 Conference must be constituted in the same way as
the 1902 Conference, and any question of change was for
1the Conference itself to determine. Carruthers felt that
if the States were excluded from the Conference no subject
which was solely within their jurisdiction should be
2discussed at it. Later, he took the Imperial Government
severely to task for wanting 1 to relegate the States to a
position of entire subordination to the Federal
authorities. ... 1 He expressed the view that it was
forcing the States more and more into the arms of the3Federation and loosening 'the bonds of Empire'.
This was an argument much in Carruthers' mind at the 
time. It was repeated a little later in the general
4debate on channels of communication in external affairs. 
Carruthers seems to have thought that it was well- 
calculated to appeal to the Imperial Authorities, but 
there is no evidence that it did. Of course, to stress 
the greater importance of the bonds of Empire to those of 
federation was also a way of indicating independence of 
the Commonwealth Government.
1
S. of S. to Gov. N.S.W., 18 July 1906, cable, copy, and 
S. of S. to Gov. Vic., 31 July 1906, P.D.V.I.L., P 07/2086. 
2
Gov. N.S.W. to S. of S., 21 July 1906, cable, copy, 
ibid.
3 Prem. N.S.W. to Gov. N.S.W. , 12 October 1906 (with Gov. 
N.S.W. to S. of S., 13 October 1906), printed paper, ibid.
4
Prem. N.S.W. to Gov. N.S.W., 18 March 1907 (with Gov.
N.S.W. to S. of S., 20 March 1907), A.N.L., A .J.C.P.2184,
C.0.418/53, no.15101.
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In replying to the objections of the States, Deakin
broached a scheme of his own. He viewed the Conference
not as one between Great Britain and all the Colonies, but
as one in which 8 representatives of the chief
constituent Governments5 of the Empire met to discuss
matters of common interest. It was to be an 'Imperial
Council8. If his concept of the Conference were right,
then the matters discussed could not possibly be within
the province of the States. The States could always
consult the Imperial Government through their Agents-
General, but to discuss matters of State concern at the
Conference would imply 'a derogation from its status and
1confusion in its methods'.
Carruthers1 2 case against the exclusion of the States
at least had a practical basis. In December 1906, the
South Australian Premier, Thomas Price, tried to argue
from a constitutional point of view and largely lost
touch with reality. Federation had not in any way altered
the status of the States which remained independent of the
Commonwealth and in no way subordinate to it. The
Commonwealth Government was, in reality, only the agent of
the States for the management of the Customs, Postal and
Defence Departments. To admit the agent to the Conference
while excluding the principals was utterly indefensible.
To exclude the States would arouse the antagonism of the
2people and the politicians.
1
P.M. to G.G., 31 October 1906 (with G.G. to S. of S., 31 
October 1906), printed paper, P.D.V.I.L., P 07/2086.
2
Prem. SeA. to Gov. S.A. (for S. of S„), 12 December 1906, 
copy, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 06/519*
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He spoke truly of the antagonism of the politicians, 
but the attitude of the people must be doubted. It is 
hard to imagine that most were in any way concerned with 
the Conference, let alone worried about who represented 
them. Price’s claim concerning the status of the States 
vis-a-vis the Commonwealth was the most extreme advanced 
during the first decade. It was unlikely to find much 
favour in Commonwealth or Colonial Office circles.
Deakin was quick to point out that federation had
established an entirely new Government with the right to
act on behalf of Australia as a whole in matters that
concerned the interests of Australians as a united
community. The claim that the Federal Government was
merely the agent of the States overlooked the direct
relationship between it and the people from whom it
derived its authority without the intervention of a third
party.^ Crewe accepted this argument and developed the
point that the States were not fully self-governing in the
way that Natal and Newfoundland were, as the latter
continued to exercise full control over many important
subjects (for example, immigration, overseas trade,
customs) which the States had surrendered to the 
2C ommonwe a 11 h,
This was the first time since Chamberlain’s despatch 
of 15 April 1903 that the Colonial Office had re-argued 
its case against State participation in matters which
1 P.M. to G.G. (for S. of S.), 22 December 1906, printed
paper, P.D.V.I.L., P 07/2086.
S. of S. to Gov. S*A., l6 February 1907 , copy, ibid.
2
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concerned other communities, either within the Empire or 
foreign communities. The reasoning showed a marked 
advance.
The States continued to feel so bitterly about their
exclusion that they refused to allow their Agents-General
to supply Deakin with the information which would have
helped him, while he was at the Conference, to answer
questions about immigration to Australia. Thomas (later
Sir Thomas) Bent, Premier of Victoria, arranged to be in
London during the Conference and, while he was officially
concerned with financial business, he made it appear
before he left that at least part of his purpose in going
2was to keep an eye on Deakin. Not that the oafish 
Premier was likely to be any match for the nimble-tongued 
Prime Minister.
At the Conference, there was some discussion
concerning its future composition. Deakin tried to
persuade the members to allow for subsidiary conferences
at which subjects which concerned the Australian States
and Canadian Provinces might be discussed. He was
entirely overborne by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister
of Canada, who wished that any such conference should be3entirely separate.
1 The correspondence concerning this unpleasant incident 
is almost entirely in N.S.W.A., Treasury, P 17104, 
07/A3264.
2 D/T., 18 March 190?.
C.P .P ., 1907-8, vol.3, no.11, pp.92-4.3
io4
It was true that some of the matters discussed at the 
Conference were of interest to the Statess judicial 
appeals, double income tax and reciprocity in the 
admission of barristers and surveyors to practice were 
clearly within their ambit. But, once Deakin1s suggestion 
at the Conference had been put aside, it is difficult to 
see how they could have been admitted without creating 
more difficulties than were solved. The only solution was 
for the States to remain disconsolate until time had 
allowed national sentiment to mature sufficiently for them 
to accept the Commonwealth as the representative of the 
whole country.^
Just before the I9H  Conference, Sir Gerald 
Strickland, Governor of Western Australia at the time, 
tried to raise the question again. The Secretary of State, 
Lewis Harcourt, moved quickly to avert trouble. He told 
all Governors that if they thought that their Premiers 
were under the misapprehension that their presence in 
England for the Coronation of George V would mean that 
they would be asked to participate in the Conference, they
1
Immediately after, and partly as a result of, the 
Colonial Conference of 1907» certain changes were made in 
the organization of the Colonial Office. When the States 
were informed of the changes, C.G. Wade, Premier of New 
South Wales, chose to regard them as an underhand attempt 
to cut off direct communication between the States and the 
Colonial Office. The Victorians, advised by Professor 
Moore, did not join Wade in his vigorous protest. The 
Colonial Office had no such evil intentions and, in 
replying, made it clear that, unless the Australian 
Constitution was changed, the Commonwealth could never 
hope to become the sole channel of communication between 
the Imperial and State Governments. See N »S .W .P .P . , 1908,
first session, vol.l, pp.21-24, 285 P.D.V.I.L., P 08/1518 
(opinion of Professor W„H. Moore).
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should be warned that this was not so. There was no 
trouble.
In March I9II , Lewis Harcourt summed up, for Lord 
Denman, the position with regard to the channels of 
communication debate. It had, he said, originally been 
considered desirable for all. State despatches to be sent 
in copy to the Governor-General. This had been changed 
because the State Governments had objected 'more or less 
strongly' to anything which seemed to make them 
subordinate to the Commonwealth. Copies should be sent 
of anything which affected federal interests. This was 
'absolutely essential' with communications concerning 
recommendations for honours, the use of the title 'Royal', 
any difficulty with a foreign consular representative or 
any matter in dispute with the Commonwealth. If the 
Governor-General thought it did affect Commonwealth 
interests, he should forward the despatch to the 
appropriate minister for comment, though confidential and 
secret despatches should be discussed only with the Prime 
Minister.^
The long and complex debate had lasted for a little 
more than a decade. In a sense it had come to an end. from 
exhaustion rather than because either side had been
1
The correspondence is in P.R.O., C.0.532/25) no.6575* 
See also T 0S„A.., P . D . I/239/I63 .
2
Memo, by S. of S. for G.G., re communication of State 
despatches to Federal Ministers, 30 March 1911? Denman 
Papers, A.N.L., MS.769/26.
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convinced of the rightness of the other's arguments. It 
was still possible for disagreements to arise in the future 
with regard to practice, though the underlying principles 
could scarcely be questioned.*
Extravagant claims had been raised on all sides. The 
maximum claims advanced for the Commonwealth, in the 
Anderson-Chamberlain despatches of 25 November 1902 and 15 
April 1903 j involved a degree of unification in all 
relations with Great Britain and the rest of the Empire, 
as well, as foreign countries, which had been deliberately 
rejected in the drafting of the Constitution and could not 
have been justified from the text of that document. The 
maximum claim of the States, in Price's memorandum of 12 
December 1906, that the Commonwealth was merely an agent 
of the States, was equally untenable. In between these 
extremes, the debate had covered much significant ground 
and had reached some worthwhile conclusions.
The States had tried to establish that they were not 
subordinate to the Commonwealth and that, within their own 
spheres, they were independent and equal, exercising a 
quasi-sovereignty similar to that exercised by the 
Commonwealth in its field. They had had only partial 
success. There was a field in which they were not 
subordinate, but it had been strictly limited, in a way 
not anticipated when the Constitution was accepted, to 
matters which had no implications for any Government or 
community outside the confines of the State. From their
1
Mr L.F. Fitzhardinge (of Australian National University) 
states that yet further aspects of this question troubled 
relations during the First World War,
io?
point of view, this amounted to an unjustified derogation 
from their political status. In effect, this appeared to 
them as a practical subordination of their position.
On its side, the Commonwealth had established, with 
limited exceptions, its right to speak for Australia in 
matters of external affairs and foreign trade. There was 
a third field where authority seemed to overlap, in 
matters like the appointment of consuls. Here, each side 
had to be content with a compromise which preserved the 
real interests of both parties.
That was the positive achievement of the debate. 
Counter-balancing it was the vast amount of ill-will 
engendered in an encounter which had been argued always 
keenly and often bitterly. This ill-will, coupled with 
the genuine fears of encroachment which existed on both 
sides, rendered more difficult the development of 
executive co-operation.
The first impulse of the Colonial Office, on most 
occasions, was to favour the Commonwealth. Above all, Sir 
John Anderson and Chamberlain seem to have been 
responsible for this. The influence of Chamberlain was 
such that there appears to have been no real 
reconsideration of his views until 1907. There were men 
who favoured the position taken by the States? of these, 
H.E. Dale and A.B. Keith were the most important. These 
were also the men who had the deepest understanding of the 
Constitution, but they had less influence in the Office. 
However, while the Colonial Office played a decisive part 
in determining Australian practice on this question, it 
was at times deflected from its course by the States.
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The debate has not continued to trouble the relations 
of Commonwealth, and States, but, in its time, it was 
considered to be of the utmost importance and was fought * 
with great vigour. The questions of status and power 
involved were important and arose naturally out of the 
understandable inclination of Commonwealth and State 
politicians and Governors to place on the Constitution the 
construction most favourable to their own Parliament and 
Government and to their personal interests.
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CHAPTER 2
THE TRANSFER OF TERRITORY; THE FEDERAL CAPITAL 
TERRITORY AND THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
On 1 January 1901, the only land within Australia 
which was under the sole control of the Commonwealth 
Government was that which had been transferred 
automatically with the Customs Departments of the States. 
As further departments were transferred, more land passed 
to the Commonwealth. By 1 January I9U , it was not only 
this transferred real estate which the Commonwealth 
governed unaided (or unhindered) by the States, but Papua, 
the Northern Territory and the federal capital territory.
This situation had been foreseen. Constitutional 
provision had been made for a federal capital situated in 
territory vested in the Commonwealth to avoid exacerbating 
the rivalry between the Colonies, and especially between 
Sydney and Melbourne. Some sense of national 
responsibility, however small and undeveloped, was 
responsible for the view that South Australia should be 
relieved of the task of developing the Northern Territory, 
an impossible burden which misdirected self-interest had 
led the Colony to assume eagerly almost 40 years before. 
The British Government, which had reluctantly annexed 
British New Guinea in response to Australian demands, was 
anxious to hand over responsibility for the territory as
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soon as there was an Australian Government able to 
administer it.'
Although the administration of its affairs caused 
ample trouble for the Commonwealth, New Guinea raised no 
serious problems between the State and Commonwealth 
Governments and it therefore lies beyond the scope of the 
present discussion. The arguments over the transfer to 
the Commonwealth of the federal capital territory and the 
Northern Territory began early in 1901 and were not 
finally settled until the two territories passed under 
Commonwealth control on 1 January I9H .
5Each of these transfers provided ample scope for 
political lobbying and debate and the exercise of local 
pressures. But these facets of the problems, interesting 
as they are, are largely outside the purpose of this study 
and will be discussed only when they seem to affect 
executive administration in a vital way.
2The location of the seat of government was discussed 
at the Federal Conventions and the final decision in 1898 
was that it must be 'within territory vested in the
1
Material relating to the New Guinea transfer can be found 
in C.A.O., C.R.S. A 2 , 03/2538. This has been discussed in 
a very able article by H.J. Gibbney, ‘The Interregnum in 
the Government of Papua, I9OI-I906', A .J .P ■H ., vol.12,
no . 3 •
2
An accurate but unannotated and uncritical account of the 
selection of the federal capital site, based on the 
copious printed papers, may be found in F. Watson, A Brief 
History of Canberra, Canberra, 1927, chs. 7 - H  (inclusive).
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Commonwealth1 at a site selected by the Commonwealth
Parliament. Until the site had been chosen, Parliament
would meet at a place selected by a majority of the State
Governors or, if they could not agree, where the Governor-
General directed. The Constitution as adopted at the
Convention failed to obtain the statutory minimum vote at
the 1898 referendum in New South Wales. One reason for
this was the desire of the 'mother* Colony to have the
capital within its borders. The Premiers' Conference,
which met in 1899 to consider changes desired by New South
Wales, agreed that the capital should be in that State but
not less than 100 miles from Sydney. The federal
territory was to be not less than 100 square miles and
that part of it which was Crown land was to be granted free
by the State. ‘ Until it could meet at the seat of
1government, Parliament was to sit in Melbourne.
In their discussion of section 125 in 1900, Quick and
Garran indicated that it was uncertain whether the
determination of the seat of government rested entirely
with the Commonwealth Parliament or whether its choice was
limited to sites offered by the Parliament of New South
Wales. It was desirable that the selection of territory
should be the result of an agreement between the
Commonwealth and the State, but, if the need arose, the
Commonwealth had a reserve power to acquire a territory of
about the constitutional minimum area without the
2concurrence of the State.
_
Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, pp.978-9;
Report of Premiers' Conference, 1899» C.A.O., C.R.S. A 1 8 , 
printed paper, dated 3 February 1899» n.f.n.
2
Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, pp.979-82.
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It was this uncertainty in the Constitution, along 
with the traditional and virulent jealousy between Sydney 
and Melbourne, which was to cause so much delay and so 
much animosity between the Commonwealth and New South 
Wales over the selection of the seat of government.
In the beginning, the Governments of both New South 
Wales and the Commonwealth had good intentions and took 
prompt action. In November 1899j Sir William Lyne1 2s 
Government in New South Wales appointed Mr A. Oliver, 
President of the State Land Appeal Court, a royal 
commissioner to inquire into the suitability of sites for 
the seat of government and invited the public to suggest 
sites and submit information concerning them.^
On 13 April 1901, Barton enquired whether the New 
South Wales (See) Government was prepared to offer any 
sites for consideration, indicated that his Government 
wished to consider areas larger than the constitutional 
minimum, and suggested that Crown lands within any areas 
offered should be reserved from alienation until, a 
decision had been r e a c h e d . T h e  Premier, Mr (later Sir 
John) See, submitted sites at Bombala, Yass and Canoblas
O(Orange) along with a copy of Oliver's report on those 
and other sites. He informed Barton that he had reserved
1
Watson, History of Canberra, p.75j Quick and Garran, 
Annotated Constitution, p .982.
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W. 13 April 1901, N.S.W. (L.A.),
V . & P ., 1901, vol.l, p.879.
3
See map, appendix D.
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Crown lands in the areas named but if the Commonwealth
preferred other sites his1 Government would endeavour to
meet it.^ Barton urged that similar reservations should
be made in other areas which the State Government felt
deserved consideration, but refused to suggest any areas 
2himself as both he and his Minister for Home Affairs, Sir
William Lyne, held that it was the State's responsibility3to do that in the first instance. See was prepared to 
forward any further recommendations made by Oliver but 
would not reserve lands which might be required for bona
4fide settlement purposes.
On 19 July 1901, in the House of Representatives,
King O ’Malley (Tasmania) moved that it was desirable to
secure as federal territory not less than 1,000 square
miles of suitable land, the freehold of which should5remain forever with the Commonwealth. Barton agreed with 
O'Malley’s main contentions but sought to remove the 
reference to a specific area so that the Commonwealth 
could choose a site containing less than 1,000 square 
miles should such a site suit its purposes. The members 
who spoke agreed generally with the motion but, because of 
the consideration of the tariff and important machinery
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 24 April 1901 , N.S.W. (L.A. ) , V.& P., 
1901, vol.l, p.881.
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 30 April and 26 July 1901, ibid., 
pp.881-2, 883.
3
Minutes by Barton, 18 July 1901 and Lyne, 22 July 1901, 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A18, printed Senate paper, 1901, n.f.n.
4
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 1 August 1901 , N.S. W. (L.A. ) , V.& P., 
1901, vol.l, p.883.
5
C.P.D., vol.3, p.2807.
measures, the debate was adjourned until 10 September 1902
1when the motion was passed as amended by Barton.
The motion, and Barton's statement to See in his 
letter of 13 April 1901, on the question of area, 
indicated an important trend in Commonwealth thinking 
which was to be significant later in the quarrel with New 
South Wales.
As See's Government was opposed to the unnecessary
reservation of land, Barton enquired, on 29 August I9OI. ,
whether any further sites would be submitted and if See
were prepared to name an area or areas which his
2Government favoured. For reply, an official sent a copy
of a report by Commissioner Oliver indicating that a site3at Godara, near Tumut, might be added but arguing that it
was for the Commonwealth to indicate its preference as
this would save the expense of further inquiry. Oliver
doubted whether there was a site in New South Wales more
4suitable than those already recommended.
On 10 September, See stated in Parliament that it was 
not for his Government to do more than it had done. It 
had provided information for the Commonwealth and promised 
to assist it to acquire any site desired. The Federal.
_
Ibid., vol.12, p.15898.
2
P.M, to Prem. N.S.W., 29 August I9OI , C.A.O. , C»R»S„ A18, 
printed Senate paper, 1901, n.f.n.
3
See map, appendix D.
4
Principal Under-Secretary, N.S.W. to P.M., 23 September 
I9OI, C.A.O. , C.R.S. A.18 , printed Senate paper, 1901 , 
n.f.n. Reply by an official instead of a responsible 
Minister was discourteous.
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Government must take the responsibility for choosing the 
site, but he was confident that the State Parliament would 
agree to whatever site was chosen.^ He never replied 
officially to Barton's request for an expression of 
preference although the request was repeated several 
times.^
There was no real difference between the views of 
Barton and See as to which Government was to choose the 
territory in which the seat of government was to be 
situated. Barton was considerately anxious to give the 
State as much voice as he could in the matter, since it 
had to surrender the territory, but See seemed afraid to 
make a suggestion, possibly because he thought that to do 
so might arouse local prejudice against his Government.
J.H. Carruthers, Leader of the Opposition in the New
South Wales Parliament, sought a debate on the capital
site question and got it on 19 December 1901, the last day
of the session, when See introduced a motion recognizing
the exclusive right of the Commonwealth to make the final
selection of a site and undertaking to accelerate cession
of the territory when the Federal Government had made its3wishes known.' The motion was eventually ruled out of4order but, before it was, Carruthers had an opportunity
1
N,S.W,P,D., 2 Ser., vol.2, p.117^.
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., l4 and 23 October, 2 December 1901, 
N .S.W. (L.A,), V.& P ., 1901, vol.l, pp.889-90.
3
N.S.W.P.D., 2 Ser., vol.4, p.46l3*4
Ibid., p.4632.
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to show the attitude that he was likely to take should he 
become Premier before the matter was settled.
Carruthers argued that while the Federal Parliament 
alone could decide the exact location of the seat of 
government, it had no voice in deciding where the federal 
territory was to be. Section 125 stated that the seat of 
government must be within territory which 5 shall have been 
granted to or acquired by the Commonwealth’. It was the 
right of the State to grant a territory of, say, 400 square 
miles to the Commonwealth which would then exercise its 
right to fix the exact location of the federal city within 
that area. If the Federal Parliament were invited to come 
to New South Wales and choose its own site, the State 
would be virtually bound to accept the decision however 
unpalatable. It might select a site near the Victorian 
border which would make Melbourne and not Sydney the port 
for the Commonwealth. That would be unacceptable. The 
Parliament of the State alone, and not the executive 
Government, could surrender land to the Commonwealth and 
it must make clear what sites it would offer. If they 
were rejected, others could be offered later. In the 
meantime, the temporary seat of government must, like the 
permanent one, be within New South Wales, but not less 
than 100 miles from Sydney. It was unconstitutional for
the headquarters of every Commonwealth department to be in
1Melbourne as was then the case.
Carruthers had shown himself a vigorous champion of 
State rights in the debate on the Murray waters question
1
Ibid., p p .4616-25•
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at the 1897-8 Convention.^ He was noted for his anti-
2Victorian attitude and was likely to regard a Melbourne 
based Commonwealth Government as seeking to enrich 
Victoria at the expense of New South Wales. He was a 
lawyer-politician, well grounded in the non-conformist 
tradition, and his natural instinct was to treat every 
issue as a brief to be argued as strongly as he could. He 
represented the Sydney electorate of St George and so 
shared the aspirations and fears of that city to the full. 
Every one of these characteristics is clearly shown in his 
conduct of the capital site negotiations and foreshadowed 
in his first speech in Parliament on the subject.
The Commonwealth's desire to settle the question
slackened as a result of See's unhelpful attitude and
nothing was done during 1902. Early in 1903 , J.C. Watson,
the Federal Labor leader, urged Barton to settle the
question during the forthcoming session as the Sydney
newspapers were complaining that the Commonwealth
Government was neglecting the State and would make the3most of any failure over the capital site. In October of 
that year, Federal Parliament made its first attempt to 
choose a site. Barton had tried to have a joint sitting 
of the Houses to consider the question but the Senate had
1
N .A.C.D,M., I898, especially vol.1, passim; Quick and 
Garran, Annotated Constitution, pp.19^-7.
2
Age, 2 October 1907.
3
Watson to Barton, 19 March 1903, D.P., A.N.L., MS.154-0/
438.
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refused to participate. The Deakin Government, which 
succeeded Barton’s when the latter joined the High Court
2bench, introduced a Seat of Government Bill on 6 October,
but it came to nothing. As the result of an exhaustive
ballot on 8 October, the House of Representatives selected
3Tumut as the site, while on 15 October the Senate
4substituted Bombala. As there was no hope of compromise,5the matter was left for a new Parliament to settle.
The Government had not made itself responsible for
the selection of any particular site, partly because its
members were divided over the issue and partly because
this was an obvious case for freedom of individual action.
The voting revealed rivalry between Victoria and New
South Wales. All Victorian members of the House of
Representatives voted for Tumut and all Victorian Senators
for Bombala. Members and Senators from New South Wales
were not unanimous but generally preferred a western site
6 7such as Lyndhurst. The Victorian strategy' ensured that
1
C.P .D . , vol.17, PP•5558-7^• The Senate wished to avoid having its views ’swamped’ by the larger House of 
Representatives.
2
Ibid., P.5673.
3
Ibid., p.5936.
4
Ibid., p.6l89.
5
Ibid., p p .6401-4.
6
Ibid., Pp.5936, 6188-9; see map, appendix D.
7
It was also the view of P. McM. Glynn, a South 
Australian member of the House of Representatives, that 
the bloc voting by the Victorians in each House, for two 
different southern sites was a ’strategy’. Diary entry, 
23 October 1903, Glynn Papers, A.N.L., MS.558.
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the question would not be settled and that Parliament
1would continue to meet in Melbourne. It also ensured the 
maintenance of a privileged position for Victorian 
interests.
Carruthers had foreseen such a result and, on 9
October, had introduced a motion in the State Legislative
Assembly which asserted that the procedure adopted by the
Commonwealth Government was unconstitutional and inimical
to the rights of the State, and that the Commonwealth
Parliament should have indicated by resolution the
locality in which the territory was desired so that the
State Parliament could consider its attitude. State
territory could be ceded to the Commonwealth by the State
Parliament only under section 111, or under section 123
with the consent of the Parliament and people expressed by
referendum. The power under section 51 (xxxi) to acquire
property on just terms was distinct from the acquisition
of territory and applied only when land was required for a
railway or public building. However, had the Commonwealth
Parliament settled definitely on a site, he would have had
the State Government take prompt action to surrender it so
that the proceeding would be legal and the machinations of
2the Victorians defeated. Later in the debate, which was 
never brought to an issue, Wade (Carruthers* future
1
Of the other States, the South and Western Australians 
strongly favoured a southern site, the Queenslanders a 
northern or western site while the Tasmanians were divided. 
They did not show the same rigid divisions between 
Senators and members of the House of Representatives as 
did the Victorians. See C .P .D ., pp.5936, 6188-9»
2
N .S.W.P.D., 2 Ser., vol.12, pp.3212-21.
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Attorney-General) foreshadowed other points of dispute
when he opposed the desire of the House of Representatives
for an area of 1,000 square miles and a site touching the
Victorian border.^ See indicated that he also would
2refuse a demand for 1,000 square miles. However, both
See and his immediate successor, Waddell, continued to
behave amicably towards the Commonwealth and, during 1904,
reserved, at the Commonwealth's request, Crown lands
around Lyndhurst and Dalgety so that those sites might be3readily available should the Commonwealth desire them.
Whatever the attitude of the Government of New South 
Wales, the leading members of the Opposition had shown a 
degree of anti-Victorian sentiment and of hostility to the 
selection of a large area of territory which was 
significant for the future. While Carruthers' speech had 
been free from the extreme postures which too often marred 
his later statements about the Federal Government, it did 
reveal the determination of a narrowly legalistic mind to 
squeeze the last drop of value for the State from the 
wording of the Constitution.
Watson succeeded Deakin in office in April 1904 and
his Government introduced and passed a Seat of Governmentz-
Act which named Dalgety as the site of the capital. Its
1
Ibid., p.3244.
2
Ibid., pp.3420-1.
3
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 25 July 1904, C.A.O., C.R.S. A322, 
file 13, 04/A5428. Minister for Works, N.S.W. to P.M., 28 
July 1904, ibid. See map, appendix D.
4
Act n o .7 of 1904.
121
successor, the Reid-McLean Government, approached New 
South Wales in September 1904 with the intention of 
opening negotiations on the basis of the Act, but 
Carruthers, newly become Premier of the State, refused to 
negotiate until he had obtained the opinion of both Houses 
of the State Parliament.^ This was fully consistent with 
his earlier attitude that it was the prerogative of the 
Parliament, not the Executive Government, to offer 
territory; it also gave ample opportunity for local 
pressures and prejudices to exert their influence.
Carruthers obtained legal opinions from his Attorney-
General, Wade, and the prominent Sydney legal firm of J.E.
Salomons and C.B. Stephen on the question whether the Seat
of Government Act 1904 was binding on New South Wales.
The lawyers were able to provide the opinions they knew
their client wanted. It was Wade’s view that section 125
of the Constitution required the seat of government to be
within an area already vested in the Commonwealth. As no
territory had been granted to or acquired by the
Commonwealth, this condition had not been fulfilled and
2the Act did not bind the State. Salomons and Stephen 
agreed but argued that as the Act purported to fix a 
general and not a specific area it was merely declaratory. 
That part of section 125 which stipulated that the area of 
the territory should be 'not less than’ 100 square miles
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 10 October 1904, C.A.O., C.R.S. 
A100, A04/8335.
2
Opinion by C.G. Wade, 18 November 1904, N .S . W. P .P . , 1904, 
2nd session, vol.l, p.178.
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should not be taken too literally but should be 
interpreted to mean 100 square miles or an area a little 
larger.^
On 9 December 1904, in the Legislative Assembly,
Cärruthers moved resolutions to the effect that the State
would offer an area of between 100 and 200 square miles,
instead of the 900 square miles requested, at or near
Tumut, Lyndhurst, Dalgety or Yass and would make
additional reservations for a water catchment area outside
the federal territory, but that the State Government would
not be justified in undertaking heavy expenditure to
improve an old or lay a new railway line to the capital
and that such expenditure must be the subject of a prior
2arrangement with the Commonwealth.
Carruthers argued, as Salomons and Stephen had, that 
the Commonwealth Act was only declaratory and that it was 
an attempt to get New South Wales to face its 
responsibilities. His view of the correct procedure 
remained unaltered and he urged the Parliament to make its 
wishes known in a spirit of conciliation. He referred to 
a letter from Reid in which the Prime Minister had urged
3the advantages of Dalgety from the State’s point of view, 
but expressed his own disapproval of the site because of 
the high cost of linking it satisfactorily with the 
existing railway system. In spite of this, Carruthers was
1
Opinion by J.E. Salomons and C.B. Stephen, 22
1904, ibid., o pp.178-9.
N.S.W.P.D.., 2 Ser., vol.17, pp.2253-4.
j P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 12 October 1904,
A33, vol.7, P-526,
November
C.R.S.
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prepared to offer the site in the attempt to be helpful.
He would not grant a port because the whole of the Monaro
traffic would be diverted through it and the customs
duties payable on the goods lost to the State during the
currency of the bookkeeping systemJ Neither would he
grant access to the sea by a narrow strip of land, as the
Commonwealth seemed to wish, but he would allow a railway
to be built on land which remained under State control.
If the Commonwealth wanted large areas of land for
’socialistic experiments', it must get it by proper 
2methods. Later, in concluding the debate, he showed that
other matters, such as the inability of the States to tax
Commonwealth servants, and the fear that the Commonwealth
Parliament would continue to sit in Melbourne, were3influencing his attitude on this question.
The House showed its attitude clearly when it adopted 
the resolutions but omitted Dalgety, the site already4chosen by the Commonwealth, from those to be offered.
This meant that the 'State right’ characteristics of the 
motion introduced by Carruthers had been considerably 
strengthened. A debate in the Legislative Council had a5similar result. By this means, a situation of complete
_
Under the bookkeeping system, customs duties were 
credited to the State in which goods were consumed. Thus, 
Carruthers’ fear was unjustified - if, in fact, it was more 
than a red herring.
2
N .S.W.P.D., 2 Ser., vol.17, pp.2265-70.
3 Ibid., pp.2449-3^* The taxation question is discussed 
in Chapter 3*
4
Ibid., p.2467.
Ibid., p.2499.3
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deadlock was created; the Commonwealth Parliament had 
fixed the seat of government at or near Dalgety and 
stipulated that the area acquired must be not less than 
9 0 0 square miles and must have access to the sea; the 
State Parliament had expressly refused to offer Dalgety, 
an area larger than 200 square miles, or access to the sea. 
The outlook for an early settlement was not promising.
Local feeling had had its effect. For four years the
Sydney papers had consistently demanded the early
selection of the seat of government in a place which would
confer real advantages on New South Wales, and especially
on Sydney, and which would get Parliament away from the
pernicious influence of the Victorian protectionists.
They had blamed both the Commonwealth and See Governments
for the delay.^ On 30 September 1904, the Sydney Morning
Herald promised Carruthers the support of the whole State
should he try to reverse the injustice perpetrated by the
selection of Dalgety. On the other hand, the Melbourne
Age insisted on the absolute freedom of action of the
Commonwealth and the need for suspicion of the Sydney
2politicians who were out to capture the capital.
The debate in the State Parliament caused some anger
in the Commonwealth Parliament and Reid, although a Sydney
representative, declared that his Government would abide
oby the 1904 Act unless Parliament repealed it.
_
See for example, D .T ., 25 January 1901, 22 January 1902,
23 July 1903; S.M.H., 10 July 1901, 23 September 1 9 0 3 , 25 
August 1 9 0 4 .
2
Age, 27 July 1904.
C.P.D., vol.24, p.8 5 6 1 .
3
125
Carruthers tried to negotiate on the basis of the
1resolutions and reinforced this action by cancelling the
Crown land reservations at Bombala and Orange, sites not
2offered in the resolutions. Reid’s Minister for Home 
Affairs, Dugald Thomson, another New South Welshman, tried 
to persuade him to change his attitude by pointing out 
that the Dalgety site had been investigated under the name 
of ’Buckley’s Crossing' by Commissioner Oliver, who had 
recommended its inclusion in a Southern Monaro site, and 3that the State Government had reserved Crown lands there.
However, both Governments were bound by parliamentary 
decisions and Carruthers, who had probably included Dalgety 
in his original resolutions only because he believed that 
the Parliament, and not the Government, should decide 
whether to offer i t , argued that it had never been offered 
under the terms of section 125 (that is, by Parliament) 
and that it was unsuitable because it was inaccessible and 
too far from Sydney, straining unduly the 100-mile embargo 
placed on that city by the Constitution. He repeated the 
other arguments he had used in Parliament and drew special 
attention to the State's offer to reserve a water 
catchment as compensation for granting an area smaller
4than that sought by the Commonwealth.
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 22 December 1904, C.A.O., C.R.S. 
A100, 06/3744.
2
A. Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 4 February 1905, ibid., A322, 
file 1 3 .
3
Memo, by Minister for Home Affairs for Prem. N.S.W., 17
March 1905, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 1 8 , n.f.n.
4
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 11 April 1905 (with enclosure),
N .S .W ,P .P ., 1 9 0 5 » vol.1, pp.242-6.
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The fact that Carruthers' letter was published in the 
Press before it could reach the Commonwealth caused some 
bitterness. Thomson at first replied through the Press 
and only answered officially much later when Carruthers 
refused to accept the Press interview as a reply. He 
pointed out that for New South Wales to demand, when the 
Commonwealth had, after years of investigation, selected a 
site, that its selection should be put aside meant that 
the Commonwealth must either do nothing or go ahead 
unilaterally. No harm was done to New South Wales by the 
selection of Dalgety, which had been included in the 
Bombala site when the first choice had been made in 1903•
If the decision in favour of Dalgety were reversed, it 
would prove even more difficult to get unanimity on a new 
site .
In July 1905» there was another debate in the State
Parliament which further embittered feelings. The
originator declared that New South Wales had been
defrauded of the right to have the capital within its
boundaries because members of the Commonwealth Parliament
2had preferred to remain in Melbourne. Carruthers
deplored the fact that even Reid had denied New South
Wales justice and was continuing to move federal3departments to Melbourne.
_
Minister for Home Affairs to Prem. N.S.W., 8 and 28 June
I.905, copies, C.A.O., C.R.S. A100, A05/2710 and 4572; Prem. 
N.S.W. to Minister for Home Affairs, 22 June 1905, ibid., 
AO5/419I..
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In fact. New South Wales had little just cause for 
complaint by this time. The whole of its contribution 
since the Commonwealth had passed its Seat of Government 
Act in 1904 had been of a nature to hinder settlement. 
Indeed, the most kindly disposed Federal Government could 
scarcely have made conciliatory moves without appearing to 
have given in to the prejudices and threats of the Sydney 
politicians.
There was a brief glimmer of hope when Deakin
succeeded Reid in office in July 1905. Carruthers
enquired whether his Government accepted the policy of its
predecessor in the matter and, if it did, whether Deakin
would agree to submit the questions at issue to the High
Court for decision.^ Deakin did endorse Reid's policy and
asked Carruthers to submit a list of the questions which
he wished to refer to the Court and to indicate the manner
2in which they were to be submitted.
Carruthers wished to know whether the Commonwealth 
regarded its 1904 Act as binding on New South Wales and 
insisted on all its terms and on the right of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to fix the site in a mandatory way 
although New South Wales had refused to grant the 
territory sought but had offered other sites. Assuming 
that the answer would be in the affirmative, he listed 
fourteen questions to be put to the High Court as a 
special case. They were designed to elucidate six main
_
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 10 July 1905, N .S. W.P.P. , 1905 , 
vol.1, p .24l.
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P.M. to Prem. N.S.W.,
A 33 , vol.10, p.623.
20 July I9O5 , copy, C.A.O., C.R.S.
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principles: the right of the Commonwealth Parliament under
the Constitution to determine the seat of government 
before territory had been granted to or acquired by it; 
its power to acquire territory without the consent of the 
State and, if it had such power, the circumstances in 
which it might be exercised; the extent of territory which 
might be so acquired; whether the territory had to be 
close to the 100-mile limit and whether access to the sea 
could be demanded; whether the temporary seat of government 
might be located outside New South Wales. Even more 
important than keeping the letter of the Constitution was 
the need to keep faith with the State. Until this had 
been done its loyalty to the Commonwealth would be 
severely strained.^
Deakin was confident that the Commonwealth had power 
to determine both the seat of government and the territory 
in which it should be. He indicated that, while his 
Government regarded the selection of Dalgety as mandatory, 
it would seriously consider modifications which New South 
Wales might wish regarding the area of the site and the 
condition of access to the sea, although Parliament had 
expressed a clear opinion on these matters. While there 
would be no seat of government within the meaning of 
section 125 of the Constitution until the capital had been 
established, it was both desirable and constitutional for 
the Governor-General to be in Melbourne while Parliament 
was in session, and there had been no breach of faith with 
New South Wales, especially as he spent much of the recess
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 1 August 1905, N.S.W.P.P., 1905, 
vol.l, pp.247-8.
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in Sydney. The High Court would not consider questions of 
law framed to elicit an opinion but a writ must be issued 
in a form to show cause of action by one party to the suit 
against the other. He was prepared to help state a 
special case before the Court if New South Wales would 
take action to initiate one.1
Carruthers thought that Deakin was evading the 
2question. He was probably confirmed in this suspicion
when, in reply to his suggestion that the Commonwealth
should furnish cause for a test case by some overt act,
such as driving in a survey peg, and then agree to raise
only the issues affecting the broad question to be
3determined, he was informed that the Commonwealth
Attorney-General, I.A. Isaacs, believed that such an act
would not raise the questions which it was desired to
settle. The 1904 Act did not purport to define an exact
site for the territory or to give the Commonwealth right
of entry for the purposes of survey. Deakin forwarded a
confidential draft of a bill which Isaacs felt the
Commonwealth should pass if such an act were to raise the
4desired issues. Carruthers, who had never disputed the 
right of the Commonwealth to make a preliminary survey,
1
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W. , 9 August (two letters) and 19
August 1905, ibid., pp.24-8-9» 251.
2
D,T., 17 August 1905.
3 Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 21 August 1905, N.S.W.P.P., 1905,
v o l .1 , p .251•
4
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 8 September 1905 , C.P.P. , 1905 >
vol.2, pp.455-5; Minute, Isaacs to P.M., 31 August 1905, 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A100, 06/3744.
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rejected this as he felt that it might validate the very
point in dispute. He urged further consideration of his
1 2own proposal. Each leader maintained his position and
the Daily Telegraph laughed at their 'tame little comedy'
and expressed the view that the Commonwealth Parliament
would have the site it wanted or remain in Melbourne. The
blame for this, it believed, lay with New South Wales for
3having accepted the Constitution as it stood.
To meet Carruthers' objection that the proposed 
survey act might be valid even if it had been passed before 
the Seat of Government A c t , Deakin had an extra clause 
drafted stipulating that no action performed under it 
should be «deemed valid if the 1904 Act were held to be
4invalid or not binding on New South Wales. Carruthers
was still not satisfied and suggested that the Attorneys-
General of the Governments should meet to discuss the
points at issue and that each Parliament should then pass
an act agreeing to submit certain matters, to be defined5in a schedule to the act, to the High Court.
Wade and Isaacs met in Melbourne on 16 October 1905 
and agreed that the questions between the Governments
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., l4 September 1905, C.P.P., 1905, 
vol.2, P.457.
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 20 September 1905 and Prem. N.S.W.
to P . M . , 26 September 1905, ibid., pp.437-8*
3
D.T., 7 September 1905*
4
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 27 September 1905, C.P.P., 1905, 
vol.2, p .438.
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Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 29 September 1903, ibid., p.438.
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could not be brought to issue merely by driving in a 
survey peg and that an action for trespass might not lie 
under the proposed survey act. Wade believed that the 
1904 Act was merely declaratory, but Isaacs thought that 
it amounted at least to a quasi-determination of the seat 
of government, as it restricted consideration to land 
within 17 miles of Dalgety. Both agreed that further 
definition of the territory was necessary before the 
Commonwealth's power to determine the site, before the 
grant or acquisition of territory, could be tested.
Isaacs thought that the Commonwealth should press on with 
its Survey Bill, including a waiver clause preserving the 
rights of New South Wales, survey the land and request 
that the State grant it. The main and dependent issues 
would then be raised.
Carruthers noted with satisfaction that the 
Commonwealth Government had apparently withdrawn from its 
earlier contention that the 1904 Act was mandatory on the 
State. He commented that, if this were so, it could 
consider the three sites offered by New South Wales in 
December 1904 and there would be neither need nor cause to 
approach the High Court. It was simply a question of 
whether the Commonwealth Parliament would consider the 
reply of the State Parliament to its own suggestions in 
the Seat of Government Act 1904 and there was no need for
1
A.G. for Commonwealth to A.G. for N.S.W. , 20 October 1905,
ibid., pp.460-1; A.G. for N.S.W. to A.G. for Commonwealth, 
18 October 1905 , N.S.W.P.P., 1905, vol.l, pp.235-6.
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further legislation.^ Carruthers had already written that
he had revoked the reservation (from lease and sale) of
2Crown lands in the neighbourhood of Dalgety. If he had
consulted with Wade before sending the letter, and that is
possible although not certain, the action fitted in with
his view of the ’new* Commonwealth position. From the
Commonwealth viewpoint, it bore a different appearance.
3When Deakin asked him to stay his hand, Carruthers agreed
to do so for a month, but insisted that the State would4never grant the Dalgety site.
A heated exchange followed. Deakin was determined to 
proceed as Isaacs had suggested and to ask Parliament to 
fix the exact site of the capital. Carruthers saw this 
as an attempt by the Commonwealth to legislate New South 
Wales out of a voice in a matter of intimate concern to it. 
He threatened that, if Deakin persisted in this course, he 
would invite the Legislature and people of the State to 
consider the unsatisfactory position which the action 
would create with a view to taking 'definite action' for 
the maintenance of 'our unquestionable rights'.^
1
Minute by Carruthers, 23 October 1905, on Isaacs letter
above, ibid., pp.264-5; Prem. N.SJtf. to P.M., 1 N ovember
1905, C.P.P. , 1905, vo1.o ■ 2 ,
p .464.
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This was probably the letter which led Deakin to give 
his departmental Secretary, Atlee Hunt, his opinion of 
Carruthers in the most vigorous terms. When he had 
finished, Hunt asked, ’Yes, but what shall I reply?’
Deakin gave the unique instruction: 'Tell him to go to
hell - three pages'.^
Hunt carried out the instruction admirably. The
reply pointed out that the fact that reports had been made
on the Dalgety site and Crown lands reserved there showed
that the New South Wales Government recognized the
propriety of its being considered along with the other
sites. Carruthers’ attitude, and the threatened withdrawal
of the reservation at Dalgety, was an attempt to control
the actions of the Commonwealth Parliament but it could
not give way before such dictation. If they could get a
majority against it, the New South Wales representatives
in the Federal Parliament could reverse the 1904 decision
2when the Survey Bill was introduced.
Debates in the Commonwealth Parliament during
November-December 1905 showed that the opinion of New
South Wales members was swinging behind their State
Government, while a rift was growing between them and the
3members from the other States. It is doubtful whether
1
La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, vol.1, p.273 and note. La 
Nauze incorrectly refers to the letters being in C .P .P ., 
1906, whereas they are in C .P .P ., 1905.
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 15 November 1905» C .P .P ., 1905?
vol.2, pp.469-70.
3
See C.P.D., vol.28, pp.4602-13, 4679; vol.30, pp.6646-62, 
7148-70, 7285-310, 7378-416.
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the Government acted wisely in introducing its Seat of 
Government Bill 1905 in the dying moments of the session 
when there was no hope of its being passed. It did redeem 
a promise, but it made the charge of insincerity easy, and 
added to the ill-will already aroused by Carruthers. The 
whole failure of the scheme to obtain a ruling on the 
capital site question from the High Court sprang from 
Carruthers’ unwillingness to co-operate in the procedure 
proposed by Isaacs for the benefit of New South Wales, but 
it was regrettable that the Commonwealth should do 
anything to add to the difficulties.
On the last day of the session of the New South Wales 
Parliament (8 December 1905)» Carruthers carried out the 
threat he had made on 8 November. He asked the Assembly 
to express its ’profound dissatisfaction’ with the 
treatment given the State by the Commonwealth Parliament 
with regard to 'many matters of serious concern', and 
especially the selection of the federal territory, and to 
instruct the Government to devise a simple means to allow 
the electors to express their opinion on the matter.^ A 
move to omit the provocative clause concerning reference 
to the electors failed by 44 votes to 17 in the 90-member 
House." The motion finally passed by 42 votes to two
after Labor members had walked out in protest against the 
3use of the gag. The Legislative Council passed a similar
1
2
3
N .S.W.P.D., 2 Ser. 
Ibid., p.4852. 
Ibid., p.4853.
vol.21, p .4806.
135
motion without division and after only perfunctory 
discussion.^
The debate on the resolutions was bitter and opened a
new phase in the negotiations with the Commonwealth. In
terms of arguments, it added nothing new to the discussion,
but it did reveal the extent to which Carruthers had the
Parliament behind him in the matter and so strengthened
his hand as he tried to put pressure on Deakin. Not tftat
it was the kind of pressure to which Deakin was likely to
(or, indeed, could) yield. The situation was similar to
that in 1901 when Philp had tried to control Barton's
2actions over the expulsion of the Kanakas. If federation 
was to mean anything, Deakin had to maintain the right of 
the Commonwealth Parliament to deal, without interference 
from the States, with matters specifically committed to it 
by the Constitution.
These bald resolutions were forwarded to the3Commonwealth Government which sought some explanation of4them. Three months later, Carruthers set out the whole 
position. He rehearsed the old arguments against Dalgety 
and against the constitutionality of the 1904 Act, 
although he did admit that the State was partly to blame 
as it had delayed so long in offering a site for the
1
ibid., pp.4763-7.2
This matter is discussed below, in the chapter 'Three 
Problems'.
3
Lt. Gov. N.S.W. to G.G., 18 December 1905, C.P.P., 1906, 
vol. 2 , pp.4d-2.4
P.M. to G.G., 30 December 1905, ibid., p.402.
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capital. He directed attention to the question of the
distance of the site from Sydney and claimed that the 1899
Premiers’ Conference, which he had not attended and which
had issued only a series of resolutions by way of report,
had intended the site to be as near as possible to the
100-mile limit. In this faith, the New South Wales
1electors had accepted the Constitution.
It is true that the phrase used by the Premiers in 
their resolution, 'at a reasonable distance from Sydney', 
was understood in New South Wales during the referendum
campaign of 1899 as a qualification of the 100-mile
2limit, but that was still a far cry from Carruthers' 
claim.
Deakin refused to be bound by an unofficial agreement 
only brought to light seven years after it was alleged to 
have been made. Parliament had to act according to the 
written Constitution and had done so when it had selected 
Dalgety. Before that site had been chosen on 15 August 
1904, three years had been spent in seeking the best site 
and, not only had New South Wales not objected to Dalgety, 
but it had expressly acquiesced in its consideration as it 
had been included in the extended Southern Monaro or 
Bombala sites as offered. The State Parliament could have 
assisted in settling the question in December 1904, but 
had acted inconsistently and embarrassingly by refusing
1
Memo, by Prem. N.S.W., with Gov. N.S.W. to G.G., 28 
March 1906, ibid., pp.402-4.
2
L.F. Fitzhardinge, 'Political and Public Life' in 
J. Groom (Ed.), Nation Building in Australia, Sydney,
19^1, pp.77-8.
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the site which the Commonwealth had chosen. However, the 
Federal Government and Parliament could not surrender
1their duty to select the site which they thought best.
Carruthers placed the blame for the dispute squarely
on the See Government which had neglected its duty in not
asking the State Parliament to offer a site. The
resolutions of December 1904 were the first valid offer
made. When the State offered Tumut (322 miles from
Sydney), Lyndhurst (l95 miles) and Yass (l92 miles), while
claiming that the site should be near the 1 0 0 -mile limit,
it was not being inconsistent but merely showing an
'earnest desire' to have the best site selected even if it
had to forego some of the advantages which should accrue 
2to it.
On the other hand, the Adelaide Advertiser, a
reasonably disinterested spectator in this matter,
attributed the whole trouble to the fear within New South
Wales that the interests of Sydney would be compromised by3a site as far away from it as Dalgety. There is little 
doubt that the Advertiser was correct, though the 
stricture implied in its judgement might be qualified by 
the remark that the attitude of the Victorian Press and 
politicians did nothing to allay that fear.
_
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Carruthers argued consistently that the
Commonwealth's only independent power was to fix the exact
site of the 'seat of government' (the federal city) within
territory already granted to it by the State. It was for
the State to make a formal offer of territory by
parliamentary resolution and only if the State declined to
make such an offer could the Commonwealth exercise an
1independent power of acquisition. Under this 
interpretation of the Constitution, it was consistent to 
claim that the resolutions of December 1904 constituted 
the first valid offer made by the State, to cancel 
reservations of Crown lands in areas not thus offered, to 
blame the See Government for the early delays and even to 
claim that the 1904 resolutions were 'conciliatory'.
His whole case was based on a strained and untenable 
interpretation of section 125» as R.R. Garran showed in a 
memorandum written in January 1905* Grammatically and 
logically it was clear that the first paragraph of section 
125 required the federal territory to be granted or 
acquired before the seat of government was established, 
not before it was determined. There was nothing in the 
section to justify the assumption that the 'seat of 
government' was a smaller area within the larger 
'territory', a view necessitated by Carruthers' 
interpretation. It was clear that the Commonwealth 
Parliament was given power to determine the seat of 
government. Garran pointed out that when the Legislative 
Assembly of New South Wales had asked (in 1899) that the 
capital should be established within that State, it had
_
See N .S .W .P .D ., 2 Ser., vol.4, pp.46l6-25 and vol.17,
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139
not sought to fetter the freedom of the Federal Parliament 
to determine its own territory. The only constitutional 
limitations were that the site must be within New South 
Wales but not within 100 miles of Sydney. If the words of 
section 125 were not sufficient in themselves to give the 
Commonwealth power to acquire the territory, it was given 
under section 51 (xxxix), which empowered it to make laws 
with respect to matters incidental to the exercise of 
powers given under the Constitution. Only on one point 
did Garran agree with Carruthers: the Commonwealth's power
of independent acquisition was limited and only extended 
to such an area as was 'reasonably necessary for the 
purposes of the seat of Government'.^
On all points Garran's logic was unanswerable.
Because Deakin adopted this interpretation, it was
consistent for him to assume, as See had done, in contrast
with Carruthers, that when the State reserved Crown land
in an area or furnished information about its potential as
a site it was offering the area for consideration and had
2done all that was expected of it. In this difference lay 
the seeds of trouble, especially as Carruthers, who was 
playing the part of an advocate and putting his client's 
case as strongly as possible, was not subject to the 
persuasion of reason.
Official negotiations died for a time, but efforts 
were made behind the scenes to find a solution.
1
'Notes on the provisions of the Constitution relating to 
the Seat of Government', R.R. Garran, 19 January 1905, 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A100, A06/3774.
See P.M. to G.G., 5 May 1906, ibid.
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J.C. Watson was publicly critical of Carruthers but
received his private thanks for working with him in the
matter and was assured by Carruthers that the latter would
2follow Watson’s lead with regard to Canberra, a new.site
3which was occupying public attention for the first time.
In September 1906, Carruthers demanded that the 4matter should be settled before the end of the session,
but this was impossible because of the invitation issued
by New South Wales to visit several new sites and because
certain details about Canberra, a site which had excited
5much interest, had just become available. Carruthers 
might have drawn hope from the fact that the Commonwealth 
had agreed to inspect and receive reports on new sites, 
but he preferred to think that Deakin was trying to blame 
his Government for further delays and attempted to 
pinpoint the refusal of the Commonwealth to consider 5 the 
respectfully expressed views of the [state] Parliament’ 
(the 1904 resolutions) as the root cause.^
1
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Deakin listed the stages in the dispute, with dates, 
and it was clear that most of the delays had been due to 
New South Wales. When the Commonwealth Government invited 
negotiation in September 1904, the State had not replied 
until 15 December and, by that time, the Commonwealth 
Parliament had prorogued; between July and December 1905 
there had been correspondence about submitting the 
question to the High Court as suggested by New South Wales 
but the State had finally refused to agree to the method 
proposed; in the early part of 1906, the State Government 
had had new sites examined but had submitted the reports 
too late for the question to be dealt with that session.
In addition, when the Commonwealth had introduced a bill 
authorizing the acceptance of a grant of territory to be 
made by New South Wales, several prominent members from 
that State, no doubt working with Carruthers, had 
suggested that it should not be proceeded with then.
On 7 August 1907, Crown land reservations at Dalgety,
2Yass, Lyndhurst and Tumut were revoked - it was no longer 
in the interests of the State to have the capital at any 
of these places although three of them had been offered as 
sites in 1904. This was Carruthers* last action in the 
matter as he retired on 30 September and his Attorney- 
General, C.G. Wade, became Premier and carried on the fight 
for the State.
1
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 20 October 1906, copy, ibid.
2
C.G. Wade (for Secretary for Lands) to P.M., 8 August 
1907? ibid. Carruthers had not previously carried out his 
threat of October 1905 to revoke the Dalgety reservation.
By his rigid insistence on the 'rights' of New South 
Wales, and his failure to recognize the rights of the 
Commonwealth, Carruthers had made a friendly solution of 
the capital site question almost impossible, His three 
years in office were a period of constant strife and in 
that time it appears never to have occurred to him that he 
had a poor bargaining position and that all his threats 
were largely bluster.
The capital site question was of some interest in New
South Wales in the Commonwealth election of I906, It was
again prominent in the 1907 State election. Candidates
were questioned frequently about their choice of site.^
This prompted Wade, soon after he had assumed office, to
press for a definite assurance that the matter would be
settled that session or first thing the following 
2session. Deakin pointed out that there was already a 
statute on the books and that the tariff would take up 
most of Parliament's time in the 1907 session but he hoped, 
rather vaguely, to 'submit' the matter to Parliament before
3the prorogation. Deakin’s use of 'submit' rather than 
'settle' was taken by Wade to indicate that he was begging 
the question and he charged Deakin with bad faith. Deakin 
repudiated this angrily and there was a sharp personal.
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exchange between the two men which ended with Deakin re­
asserting the entire responsibility of the Commonwealth 
for dealing with the question. Wade 1 234s first attempt to 
settle the issue had been no less clumsy than those of his 
predecessor.
On 25 February 1908s, Wade enquired whether it would
help the Commonwealth Parliament if the State Parliament
2made a definite offer of the site it preferred. Deakin
was not prepared to speak for such a divided body as the
Parliament and stated that, while his Government would
interpret such an action as favourably as possible, the
State Government alone must bear the responsibility for 
3it. Wade took this to mean that the help would not be 
acceptable and contrasted Deakin*s attitude with the way 
Barton had earlier sought the views of the State. He 
pointed out that Lyne had indicated that settlement was 
being hampered by lack of knowledge of the wishes of the 
Government and people of New South Waies. Wade had been 
trying to remedy this but had no wish to force the views
4of the State on the Commonwealth Parliament.
1
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When Deakin reminded Wade that it had been
consistently forgotten in New South Wales that the
Commonwealth had already selected a site, and that its
attitude to new information must necessarily be different
from what it had been before the 1904 Act had been
passed,^ he was correct. But it did appear that he was
refusing to notice the moves to alter the site, moves
which he had recognized in his correspondence with
Carruthers in the winter of 1907* While he had to be
guarded in his comments, he was unduly hard on Wade, whose
tone was now more conciliatory than it had been before
Christmas, and who was at last genuinely trying to help.
Eventually Deakin did modify his attitude and when Wade
requested that the bill should be introduced in a form
which would allow the insertion of any name which
2Parliament might choose, Deakin informed him that not
only would it be possible to alter the site by amending
the, bill but that any information which Wade might supply
3would be laid before the Parliament.
On 8 April 1908, a Seat of Government Bill was 
introduced in the House of Representatives, but the debate 
was adjourned at the end of the day and was not resumed 
before the end of the long and wearisome tariff session 
which had extended from 3 July 1907 to 3 June 1908. When 
the next session opened, on 16 September I9O8 , a new Seat
1
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 20 March 1908, ibid., p.223*
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of Government Bill was introduced almost immediately, and, 
on 1 October, an amendment was passed requiring that, 
before the Bill was further proceeded with, an opportunity 
should be given to consider sites other than Dalgety.^
A ballot was held in the House of Representatives on
8 October. From the outset the real contest was between
Dalgety and Yass-Canberra. The latter site won in the
ninth ballot by 39 votes to 33* As in 1903-4, there was a
split between New South Wales and Victorian members, with
all except two of the former voting for Yass-Canberra and216 out of 23 Victorians supporting Dalgety. The Senate
ballot took place on 6 November, and, of the six sites
listed, only Tumut and Yass-Canberra were supported, each
receiving 18 votes. All New South Wales Senators supported
Yass-Canberra and five Victorians voted for Tumut. In a
second ballot, Senator McColl, a Victorian, switched his
3vote to give Yass-Canberra a narrow victory.
The Victorians had voted less solidly than before and 
it was this which allowed a settlement which was acceptable 
to New South Wales to be reached. The Sydney Morning 
Herald thought that an insult had been wiped out and the
1
C .P .D ., v o 1.47, pp.663-75*
2
Ibid., pp.936-9* Tasmanian and Queensland members were 
more evenly divided than previously but the Western 
Australians voted solidly for a southern site and the 
South Australians preferred Dalgety (southern).
3
Ibid., vol.48, pp.2101, 2108. South Australians and 
Queensland Senators were evenly divided, the Western 
Australians solid for Tumut while the Tasmanians heavily 
favoured Yass-Canberra.
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first real steps towards union taken. The statement
illustrates the importance which was put upon the question
in New South Wales. Some time later the Age expressed the
view that the selection was a 'national crime' and it
severely castigated the few 'unpatriotic' Victorians who
had supported 'the Sydney contingent' and so ensured that
the capital would forever exist unimpressively in the
2shadow of Sydney. The thought of losing their grip on 
the Commonwealth Parliament was apparently not pleasing to 
Victorians. The biggest step towards settlement of the 
dispute had been taken and relations, with regard to this 
question, improved markedly once the aspirations of New 
South Wales had been at least partly satisfied.
When the Fisher Government assumed office in November 
1908, one of its first tasks was to pass a Seat of 
Government Act naming the Yass-Canberra area as the 
federal territory. In spite of last ditch efforts to 
change the site, the bill was pushed through all stages in
3a few days. During the rest of its brief period in 
office, the Government arranged, with the co-operation of 
the State Government, for the selection of the most 
suitable site for the seat of government within the
4general Yass-Canberra area.
1
S .M ,H ., 9 October I9O8 .
2
Age, 5 July 1909.
3
C.P.D., vol.48, passim.
4
See the correspondence in N.S.W.A., P.D., S.B. 4/6257, 
09/^607 and C.A.O., C.R.S. A322, bundle 11.
When the Fusion Government took office in July 1909,
Deakin asked Wade to pass a State act for the surrender of
territory in accord with section 111 of the Constitution.
He wanted to see the bill before it was submitted to the
Parliament and asked that the Commonwealth should be given
the right to draw on the resources of the Snowy River for
power, if needed, and to construct harbour works at Jervis
Bay in connection with the establishment of a federal port
there.1 Wade was unwilling to pass a surrender act
because of the vagueness of the Seat of Government Act
1908 which simply placed the seat of government !in the
district of Yass-Canberra in the State of New South Wales’.
If the State surrendered the Crown lands indicated in the
map accompanying Deakin’s letter and the Commonwealth
Parliament did not adopt that area, the State would be in
an anomalous position. The precise locality should first
2be declared by metes and bounds. The expeditious passage
of the bill through the New South Wales Parliament would
depend on the availability of this information. He
pointed to the South Australian Act concerning the
Northern Territory as the kind of formal ratification of
an agreement already reached between two parties which
3seemed desirable to him.' Deakin merely advised that his
7
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 20 July 1909, C .P .P ., 1909, vol.2,
p.553.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 5 August 1909» ibid., pp.55^-5*
3
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 28 Augus t 1909 » ibid. , pp.56l-2. 
The Northern Territory agreement is discussed later in 
this chapter.
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Government adhered to the terms of the I9O8 Act concerning 
the area required and that it accepted Scrivener1 23 4s plan, 
as shown on an accompanying map, as satisfactory. A
2meeting of the parties was arranged early in September.
As a result, on 16 September, Wade introduced resoltuions
dealing with the matter into the New South Wales
Legislative Assembly. These resolutions contained certain
3modifications of the original plan.
The area offered was reduced to about 800 square 
miles and the catchment area of the Gudgenby, Naas and 
Paddy Rivers was substituted for the Queanbeyan area 
(which Wade had been unwilling to surrender because of the 
high percentage of freehold land there and because it 
included a. section of the Goulburn to Queanbeyan railway) . 
Commonwealth interests in the Queanbeyan and Molonglo 
catchment areas were preserved. Two square miles of land 
were offered at Jervis Bay and the right given to link 
this by rail to the capital site. The right to conduct 
power across State territory from any place agreed upon to 
the capital was granted. The Commonwealth was not to have
1
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W, , 31 August I909, telegram, ibid. ,
P . 56l.
2
Diary entries, 3? 4 and 6 September 1909» D,P, , A.N.L. ,
MS.1540, box 47.
3
N » S , W .P ,D „ , 2 Ser. vol .34, pp.2075-6.
4
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 6 June 1909, N.S.W.A», P.D., S.B. 
4/6257» 09/4607. By the time the alteration was actually 
made the people of Queanbeyan had become worth 25 
shillings a head a year to N.S.W. (under the Financial 
Agreement of August 1909) - another good reason for not 
transferring the town.
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a right to interfere with the use of the waters of the 
Murrumbidgee by the State or citizens of New South Wales.
1The resolutions were passed without amendment. Wade
forwarded them to the Prime Minister with the suggestion
that they should be submitted to the Commonwealth
Parliament. He assured Deakin that any modification
desired by the Parliament would be considered by the State
2with every desire to secure agreement. The Commonwealth
Advisory Board recommended acceptance of most of the 
3resolutions.' Later, Wade offered an additional 100
square miles of territory. He had understood from a
meeting he had had with the Ministers for Home Affairs and
Defence that the offer of only 800 square miles might
cause difficulty as it would necessitate amendment of the41908 Act. After this there was nothing to prevent the
resolutions being drafted as a formal agreement and the
submission of surrender and acceptance bills to the
5respective Parliaments.
One last occasion for friction remained. Under the 
terms of the Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909. two 
proclamations were necessary. The first took effect on 22
1
N .S .W.P,D ., 2 Ser., vol.3^, p.2118.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 20 September 1909, C.P.P., 1909, 
vol.2, p.571.
3
Report of Advisory Board, 22 September 1909, ibid., 
pp.572-4.
4
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 28 September 1909> ibid., p.375*
5
See debates in C.P.P., vols.52-4, and N .S .W.P.D ., 
vols.35-6.
2 Ser.,
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January I9IO and brought the Act itself into operation
and gave the Governor-General authority to issue another
proclamation which would finally vest the territory in the
Commonwealth. The second was long delayed so that certain
machinery of government could be provided before it was 
2issued. By July, Wade was impatient and critical of the
3Fisher Government's inactivity," but delay continued until 
5 December when everything was in order and the 
proclamation was issued to take effect from 1 January
41911* By that time the Wade Government had fallen and 
the control of affairs in New South Wales had passed to 5others who had had no part in the now completed struggle.
It was a bitter irony that New South Wales, which had 
struggled hard and successfully before 1901 to ensure that 
the federal capital would be within its territory, should 
have been deprived of the fruits of its struggle for so 
long after federation. It was inevitable that interstate 
jealousies should have some play in the selection of a 
capital site and, j^sibly, the constitutional provisions 
that it must be within New South Wales but not less than 
100 miles from Sydney limited their scope to some extent.
1
C.A.O., C.R.S. A206 , v o l .2, p.65-
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., l4 June I9IO, C a P „P . , 1910, vol.2,
pp.473-4.
3
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 4 July 1910, ibid., p.475.
4
C.A.O., C.R.S. A206, vol.4, p.12.
5
The McGowen Ministry took office 21 October 1910.
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But their importance was, on the other hand, magnified by 
the fact that New South Wales placed so much emphasis on 
the early selection of a site of which it could approve. 
Indeed, it. is hardly too much to say that Carruthers and 
Wade, often backed by the Parliament and newspapers, made 
the question the touchstone by which they judged the 
working of federation. The failure to settle it 
satisfactorily poisoned relations between the Commonwealth 
and New South Wales during the first decade. The attitude 
of Victorian members of the Federal Parliament and of the 
Age did nothing to help.
The opposing interpretations of section 12.5 of the 
Constitution, already discussed, were fruitful of much 
strife, as were the inconsistencies of Carruthers. Always 
far more concerned to maintain the power and prestige of 
New South Wales than to reach a solution on strictly 
constitutional lines, he was consistent in his basic 
interpretation of section 125 but not in other matters.
In 1904 he criticized Dalgety as a site because it was too 
far from Sydney, but offered other sites also very distant 
from it,; he asked Parliament to offer Lyndhurst, Tumut and 
Yass as suitable sites in 1904 but in 1907 revoked the 
Crown lands reservations there as not being in the 
interests of New South Wales^ he fought the request for 
900 square miles of terri tory 8 on principle , yet in I9OI 
he had thought that an area of ^00 square miles might be 
offered and in 1904 was prepared to offer 200 square miles, 
or double the constitutional minimum, an area which 
breached 8 principle8 as clearly as did 900 square miles.
In fact, it was not "principle8 but. the interests of New 
South Wales, and especially of Sydney, which guided his
152
actions. It is highly probable that his strained 
interpretation of section 125 was adopted and maintained 
simply to bolster those interests»
The Commonwealth had sometimes been the cause of 
delay. In the main, this had been unavoidable, as in 
1901-2 and 1907-8 when Parliament was engaged for long 
periods with the tariff to the exclusion of much ordinary 
business. The complication introduced by the desire of 
the Federal Parliament to acquire an area much larger than 
the constitutional minimum, and with access to the sea, 
was its main contribution to the strife. This was a 
matter on which it might have been preferable for 
negotiations to precede the parliamentary demand. Even 
in this the Commonwealth had some excuse. In his first 
letter to See in April 1901, Barton had referred to his 
Government's desire to consider larger areas. See did not 
comment officially on this, though he did remark in 
Parliament later that he would not grant 1,000 square 
miles. He reserved substantial areas of Crown lands at 
various suggested sites.
Compromise became possible only after Carruthers had 
gone from the political scene. But the final solution was 
a compromise. Indeed, it was an anti-climax after the 
bitter discussions which had gone before, While the 
Canberra site was well outside the 100-mile limit, it was 
far more dependent on Sydney than Dalgety had been. The 
Commonwealth got the 900 square miles and the port which 
it desired, but they were separated by a large tract of 
State territory and have yet to be linked by railway.
There was even compromise in the method finally adopted to 
transfer the territory^ the Commonwealth Parliament
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indicated by balloting which site it wanted, the State 
Parliament passed resolutions offering its transfer under 
certain conditions arid then the respective Parliaments 
passed Acts of surrender and acceptance. Commonsense had 
finally triumphed over the absurd posturing of earlier 
year’s .
The Imperial Government had intended to annex the
immense area (over 500,000 square miles) of the Northern 
1Territory to Queensland, but, when the explorer John
McDouall Stuart reported favourably on it, misdirected
self-interest led the South Australian Government to seek
control of it. It was annexed to South Australia in
1863 but the State had neither the resources nor the will
to develop the area, with its tropical north and arid
interior and, instead of becoming a commercial asset, the
3Territory remained a financial liability.
Such an area, could be developed only as a national 
responsibility and it was clear' that development was 
necessary if the country were to justify its restrictions 
on coloured Immigration and build up an adequate system of
1
There is a useful, but strongly pro-South Australian, 
account, from printed sources only, of the transfer of the 
Northern Territory in R.L. Reid, 'South Australia and the 
First Decade of Federation5, M.A thesis, Adelaide, 195^» 
chapter 6.
2
Quick and Gar-ran, Annot a ted Cons t i t, u t: io n , p.37,5>
R. Duncan, The Northern Territory Pastoral Industry 1863- 
1910* Melbourne, I967 , c h . 1.
3
Reid, ‘South Australia and the First Decade5, pp.135?
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defence. That the Commonwealth should take over the 
burden of development from South Australia had been 
contemplated at the Conventions,  ^ and negotiations began 
soon after federation.
In mid-April 1901, F.W. Holder, still Premier of
South Australia, although already elected to the Federal
Parliament, outlined to Barton the financial position and
potential of the Territory and the inability of the State
to construct the necessary railway link between Pine Creek
in the north and Oodnadatta in South Australia proper. He
offered the Territory to the Commonwealth with the short
existing railway (from Darwin to Pine Creek) and all other
2assets on the assumption of all its liabilities. In
July, Jenkins, Holder's successor, indicated that his
Government was prepared to subscribe to the terms offered
3by Holder, but another three months passed before Barton 
initiated enquiries concerning recent South Australian
4action to develop the Territory. Even then there was no 
attempt to secure control of it. This dilatoriness was to 
pave the way for later difficulties, although it must be 
doubted whether the Commonwealth was at that time in a 
position to take any very practical action.
1
La N a u z e , Alfred Deakin, v o l .2, p.593*
2
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 18 April 1901, C.P.P., 1901-2, v o l .2, 
P P •9^3-^•
3
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 16 July 1901, telegram, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A432, 54/621.
4
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 2 October 1901, ibid.
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Meanwhile, in July, V.L. Solomon (South Australia,
formerly a member for the Northern Territory in the State
Parliament) had moved in the House of Representatives that
it was desirable that the Commonwealth should negotiate
with South Australia to obtain complete jurisdiction over
the Northern Territory.^ The debate was not completed
until September 1902, when the motion was carried with the
2stipulation that control should be assumed on just terms. 
In the South Australian House of Assembly, Mr Herbert 
(Northern Territory) had asked the House to disapprove of 
Holder's offer and to express the opinion that 
negotiations should not be continued until it had approved 3of the terms. His view of the correct procedure bore
some similarity to that of Carruthers in the capital site
issue. The motion was discharged when Jenkins promised
that no action would be taken until the House had been
kacquainted with the details of the proposal.
Soon after Barton had informed Jenkins, in September
1902, of the resolution passed in the House of
5Representatives, the State Government introduced a bill 
to allow the completion of the north-south railway on the
1
C.P.D., vol.2, pp.2149-55.
2
Ibid., vol.12, p.15911»
3
S.A.P.D. (L .A .), 1901, p.713.
4
Ibid., P.1225.
5
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 17 September 1902, copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A452, 54/621.
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land grant system, a method which had previously been
resisted as undesirable. While the Commonwealth could not
object to the legislation, Barton pointed out that it
would have to take account of its general effect on
Commonwealth interests and he enquired whether Holder's
offer had been abandoned or remained open under new 
2conditions. Jenkins wanted to suspend negotiations as
his Government felt that the railway question was too
important to be entrusted to a Commonwealth Parliament
3which might be hostile to the scheme.
This attitude was apparently the result of pressure 
by Northern Territory pastoralists. They desired a 
railway to Adelaide to enable them to get their stock to 
market in good condition and felt that they were more 
likely to get it from the State than from the Commonwealth
4Parliament. As Barton noted, if the railway made the 
Territory a paying proposition South Australia would keep
it; if not, the offer to transfer the burden would be
5 6renewed. Deakin thought that, with the Vondel argument
1
S .A .P .D . (L.A.), 1902, pp.567» 630. Under this system a 
company would lay and operate the line and, in return, 
receive large grants of land in alternating blocks along 
each side of it.
2
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 22 November 1902, copy, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A452, 54/621.
3
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 1 and 10 December 1902, ibid.
4
Reid, ’South Australia and the First Decade’, p.l4o.
5
Minute by Barton, 13 December 1902, on Prem. S.A. to P . M . , 
10 December 1902, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 4 5 2 , 5^/621.
6
See chapter 1 above.
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at its height, the State was doubly unwilling to surrender 
territory to the Commonwealth and that Adelaide businessmen 
were anxious to make the city the hub of the east-west and 
north-south transcontinental railway systems and had 
exerted their influence accordingly. Mr Darling, the
Leader of the State Opposition, was supposed to have been
1particularly influential. In Parliament, Darling 
certainly supported the moves by the Jenkins Government on 
the grounds that they would prevent the railway being 
built to New South Wales and Queensland and would make 
South Australia ’one of the most promising and prosperous 
States of the Commonwealth’. He also claimed that the
2Government had taken the idea over from the Opposition.
The South Australian desire either to turn the 
Northern Territory into a commercial asset in its own 
right or to use it to gain an advantage for Adelaide 
caused negotiations with the Commonwealth to lapse until 
late 1905* When the State did re-open them, it was in a 
manner which made further delay almost certain.
On 18 October 1905» V.L. Solomon, once more a 
representative of the Northern Territory in the South 
Australian Parliament, moved that the State Government 
should ask the Commonwealth to assume control of the 
Northern Territory on certain conditions. It was to repay 
to the State all moneys spent on the settlement and 
administration of the Territory and, within a year of
1
Morning Post, 12 December 1902 (Sydney, 4 November), 
D.P., A.N.L., MS.1540.
2
S.A.P.D. (L .A .), 1902, pp.693-7.
158
transfer, was to commence the construction of a railway 
from the southern boundary of the Territory to Pine Creek. 
This railway was to be linked with South Australia's 
northern line and to deviate no more than 1.00 miles from 
the path of the Overland Telegraph - that is, it was to 
follow a central course, the one most favourable to South 
Australian and least favourable to Queensland and New 
South Wales interests. The southern boundary of the 
Territory was to be moved from 26° south latitude to 22°.
The last provision was deleted on the suggestion of
2the Price Government, which accepted the remainder of the
resolutions without enthusiasm, mainly because it was felt
that the extra mileage of railway that the State would
have to build would cost more than the land was worth.
3The motion passed as amended.
Price, the Premier, sought the Commonwealth’s views 
4on the resolutions. Deakin pointed out that, since the 
first offer, not only had the debt on the Territory 
increased from £2,852,495 to £3,^+00,000, but the 
Commonwealth was asked to build an expensive railway on a 
restricted route which might interfere with its financial 
prospects. He wondered what had enhanced the value of the 
Territory so much, especially as no-one had taken up the
1
S . A . P . D . ( L . A . ) , I.9 0 5 , p.5 0 9 .
2
Ibid., p.918.
3
Ibid., pp.918, 1004.
4
Prem. S.A. to P.M.', 3 February 1906 , C . P . P . , 1906 , vol.2,
p.1233.
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State's offer of 75 million acres of land and the profits 
of working the railway in return for building it, and why 
the proprietorship of such an apparently rich area should 
imply annual deficits.
There was no real answer to these questions. The
State Government could only argue that the through-line
was essential if the country were to be profitably
occupied. The deficits and failure of the land grant
railway proposal were the result of Commonwealth
legislation forbidding the introduction of white labour
under contract and imposing customs duties on goods
2imported for railway construction.
3The thinking was confused. The introduction of 
white labour under contract was not prohibited but merely 
strictly regulated. As three-fourths of the customs 
revenue was returned to the State under section 87, that 
portion could have been refunded to a contractor. The 
completion of the railway link would bring benefit to 
South Australia and the fact that the State would have to 
build the portion within its own borders was no excuse for
1
P.M. to Prem. S.A. , 23 February 1906 , ibid. , p.123^*
2
A. Prem. S.A. to P.M., 6 April 1906, ibid., pp.123^-5*
3 The Labor members of Price's coalition Government were 
in an awkward position. They would probably have been 
acutely embarrassed if there had been any real prospect of 
the land grant offer being taken up and probably approved, 
in principle at least, of the Commonwealth's restrictions 
on contract immigration. Both Price and his coalition 
partner, A.H. Peake, a liberal in the Kingston tradition, 
had opposed the land grant railway in 1902. S.A .P .D. 
(L.A.), 1902, pp.782-5, 793-9.
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increasing the price. When Price suggested that the fact
that the State had built the Overland Telegraph to Darwin
unaided gave it another claim to consideration, the
position was becoming ridiculous, though he was on firmer
ground when he pointed out that he could not modify the
terms of the resolutions without the approval of 
1Parliament.
Deakin could not recommend such terms to the Federal
Parliament but thought that it might consider the matter
if the Territory were offered free of past liabilities,
except for the Pine Creek railway, and subject only to the
condition that it construct a railway to the southern
border of the Territory along a route of its own choosing.
South Australia was to consent to the construction of the
Port Augusta to Kalgoorlie line if, after survey, the
2Commonwealth decided to build it.
Negotiations bogged down, with neither side prepared 
to give ground, until they met in conference on 12 
February 1907. At the meeting, the Commonwealth agreed to 
accept the transfer of the Territory, assume
responsibility for its debt, take over the Port Augusta to 
Oodnadatta railway within South Australia proper and link 
it to a line which it would lay from Port Darwin to the 
southern border of the Territory. The State agreed to 
surrender all title to the Territory and to sell the Port
tAugusta to Oodnadatta railway at the cost of construction.
1
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 6 August 1906, C .P .P ., 1906, vol.2, 
p.1241.
P.M. to Prem. S.A. , 30 August 1906, ibid. , p.12-42.
2
l6l
It further agreed to give the Commonwealth the right to
link that line to the line to be built from Port Darwin
and also with a point on the Western Australian border, by
a route to be chosen by the FedeTal Parliament. The
Commonwealth was released from compensating the State for
properties within the Territory transferred under section
85 of the Constitution, The agreement was not binding
1until ratified by both Parliaments.
South Australia had not been able to impose either a 
route or a time limit on the construction of the north- 
south line and had been compelled to agree to the 
construction of the east-west line on a route of the 
Commonwealth's choosing, but the agreement, and especially 
the clause transferring the unprofitable Port Augusta to 
Oodnadatta line, was heavily weighted in its favour. The 
other States were generally hostile to the agreement as 
they could see no benefit in it for themselves, while they 
would be required to bear about nine-tenths of the cost of 
building the railway. When Carruthers led an attack on 
the agreement at the Premiers' Conference in May 1907»
A.H. Peake, the South Australian Treasurer, coolly informed 
him that he was 'anti-Federal' for being unwilling to let 
the Commonwealth do something which it had the power to
a 2 do .
In October 1907 , the State House of Assembly passed a 
motion approving the terms of transfer. This was done
1
Report of Premiers' Conference, May 1907» appendix E, 
S .A „P ,P ., 1907, vol.3, no.75, pp.337-8.
2
Ibid., pp.278-93.
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only after spirited protests by the Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr (later Sir Richard) Butler, and the two 
representatives of the Northern Territory who wanted the 
route of the railway and the time within which it must be 
built stipulated. Butler thought that the State could not 
afford to make a loose agreement with Deakin, whose 
attitude towards it had always been ’grossly unfair'.'
When the memorandum issued after the February meeting
was being redrafted into a formal agreement for inclusion
in the surrender and acceptance bills as a schedule, the
South Australians realized that no mentibn had been made
in it of a verbal agreement that the east-west railway
should not hug the coast as the telegraph did. They sought
its inclusion but Deakin would not agree that the Federal
Parliament should be bound as to route (though he admitted
the original a g r e e m e n t ) H e  did accept liability for the
cost of that portion of the Overland Telegraph which was
within the Northern Territory when it was found that it
had been omitted from the amount to be paid by the3Commonwealth.
1
S.A.P.D. (L.A .), 1907, especially pp.603-21, 718-23, 
781-9* Deakin was not particularly fond of South 
Australia (as is shown by his frequent attacks on the 
State in his Morning Post articles, e.g. 6 February I.903 
(Sydney, 30 December 1902) and 4 March 1903 (Sydney, 19 
January I903) but Butler would have had trouble to 
substantiate this claim.
2
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 2 December 1907 and P.M. to Prem.
S.A . , 4 December I.907, C.A.O., C.R.S. a 4^2 , 54/621.
3 Prem. S.A. to P.M., 9 December 1907, C.P.P ., 1909, vol.2, 
p.1.887; P.M. to Prem. S.A. , 16 December 1907, ibid.
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The clause compelling South Australia to allow the
construction of the east-west railway seems out of place
in the agreement for the transfer of the Northern
Territory, but there is an interesting explanation for its
presence. Before federation, the South Australians,
especially C.C. Kingston, F.W. Holder and Sir Josiah Symon,
had been lavish in their promises to Forrest that they
would support the railway if Western Australia joined the
union. Symon had spoken of the railway as a project 'so
dear to us all'. Although their promises were said to
2have affected the result of the referendum, they were 
markedly less enthusiastic after federation. The Jenkins 
Government soon began to back down. By 1904 , although 
the State was theoretically willing to pass a bill 'next 
session' to allow a survey for the line, it would not 
agree in advance to allow the line to be built across its4territory if the survey proved satisfactory. In 1906,
the Senate actually refused to deal finally with a survey
5bill until South Australia did give such an assurance.
1
Sir S. Way to Lord Tennyson, l4 August 1907, Tennyson 
Papers, M . L . , MS.A50II.
2
Prem. W.A. to Prem. S.A., 11 December 1902, W.A,, V . & P ., 
v o l .2, 1903-4, n o .28, p p .3-6.
3
Prem. S.A. to Prem. W.A., 11 June 1901, telegram, ibid.,
P.4.
4
Prem. S.A. to P.M. , 10 and 17 May 1904 , telegrams, C .P . P., 
1904, vol.2, pp.1927-8. S.A. wanted to have a controlling 
voice in determining the route and gauge of the line.
5
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 7 May 1906, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , 
v o l .l 4 , p.17.
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Apparently Forrest and Deakin saw South Australia's desire 
to transfer the Northern Territory on favourable terms as 
an opportunity to get the State's approval for the 
building of the east-west railway. This may well explain 
why Deakin was prepared to give the State such good terms 
at the conference in February 1907; certainly he had 
raised this point in his reply to Price's offer during 
their 1906 correspondence.
The State passed its Surrender Act in December 1907»
but there were long delays in the Commonwealth Parliament.
The tariff prevented action in the 1907-8 session and in
1908 and 1909 business was hindered by the unstable
political situation and by delaying tactics. The Fusion
Government introduced a bill in 1909» but it lapsed after
2strong opposition in the Senate. The root of this 
opposition was the desire of the New South Wales and 
Queensland senators to leave the Commonwealth free to take 
the railway to the east to be linked with their State 
systems. it had been South Australia's continual 
endeavour to prevent this - an attempt which the Age 3described as 'sordid and unpatriotic to the last degree'. 
The Western Australians also feared that the building of a 
north-south line, along whatever route, would mean further
1
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 30 August 1906, C ■P ,P ., 1906, vol.2, 
p.1242.
2
See C .P .D ., vols.50-34, passim.
3
A g e , 3 July 1909.
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1delay for the east-west line. The Fisher Government,
with the aid of its huge majority in both Houses, passed
the bill in I9IO, but only after much argument over the
route of the railway. The Queensland senators fought the
prailway clauses to the end. No great degree of federal 
spirit had been shown, but the South Australians were 
hardly in a position to complain. They had, in the words 
of the A g e , shown ’prodigious cleverness... in the gentle 
art of making agreements enormously favourable to 
[themselvesJ 5 .'
Before the Commonwealth Act could be passed, certain
members representing the North-Eastern District in the
Legislative Council of South Australia showed their
dissatisfaction with the terms of the agreement by
introducing, and having passed through the Council, a bill
for the repeal of the Northern Territory Surrender Act
41907 » it did not get beyond the first reading stage in
the Assembly. The transfer eventually took place on 1.
January I9H , with the South Australian officers involved
in the administration of the Territory remaining at their
posts until the Commonwealth could determine its needs in5this respect.
1
O ’Collins, Pa tri ck. McMahon G1 ynn , p.205*
2
The debate is in C .P „D „, vols. 56-8 , passim.
3
Age, 3 July 1909.
4
S .A .P .D . (L.C.), I9IO, pp.223-9» 281-95.
5
A.P.M. to Prem. S.A., 2 December I9IO, C.A.O., C.R.S.
A452, 5^/621; Prem. S.A, to A.P.M., 16 December I9IO, 
ibid .
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The Northern Territory was transferred to 
Commonwealth control because it was clearly a national 
responsibility to develop it. It was important in any 
Commonwealth system of defence and it could only be 
defended adequately, in the conditions existing in 1910, 
if it were first developed, and populated. The task was 
beyond the resources of South Australia. Deakin saw the 
national obligation clearly and expressed it forcibly. He 
believed that if the Territory could not be populated 
Australia would have to submit to its transfer to some 
other nation. This alternative was not to be tolerated.
Commonwealth delay in 1901-2 made trouble possible, 
but it was South Australia’s desire not only to rid itself 
of a burden but to be paid hansomely for doing it that 
caused most of the friction. That the State was given
terms which the Age described as ’utterly one-sided and
2unfair' can only be accounted for by the desire of the 
Commonwealth to obtain the State’s consent to the 
building of the east-west railway and Deakin*s strong 
belief that it was a national obligation to develop the 
Northern Territory. Unfortunately, not all succeeding 
Prime Ministers have shared his sense of the urgency of 
this obligation.
Under the Constitution, territory for a federal 
capital had to pass to the Commonwealth. Defence and
1
C P - 1.)» , vol.52 , p.4629.
2
A g e , 3 July I909. It should be noted that the
Commonwealth has not yet completed the north-south railway 
connection by any route.
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development made it desirable that the Northern Territory 
should also come under federal control. Neither 
constitutional necessity nor national responsibility was 
able to prevent protracted disputes from developing. Both 
transfers should have involved relatively simple 
co-operative acts by the Executives and Parliaments 
concerned, Interstate jealousy, the determination of 
South Australia and New South Wales to insist on their 
'State rights3 and local vested interests combined to 
ensure that both issues, and especially the capital 
territory, would remain as festering sores for a decade.
On 1 January 1911* the territories ceased to be a cause of 
strife between the States and the Commonwealth. But they 
did not cease to be a cause of trouble for the 
Commonwealth itself. It was another 1? years before the 
Federal Parliament moved to its own capital where it still 
meets in a 'temporary' Parliament House. The passage of 
almost 60 years has not seen the Commonwealth fulfil, in 
any real sense, its responsibility to develop the Northern 
Territory.
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CHAPTER 3
THREE PROBLEMS
Federation is a heroic remedy Tor many evils; 
and it often happens that many oT those who 
Foresaw the benefit oT its application to others 
have sorely chafed at Finding it applied to 
their own case.'
The attempt within the Federal system to reconcile 
national aspirations and local or group interests puts a 
constant strain on the will to co-operate and the desire 
to make the system work. As a result, the real importance 
and enduring signiFicance oF a dispute will not always 
account For the extent to which the Feelings oF the 
parties to it become involved.
The First decade oF Federal history in Australia 
threw up a number oF problems which, although minor in 
themselves, illustrate Facets oF the diFFiculty 
associated with establishing the Federal Form oF 
government. Seen in an atmosphere oF growing suspicion 
and mistrust, they easily came to appear larger and more 
important than they were and became real obstacles to 
intergovernmental co-operation.
Three such problems will be discussed in this chapter. 
The expulsion oF the Kanakas From Queensland, as part oF 
the movement For a ‘white Australia’, began in bitter
1
P.M. to G.G., 3 April 1902 (with G.G. to S. oF S., 5 
April 1902), A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2150, C.0.4l8/l8, no.18503.
169
controversy but ended in fruitful co-operation. The field 
of immigration policy was an ideal area for co-operation 
but the opportunity was missed during the first decade 
because of mistrust and lack of common objectives. The 
provision of a residence for the Governor-General should 
have been a simple matter to arrange but was not when it 
became entangled in the Sydney-Melbourne rivalry and the 
fear of New South Vales that it was being deprived of its 
rights over the federal capital site.
The Constitution, section 51 (xxvii), gives the
Commonwealth unlimited power over all aspects of
'immigration and emigration', though it is clear that at
the time it was being discussed it was the power to
1exclude which was uppermost in men's minds. The 
Commonwealth used this power of exclusion in 1901 and the 
expulsion of the Kanakas, or Pacific Island labourers, 
from Queensland arose as a special aspect of the 'white 
Australia' movement.
Anti-Chinese legislation was common throughout 
Australia in the second half of the nineteenth century and 
reached a peak in the last decade. In March 1896, an 
inter-colonial conference decided that anti-Chinese 
legislation should be made to apply to all coloured 
peoples and that existing exemptions in favour of coloured 
British subjects should be withdrawn. Only Queensland
1
See N .A .C .D . , 1891, p.689; Quick and Garran, Annotated 
Constitution, pp.623-9; Moore, Commonwealth of Australia, 
first edition, p.l44.
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adhered to the Anglo-Japanese treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation of 189^ which gave some right of entry to 
Japanese subjects. The Queensland Government handled its 
adherence badly, keeping it secret for more than two years, 
and Sir Samuel Griffith had to admit that it had aroused 
the suspicion that it was trying to subvert the wishes of 
the Queensland people.^
Not surprisingly, the white Australia question was
taken up strongly by all political groups at the federal
elections, especially in Queensland where a section of the
Labor Party had already made this a reason for supporting
2federation in the referendum of 1899«
Many Queenslanders had long realized that the Kanaka
must eventually go. In 1883, Griffith, then Premier,
passed legislation prohibiting the issue of licences for
their introduction after I89O. He decided in 1892 that
the sug^iar industry needed a further ten years in which to
adjust itself to the use of white labour alone, but he had3no doubt about the Kanaka's eventual removal. In I889 , 
W.H. Groom, later a member of the first Federal Parliament, 
offered the opinion that the federation of the Australian
4Colonies would mean the exclusion of all coloured races,
1
A.T. Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia, Melbourne, 
1964, ch.l.
2
Ibid., p.19.
3 'The Griffith Manifesto on the Kanaka Question. 1892' , 
in C.M.H. Clark, Select Documents in Australian History, 
1831-1900, Sydney, 1933, p.2l6, no.31.
4
'Federation and Coloured Labour in Queensland. 1889', 
ibid., p .220, no.32.
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while an historian of the sugar industry has stated that
it was 'quite understood' that federation meant the end of
black labour.^ Senator Glassey claimed in 1901 that
nothing had had more effect on the vote in the 1899
referendum than the belief that the Commonwealth
Parliament would deal with the matter more effectively
2than the Queensland Parliament had done.
By 1901, the division of large estates into small
family farms, where the owner’s family provided much, but
by no means all, of the labour, had caused a decline in
the use of Polynesian labour. While sugar production had
increased by 120 per cent between 1885 and 1899» the
number of Kanakas in the State had declined by 18 per
cent. The trend appeared likely to continue unless3untoward economic conditions intervened.
The death of Sir James Dickson, Queensland's
representative in the Federal Cabinet, in January 1901,
increased the certainty that the Kanaka would be banished
swiftly. There was considerable delay before the Premier,
Robert (later Sir Robert) Philp, who had no desire to
enter federal politics himself, suggested that J.G. Drake,
a known opponent of black labour, should fill the gap.
Barton's policy speech had already been delivered at
4Maitland when the appointment was made.
1 H.T. Easterby, The Queensland Sugar Industry, Brisbane, 
n . d. , p.23 •
2
C.P.D., vol.6, p.7670.
3
'Report on Factors Relating to the Cane Sugar Industry 
of Australia', W. Maxwell, C.P.P., 1901-2, vol.2, p.968.
4
J.G. Drake to Barton, 1 April 1901, C.A.O.,
01/798; Brisbane Courier, 26 January 1901.
C.R.S. A 6,
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Barton placed particular emphasis on the question
during his Queensland campaign, although it does appear
that he spoke with slightly different voices to plantation
owners and small farmers on the one hand and to workers on
the other. At Toowoomba he certainly held out hopes of a
ten year transition period.^ Seven out of nine members of
the House of Representatives and five out of six Senators
2elected in Queensland were opposed to black labour, and 
Barton had every reason to interpret this as a mandate for 
prompt and absolute exclusion. The mandate was 
strengthened later in the year when L.E. Groom, a Barton 
supporter, comfortably won a by-election for the Darling 
Downs seat after a determined bid by the supporters of 
black labour to defeat him.
In the context of Commonwealth-State relations, the 
expulsion of the Kanakas must be viewed from three 
aspects: the bitter controversy between the Queensland and
Commonwealth Governments over the Pacific Island Labourers 
Act, in 1901-2 ; the close co-operation between the two 
Governments over the actual deportation in the period 
1906-8, and the efforts of the Commonwealth, lasting until 
1913 > to assure the future of the industry.
In May 1901, the Secretary of the External Affairs 
Department, Atlee Hunt, asked Dr Maxwell, Director of the 
Queensland Sugar Experiment Stations, to report on various 
aspects of the sugar industry in Australia; the relative 
costliness of black and white labour, the estimated yield
1
Yarwood, Asian Migration, p.20.
Senator Glassey in C .P „D ., vol.6 , p.7670.
2
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of the previous year's crop and the progress made in
devising labour-saving machinery for cane cutting. In
his report, Maxwell indicated that the future
mechanization of harvesting was likely to accelerate the
trend f already menti oned ) away* from coloured labour but
that he thought that the value of white labour depended on
2climate and declined the further north one went.
Although limited in scope, this inquiry was Barton’s 
only attempt to provide the Commonwealth Parliament with 
information about the sugar industry as such before he 
moved the second reading of the Pacific Island Labourers 
Bill on 2 October 1901.^
Barton ably rehearsed the history of Queensland 
legislation dealing with the Kanakas, showed that most 
Queensland statesmen had regarded black labour as a 
temporary expedient only, and pointed to the declining 
importance of the Kanakas and to the evils inherent in the 
trade in spite of strong Queensland efforts to eradicate 
them. Under the Bill, licences were to be issued to 
introduce black labour until 31 December 1903 - in 1902 
the number of Kanakas introduced might not exceed three- 
fourths of the number repatriated during 1 9 0 1 , and in I9 0 3  
half the number repatriated in 1902. All agreements with 
Islanders were to end on 31 December 1 9 0 6 and they would
1
A. Hunt to Dr Maxwell, 2-4 May 1901 , C „ P , P . , 1901-2, 
vol.2 , p .9 6 5 •
2
‘Report’, W. Maxwell, ibid., especially, pp.9 6 8 , 975 j
982 .
GoPoDo, vol.4, p.5 4 9 2 .
3
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then be subject to deportation. Before that date, any 
Kanaka who had been without an agreement for a month could 
be deported on the order of a magistrate.^
The safety of the Bill was assured when Reid
2supported it in principle and Watson declared that he
would vote for exclusion even if it meant the annihilation
3of the sugar industry. There was opposition from the4Melbourne shipping magnate, Sir Malcolm McEacharn, and
the member for the northern Queensland seat of Oxley, Mr R.5Edwards, who thought that the sugar industry would die 
out north of Mackay without black labour, but the Bill 
became law/
7Philp protested telegraphically on 2 October, but 
Barton urged patience until the details of the tariff were 
released the following week, as they would affect the 
operation of the Bill. He hoped that the solution offeredgsafeguarded the interests of the whole country. A few 
days later Philp protested at length that the Bill, if
1
Ibid., pp.5492-505.
2
Ibid., vol.5, P.5829.
3
Ibid., p.5848.4
Ibid., pp.5840-8.
5
Ibid., pp.5893-902.
6
Act no.l6 of I9OI. Received assent 17 December 1901.
7 Prem. Qld. to P.M., 2 October 1901, telegram, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A8, 01/272/1.
8
P.M. to Prem, Qld., 2 October 1901, telegram, copy, 
ibid.
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passed, would totally destroy the sugar industry and that
tariff assistance would be of no avail as the objection of
Europeans was to working conditions, not wages. He
admitted that the Commonwealth had power to legislate but
thought that before making more than the most gradual
alterations it should have consulted the State Government
and should have undertaken searching inquiries. At least
ten years should have been allowed for the industry to
adjust and the action contemplated would lead to serious
depression in all the State's industries; the Queensland
Government resented such interference at a time of
economic difficulty. Philp believed that if Queensland
opinion were opposed to black labour it would have elected
a State Parliament opposed to it; Queensland members of
the Federal Parliament were not representative of the
whole electorate but had been elected through the solid
1vote of one class.
Philp told the Press that Queenslanders were
'thoroughly disgusted at having trusted themselves in the
hands of the southern politicians' and that the
Constitution would 'hardly get a vote' if it were put
2before the people again. Lieutenant-Governor Griffith
informed the Secretary of State for Colonies that
Queensland would not have joined the Federation had it not"
understood that regional conditions would be studied
carefully before local affairs or industries were
3interfered with.
1 Prem. Qld. to P.M., 7 October 1901, ibid.
2 D.T., 29 October 1901.
3 Lt. Gov. Qld. to S. of S., 11 October 1901, A.N.L.,
A.J„C.P.2142, C.0.418/12, no.40540.
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Barton refused to discuss the matter with Philp at
the Premiers' Conference of November 1901 , as he insisted
that his Government was responsible to the Federal
Parliament alone for its action. He made the same point
in his official reply to Philp's letter on the ground that
the Federation had been established to avoid the kind of
2futility such action would lead to.
Barton was absolutely correct in his attitude while 
Philp showed little appreciation of either the purpose or 
the operation of the federal system. Each Government had 
its own sphere of action and within it no other Government 
had any locus standi. There was no legitimate means by 
which the Queensland Government could do more than 
indicate its views. Constitutionally, the Commonwealth 
Government had to assume that the Queensland members of 
the Federal Parliament represented the views of the 
majority of the people of the State and it had to act in 
accordance with the will of that Parliament as a whole.
The question it had to determine was not so much whether 
the people of Queensland were against black labour but 
whether the people of Australia as a whole were.
By mid-November, the Bill was before the Senate and 
Philp addressed that body direct, doubtless hoping that 
the House created as a safeguard for the smaller States 
would protect Queensland's interests more jealously than
1
Conference report, November 1901, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6,
02/519.
2
P.M. to Prem. Qld., 12 November 1901, C .P .P ., 1901-2, 
vol.2, pp.865-6.
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had the House of Representatives. He admitted some 
disagreement among the opponents of the Bill (said to 
include all the agricultural and commercial associations 
and the main Press organs of the State) as to the 
unreliability of white and the indispensability of black 
labour, but claimed that all agreed on the need for a 
thorough investigation of conditions, preferably by royal 
commission, before there was any interference with 
Queensland’s tropical agriculture. The State would 
’cheerfully9 accept any result of such an inquiry. The 
results of the federal election did not indicate the 
opinion of the State. Voting for the House of 
Representatives was only three to two in favour of the 
anti-Kanaka candidates in a poll of just over 50 per cent, 
while pro-Kanaka Senate candidates had a small majority of 
votes in a 30 per cent poll.^
It was not the Senate’s fault that so few 
Queenslanders had voted. That body was not sufficiently
impressed by the appeal to alter the principles of the
2Bill and Philp again took up the cudgels with Barton. In 
a violent outburst he complained that Queensland had been 
singled out for ’summary correction' before the powers of 
the Commonwealth had been clearly defined and when there
1
Prem, Qld. to the President and Members of the Senate, 15 
November 1901, copy, QoS.A., Pre/89, loose printed paper, 
n . f . n .
2
Senator Ferguson (Qld.) attempted to alter the Bill to 
allow the continued introduction of Kanakas in that part 
of Queensland north of the Tropic of Capricorn, but this 
was defeated 16 votes to ten, C„P.Do, vol.6, between 
pp.8024 and 8244.
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was no danger to the common interest to justify the haste
and no High Court to which an appeal might be made. The
protests of the growers, which showed ’enlightened
concern for the general interest’, and were based on
practical knowledge, should more than counterbalance the
'abstract sectarian opinion fortified by class resentment’
of the labour unions. If there must be interference, a
long transition period should be allowed as there was
little hope of finding 9>000 workers in the next five 
1years.
Barton dismissed protests against the Bill as the
work of sectional interests and claimed that the general
2public supported it. He was clearly right in holding
this view about the protests of Philp himself, the growers
and the Brisbane Courier (which conducted a violent
campaign for most of October 1901 to whip up opposition to
the Bill and was, no doubt,, in part responsible for Philp’s
attitude). Philp was a partner in the firm Burns, Philp &
Co. which had shipping interests in the Pacific Islands
and he was a large property owner. He represented3Rockhampton in the Queensland Parliament. There was a 
note of hysteria in what Philp and the paper wrote. In 
any case, it was for Barton, not Philp, to balance the 
'enlightened concern’ of the one group in the community
1
Prem. Qld. to P.M., 3 December 1901, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 8 ,
OI/272/I .
2-
P.M» to Prem. Qld., l4 January 1902, copy, ibid.
3
See the entry under Philp in Australian Encyclopaedia, 
Sydney, 1965•
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against the ’abstract sectarian opinion’ of the other and 
to determine which represented the will of the majority.
Queensland appealed to the Governor-General to 
reserve the Bill on the grounds that it infringed the 
British doctrine of equality of races, provided for the 
forcible expulsion of a people whose coming had been
lawful and inflicted grievous wrong on Queensland as
1distinguished from the rest of the Commonwealth. The
request was refused because the Bill did not affect the
external relations or the equal treatment of British
subjects and because Queensland itself had, in I896,
provided for the forcible expulsion of unemployed 
2Kanakas. However, the correspondence was forwarded to 
the Colonial Office. Anderson found the Act objectionable 
because of the exclusion on the grounds of race and 3colour, but found no reason to refuse to sanction it.
When it informed the Commonwealth of this, the Colonial
Office also offered to allow the British Residents in the
Solomon and New Hebrides Islands to assist with the
4repatriation.
1
L t . Gov. Qld. to G.G., 12 December 1901, cable, (copy 
with G.G. to S. of S . , 19 December 190l), A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2139, C.0.418/10, no.3604.
2
G.G. to Lt.Gov. Qld., 17 December 1901, telegram, copy, 
ibid.; P.M. to G.G., l6 December 1901, telegram, copy, 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A8, Ol/272/l.
3
Minute, Anderson to Cox, 5 February 1902, A.N.L.,
A.J.C.P.2139, C.0.418/10, no.3604.
4
Under Secretary of State for Colonies to P.M., 3 
September 1902, A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2153, C.0.418/21, no.32001.
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In his quarterly report on affairs for the Secretary
of State, in March 1902, Griffith predicted the gradual
decline of the sugar industry and its eventual extinction
in the northern districts.^ However, Barton believed that
the well-being of the whole people must be put first. In
any case, Queensland was fairly represented in the Federal
Parliament and its member of the Ministry had been
2nominated by the State Premier himself.
In June 1902, the new Governor, Sir Herbert Chermside,
forwarded to the Imperial Authorities a Kanaka ’Petition
to the King’ against their deportation. Philp claimed that
it was the result of a spontaneous movement among the
Kanakas and that it had not been encouraged by the 3Government. Chamberlain was not prepared to recommend4any action over the petition while Deakin, acting as 
Prime Minister, complained that it should have been 
transmitted through the Governor-General and that ii was 
the result of a well-organized effort by interested people 
to thwart the will of the majority in both Queensland and 
the Commonwealth. He promised that the Commonwealth would
1
Lt.Gov. Qld. to S. of S., 21 March 1902, ibid., 2152, 
C.0.418/21, no.16463.
2
P.M. to G.G., 3 April 1902 (with G.G. to S. of S., 5 
April 1902), A.N.L., A .J.C.P.2150, C.0.4l8/l8, no.18503.
3 Prem. Qld. to Gov. Qld., 18 June 1902, copy, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. Al, 03/1694.
4
S„ of S. to Gov. Qld., 30 August 1902, ibid.
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display humanity and leniency in the deportation^ and 
Chamberlain was fully satisfied by this assurance.2
At the same time, Philp informed Deakin that a number
of Islanders about to leave in the ship Rio Loge might
refuse to land when they reached their islands if changed
circumstances made it dangerous for them to do so. Under
the 1901 Act, they could not be re-recruited because the
full number of licences had been allotted for 1902.3Inspectors of the Pacific Island Branch had been 
instructed to tell the Islanders not to leave Queensland 
unless they could land safely, but this was not adequate. 
The Federal Government must find some way out of a 
situation which left no alternative between breaking
4federal law and cruel treatment of the Kanakas.
This was an ingenious dodge to get around the Act and 
Deakin regretted to learn 'for the first time' of the 
threatened difficulties but pointed out that they were not 
the fault of the Commonwealth Act which merely fixed the 
number of licences to be issued for the year. If the 
Queensland Government had made allowance when issuing 
licences, all risk of hardship could have been avoided.
1
A.P.M. to A.G.G., for S. of S., 29 September 1902, ibid.
2
S. of S. to A.G.G., l4 November 1902, C .P .P ., 1903» 
vol.2 , p .988.
3
Officially so called, but indiscriminately referred to 
in Queensland letters as Pacific Island Department or 
Polynesian Department.
4
Prem. Qld. to A.P.M., 20 June 1902, C .P .P ., 1903» vol.2,
p.983.
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It was not the Commonwealth's responsibility to find a way 
out of the situation.^
When the Rio Lo^e sailed, Philp ordered the
Government Agent on it to bring back any Kanaka whose life
2might be endangered by landing and suggested to Deakin 
that any excess for 1902 due to 'returnees' should be 3deducted from the number permitted to enter during 1903*4Deakin accepted this solution, but in the case of the 
Rio Loge, at least, the anticipated difficulty did not 
arise.^
In the interval between 1902 and the actual 
deportation of the Kanakas,^  the Philp Government fell 
from power and was succeeded by a 'lib-lab' coalition with 
Arthur Morgan as Premier. At the beginning of 1906 he 
resigned to become President of the Legislative Council 
and was succeeded as Premier by his former Treasurer, 
William Kidston, at that time a member of the Labor Party.
1
A.P.M. to Prem. Qld., 25 June 1902, ibid.; see also A. 
Hunt to Barton, 25 June 1902, Barton Papers, A.N.L.,
MS.51/1/521.
2
Prem. Qld. to A.P.M., 2 July 1902, C.P.P., 1903, vol.2,p.984.
3 Prem. Qld. to A.P.M., 15 July 1902, ibid., p.985.4
A.P.M. to Prem, Qld., 23 July 1902, ibid.
5
Collector of Customs, Brisbane, to Secretary, External 
Affairs Dept. , 17 September 1902 , ibid. , p.986.
6
This incident is briefly and inadequately described in 
M. Willard, History of the White Australia Policy, 
Melbourne, 1923, pp.182-6.
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Under the Pacific Island Labourers A ct, all Kanakas
found in Australia after 31 December 1906 were liable to
be deported. By way of preparation, Deakin wrote to
Kidston early in that year seeking information. Some
6,000 persons had to be returned during 1906-7* They had
been brought in under Queensland legislation which
provided that they should be returned to their homes and
created a fund for that purpose. It was illegal to
employ a Kanaka after 31 December and, as Deakin desired
that they should not be allowed to remain too long in
idleness, he enquired what steps were being taken to
1deport them as quickly as possible.
In July, Deakin urged that immediate action should be 
taken over 300 Kanakas then unemployed and 663 whose 
engagements would terminate between July and December 21906, as their removal would ease the problem in 1907* 
Kidston was already negotiating with a steamship company 
to have 100 repatriated each month and urged that, as 
compulsion would be necessary to deport II63 by December, 
Deakin should invoke section eight of the 1901 Act 
immediately and authorize the officers of the Queensland
3 4Pacific Island Branch to act under it. Deakin complied.
1
Deakin to Kidston, 20 February 1906, draft, D.P., A.N.L., 
MS.1340/331^5 P.M. to Prem. Qld., 2 March 1906, Q.S.A., 
Pre/8 9 , 06/01001.
2
P,M. to Prem. Qld., 3 July 1906, telegram, ibid., Pre/84, 
06/00024,
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4
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Later in July, Kidston urged that it was the 
responsibility of the Commonwealth to arrange the 
repatriation of the Kanakas as the compulsory deportation 
was under Commonwealth l.aw$ Queensland no longer had 
jurisdiction over some Kanakas who had drifted to other 
States and he believed that only the Commonwealth had 
power to deport forcibly any who were unwilling to go. 
Relations with. Governments external to Australia were 
involved and the Commonwealth was the proper authority to 
deal with them. Only Commonwealth subsidized steamers 
which operated to the Pacific Islands could be relied on 
to return the Kanakas on the necessary scale and at 
reasonable cost. His Government was prepared to let the 
Commonwealth use the resources of its Pacific Island 
Branch, and give it the sum (five pounds a head) 
contributed by employers for the repatriation of the 
Kanakas. State police could be used to enforce the Act, 
vessels engaged in deportation would be exempted from port 
dues and no more agreements with Kanakas would be 
sanctioned.
The argument was sound and the offer generous and 
revealed Kidston* s clear grasp of the requirements of the 
situation. The Commonwealth had already virtually 
admitted liability to pay any amount over and above what
was in the Queensland Polynesian Fund for the repatriation
2of the Kanakas and, when Deakin accepted responsibility 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Prem. Qld. to P.M*, 23 July 1906, C .P . P . , 1906, vol.2,
pp.1077-8.
2
Minute by G.H. Reid for A. Hunt, 3 April I.905, C.A.O., 
C.RoS. Al, o 4/9617.
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1on Kidston1s terms, the arrangement of details presented 
few difficulties» The New South Wales Government also 
granted the assistance of its police to enforce the Act 
in the sugar areas of the Northern Rivers District of that 
State.2
A Queensland Royal Commission inquired into the 
number of Kanakas to be deported, the most effective 
method of repatriation, the likely cost, whether 
deportation would in any circumstances be inconsistent 
with humanity and good faith and whether sufficient labour 
was available to carry on the sugar industry when the 
Kanakas had gone and, if not, how it could be obtained.
The only part of the report significant for this study is 
that dealing with those Islanders whose deportation was 
considered inconsistent with humanity or good faith. 
Exemption from deportation was recommended for several 
groups? those unfitted for life in the Islands by age, 
infirmity or long residence in Queensland? those who had 
fled to escape punishment and would be killed on return? 
those married to a woman of another Island or a white or 
aboriginal woman and whose lives would be endangered 
because of that? those whose children had been educated at 
State schools and those who had acquired freehold or
3leasehold land,
PoM. to Prem. Qld. , 3 August I. 9 0 6 , C,P,P. , I.9 0 6 , vol.2, 
pp.1078-9.
2
P,Mo to Prem. N„S.W„ 9 25 October I906 , copy, C0A»0. ,
C R S A33 , volo 1.6, pp. 337=8 5 PoM. to Prem. N 0S.W0, 9
November 1906, copy, ibid., pp.502-3»
3
Report of the Sugar Industry Labour Commission, 30 June 
1 9 0 6 , Q.PoP., 1 9 0 6 , vol.2, CoAol5, p.395ff.
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On the recommendation of Atlee Hunt, Deakin approved
all groups except those whose children had been educated
at State schools and those who held land on leasehold,
although eventually the latter were granted a short period
2of grace to harvest their crops. An amending Act, 3passed in October 1906, provided for the exemptions. It 
provided a. permanent certificate of exemption for those 
allowed to remain and a temporary one for those who could 
not be deported immediately. Those awaiting repatriation 
were permitted to work under short term agreements to 
prevent them from depleting their savings or becoming a 
burden on the Government.
In August 1 9 0 6 , J.O’N. Brenan, head of the Pacific 
Island Branch, suggested that an action under section 
eight of the 1901 Act (the power to deport) should be 
carried through to the High Court, with the Commonwealth 
paying the expenses of the Kanaka, so that there could be
4no doubt about the right to deport forcibly. This was
arranged and the case was heard by the High Court on 1-2
October. The right to deport aliens forcibly was upheld
under the powers to make laws concerning external affairs
5and concerning aliens.
1
Memo, by A. Hunt, 6 August 1906, approved by Deakin 6 
August 1906, CcP.P., 1906, vol.2, p .1079.
2
P.M. to A ,Prem. Qld., 30 July I9 O8 , C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 ,
vol.23, P.717.
3 See C P „ D . , vol.3 5 » passim , for the debate. Act no . 22
of 1 9 0*6 .
4
J.O’N. Brenan to Secretary, External Affairs Dept., 22
August 1 9 0 6 , telegram, C oA.0., C.R.S. A 1 , 07/293*
5 Robtelmes v. Brenan, 4 C „L .R . 395*
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A brief disagreement arose between Deakin and Kidston 
in October 1906 when the former desired to send 1,000 
Kanakas to work in the canefields of Fiji. The Fiji 
Government was to pay their fares and Queensland was to 
give it the passage money set aside for the repatriation 
of the Kanakas. Only those Islanders willing to go were 
to be sent and Deakin8s purpose was to assist the Governor 
of Fiji who, in his capacity as High Commissioner for the 
Western Pacific, was likely to give valuable assistance in 
carrying out the repatriation programme. Kidston saw it 
as a repudiation of Queensland's agreement with the 
Kanakas and refused the request. In spite of this, 352
were deported at the expense of Fiji which apparently had
1to bear the whole cost of the arrangement.
Repatriation continued until 30 June 1908 when it was
stopped. Deakin informed the Queensland Government that
4,21.8 Islanders had been repatriated almost without
complaint and that the difficulties which some had feared
greatly had not eventuated. He was not aware of any case
where the action taken had caused injury to an Islander
and he expressed his appreciation of the way in which
2Brenan and his staff had done the work. Brenan informed 
Hunt privately that, at the outset, he had thought that 
the repatriation should be carried out by the State, but 
that he had come to be thankful that External Affairs had
1
The correspondence is in Q 0S.A., Pre/84, 06/00024. See 
also Acting Secretary to the Treasury to Minister for Home 
Affairs, 16 February 1909, C,Aa0 o, C.R0S. A 57I , O9/II5I.
2
P.M. to AoPrem, Qld., 16 June I9O8 , C.A.O., C.R.S. A 33,
vol.23j pp.281-2 .
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taken control because it had allowed great freedom of 
action and had shown the Queensland officers such 
consideration.
Co-operation could, at times, be both fruitful and 
happy and it is clear that Deakin's earlier pledge to the 
Colonial Office that the deportation would be carried out 
in a humane way had also been fulfilled.
During the changeover period at least, some kind of
preference had to be given to Australian sugar against
foreign competition and to ’white’ grown sugar against
'black'. The 1901 tariff put a duty of six pounds a ton
on imported sugar and an excise of three pounds a ton on
Australian sugar, until 31 December 1906, with a rebate of
2two pounds a ton if it were grown by white labour. To
get the rebate in the first year, a farm had to use white
labour only by 28 February 1902. Seven-thirteenths of
all growers applied for registration as white growers in
the first year, including 4l6 at Mackay where it had been4said sugar could not be grown without black labour, a 
fact which indicates widespread willingness to co-operate 
with the Commonwealth and which suggests that Philp may 
have overestimated the support for his position.
1
J.O'N. Brenan to A. Hunt, 17 June I9O8, Atlee Hunt 
Papers, A.N.L., MS.52/23/1284.
2
Easterly, Queensland Sugar Industry, p.28.
3 P„M0 to Prem. N.S.W., l4 February 1902, N.S.WoA., 
C.S.I.L., 6663, 02/3018.4
D .T ., 15 April 1902.
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There were certain anomalies in the rebate system
which meant that the sugar producing States paid a Tar
higher percentage of the cost of the change to white
1labour than did the other States. To overcome this 
objection, the Commonwealth substituted payment of a bonus 
for the rebate from 1903 * The cost of the bonus could be 
spread per capita without reference to the locality of 
consumption of the sugar and was fairer to Queensland and 
New South Wales.
As early as October 1904, Queensland urged that the
time for the payment of the bounty should be extended from
1 9 0 6 to I9 H  and that the decision should be made early so3that cane planting would not be reduced. The Reid4Government refused to act. It was not until late 1 9 0 6
that Deakin authorized a confidential report from Dr5Maxwell. As a result of this, the Commonwealth Parliament 
extended the operation of the preference system until the 
end of I9 II and increased the bounty to three pounds a ton 
(with an excise duty of four pounds a ton) /
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 3 February 1903 (copy with G.G. to 
S. of S., 1 June 1 9 0 3 ), A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2159, C.0.418/26, 
n o .24956.
2
G.G. to S. of S., 1 June 1903, ibid . 5 Easterby, 
Queensland Sugar Industry, p.29*
3
Prem. Qld. to P.M., 18 October 1904 (with enclosure),
C .P .P . , 1 9 0 4 , vol.2, pp.1635-8; Prem. Qld. to P.M. , 10 
November 1904, copy, Q.S.A., Pre/49, 05/06364.
4
P.M. to Prem. Qld., 1 March 1905» ibid.
K
P.M. to Prem. Qld., 30 August 1905, ibid.
Easterby, Queensland Sugar Industry, pp.29-31*
6
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By the time a Royal Commission reported on the 
industry in 1912 , the success of the policy was such that 
less than six per cent of Australian sugar was produced by 
coloured labour and it recommended the abolition of the
bounty and excise legislation and the exclusion of
1coloured labour by State regulation. The new system
2began to operate in July 1913*
1901-13 was a difficult period for the Queensland
sugar industry and it is understandable that some
regretted and bitterly opposed the changes at first.
Their fears were greatly increased by the unfortunate3drought, the most severe the industry had faced, which
coincided with the changes. That this bitterness was
later replaced by active and fruitful co-operation was, in
large measure, a result of the Queensland premiership
passing from Philp to Kidston who was more in tune with
national aspirations in the matter and, of course, to the
success of the system of preference. In fact, federation
only accelerated movements already present in the industry
in 1901. Federal legislation greatly quickened the change
from black to white labour which had already begun and
kwould have continued. In so doing it focussed the
1
Report of the Royal Commission on the Sugar Industry,
C,P.P,, 1912, vol.3, especially pp„1052, 1070»
2
S. Adamson, 'The Queensland Sugar Industry, i860 to 
1.917' j B,A, Hons, thesis, University of Queensland, 1953»
p . 82 .
3
Easterby, Queensland Sugar Industry, pp.35-6.
4
Adamson, 'The Queensland Sugar Industry', pp.84-3*
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problems more clearly and made them seem greater than they 
would otherwise have done,
The Commonwealth showed no desire to use its power to 
encourage immigration until, the end of 1903, but from then 
until. 191  ^ there were intermittent attempts to secure 
co-operation with the States. This was necessary because 
control, over immigration was concurrent and because the 
States had full control of land policy at a time when 
rural workers were almost the only settlers in whom anyone 
was interested. ^ A.lth.ough there was little active 
hostility* agreement was elusive and the discussion 
illustrates aspects of the difficulty of achieving 
co-operation under the federal system, even when it is 
sincerely desired by some of the partners if others are 
merely unenthusiastic.
Deakin made his first attempt to organize a
co-operative immigration scheme three months after
becoming Prime Minister. He asked each Premier to
consider the matter so that it could be discussed at a
2Treasurers' Conference in February 1904.^ By a coincidence, 
at almost the same time, the Queensland Agent-General, Sir 
Horace Tozer, wrote to his Premier urging a co-operative
1
In I9II, a New South Wales investigation did reveal a 
need for 3*500 skilled labourers. 'Interim Report of the 
Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Alleged Shortage of 
Labour in the State of New South Wales', Sydney, I9H > 
p .xxx,
2
PoM. to all Prems., 30 December 1903? telegram, copy,
C J,t0. , C.R.So A3 3, vol.4, p.218.
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scheme with the Commonwealth taking the lead and all
States helping by offering inducements and distributing
1the immigrants,
Deakin addressed the Conference on 11 February and 
pointed out that the rate of increase in the Australian 
population had declined from 3^ per cent in the decade 
1882-91- to 1-3/4 per cent in the following decade. The 
trend could be reversed only by a concerted, continuous 
effort. Federal action had to be limited to matters of 
common interest, but the Commonwealth could transport 
people and assist in advertising while the States could 
make land available.^
3Little was done. South Australia expressed interest, 
but only Walter (later Sir Walter) James of Western 
Australia had given his Treasurer a full expression of his 
views. Western Australia, which had ample Crown lands 
available and was operating a small but growing programme 
of assisted immigration to overcome its great need of 
populations could see the advantages of a co-operative 
scheme. James suggested that the Commonwealth should 
establish a London Office and deal with advertising on a 
national basis while the States should have their own 
officers in the same building to provide specific 
information about the States. He believed that a 
co-operative scheme was necessary as no State was likely
____
Sir H, Tozer to A. Morgan, 1 January 1904, semi-private, 
QoS.Ao, Pre/98, n.f.n.
2
S_A ?P Po 9 1 9 0 4 ,  v o l . 2 ,  n o . 2 3 .  p p . 6 0 - 7 0 .
SJLH. , 5 January 1904.
3
193
to undertake a. costly scheme of advertising which would
bring almost as much benefit to other States as to
itself. Queensland was the only other State assisting
immigrants at the time, but on a diminishing scale, so it
was not surprising that the Conference should take no
2action in the matter. Later, when Deakin sought
information from the States to assist him in drawing up a
3policy, there was little response.
Nothing further was done during Deakin*s absence from 
office in 1904-5, but when he returned he sought 
permission from the Premiers to contact the Agents-General 
to obtain their collective advice on the best means of4encouraging immigration. All States except New South
5Wales agreed readily, but Carruthers could not see the 
point as immigration policy depended on land policy which 
was different in every State. If the Commonwealth ignored 
the States, there would be serious trouble.^ When Deakin 
explained that he only wanted to obtain the general
1
Memo, by Prem. W,A. to Treasurer W.A., 20 January 1904, 
S„A.P .P ., 1904, vol.2, no .23j Appendix B.
2 v
Conference report, ibid., p.117.
3
P.M. to Prem. Vic., 16 March 1904, circular, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.5> p.63, copy. The only reply seen was 
one from Tasmania dated 4 July 1904, T.S.A., P .D .1/166/28.
4
P.M. to all Prems., 31 July 1905» copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. 
A33, vol.10, pp.713-4.
5
The replies are summarized in C .P .P ., 1905, vol.2,
pp.II7I-2.
6
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 8 August 1905, ibid., p.1172.
19k
information necessary for intelligent Commonwealth 
1 2planning, Carruthers agreed and Deakin approached T.A.
(later Sir Timothy) Coghlan, Agent-General for New South3Wales and Chairman of the Joint Agents-General.
They indicated early in November that one of the
causes of the poor flow of migrants to Australia was the
feeling created by the immigration restriction Acts that
migrants were not really wanted. A uniform scheme was
desirable, but the differences in availability of land
would prevent a proportionate distribution of migrants
over the States and the Commonwealth would have to act in
the belief that a benefit to one State meant a benefit to 
4all. Another report, on advertising Australia generally,
produced by the Agents-General at about the same time,
urged that, as no State could advertise its resources
without affecting the others, general propaganda should be
undertaken by the Commonwealth and supplemented by the
5States according to their special requirements.
Both James, now Agent-General for Western Australia, 
and Coghlan advised Deakin privately that restrictive
1
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 12 August 1905, ibid.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 17 August 1905, ibid.
3
P.M, to Agent-General for N.S.W., 23 August 1905, ibid., 
p.1173.4
Memo, on immigration, by the Agents-General, 10 November
1905, ibid,, pp.1179-83.
5
Memo., 'Advertising Resources and Development of the 
Commonwealth’, by the Agents-General, 2k October 1905, 
copy, T.ScAo, P.D. I/I76/38.
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legislation, especially the Contract Clause, which 
prevented the introduction of immigrants under contract 
without the permission of the Minister for External 
Affairs, was harmful to Australian interests and that 
people of British birth should be exempted from its 
operation. James also suggested that the Commonwealth 
should secure reduced fares from the shipping companies 
but leave the actual assistance with passages to the 
States.
The Agents-General revealed a sound grasp of the 
position, but their memoranda probably satisfied no-one 
completely. The Commonwealth no doubt resented the view 
that legislation which was partly intended to make the 
country more attractive to British immigrants was in fact 
frightening them away. The States would have regretted 
the suggestion that, in its efforts to encourage 
immigration, the Commonwealth should concern itself with 
their interests collectively but not individually. The 
Agents-General were consistently more aware of the need • 
for co-operation than were the Premiers but were no more 
helpful when practical, measures, such as the removal of 
all immigration agents to one Commonwealth Office, were 
proposed. They were men as well as officials and did not 
relish anything which might detract from their own 
prestige.
1
¥. James to Dea.kin, 29 September and 10 October 1905»
DoPo, A.N.L., MS.1540/2663-725 T .A . Coghlan to Deakin,
20 October 1905» ibid. , p. 124-1. The 1 *5Contract Clause® is
part of Clause 4 of Act no.17 of 1901.
196
Negotiations became more serious in 1906. Deakin 
anticipated that when his immigration proposals came 
before the Premiers' Conference in April Carruthers and 
Bent would oppose them from jealousy of the Commonwealth, 
kidston and Price, as Labor Premiers, would be lukewarm, 
Tasmania would have little money to spend, but Western 
Australia might respond, provided the Premier, C.H. (later 
Sir Cornthwaite) Rason, was willing to stand alone,^
Rason decided not to attend, the Conference and
Deakin, desperate for support of any kind, outlined the
scheme to him by letter and asked him to inform the
Conference if he approved of it. Deakin believed that it
had been intended that the Commonwealth should use its
power over immigration for the benefit of the whole
continent but that independent action was almost impossible
as the States controlled the lands. All Governments must
unite if the work were to be done without wasteful
overlapping? the Conference could define the work to be
undertaken by the States and, by inference, the field to
be left to the Commonwealth. If the States made land
available for immigrants, the Commonwealth Government
would make recommendations to Parliament during the next
2session for advertising and for subsidizing passages.
Rason was confident that his State could ’work out 
its own salvation5 but he was prepared to participate in a
M S7l 5^Ö7
23 March 1906 (Sydney, 5 February), ibid..,
2
Deakin to C.Ht Rason, 21 February I.9O6, draft, D.Po ,
A J . L , , MS.1540/65631 P,M. to Prem. W.A., 7 March 1906, 
cop3^, C.A.O: , C.RoS. A33 9 vol.13, Pp.208-13.
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joint scheme3 although he saw the Commonwealth’s part as 
limited to general advertising.^ Deakin modified his 
scheme accordingly at the Conference and, in addition, was 
careful to indicate that only the types and numbers of 
immigrants specified by the States would be sought and that
the costs would be paid entirely out of the Commonwealth’s
2money. Bent thought that good seasons would bring
immigrants without the Commonwealth spending money on
3advertising, but the Premiers approved of Deakin’s scheme
4in principle, leaving the details to be negotiated.
Deakin tried to ascertain how many migrants the
States could absorb annually so that he could determine
the scale of his advertising campaign before submitting to
Parliament plans for it and for a small central office in
5London. Queensland demanded further details before it 
would co-operate in any way^ and most of the other States
urged him to use existing State facilities to the full in
7working out his plan.
1
Prerri. W.A. to P .M. , 20 March 1906, C.A.O., C.R.S. A2 , 
06/1220, Rason authorized Deakin to refer to his reply at 
the Conference.
2
Conference report, S„A „P 0P . , 1906, vol.2, no.23» pp.48-
52,
3
Ibid., p. 9 3 .
4
Ibid o , p.l47.
5 P ,M » to all Prems., 2 May I9 0 6 , C » P .P . , 1906, vol.2, 
p ,10 6 8 ,
6
Prem. Qld., to P.M. , 12 June 1 9 0 6 , ibid. , p.1070.
7 Prem. N.S . ¥ 0 to P.M. , 12 May 1 9 0 6  ^ Prem. Vic. to P.M. ,
19 June 1 9 0 6 , ibid. s pp,.1068, IO7O-I5 Prem. S.A. to Prem. 
N.S.V.s 22 May 1 9 0 6 , copy, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 0 5 / 6 7 6 5  
Prem, Tas, to P.M, , 24 May 1906 , copy, T.S.A., P . D . 1/187/55*
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Deakin was happy to accept this,^ but it clearly 
indicated that the States would only accept Commonwealth 
assistance provided that there was no interference with 
their own arrangements. It was easy to agree on a general 
principle, which individuals might interpret to mean 
anything or nothing at all, but the attempt to turn 
principles into action revealed the wide differences still 
existing.
The Agents~General believed that the Commonwealth
should either take complete control of immigration or
confine itself to advertising and to subsidizing the
shipping companies. Since the first alternative was
impracticable, it would have to be the second. They were
opposed to the central office for the sound reason that
many of the immigrants were secured in the country and
such an office would not play an important role and
because they believed that it was best for the man who
first contacted a prospective immigrant to see the matter 
2through. Although they naturally did not mention the 
matter, the Agents-General were probably still unwilling 
to surrender personal control over their immigration 
agents.
Deakin did not find their arguments convincing and 
decided to proceed with his scheme. He invited each State
1
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 25 May 1906, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. 
A33, vol.l4. pp.203-4.’
2
Coghlan to Deakin, 27 July I906, D.P. , A.N.L. ,
MS. 15^-0/1259 y see also copy of unsigned and undated memo, 
in T.S.A., P.D.I/I87/55• It is, from internal evidence, 
clearly by the Agents-General late in 1906.
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to supply an officer and the necessary information, but,
by this time, both New South Wales and Tasmania wanted the
2Commonwealth to confine itself to advertising while
3Queensland was hostile to any Commonwealth action.
In March 1907, shortly after Deakin had left for the 
Colonial Conference, Forrest, the Acting Prime Minister, 
asked the Premiers to allow their Agents-General to 
provide Deakin with certain information so that he would 
be able to answer any general enquiries from intending
4 3 6emigrants. Only Tasmania and Western Australia agreed 
to supply the information. Carruthers was still smarting 
from his exclusion from the Conference, which he regarded 
as an affront to his own dignity and that of his State,
1
P.M. to Agent-General for N.S.W. , 10 September 1906, 
copy, T.S.Ao, P.Del/187/55; P.M. to Prem. Qld., 10 
November 1906, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 > vol.l6 , pp.518-9; 
to Vic. (l4 November), ibid., pp.540-1; W.A., ibid., 
pp.548-50.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 23 November 1906, copy with Prem. 
N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 23 November 1906, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 
05/676; Prem. Tas. to Prem. N.S.W., 22 November 1906, copy, 
T.S.A., P.D.1/187/55.
3
See P.M. to Prem. Qld., 4 December 1906, copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A33, vol.l6 , pp.745-6.
4
A.P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., circular, 12 March 1907» 
telegram, and 21 March, telegram, N.S.W.A., Treasury, 
P.17104, 07/A3264.
5
Prem. Tas. to A.P.M., 28 March 1907, copy, T.S.A.,
P.D.1/196/55.
6
Prem. W,A. to Prem. N.S.W., 20 March 1907» telegram, 
N.S.W.A., Treasury, P .17104,*07/A3264.
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and it is clear that his instruction to Coghlan not to
1help Deakin was a reprisal for this.
Deakin5s absence at the Colonial Conference, his 
subsequent illness and preoccupation with the new tariff 
during the 1907-8 session ensured that the subject of 
immigration would not be mentioned again for some time.
By early I9O8 , New South Wales had a scheme of 
assisted immigration firmly established, Victoria had 
begun one on a small scale and the numbers of immigrants 
going to Queensland and Western Australia were increasing.
Deakin noted this with pleasure and offered to assist
with money for advertising if land were made available.
He stressed the possibility of resuming private lands for 
2immigrants. As usual, Western Australia gave the most
encouraging reply, but even that State would not set apart3lands specifically for immigrants. Wade, who had 
succeeded Carruthers as Premier of New South Wales, wanted 
to exclude the Commonwealth from any part in immigration;
1
See Prem. N.S.W. to A.P.M., l4 March 1907 , telegram, 
copy; Prem. N.S.W. to Agent-General for N.S.W., l4 March 
1907, cable, copy, ibid. Carruthers' alterations to the 
draft of the cable submitted by his Under-Secretary show 
that he greatly strengthened the element of hostility to 
the Commonwealth in it.
2
P.M. to all Prems., 5 February 1908, C .P .P ., 1907-8, 
vol.2, pp.1121-2.
3
Prem. W.A. to P.M., 24 March 1908, ibid., pp.1136-9 (the 
replies of the other Premiers are in the same Paper).
There were, of course, sound political and social reasons 
for not giving immigrants an advantage over residents of 
the State.
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its power, he held, was restrictive only, and the 
encouragement of immigration was entirely a State function^ 
the State controlled land policy and industrial 
development which in turn determined immigration policy.
New South Wales had introduced 4,575 migrants in just over 
two years and he believed that the work could not have been 
better done. A Commonwealth central office would be of no 
value in obtaining rural settlers and he did not want 
other States to benefit from a scheme established by New 
South Wales.^
The Oxford-educated lawyer's constitutional position 
was completely untenable - not even Carruthers had tried 
to argue such a case - since section 5l(xxvii) gave the 
Commonwealth unfettered power over immigration and 
emigration. His attitude was deplorable in the extreme, 
but it must be remembered that Wade wrote at a time when 
he was involved in a heated controversy with Deakin over 
the capital site and when he believed that Deakin was 
trying to avoid giving an undertaking to deal with that ‘ 
issue. In the matter of immigration Wade had the 
bargaining power which he lacked over the capital site.
It was a good stick with which to beat the Commonwealth 
dog.
Deakin justifiably argued that one of the main 
reasons for excluding undesirable immigrants was to make 
the country more attractive to people of British origin.
The Commonwealth must make every effort to attract as well 
as to exclude. He pointed out that it was impossible to
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M,, 21 February 1908, ibid., pp.1122-5*
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influence the labour market in one State without 
influencing it in others. The results of the efforts of 
New South Wales were, he believed, quite unsatisfactory 
and would not improve while competition continued. The 
Commonwealth still supported the view, expressed by the 
Agents-General in 1905» that joint action was essential 
and that nothing effective could be done while 1 2this great 
national issue [continued] to be dealt with provincially'. 
Indeed, the argument, that New South Wales should not be 
asked to share the fruits of its initiative with other 
States was ’one of the strongest reasons why such 
disintegrating methods should be prevented from continuing 
or strengthening’. If the country were to be developed 
and defended, population was a ’peremptory need' and the 
National Parliament would not be true to the trust reposed 
in it if it did not act energetically in the matter.^
It was true that 4,575 immigrants in more than two
years did not constitute an immigration scheme on the
scale that the country needed and it was only playing
politics to say that it did. But Deakin was unwise to
condemn it out of hand as this gave Wade, small-minded
provincialist that he was, the opportunity to divert
attention from his own inaction to Deakin's lack of
appreciation of the State's efforts and to put Deakin at a
2tactical disadvantage.
1
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W,, 6 March 1908, ibid., pp.1125-7-
2
See Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 26 March 1908, ibid., pp.1128- 
30.
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Bent decided to camouflage parochialism as 
statesmanship and told Deakin that, since immigration had 
been committed to the Commonwealth ’without any 
reservation whatever’, the Federal Government could 
undertake any action it liked to attract immigrants. 
Advertising was a minor matter which might well be left to 
the States if the rest were; the Commonwealth should 
provide funds for the resumption and subdivision of lands 
in Victoria for immigrants.^
Such a scheme would have assisted materially in the 
development of Victoria, but would have brought similar 
requests from the other States which it would have been 
quite beyond the financial resources of the Commonwealth 
to fulfil.2
At the Premiers’ Conference in April 1908, more
general resolutions were passed agreeing to further
3consultation with a view to co-operation. The value of 
these was revealed when only three Premiers replied to 
Deakin’s August letter asking how many immigrants they 
could take in the next five years and what details they
4wanted advertised. Of the three, only Wade, his temper
1
Prem. Vic. to P.M., 8 April I9O8 , ibid., pp.H30A, 1131A.
2
It is possible, especially if he knew of Wade's view, 
that Bent's letter was merely intended to embarrass Deakin. 
Such an action would have appealed to him with his love of 
heavy-handed humour.
3
Conference report, S ,A .P .P ., 1908, vol.3> no .23> see 
pp.(vi), 45-6, 73-4, 231-4.
4
P»M. to all Prems., 8 August 1908, C„A„0., C.R.S. A33> 
vol.2.4, pp. 66-71»
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improved now that Deakin had undertaken to finalize the 
capital site question early in the 1908 session, was 
really interested in co-operation, and he not only 
provided the information sought but indicated that in the 
year 1908-9 New South Wales would increase its own vote 
for immigration from £10,000 to £25,000.^
Deakin might have taken action even on that slender 
support, but his Government was replaced by the Fisher 
Government in November I9O8 and the Commonwealth made no 
further attempt to stimulate co-operation until Deakin 
returned at the head of the Fusion Government in June 1909»
In the first half of 1909 there was a desultory 
correspondence, with Wade trying to persuade Fisher to 
assume the responsibility for advertising Australia on a 
scale which would have satisfied even Deakin. When Fisher 
procrastinated, ostensibly because he was unwilling to act 
until he had the clear consent of all States, Wade became 
impatient. He tried to dragoon the other Premiers into 
supporting him but met with little success. Queensland, 
in particular, remained hostile to Commonwealth
intervention and indicated that it would not stop its own
2advertising.
Later, as a result of some vague and unimportant 
resolutions passed at the Premiers’ Conference of August
1
Prem. N.S.WU to P.M., 24 September 1908, S .A .P .P ., 1909» 
vol.3, no.52, Appendix A, pp.29-30. The other replies 
were from S.A., 23 September I9O8 , S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 
08/747 and Tasmania, 5 October 1908, T.S.A., P.D.1/203/38. 
2
See the correspondence in N » S , W . P . P . , 1909» vol.2, 
p p .640-4.
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]I909. Deakin asked the Premiers for copies of
publications used to advertise their States and for an
indication of the amount spent on advertising. The
answers helped to explain the lack of immigrants:
Queensland had spent most, £12,605 in three years;
Tasmania could not give a figure as it had no regular
2scheme of advertising.
When the Commonwealth organized a conference on
advertising in February 1910, only New South Wales,
Western Australia and Victoria sent representatives, though
it appears that later all States did co-operate in
regularly sending information and advertising material to
the External Affairs Department for the use of the High3Commissioner as suggested by the conference. Similarly, 
all co-operated in a scheme to bring out ten Scottish 
farmers and agricultural experts who had previously made 
similar visits to Denmark, Canada and Ireland. The visit 
took place between August 1910 and March I9H . The 
Commonwealth paid their expenses to and from Australia 
while each State maintained them and gave every opportunity 
for the investigation of rural conditions while they were 
within its borders. The High Commissioner, Sir George 
Reid, thought that their report, issued on their return,
1
S » A t, P . P . , I9O9, vol.3, no . 69 , p.vii.
2
The correspondence is in C.A.O., C.R.S.A63, 10/359*
3
See P.M. to Prem. S.A., 3 February (telegram), 23 
February, 22 September 1910, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 08/74-7; 
P.M. to Prem. Qld., 22 February 1910, copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S.A33, vol.31, p.647.
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would be of the greatest assistance to him in the work of
1attracting attention to Australia.
Small though they were, these were the first real
acts of co-operation, and it must be noticed that they
grew out of some of the first really definite proposals
put to the States, There was something in the stricture,
passed in 1906, that Deakin's advocacy of immigration had
been robbed of much of its effect by ’the nebulous
2character of his proposals'. This was Deakin’s great 
weakness, but there were other factors for which he was 
not responsible. Of these, the inertia and suspicion of 
the Premiers were the most important. Their behaviour was 
also of a piece with the tendency of the States, discussed 
more fully in chapter four, to co-operate willingly over 
specific acts but not over policy issues.
Once Deakin had left office for the last time in
April 1910, there was little further prospect of large
scale co-operation developing between Commonwealth and
States. In January I9H , the McGowen Labor Government in
New South Wales did try to arrange a uniform scheme, but
3nothing came of it. Later, the report of the Piddington
1
P.M. to all Prems., 7 September and 12 October 1909» 
copies, C.A.O., C.R.S.A33, vol.29, pp.305-6 , 649; 'First 
Annual Report of the High Commissioner', C.P.P., I9H  , 
vol.2 , p .970.
2
West Australian, 17 July I906.
3
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M. , 6 January I9H  (copy with Prem. 
N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 9 January I9H ) ,  S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 
11/37; Prem. Tas. to Prem. N.S.W., 27 January 1911, copy, 
T.S.A., P.D. 1/234/55; Prem. Vic. to Prem. N.S.W., 6 
February 1911? copy, P.D.V.O.L., vol.183, p.729*
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Royal Commission that the State was short of skilled
1labour in industry heightened its interest and caused it 
to raise the subject again at the 1912 Premiers8 
Conference, The States asked the Commonwealth to provide 
for 25,000 passages annually and to make the arrangements
with the shipping companies while they selected and placed
2the immigrants. The Commonwealth was unwilling to adopt
3a scheme which involved divided control' and, in any case, 
it appears that the States knew that the extra shipping 
space was not available and merely wished to transfer the
4odium of failure to other shoulders.
In 1912, Victoria and New South Wales did agree to
5co-operate in the work of immigration, but in 1913 the 
sources of immigration began to dry up. This was partly 
because of the constantly changing conditions of 
assistance offered by the States and partly the result of 
improved conditions for farm labourers in Britain. There 
was also increased competition from other Dominions/
1
'Interim Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
the alleged Shortage of Labour in the State of New South 
Wales5, Sydney, I9I I 9 p .vi .
2 Report of Premiers 5 Conference, S „A ,P .P . , 1912 , first 
session, n o .21, pp.45-6.
3 P.Mo to Prem. N.S.W., 4 April 1912 (copy with Prem. 
NoS.W. to Prem. S.A., 19»April 1912), S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6,
12/187.4
This view was expressed in. a series of private letters 
between H»C, Smart (High Commissioner's Office, London) 
and Atlee Hunt, March to July 1912. Atlee Hunt Papers, 
A.N.L., MS,52/16.
5 W.A . Watt in V.P.D., vol.133, p.555.6
Memo, by D.B. Edwards, 24 March 1914, D.P., A.N.L. ,
MS.1540/493 (Commonwealth Papers).
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When war came in 1914 , all prospect of immigration was at 
an end for the time. By the time the question was taken 
up again in 1920, the situation had changed sufficiently 
to allow a detailed and useful agreement to be reached
between all parties to pave the way for a more substantial
1migration programme in the future.
Figures vary according to the source from which they 
are taken, but probably between 180,000 and 190,000 
assisted immigrants entered Australia in the period I9OI- 
l 4 , with a peak of almost 47,000 in 1912. State 
expenditure did not exceed £100,000 until 1908-9 , but 
exceeded £360,000 in 1912-3• Commonwealth expenditure was 
negligible until 1910-1 , but exceeded £40,000 in 1913-4.^ 
It was not an impressive achievement.
Deakin was the only political leader who consistently 
tried to encourage co-operative effort in immigration and 
he undoubtedly marred his own proposals by vagueness.
That the States gradually became more interested in 
independent action after 1906 may well have been, as he
3claimed,' due to his prodding. Certainly they were not 
allowed to forget the question while he was in office, 
although it must be noted, in fairness to the States, that 
their increased activity also coincided with the return of
1
Premiers' Conference report, S .A .P .P ., 1920, vol.l, no. 
22, pp.vii-viii.
2
Commonwealth Year Book, N ,S .W ., Vic. and S .A .
Statistical Registers and Queensland 'Immigration Reports’ 
(in qT p .P .) for the period.
3
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W. , 6 March I9O8 , C.P.P. , 1907-8, 
vol.2, pp.1125-7*
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prosperity after the disastrous drought of the early years
1of the century.
I
Wade made it clear in 1908 that one of the causes of 
the unwillingness to co-operate was jealousy among the 
States as well as jealousy of the Commonwealth. But most 
important of all was the fact of divided responsibility 
and control, especially State control of land policy. 
States, such as South Australia and Victoria, which were 
not actively antagonistic to immigration but merely 
unwilling to be prodded into the complex and difficult 
business of making Crown lands available or resuming 
private lands, could simply do nothing (while agreeing 'in 
principle' to co-operate) and so prevent the development 
of a truly national policy and plan of action. The 
Commonwealth had no bargaining power in the matter, at 
least until the Surplus Revenue Act 1910 made every 
immigrant worth 25 shillings a year to the State which 
received him, and especially while it had no High 
Commissioner's Office in London to provide a starting 
point for national action.
Just as the creation of a seventh Government having 
jurisdiction over the whole of the continent created 
problems, so did the coming of a seventh representative of 
the Crown as Governor-General. The State Governors stayed 
away from the inaugural celebrations in Sydney, apparently 
because they did not wish to take second place, and it
1
See Mr Vaughan's speech in S . A . P . D . , (L.A.), I9H ,
p.lll.
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proved difficult, in the period 1 9 0 1 -1 0 «, to arrange joint
/ 1
1 e ve e s .
More important was a dispute which, arose directly out 
of the capital site question and. involved the provision of 
a residence for the Governor-General in both Sydney and 
Melbourne, as well as the payment of his railway expenses 
when travelling within Australia and especially between 
the two residences.
Section 125 of the Constitution provided that the
seat of government of the Commonwealth should be within
New South Wales but that until Parliament; met at the seat
of government it should sit in Melbourne. Nothing was
said about where the Governor-General should reside,
probably because it was obvious that he should be where
the business of the Parliament and Government was carried
on. In 1899, the Secretary of State asked that unless the
Governor-General was also to be, pro tempore, Governor of
Victoria, arrangements should be made for the provision of
2a suitable residence for him.
1
See minute by A.C. , 12 April 1901 on G.G. to S. of S. ,
4 March 1 9 0 I, A.N.L., A .J .C .P .2 1 3 8 , C.0.4l8/9, no.12336? 
Gov. S.A. to S. of S, , 20 August 1900, ibid., 1801,
CoO.13/154, no.27259) A.G.G. to all State Govs., 1 August
1 9 0 2 , C 0A .0., C 0P.7 8 /II, vol.2, pp.31-42j Gov. Vic. to
G ,G ., 17 October I9 0 3 and Prera. Vic. to G.G., 20 October
19 0 3 , Tennyson Papers, A.N.L., M S .479/3/86-7• The general 
question of precedence, only affecting the Governor- 
General. and Governors to a. limited extent, is discussed in 
D CP., A.N.L», MS,1 5 4 0 / 4 4 5  (Commonwealth Papers) and S.A.A.,
G,R u G .24/6, 0 2/5 5 6 .
2
S. of S. to Gov, N.S.Wo, 10 August 1899, N,S,W,P,P. ,
1905, vol.l, p„267.
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The possibility of his residing permanently in
Melbourne was something that New South Wales could not
tolerate. The Premier, Sir William Lyne, immediately
began to organize an arrangement under which the Governor-
General would reside in Melbourne while Parliament was in
session but in Sydney at other times, except when he made
brief visits to the other smaller States. The other
}Colonies approved of the arrangement. Chamberlain
accepted the scheme, subject to any future decision by the
Federal Government, but pointed out that the Governor-
General would be unable to maintain two establishments
2without some additional allowance. New South Wales 
passed an Act to provide its share of an additional
3£10,000 but the proposal lapsed because no other State 
took similar action.
Lyne's ostensible reasons for wanting this were that 
New South Wales was the oldest, wealthiest and most 
populous Colony and that the seat of Government was 
eventually to be within its borders. In fact, there can 
be no doubt that the whole business sprang blatantly from 
jealousy of Victoria and that there was no adequate 
justification for the demand.
The Governor-General, then, was to divide his time 
between Government House, Melbourne, and Government House
1
For the correspondence see ibid., pp.267-71*
2
Governor N.S.W. to Prem. N.S.W., 18 July 1900 (enclosing 
copy of cable S. of S. to Gov. N.S.W. , l6 July I.9OO, 
N.S.W.P.P,, I905, vol.l, P.271.
3'
N.S.Wo, 64 Vic., no.78.
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(Domain), Sydney, the State Governors being moved to other 
quarters. There were no problems in Melbourne except, 
briefly, in 1906 when Bent tried, without success, to
1force the Commonwealth to pay for the use of the property, 
but there was trouble over the Sydney residence.
Victoria agreed, with reasonable promptness, to allow
the Commonwealth the use of the Melbourne residence for
three years (extendable to five) rent free, with the
2Commonwealth paying for maintenance, but it took New3South Wales fifteen months to accept the same terms. It 
was the result of sheer administrative inefficiency. 
However, no real trouble arose until 1905 by which time 
Carruthers had become Premier and, having joined issue 
with the Commonwealth over the capital site, was eager to 
find fault with its treatment of the State wherever he 
could.
It was claimed that the Governor-General rarely
4occupied Government House, Sydney, and Carruthers decided 
that 'the time [had] come for a distinct assertion of the 
rights of this State under the Constitution'. The rights
1
See Prem. Vic. to P.M., 28 May 1906, P.D.V.O.L., vol. 
157, p.126, and Senator Keating in C .P .D ., vol.32, 
pp.1853-4.
2
D . T ., 7 June 1902.
3
Memo, by E.B. Harkness, 6 May 1905, N ,S ,W.P.P ., 1905» 
vol.l, pp.279-80.
4
Ibid. In fact, up to mid-1905, the Governor-General 
occupied it for over 70 per cent of the time that 
Parliament was in recess, although for less than one-third 
of the total time.
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of New South Wales to the seat of government must be
recognized and the Governor-General, should be absent from
the State only when parliamentary business made it
necessary. As it was, his residence was ’practically
fixed' in Melbourne. If the rights of the State were not
to be recognized. Government House should be returned and
other arrangements made for the occasional visits of the
1Governor-General, to Sydney.
Deakin could only explain that it was the long 
sessions of Parliament which had caused the Governor- 
General to be so long absent from Sydney and, while he 
could not agree that there could be a permanent 
headquarters for him until the seat of government was 
established, there was no desire to deprive Sydney of its 
rights under the pre-federal arrangement. The difficulty 
arose from the fact that while Parliament met in Melbourne 
it was desirable for the Governor-General and the heads of 
departments, all inseparably associated with the 
transaction of parliamentary business, to be there as well. 
This situation would remain until the permanent seat of 
government was occupied.^
The explanation was sound, but no explanation was 
likely to appease jealousy or the hostility aroused by the 
capital site question. However, the matter was dropped
1
Submission to Cabinet by J.H. Carruthers, n.d., but 
certainly May 1905» and Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 12 July 1905» 
N.S.W.A., Attorney General, S.B.7782.
2
P . M . to Prem. N.S.W. , 24 July 1905, N.S.W.P.P. , 1905, 
vol.l, p,281, and 9 August 1905, N.S.W. A., Attorney-General, 
S.B.7782.
2l4
until the end of 1905 when a debate in the Senate showed
that it was ver\ doubtful whether money would be voted for
maintenance of Government House, Sydney, after the
financial year 1905-6. During the debate it was stated
that the need for the double establishment had arisen only
1from 9 the absurd. s small-minded jealousy of Sydney9.
This raised real problems for Carruthers as the lease
on 9Cranbrook89 the alternative residence for the State
Governor, expired late in I.906 and he needed an early
intimation of the Commonwealth's intentions with regard to
Domain Government House so that he could take the
necessary action over 'Cranbrook*. The situation became
even more urgent for him when the owner decided to sell
2“Cranbrook8 and gave the State the option to purchase. 
Eventually the Commonwealth Parliament passed an Act 
enabling the Governor-General to make an agreement for 
five years with the Governors of New South Wales and 3Victoria for the use of the respective Government Houses. 
Carruthers was informed of this the day before the State's
4option on 9Cranbrook8 expired.
1
The debate is in CJ>JX} vol.29, pp.5813-23, 5962-78.
2
Gov. N 0S0W. to G.Go, 3 January I9 0 6 , copy, with G.G, to 
P.M., 5 January I.9 0 6 , C„A»0., C.Po78/4s vol.3, p .2685 see 
al so the correspondence in N tS.V.PT, , 1912, vol. 1, 
pp.685-7•
3
CoP„D.„ vol.31» pp.8 7 6 -9 2 1 vol.32, pp.1851-69, 1938-9.
Act no ® 2 o f 1 9 0 6.
4
PoM. to Prem, N 0S.W0, 31 July I9 0 6 , telegram, N aS„W.P,P., 
I9 1 2 , vol.1, p c687. The option expired on 1 August 1 9 0 6.
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The Commonwealth was able to extend its lease on 
Domain Government House for a further five years and it 
must be said that, considering the position he had taken 
up on the rights of the State in 1905, Carruthers acted 
with remarkable restraint and consideration in 1906.
There is no apparent reason for this, except, perhaps, the 
realization that it was the only way to ensure that the 
Governor-General resided in Sydney for at least a part of 
the year and so brought that city the benefits, real or 
imagined, which were said to result from his presence.
The new lease remained in force until 1911 and there 
was no trouble until the time for its renewal drew near. 
Unfortunately, the next round of negotiations had to be 
conducted between Governments and men who were estranged 
at the time. In the Commonwealth,the Fisher Government 
was in power, while the McGowen Government held office in 
New South Wales. Early in 1911 , when the negotiations 
began, the two leaders were away at the Coronation of 
King George V and their deputies, W.M. Hughes and V.A. 
Holman, were in charge of affairs at home. At this time 
there was an acute breach between the two men as a result 
of their opposing attitudes over the first referendum for 
the extension of the industrial powers of the Commonwealth, 
held in April 1911.^
In March I9H , Holman informed the Commonwealth 
Government that he understood that it would 'be pleased to 
be relieved of the occupancy of the premises' and offered
1
L.F. Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes, vol.l, p.262. 
See generally C. Joyner, Holman v . Hughes.
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to terminate the lease without the formal notice provided
for. ' Hughes’ reply was simply a request that the State
2Government should agree to the renewal of the lease.
Holman was not prepared to extend the lease beyond 31 
December 1911 (it was due to expire on 8 August), 
ostensibly because the property was required for public3purposes. It turned out later that he intended to use 
some of the land to supply the needs of the Sydney 
Hospital and Law Courts, while the building was to be used 
temporarily to take the pressure off the Macquarie Street
4Library and then, permanently, as a 'national' museum.
As an excuse for evicting the Governor-General, this 
reason was more original than convincing. No doubt it was 
designed to appeal to at least a section of the public, 
just as the intention to use part of the land as a public 
park would have appealed to another section.
The real reason for denying Government House to the 
Commonwealth lay in the Surplus Revenue Act 1910. In. 
Holman's view, the complete separation of Commonwealth and 
State finances meant that the various services performed 
by the State for the Commonwealth must either be paid for 
or cease. The time had gone 'when it [could] be regarded 
as the duty of the State to find the appliances with which
1
A. Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 23 March I9II, N.S.W.A., 
Attorney-General, S.B.7783*
2
A.P.M. to A.Prem. N.S.W. , 8 May 19H  , ibid.
3
A.Prem. N.S«W0 to A.P.M., 23 May and 6 June I9H  > 
N.S.W.P.P., 1912, vol.l, p.689.5
Press release, n.d., but between June and August 1911» 
Holman Papers, M.L., uncatalogued MSS., Set 111.
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the Federal [Government wasJ to carry out its functions1 23*5. 
What with the purchase of 'Cranbrook' and the upkeep of 
two Government Houses, New South Wales had spent more than 
£100,000 on its vice-regal establishments since federation 
For some time the States had been trying to obtain 
compensation for the properties transferred to the 
Commonwealth and payment for services rendered by State 
officers in the performance of Commonwealth duties. The 
resumption of Domain Government House for State purposes 
was simply a part of this policy.^
The 'policy* had all the appearances of a reprisal.
However, the Commonwealth tenancy dragged on beyond 31
December 1911 and, in May 1912, the Premier, J.S.T.
McGowen, agreed to allow Lord Denman to use the House
2while he remained in Sydney that year, but, when the
Commonwealth tried to secure its use, even without most of
the grounds, until the end of Lord Denman’s term of office
McGowen would only agree if the State were paid 3'§‘ per
cent on the capital value of the property. There are
indications that Holman had a strong hand in this
3proposal. The Commonwealth understood this as an 
indication that New South Wales no longer desired the
1
Ibid.3 Minute by A.Prem. N.S.W. to Lt.Gov. N.S.W., for 
S. of S., n.d., copy, N.S.W.A., Attorney-General, S.B.7783
2
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 1 May 1912, N.5.W.P.P., 1912, 
vol.1 , p .691.
3
Prem. N.S.W. to Minister for External Affairs, 17 July 
1912, ibid., pp.691-2$ see also W.A. Holman to J. Thomas, 
10 July 1912, Holman Papers, M.L., uncatalogued MSS.,
Set 111.
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Governor-General to spend the parliamentary recess in
1Sydney and negotiations collapsed.
When Lyne had so urgently set about making 
arrangements for the Governor-General to spend the recess 
in Sydney he had expected that the site for the federal 
capital would be selected early and the seat of government 
established there. His arrangement was intended to apply 
only for a. short time, until the Governor-General's 
permanent headquarters was established in a country centre 
in New South Wales. It was a temporary provision to 
ensure that the rights and privileges of the 'mother' 
Colony were safeguarded. As the dispute over the 
selection of a site for the seat of government dragged on 
and Parliament remained in Melbourne, keeping the 
Governor-General there with it during its unexpectedly 
long sessions, the situation became inconvenient for New 
South Wales, which had to make costly extra provisions for 
its own Governor without gaining the compensating 
advantages of the Governor-General’s presence. There was 
ample room for interstate jealousy to arise. There was 
also something in the State argument that circumstances 
changed after the passing of the Surplus Revenue Act 1910i 
although this was more than counterbalanced by the fact
1
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 22 August 1912, N,S.W.P.P., 1912, 
vo1.1, pp.692. From 1913 the Commonwealth used Admiralty 
House, North Sydney, as a residence for the Governor- 
General. No rent was paid because the Commonwealth claimed 
a. reversionary right direct from the Imperial Government. 
There was a dispute with New South Wales in 1930* The 
incident is outlined in Australian Encyclopaedia, article 
on Government Houses.
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that the use of Sydney Government House during the recess 
was a concession to the State which had been granted at 
its own request and without any Commonwealth Government 
being consulted. Not that any State politician could have 
been expected to see the matter in that light.
The eviction of the Governor-General did not end the 
troubles of the State Government as it immediately found 
itself involved in a long legal battle with a number of 
Sydney citizens who contended that Government House could 
not legally be used for any purpose other than as a home 
for the K i n g ’s representative. The Government won, but 
the building was not destined to end its days as a museum 
and a few years later it again became the State Government 
House.^
Naturally, the Governor-General was expected to visit 
all States from time to time and to do this he had to 
travel on the State owned railways. The amount of 
travelling he, and his whole establishment, including his 
stable, were involved in was greatly increased by the need 
to occupy in turn two Government Houses several hundred 
miles apart. The costs involved in the former visits 
might have caused little difficulty but the extra travel 
between Sydney and Melbourne made these charges more 
important.
The basis of the trouble was a cable sent to the 
Secretary of State for Colonies by the Lieutenant-Governor
1
There are masses of material on the court cases in 
N.S.W.A., Attorney-General, S.B.7783-^*
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of New South Wales, on the suggestion of Sir William Lyne, 
on 2k August 1900. It read simply, 'Free railway
travelling for Governor-General and Establishment
1promised'. It was not for Lyne to settle such matters,
and, in February and March I9OI, an arrangement was made
with the Victorian Railways Commissioner whereby the
Governor-General and six of his staff were issued with
free passes over State lines. The New South Wales
2authorities concurred in the arrangement.
The agreement in itself was clear enough, but it was 
unfortunate that in his letter the Victorian Commissioner 
should have said that his Department would treat the 
Federal Authorities in the same way as it treated the 
State Authorities. This apparently led the Federal 
Government to assume that no payment whatsoever would be 
required for railway services rendered to the Governor- 
General and his establishment. Probably the members of 
Cabinet were not thoroughly conversant with the actual 
practice in the States with regard to the State Governors. 
In New South Wales, services to the Governor's 
establishment were debited to a special vote which had (by 
1903 at least) become insufficient to meet all charges 
properly debited against it. In Victoria, whenever
1
See P.M. to Prem. N.S.W«,, 22 September 190.5* R.E„, C.A.O. , 
C.R.S. A 33 , vo 1.11., p.321$ Lt.Gov. N.S.W. to Prem. N.S.W. ,
6 October 1905, V5893, 05/A11251, R.E.
2
Victorian Railways Commissioner to P.M., l4 February 
1901.5 minute by G.G. for Senator O'Connor, 2 March 1901; 
Under-Secretary for Finance and Trade, N.S.W. to Secretary 
to PcM. , 13 March 1901y Private Secretary to G.G. to
Secretary, External Affairs, l4 March 1901, C.A.O.,
C.R.S.A6 , 01/611.
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someone was given a free pass, the Railways Department was
credited with the amount and the Treasury debited with
. . 1 11 .
The system of free travel for the Governor-General
and a limited number of his staff apparently operated
unchallenged until May 1902 when Deakin, acting as Prime
Minister during the absence of Barton, privately asked
See to allow Lord Hopetoun free transport to Sydney for a
2farewell visit before his return to England. This
request seems to have been granted after some difficulties
3with the State Railways Commissioners and Deakin set out 
a system to operate in the future should the States 
insist on payment. If the Governor-General travelled on 
Commonwealth business, the Commonwealth should pay; if he 
travelled at the invitation of a State, the State should 
pay; if he travelled privately, he should bear the cost
4himself. The State Authorities gave general assent to 
this .
1 Minute by Railway Commissioners, N.S.W., 18 May 1903, 
copy with Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. Vic., 13 July 1903;
W. Shiels (for Prem. Vic.) to P.M., 30 May 1903 , copy, 
P.D.V.I.L., P06/3231.
2
Deakin to See, 21 May 1902, See Papers, M.L., MS.A3675»
vol.27.
3 See register entries in C.A.O., C.R.S.A10, vol.4,
02/53/42-4, 49.
4
Minute, A.P.M. to A.G.G., for S. of S., 29 August 1902, 
copy, C.A.O., C.P. 78/11, vol.2, pp.178-9* Apparently 
also sent to State Governors.
5 See G.G. to Gov. Vic., 3 December 1902, copy; G.G. to 
Gov. N.S.W,, 5 December 1902, copy, C.A.O., C.P. 78/11, 
vol.2 , pp.187, 198.
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General assent was, however, of little use as it 
appears that the different parties understood different 
things by Deakin's plan. Almost certainly the States 
understood that they would be paid for transporting all 
except the Governor-General himself and those members of 
his staff with free passes, on all but a few special 
occasions. The Commonwealth apparently imagined that if 
payment were demanded for the regular trip to Sydney it 
should be paid by the Governor-General himself.^ Such an 
assumption was both unfair and unreasonable.
That interpretations of the memorandum differed
became plain in 1903 when the Commonwealth found claims
being pressed for amounts which almost certainly
represented the full cost of travel, apart from the
special passes. Barton protested strongly and asked that
the charges should be withdrawn, urging as a reason the
earlier promises of the States to treat the Governor-
2General as they did their own Governors. The States 
continued to press their claims and the Victorian Railways 
Commissioner did much to stiffen the attitude of his 
Government. Victoria was in the peculiar position of 
being the place from which most of the arrangements were 
made and tickets issued. Consequently, it had already
1
See G.G, to S. of S., 18 February 1903, enclosing G.G. 
to P.M., 6 February 1903, A.N.L., A .J.C .P.2158, C.0.418/26, 
no.l.0804, Tennyson threatened to resign immediately if he 
were asked to pay. Also minute, G.G. to P.M., 5 February 
1 9 0 3, D.P., A.N.L., MS.1540/4 6 9 0. Note the difference in 
date between the two copies of the same minute.
2
P.M. to Prems. N.S.W., Vic., S.A., 6 April 1903, copy, 
C.A.O., C.R.S.A33, vo1 .1 , p.6 2 5.
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paid out to the other States their share of the amount it
expected to receive from the Commonwealth. It was out of
1pocket in fact as well as in theory.
The situation continued unaltered until mid-1904 when 
it changed suddenly, but only temporarily. During its 
brief stay in office, the Watson Government persuaded New 
South Wales, Victoria and South Australia (which was only 
marginally interested in the matter) to forego all claims 
for railway services to the Governor-General. The 
Commonwealth Parliament was 8 di sinclined8 to vote extra 
money for the Governor-General's establishment and, if the 
States did not grant free travel, interstate journeys 
would have to be reduced to a minimum. He pointed out
that the Governor-General could perform all his official
2duties from Melbourne. Soon, the Premier of New South
Wales, Thomas Waddell, whose Government had already been
defeated at a general election and was only acting in a
caretaker capacity, indicated that his promise to forego
the charges was limited to those existing at the time the
3promise was made on 12 July, He was apparently not 
prepared to commit the incoming Carruthers Government to a
1
W, Shiels (for Prem. Vic.) to P.M., 7 January 1904, 
copyj Commissioner of Railways, Vic., to Minister for 
Railways Vic, , 6 February and 21 April 1904j see also 
memo., Commissioner of Railways, Vic,, 29 April 1903» 
P.D.VoIoL., P06/3231.
2
The story can be traced through register entries in 
CcA.Oe, CoR.So A48, vol.l, 04/101, 394, 550, 1170; see 
also C.RoSo A33, vo1,6, pp.135» 527, 747^ P.D.V.I.L., 
PO6/323I and P o D o V o 0 o L . , vol.l44, p,204.
3
Prem. NoS.Wc to P.M0, 26 August 1904, R 0E„, C oA o0.,
C o R o S o A 4 8 , vo1.1, 04/1277.
future expenditure of“ which it might not approve and which 
had not been authorized by Parliament.
Further claims were pressed, by New South Wales. The
matter was discussed at the Premiers8 Conference of
February 1905 when particular reference was made to the
subject of special trains. The Commonwealth was prepared
to, pay for these, when needed, but thought they were run
unnecessarily and that it was unreasonable for New South
Wales to charge more than twice as much a mile for them as
Victoria did. Carruthers promised no more than that he
would try to arrange that, all charges against the
Governor-General were made at the same rate as those
1against the State Governor. In April 1905» Victoria also
began to present accounts again, as it had only agreed to
2stop subject to similar action by New South Wales. When 
Carruthers eventually made his intentions known, he 
proposed to insist on payment and forwarded an account for 
almost £4,000.^ In view of the “agreement8 of mid-1904, 
and the discussions at the 1905 Conference, Reid was very4unwilling to pay it.
1
Conference report, S „A .P 0P . , 1905, vol.2, n o .22, 
p p .121-3 *
2
Secretary to Treasury to Secretary to External Affairs 
Dept., 4 April 1905, R«E0, C„A.0., C.RoS 0 A48, vol.2, 
05/1195$ Prem. Vic. to P.M«, 7 April. 1905? copy, P oD.V.0oLo 
v ol.148, p .56 5•
3
Prem. N CS.W„ to P 0M., 9 June 1905, R.E., C.A.0,, C.R0S. 
A48, vol.2, 05/2141.4
P„Mo to Prem. N US.W0, 20 June 1905, copy, C.A.0., C 0R.S. 
A 33 j vol.10, P.376.
225
Sir George Turner, the Commonwealth Treasurer at the
time, seems to have assumed that Carruthers had
9 practically agreed9 , at the Conference, to make no
1further charges, except for special trains, although the
record of the Conference debate gives absolutely no
justification for this interpretation. The correspondence
muddled on until the end of 1905? with the Commonwealth
still plaintively adhering to the view that the States had
initially promised free travel and that if they wished to
withdraw from the agreement it should be abrogated
2formally and a new system established.
Formal abrogation of an agreement which had never 
been made, either formally or informally, was scarcely 
necessary. The Commonwealth was a victim of its own 
imagination and of the loose administrative practices used 
on all sides in the early years of federation and before.
The States agreed among themselves to adopt a uniform 
basis for charges, including a charge of two shillings and 
sixpence a mile for special trains, made it retrospective, 
and insisted on payment of all amended accounts. Deakin 
recognized the fruitlessness of further argument and 
submitted. Before the end of the financial year 1.905-6, 
payment was made for the whole period 1 January 1901 to 
31 December 1905* Thereafter the Commonwealth made annual
1
P.M, to Prem. N„S»W, , 31 October 1905? copy» C qA.Qs, 
CoRcSo A 3 3 , vo1.11, pp.727-8.
2
Ibid,
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provision in the Estimates for a sum to cover this 
charge.
The States had won a complete victory, but it was a 
victory which made little immediate difference. What they 
gained in payment for services rendered they lost in the 
return of surplus revenue, at least until, the passing of 
the Surplus Revenue Act 1908. The only immediate loss to 
the Commonwealth was a slight increase in its estimates of 
expenditure which made its administration seem a little 
less economical than before, but the amount involved was 
not large. State and Commonwealth officers were only 
doing their duty in scrutinizing expenses which, it 
appeared to them, were not clearly authorized. This was 
always their duty. But the position became more complex 
when one Government used facilities provided by another. 
Perhaps the most important result of the discussion was to 
show the need to make intergovernmental agreements clear and 
definite in their terms.
These three questions, and others like them, trivial 
as they may appear in retrospect, were irritants 
interfering with the harmonious working of the new
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P . M ., 16 January 1906, copy with Prem. 
N.S.W. to Prem. Vic., 16 January 1906, P.D.V.I.L.,
P06/3231 j Prem. Vic. to P.M . , 3 January 1 9 0 6 , acknowledged 
in P.M. to Prem. Vic . , 10 January 1 9 0 6 , copy, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A.33 » V 0 I . I 2 ,  p.466; P.M. to Prems. N.S.W., Vic., 
S.A., 17 February I9 0 6 , copies, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.13, 
pp.44-5* P.M. to Prems. Vic. and N.S.W., 9 July 1906, 
copies, ibid., vol.15, pp.11-2; Sir W. Lyne in C .P .D ., 
vol.39» P .3305 5 C .P .P . , 1906-10, ’Estimates of Revenue and 
Expenditure’.
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political system. They made it possible for each 
Government concerned to feel that it was being wronged in 
some way and that it was not being shown proper 
consideration. A State could feel that the Commonwealth 
regarded one of its major industries as expendable, or 
that the Federal Government was economizing at the 
expense of the States. The Commonwealth could feel that 
the States were trying to control its actions and 
frustrate its will simply for the sake of frustrating it. 
This was not really so, but, in such situations, what men 
assume is true may be more important than the truth 
itself. In the circumstances, it was easy for the 
’chafing’ caused by the ’heroic remedy’ called federation 
to appear more onerous than the 'many evils’ of disunity 
that it was supposed to overcome.
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CHAPTER 4
TRANSFERRED DEPARTMENTS AND PROPERTIES? CO-OPERATION
Many of the problems discussed in this thesis are 
concerned with extraordinary aspects of the relations of 
the Commonwealth and State Governments. The argument 
about channels of communication was unexpected, highly 
specialized and unusual in that it involved a third party 
as prominently as it did the various Australian 
Governments. The expulsion of the Kanakas affected a 
single State and aroused local sectional hostilities. 
Finance was an issue of general concern but its 
fundamental importance lifted it into the category of 
'special* problems. A capital site is chosen once only in 
the life of a nation, but the Governments in a federal 
system must go on living and working together harmoniously, 
or with growing resentment, for as long as the system 
lasts. The way in which they deal with the ordinary day 
to day difficulties, and the measure of co-operation that 
they offer each other in meeting them, is not exciting 
but it is vital to the political life of the nation and 
may well be of more lasting significance than their 
handling of extraordinary problems. This aspect of 
intergovernmental relations cannot be neglected by the 
student who hopes to understand something of the way the 
federal system began to work and has continued to work.
It was part of the very purpose of federation in 
Australia that the control of those aspects of
229
administration which could be handled more efficiently as 
one than under the divided control of six governments 
should be brought under the control of the Commonwealth.
No one questioned the need for the customs, postal and 
defence departments to be transferred as speedily as 
possible and there were no arguments over the transfers.
In part this was the result of the general accord which 
existed, in part it sprang from the very speed of transfer 
which gave no time for opposing interests to be expressed. 
The transfer of the control of customs was simultaneous 
with the inauguration of the Commonwealth. The postal and 
defence departments came under Commonwealth control on 1 
March 1901.
The Constitution also provided that control of 
lighthouses and quarantine should pass to the Commonwealth 
by proclamation and it gave the Federal Parliament power
to make laws on the subjects of astronomical and
2 3meteorological observations and census and statistics.
At the Conventions, no one had seriously questioned that
it was desirable to give the Commonwealth power to deal4with these matters but while the value of unified control 
of quarantine, lighthouses and the census was clear there 
was no urgency to act quickly to achieve it. Because 
action was slower, there was time for such diversity of
1
Section 69.
2
Section 51 (viii).
3
Section 51 (x i)0
4
See Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, historical 
notes to the sections listed above.
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interests as existed to gain prominence and to cause 
disagreement and further delay. Sometimes, as in the case 
of statistics, it was clear that control by the 
Commonwealth alone would be no more satisfactory than 
control by the six State Governments alone and that a new 
Commonwealth department would have to be created to work 
closely with the existing State departments and utilize 
some of their machinery. Such co-operation, though vital, 
was not easy to initiate.
Unless the new system was to involve unnecessary 
duplication of departments and great cost, there had to be 
co-operation between many branches of the State and 
Commonwealth services. These reciprocal services were 
especially valuable to the Commonwealth during the first 
decade because of its limited financial resources and the 
small number of its officers. But the States had always 
used their postal departments for more than merely postal 
services and it was an advantage to them to be able to 
continue to do so. Although there were problems in 
arranging the widespread co-operation that was desirable 
if the new system of government was to be made to give 
satisfaction at a fair price, it was usually possible to 
agree on specific individual acts. The real trouble 
began when the Commonwealth tried to organize something 
approaching administrative integration of departments 
where the Constitution did not contemplate unified control.
Two problems associated with the transfer of 
departments demand special attention. When transfer 
occurred, the property which the department used (varying 
from real estate to pencils) went with it if it was used 
exclusively by the transferred department. If use was
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shared with a non-transferred department, the property 
could be transferred at the discretion of the Commonwealth. 
Sometimes it was difficult to decide which Government 
should own a specific piece of property. Always the 
question of compensation had to be settled and it proved 
so thorny that it took more than ten years to reach even 
an interim settlement.
Modern government could not be carried on 
satisfactorily without an adequate supply of statistics 
whether of population, of production or the interchange of 
goods. The Federal Conventions recognized this by giving 
the Commonwealth power to make laws with regard to census 
and statistics. In making the power concurrent, the 
Australian Constitution recognized that the States, in the 
exercise of their many independent powers of government, 
would continue to need their own statistics. Intelligent 
contemporary opinion thought it likely that the 
Commonwealth would take over the existing State 
Statistical Bureaux.' This failed to recognize that the 
needs of the State Governments might not be identical with 
those of the Commonwealth and that some decentralization 
of statistical work might continue to be both necessary 
and desirable.
Even .in pre-federal days, the brilliant Government 
Statistician of New South Wales, T.A. Coghlan, had 
produced a book, The Seven Colonies of Australasia, which 
provided comparative statistics for Australia and New
Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, p.572.
1
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Zealand, in so far as they were available. There were 
weaknesses, which Coghlan could do nothing to correct, 
arising from the fact that the various Governments did not 
all collect the same figures nor did they all collect them 
with equal determination and skill.
It was clear that it would be impossible for the
Commonwealth Parliament to legislate on the question of
census and statistics early in its life, because of the
other more urgent matters it had to deal with, and Coghlan
determined to continue production of his book. Because it
was of federal interest and relevance, he suggested that
the Commonwealth should bear the cost of publishing it
1rather than leave it to New South Wales alone. While the 
Minister for Home Affairs, Sir William Lyne, was not 
prepared to rush into the establishment of a statistical 
department, he was willing to recommend that the 
Commonwealth should bear the cost of the book, but the 
Government eventually decided to pay only the cost of
2compilation, leaving the cost of publication to the State. 
The arrangement, a useful act of co-operation, remained 
unaltered until 1906. The unwillingness of the 
Commonwealth to bear the full cost looks ungenerous and is
1
Government Statistician N.S.W. to P.M., l4 August 1901, 
C.A00., C.R.S. A100, A05/4461, ’Publication of Australia 
and New Zealand’.
2
Minute by Lyne, 13 November 1901, ibid.5 Government 
Statistician N.S.W. to Secretary, Home Affairs, 25 March 
1903, ibid,
3
P „M. to Prem. N.S.W., 15 September 1906, copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S, A.33, vol.15, p . 698.
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probably attributable to the acute consciousness of the 
first Treasurer, Sir George Turner, of the need for 
economy.
A conference of statisticians met in Hobart in 
January 1902 and discussed the future relationship of 
their Bureaux with the Commonwealth Bureau. They agreed 
that the work of collecting statistics for both States and 
Commonwealth should be left in the hands of the State 
Bureaux which could also prepare, in more concentrated
1form, those which the Commonwealth desired to publish.
At the end of 1902, the Commonwealth asked Coghlan to draw
up a scheme for a Federal Bureau of Statistics and he
agreed that, provided all State Bureaux were brought up to
a uniformly high standard of efficiency, it would be
desirable to act as the conference had suggested because
much of the collection of statistics was done by the
2police who were under State control.
There was much in this argument, as it was likely to 
be easier to get co-operation between various State 
departments than between Commonwealth and State 
departments. A knowledge of local conditions and 
circumstances was likely to be valuable both in organizing 
the collection of statistics and in interpreting them.
The view of the State statisticians did tend to limit the
1
Conference report, S.A.P.P., 1902, vol.2, no.25A,
PP.7-8.
2
’Report on the proposed establishment of a Central 
Bureau of Statistics’, T.A. Coghlan, 21 April 1903, Barton 
Papers, A oN .L0, MS.51/1/591.
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function of the Commonwealth Bureau severely and to keep 
the maximum amount of control in their own hands.
On the basis of Coghlan's report, a fairly general 
Act was passed during the 1905 session of the Federal 
Parliament.! It provided for the establishment of a 
Central Bureau and the appointment of a Commonwealth 
Statistician and gave power to make arrangements with the 
States for the use of officers and the exchange of 
statistics. The Act sought to make use of State machinery 
and so minimize the cost of the service. It made no 
attempt to take over the existing State Bureaux, a move
2which would have met strong opposition from the States.
The appointment of the first Commonwealth
Statistician caused much unpleasantness and showed the New
South Wales Premier, J.H. Carruthers, in a bad light. The
obvious choice for the position was T.A. Coghlan, the
country's foremost statistician. Although it had been
known at the beginning of 1905 that the Commonwealth
wished to appoint Coghlan to the position when it was
3created, he was sent to London with an appointment as 
Acting Agent-General to re-organize the office there and 
to negotiate a series of loan renewals for the State.
1
Act n o .15 of 1905. The debate is in C .P „D ., vols.25-30, 
passim.
2
D .T ., 9 September 1905.
Ibid., 7 and 25 January 1905*
3
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In December 1905, Deakin sought permission to 
approach Coghlan about the post and Carruthers granted 
this.^ When Coghlan was approached he asked Carruthers to 
clarify his position. This was to all intents and 
purposes a request to be allowed to accept the invitation. 
Carruthers told him that his withdrawal at that juncture 
would prejudice the State's financial interests in London. 
At the same time, he asked Deakin to let Coghlan delay his 
reply for six months. All Deakin wanted was to know 
whether Coghlan would accept the job and whether he would 
provide the information necessary before the office could 
be organized. There was no need for him to take up the 
appointment until 1 July 1906. Carruthers would not allow 
Coghlan to do even this and the latter had to inform 
Deakin that he had been virtually commanded to remain in 
London.
Later, in a private letter, Coghlan revealed that 
Carruthers had re-inforced his command with the threat 
that, if he left the State service without permission,
2Coghlan would lose all his accumulated pension rights.
It appears that Carruthers* jealousy of the Commonwealth 
and his desire to beat it with any stick on which he could 
lay his hand deprived Coghlan of a post for which he was
teminently suited and deprived the country of the services 
of its ablest statistician. The Commonwealth showed its
1
The correspondence on this question is all in C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A100, AO6/I.258.
2
T.A. Coghlan to Deakin, 15 February 1906, D.P., A.N.L., 
MS.1540/1248.
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opinion of Coghlan’s worth by reducing the salary for the 
position from £1,200 a year to £1,000 a year before it 
appointed G.H. Knibbs to it.
Despite Tasmania's protests that conferences were
becoming too frequent and their cost a burden,1 the
Commonwealth called a conference of statisticians for
November-December 1906 to discuss the collection and
exchange of statistics. Apart from their many technical
resolutions, the statisticians agreed that all statistical
material, except that collected in confidence, should be
made available to other States and the Commonwealth. In a
special resolution, each statistician pledged his 'prompt
and complete' assistance to the Commonwealth Statistician
2in the conduct of his duties. This resolution was not
acted upon very effectively in the early years. New South
Vales was slow in supplying the Commonwealth with copies
of its past statistical publications for its library and
New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia were often
unduly slow in supplying statistics that were urgently
3needed for comparative purposes and for publication. The
1
Prem. Tas. to P,M., 24 September and 22 November 1906, 
copies, T.S.A., P.D. 1/185/19; P.M. to Prem. Tas., 9 
November 1906, C.A.O., C.R.S. A33> vol.l6 , pp.486-7»
2  j'Unification of Australian Statistical Methods and 
Co-ordination of the Work of the Commonwealth and State 
Bureaux', S „A .P .P ., 1907» vol.2, no.25, Appendix A.
3 See P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 6 March 1907» copy, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.17, pp.656-8 ; P.M. to Prem. N.S.W. , 7 
December 1908, copy, ibid., vol.25» pp.254-5; P.M. to Prem. 
Tas., 7 December 1908, T.S.A., P.D. 1/202/19; P.M. to Prem. 
Tas., 15 January 1909 and reply (copy), 4 February 1909» 
ibid., P.D. 1/210/19; P.M. to Prem. W.A., 7 December 1908 
and reply (copy), 13 January 1909» W.A. 732, C.S.O. 5913/08.
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lack of urgent requests for information to the other 
States seems to indicate that they co-operated adequately 
with the Commonwealth ip this regard.
In the matter of statistics, Western Australia caused
more difficulties than any other State. In August 1907,
the Commonwealth asked that each State Statistician should
be appointed an officer under its 1905 Act so that he could
act under the instructions of the Commonwealth Statistician
to collect all information required for the purposes of the
Census and Statistics Act 1905, supply the information so
collected to the Commonwealth Statistician and take any
action necessary to enforce compliance with the demands
1authorized by the Act. Western Australia alone refused
2to make the appointment. The State Statistician, Mr
Fraser, had shown marked hostility to any kind of
Commonwealth control over the State Bureaux as early as
31903 and was able to find ample reason why he should not 
be appointed an officer of the Commonwealth for the 
purposes of the 1905 Act. He argued that a nominal 
appointment would be of no value as it had already been 
agreed that the Commonwealth should be supplied with the 
statistics which it needed. He believed that the request 
was simply 'the thin edge of the wedge', leading 
eventually to the absorption of the State Bureaux. He
1
A.P.M. to Prem. W.A,, 30 August 1907» copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A3 3 , vol.20, pp.156-7.
2
P.M. to Prem. W.A., 20 November 1908, copy, ibid., vol. 
25, pp.127-8 .
3
Government Statistician W.A. to Government Statistician 
N.S.W., 1 April 1903, W.A. 527, C.S.O., 125/05-
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feared the additional complication that the State might 
not be able to use its own statistics until the 
Commonwealth had completed the slow job of collating and 
publishing comparative statistics for the whole 
continent.
Although the Commonwealth insisted that compliance
with its request would lead to greater uniformity and 
2efficiency, the State Government stood by its 
Statistician and, at this stage at least, would do no more
than direct him to give whatever help he could to the
3Commonwealth. There was little that could be done about 
it.
There was one partial justification for the State's 
attitude. In 1907 it had passed an Act of its own 
relating to statistics which was at least partly designed
to enable it to comply with the statistical needs of the
4Commonwealth. In the main, the refusal sprang from the 
desire to resist any action which might make it easier for 
the Commonwealth to assume full control of the State
1
Memo, by Government Statistician W.A. to Under Secretary, 
Colonial Secretary's Department explaining why he should 
not be appointed a federal officer under the Commonwealth 
Census and Statistics Act 1905» n.d. (probably early 1908), 
W.A.752, C.S.O. 895/09.
2
P.M. to Prem. W.A., 20 November 1908, copy, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A33, vol.25, pp.127-8.
3
P.M. to Prem. W.A., 29 October 1909 (replying to Prem.
W.A. to P.M., l6 January I9O9), ibid., vol.30, p.125*4
See W.A.P.D., N.S., vol.31, pp.4l3-4, 626-7.
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Bureau later. The State was prepared to supply statistics, 
but not to allow the Commonwealth any measure of control 
over its officers.
The Commonwealth was able to even the score in 1909 
when the State asked that the Postal Department should be 
allowed to supply it directly with certain statistics.
The request was refused on the ground that it would cause
1duplication of work and lead to inconsistencies.
More trouble in 1910, when Western Australia alone
refused to co-operate by allowing Fraser to be appointed
as State Supervisor under the Commonwealth Statistician
2for the I9 H  census, re-inforces the view that there was 
already in that State a growing resentment of the 
centralization of power in the distant east. In the 
matter of statistics, the natural resentment of the State 
politicians was undoubtedly strengthened by the arguments 
of their officer who was determined not to lose full 
personal control of his Bureau if he could avoid it. The 
Western Australian attitude was, fortunately, an exception 
to the general rule of real, if sometimes tardy, 
co-operation in the business of compiling and publishing 
the statistics of the Federation. In a real sense the 
relationship between the statistical bureaux reflected the
1
P.M. to Prem. W.A., 25 March, 23 April, 30 June 1909, 
copies, C.A.O., C.R.S. A33, vol.26, pp.484-6, vol.27, P*9> 
vol.28, pp.197-8 .
2
P.M. to all Prems., 2 March 1910, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. 
A 3 3 , vol.31> PP •739-40 ? P.M. to Prem. W.A. , 7 May 1910, 
copy, telegram, ibid,, vol.32, p,644; P.M. to Prem. W.A.,
3 June 1910, copy, telegram, ibid., vol.33> p.l64.
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political relationships between the Governments; the 
arrangement was genuinely federal with all the advantages 
and disadvantages that the term implies.
Among the delegates to the Federal Conventions, only
G.H. Reid seems to have doubted the necessity for the
Commonwealth to have power to legislate on the subjects of
astronomical and meteorological observations. The value
of having the matters under unified control was so obvious
to the other delegates that they did not bother to state
1their reasons for giving the power. It is true that
unified control makes the exchange of information a little
easier, but there was so little urgency about the matter
that the Commonwealth made no attempt to use its power
until 1906, when it passed an Act transferring the
2meteorological functions of the States to itself. A 
meteorologist was appointed early in 1907 and the actual 
transfer took place on 1 January 1908. It is not 
surprising that action was so long delayed. Indeed, it 
probably implies that the Commonwealth Government felt 
that it was getting a grip of things that it bothered at 
that stage to exercise a power which could have been left 
to the States for much longer without any serious 
disadvantage. A number of interesting exchanges occurred 
with the States, especially Queensland, before the transfer 
occurred and there were some difficulties in organizing 
the department, partly the result of the attitudes of the 
experts concerned, which merit discussion.
N.A.c.D.A., 1897, pp.775-6.
Act no. 3 of 1906, received assent 28 August 1906.
2
In pre-federal days, the Queensland Weather Bureau 
had occupied a unique position in Australia in that it had 
issued forecasts for the whole continent. The 
meteorologist in charge was Clement L. Wragge, known to 
his contempories as 'Inclement' Wragge because of his 
tempestuous nature. Wragge was the forerunner and teacher 
of Inigo Jones, the long-range forecaster of recent years. 
He had begun a chequered career by studying law and 
navigation and had tried his hand at surveying before he 
turned to meteorology, at first in England, then in 
Adelaide and later in Brisbane. Arrogant by nature, he 
edited a journal which he called simply Wragge and he 
showed his contempt for politicians by naming cyclones 
aft er them. ^
His Bureau had functioned as part of the Queensland
Post and Telegraph Department and, as soon as that
Department was transferred, Wragge foresaw trouble for the
Bureau because of its reliance on the free use of the
2telegraph system to obtain reports from outstations. It 
was almost a year later before the Premier, Philp, at 
Wragge’s instigation, made an official approach to the 
Prime Minister and pointed out the inconvenience caused by 
the fact that the Bureau had not been taken over by the 
Commonwealth along with the Post and Telegraph Department 
of which it was an integral part. The heavy telegraph 
costs which were chargeable since the separation of the 
services might make it necessary to abandon the Bureau
1
Australian Encyclopaedia, article on C.L. Wragge.
2
C.L. Wragge to P.M., 3 March 1901, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 6,
01/538.
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unless it could be re-absorbed into the postal department
and given free communications until that could be
1arranged. By the middle of 1902, Philp had determined
that Vragge must go unless the Commonwealth took over the
2Bureau as a national institution and Wragge himself was
modestly urging Barton to ’SAVE the Weather Bureau to the
3Australian Nation1. A surprising number of people, 
including the French Consul-General, believed that his 
forecasts were necessary for the well-being of either the 
agriculture of the country or the shipping in 4neighbouring seas and added their voices to the appeal.
The Commonwealth recognized that the Bureau was
endangered, ironically enough, by financial difficulties
forced on Queensland by the severe drought which gripped
that State along with other parts of the Commonwealth.
Deakin, acting as Prime Minister, could see no likelihood
of taking over meteorology quickly and could only suggest
that Queensland should try to obtain assistance from the
other States until the necessary legislation could be
5introduced. But all States had their own meteorological 
services and many of the meteorologists resented Wragge's
1
Prem. Qld. to P.M., 1 February 1902, precis, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A100, A05/7206 .
2
Prem. Qld. to P.M., 6 May 1902, ibid.
3
C.L. Wragge to P.M., 2 May 1902, ibid.4
Consul-General for France to A.P.M., 21 May and l4 June 
1902, ibid.
5
A.P.M. to Prem. Qld., 15 May 1902, copy, ibid.
2.4.3
national forecasts. Only New South Wales was prepared to
assist Queensland. Even this arrangement did not last
long, and, on 30 June 1903 , Wragge's Bureau became simply
2a Government office for recording rainfall and Wragge
himself took to touring to deliver ’scientific lectures’
3and later turned to occult philosophy. The demise of the 
Bureau could not fairly be blamed on the Commonwealth 
which would have given financial assistance had all States
4been prepared to do the same. It could hardly act alone 
as its expenditure would necessarily have been deducted 
from the surplus revenue returnable to the States.
The Commonwealth gave valuable assistance to all
State meteorological services in the Post and Telegraph
5Rates Act 1902. It provided that, on certain conditions, 
all meteorological services should enjoy free telegraphic 
communications until the Commonwealth service had been 
established. The conditions were less favourable than 
those that the States had allowed before federation but 
the assistance was of great benefit to them and did 
something to ensure economy at a time when that was a 
popular cry throughout the country and when several of the 
States were hard pressed by the drought.
1
Prem. S.A. to A.P.M., 19 June 1902, precis, ibid.
2
S.M.H., 4 July 1903.
3
Australian Encyclopaedia, article on C.L. Wragge.
4
Prem. Qld. to Prem. T a s . , 18 August and 2 September 1902, 
T.S.A., P.D.1/153/109.
5
Act no.13 of 1902.
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Discussion lapsed until 1905 , when talk of the 
proposed establishment of a Central Meteorological Bureau 
by the Commonwealth caused the Government of South 
Australia to organize an Interstate Astronomical and 
Meteorological Conference in Adelaide during May. The 
merits of the establishment of the proposed Bureau were 
discussed along with the advantages of transferring 
astronomical work to the Commonwealth. The experts could 
see advantage and some disadvantage in the latter 
suggestion but approved of the proposed Bureau, provided 
it was established along lines laid down by themselves. 
They were almost unanimously opposed to having forecasts 
issued from a central bureau for the entire continent, 
believing that such forecasts would be less accurate than 
those issued locally, but thought that it could do useful 
work in the field of theoretical and scientific 
meteorology and in collating and publishing data for the 
entire continent,^
In calling the conference, the South Australian 
Government was probably hoping to be able to do something 
to determine the course that the Commonwealth would 
follow. Since meteorology was still under State control, 
and power over it was concurrent, there was no reason why 
the State should not call such a conference, but the 
action was liable to be interpreted as an attempt to 
dictate to the Commonwealth. The conclusions reached by 
the experts were predictable. They were anxious to
1
Report of the Interstate Astronomical and Meteorological 
Conference, May 1905 , S .A ,P .P ., vol.2, n o .25, pp.7-8.
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encourage any move which might lead to the development of 
their science and to resist any action which might lessen 
their own power and prestige. Above all, they did not 
want to fall under the control of another Wragge.
Deakin enquired in August 1905 what part of their
astronomical and meteorological services the State
Governments were prepared to transfer to the Commonwealth,
but there was little unanimity in their proposals. South
Australia and Victoria were unwilling to transfer any
part, Western Australia wanted to transfer everything,
Queensland and Tasmania would transfer meteorology (they
were not involved in astronomy) and New South Wales did
not reply. By the time they met at their annual
Conference in April 1906, the Premiers had altered their
views sufficiently to be able to agree to a resolution
proposed by Carruthers of New South Wales that both
astronomy and meteorology should be transferred. They
had missed their chance. In the absence of any helpful
guidance from the States, the Commonwealth had decided
2that it would take over meteorology alone. An Act was 
passed during the 1906 session empowering the Governor- 
General to establish observatories, to appoint a 
meteorologist and to arrange for the transfer of
1
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 22 March 1906, copy, S.A.A., G.R.G. 
24/6, 02/606; Prem. Vic. to P.M., 20 September 1905 , 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A100, A05/7206 ; Prem. W.A. to P.M. ibid.; 
Prem. Qld. to P.M., 19 October 1905, ibid.; Prem. Tas. to 
P.M,, 28 September 1905, T.S.A., P.D.1/180/109» copy.
2
Conference report, S .A .P .P ., 1906, vol.2, no .23, pp.67-8 
and 150.
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observatories from the States and for the interchange of 
meteorological information.^
South Australia could see that the division of the 
work of meteorology and astronomy would duplicate costs to 
some extent. In an attempt to prevent this (or, perhaps, 
in an attempt to get the Commonwealth to pay for the 
State's own astronomical work) the Premier, Price, 
suggested that the meteorological work should be done by 
the State's astronomical staff who would work in accord
2with any uniform system established by the Commonwealth.
The proposal, was not acceptable to the Commonwealth.
Nothing further was done until December 1907» just prior
to the transfer of the meteorological section, when Price
made a last minute attempt to persuade the Commonwealth to
3take over both sections or neither. The move had to
fail. The Commonwealth's Act did not give it power to
take over astronomy. For a year, the Commonwealth
meteorological staff in Adelaide carried on the
4astronomical work for the State but towards the middle of 
1909 South Australia decided to re-establish its own 
astronomical branch. It appointed the Divisional Officer
1
Sir J. Quick, The Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth. 
and the States of Australia, Melbourne and Sydney, 1919»
p.44'6'.
2
Prem. S 0A. to P.M., 29 September 1906, copy, S.A.A., 
G.R.G.24/6, 06/756.
3
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 11 December 1907» telegram, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A100, A09/6003.
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See EoL. Batchelor (for P .M. ) to Prem. S.A., 27 February
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for Meteorology as its Government Astronomer and again
invited the Commonwealth to allow the State to do its
1meteorological work for it. The Commonwealth had had
2enough of co-operation with South Australia and refused,
though later the two Governments did agree to share the
3office accommodation at the observatory. The State had 
shown the Commonwealth little consideration but had tried 
to do only that which would bring itself maximum benefit 
at minimum cost.
As in the case of statistics, there was trouble with 
Western Australia. This was directly attributable to the 
isolation of the State and to the strong streak of 
individualism in the Government Astronomer, W.E. Cooke, 
rather than to the Government itself.
A conference of meteorologists in May 1907 met to 
advise on the transfer of the service to the Commonwealth 
and decided, in contrast with the decision of the 1905 
conference, that weather forecasts should be issued by the 
Central Meteorological Bureau and that the Divisional 
Officer in each State should have a limited discretion of 
amplification or modification. Cooke had dissented from 
this. He had argued that the time lost in sending 
information from Perth to Melbourne and in getting the
1
A.Prem. S.A. to P„M», 11 May 1909» ibid.
2
P.M. to Prem. S„AC, 25 May 1909, ibid.
3
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 16 June 1909 , ibid., A 3 3 , vol.27, 
p p .74-0-1 $ P.M. to Prem. S.A., 29 September 1909 
(acknowledging Prem. S.A. to P.M. , 31 August 1909)» ibid.,
vol.29, P.519.
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forecast back would render it useless. His Government 
decided to support him and there was considerable 
correspondence, first with Sir John Forrest, who acted as 
Prime Minister while Deakin was in England, and, after he 
had resigned, with Sir William Lyne.
Cooke argued that the lack of reporting stations from
which a Perth forecaster could draw information meant that
he had to rely to an unusual extent on ’local prognostics’,
and that a Melbourne based forecaster would not be able to 
2do this. In fact, Cooke's method seems to have been to 
put his head out of the window and base his forecast on 
what he saw - a method which was perhaps more accurate 
than scientific. This argument was ludicrous and Cooke 
would have done well to rely entirely upon the time factor 
which did have some basis in reality. The Western 
Australians became particularly frustrated once Lyne took 
over the correspondence, as he showed no consideration for 
the State at all. Indeed, late in 1907 , the State 
Government found that the Commonwealth had undertaken 
direct communication with certain State officers, whom it 
wished to use as observers after the transfer of
meteorology, without first seeking the permission of their3Government.
T
See ’Report of Meteorological Conference1, Appendix II,
C c P .P . , 1907-8, vol.2, n o .8, p.1218. The personnel of the 
conferences was not identical and that of 1907 did have a 
definite Commonwealth proposal before it.
2
Report by the Government Astronomer of W.A., 6 June 1907» 
with A.Prem. W 0A 0 to A.P.M., 21 June 1907, C.A.O., C.R.S0 
A1.00, A09/5077. The rest of the correspondence is in this 
f ile .
3
Colonial Secretary W 0A. to Prem. W.A., 23 December 1907» 
W.A. 752, CoS.O. 4349/12.
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In spite of these and other differences of opinion as 
to what should be taken over by the Commonwealth and the 
way in which the service should be organized, the work 
seems to have been carried on smoothly under the 
Commonwealth Meteorologist, Hunt; and the States, most of 
which were never hostile to the Commonwealth’s intentions,
gave substantial assistance by undertaking to inspect
1outstations and to help maintain equipment.
The first stimulus towards co-operation in quarantine
arrangements in Australia was given by the outbreak of a
smallpox epidemic in New South Wales, Victoria and South
Australia, in 1881. A joint bill was prepared but it
failed to pass the Colonial Parliaments and further action
2had to await the birth of the Commonwealth.
The Constitution gives the Commonwealth full (but
concurrent) power over the whole range of quarantine
matters. At the Convention, only R.E. O ’Connor of New
South Wales questioned the wisdom of this. He thought its
power should be limited to dealing with infections from 3outside. This view was to be expressed again by the 
States at a later stage. While the Commonwealth could and
1
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 21 (telegram) and 25 November 1907, 
copies, C.AeOo, C.R.S. A33, vol.21, pp.l43 and 192; P.M. 
to Prem. W»A0, 13 February 1908 and Prem. W.A. to P.M., 12 
March 1908, copy, W.A. 752, C.S.O. 1068/08.
2
D.H. Provost, 'Intergovernmental Co-operation in 
Australia’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Queensland., 1954, p.135*
NeA.C.D,S., 1897, pp.1071-3.3
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did take full power to itself, it has in practice left 
most internal quarantine matters to the States. The 
traveller who crosses today from New South Wales into 
Victoria or South Australia will find that it is a State 
officer who insists that he must surrender his last apple.
The first Minister for Trade and Customs, C.C. 
Kingston, moved swiftly to obtain information from the 
States which would allow the Commonwealth to draw up 
legislation on a subject which it was obviously desirable 
to bring under unified control.^ He foreshadowed an early 
transfer of the work but this was not to be. The State 
quarantine systems had given the country reasonable 
protection for many years and a Government confronted with 
the amount of important work which faced the first Federal 
Government must have found it easy to decide that they 
could manage for a little longer while more immediately 
urgent matters were dealt with. Possibly the exclusion of 
coloured immigrants seemed a more popular catchcry than 
the exclusion of disease.
In 1904, Tasmania tried to get the Commonwealth to 
act. The Chief Health Officer of that State sought the 
opinion of the health authorities in the other States on 
the desirability of unifying the nation's quarantine 
regulations. All States (except Queensland, which did not 
reply) favoured the transfer of the department, although 
New South Wales expressed some fear that the Commonwealth 
might require control of certain quarantine stations which 
the State would continue to need for the isolation of
1
Minister for Trade and Customs to Prem. Tas. (and all 
Prems.), 31 January 1901, telegram, T.S.A,, P.D.1/135/16.
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infectious diseases occurring on land. The Premier of
Tasmania, Sir Neil Lewis, urged that the necessary
legislation should be prepared at once to deal with
maritime quarantine but that land quarantine should be
1left under State control. The Commonwealth indicated
2that it was preparing a bill to deal with the matter.
Since the transfer of quarantine work would bring no 
financial advantage to the States (the cost of transferred 
departments was charged directly back while the bookkeeping 
clauses were in force) it is probable that they were 
actuated by a genuine desire to see the terms of the 
Constitution carried out and a realization that unified 
control was desirable in a matter which was so important 
to the well-being of the nation.
The Watson Government called a conference of experts
to advise on the kind of legislation that was necessary
3and the best way in which to effect the transfer. The 
conference was valuable and made practical suggestions.
It agreed unanimously that the Commonwealth should take 
over quarantine administration without delay, that the 
department should be controlled by two full-time 
Commonwealth medical officers and that the permanent head 
of each State Public Health Department should be 'deputy 
medical officer' for his State without payment from the
1
Prem. Tas. to P.M., 17 March 1904 (copy with Prem. Tas. 
to Prem. W 0A., 17 March 1904), W.A. 527, C.S.O. 2929/03- 
2
P.M. to Prem. W.A. , 3 May 1904, ibid.
3
P.M. to all Prems., 10 May 1904, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. 
A33 vol.5 , pp. 560-1 .
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Commonwealth. To prevent duplication of quarantine
stations, it was suggested that, when infectious diseases
broke out on land, cases should be admitted to the
Commonwealth stations, subject to the refunding of the
costs by the States. Other detailed suggestions for the
bill and regulations were also made. The only point on
which the officers could not agree was whether the
Commonwealth should have power to act to prevent the
spread of an infectious disease which had broken out on
land and which threatened to spread from one State to
another. The representatives of New South Wales and
Western Australia thought that the Commonwealth should not
exercise any power whatsoever over internal sanitation.
The language in which they argued went beyond that
normally employed by medical men and made it appear that
the Governments of those States had passed on their views
1to the delegates beforehand.
In spite of the essentially practical nature of the
suggestions and the continued willingness of the States to
2transfer the work of quarantine, nothing was done until 
1907* When the Deakin Government introduced its 
Quarantine Bill in the 1907 session it purported to give 
the Commonwealth control over animal and plant quarantine
1
'Report of the Commonwealth of Australia Quarantine 
Conference, 1904', W.A. 7 5 2 , C .S .0.6 0 9 7 /O6 . The officers 
further suggested that the Commonwealth deal with the 
question of uniform standards for foods and drugs but, 
although an attempt was made, nothing had been achieved by 
191^ - see Premiers' Conference report 1914 , S . A, P . P . ,
191^, vol.3> no .49, appendix A, p.224.
2
Premiers' Conference report, 1 9 0 6 , S .A .P .P ., 1 9 0 6 , vol.2, 
no.23, p.138.
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and interstate quarantine as well as maritime quarantine.
The States were alarmed by its scope. When Lyne, the
acting Prime Minister, refused to delay the Bill to
discuss it with the Premiers,^ they asked their senators,
still thought to be the protectors of State rights, to try
to have the scope of the Bill limited to maritime 
2quarantine. Some did try, but they did not push the
attempt far and there was never any likelihood of 
3success. The disagreement over the scope of the
Quarantine Act, as it became, was not resolved until 1909.
The States then accepted the fact that the Commonwealth
had the constitutional power to deal with internal
quarantine and the Federal Government stated clearly that
the section would only be used if proper precautions to
prevent the spread of a disease were not taken by the4State in which it originated. The States had, without 
doubt, objected to the scope of the Act because 
Commonwealth control of internal quarantine seemed to 
threaten the States' control of the general field of 
health legislation. The Commonwealth promise in 1909 
effectively removed this fear because it limited federal 
action to matters threatening to affect a second State.
1
A.P.M. to Prem. S.A., 31 July 1907» telegram, S.A.A., 
G.R.G. 24/6, 07/683.
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4533/09; T.S.A., P.D.1/198/92; P.D.V.O.L., vol.165, p.631. 
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vol.41, pp.5395-7, 5^73-93, 5666-70. 
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Any division of control is likely to create 
administrative difficulties. In 1912, an immigrant ship 
arrived at Melbourne and reported that it had had many 
cases of measles (an infectious but non-quarantinable 
disease) on board during the voyage. The Commonwealth had 
no authority to act in such cases but notified the State 
which, having no facilities of its own, promptly ordered 
the ship to the quarantine station where the passengers 
were detained until they could be released safely. The 
Commonwealth lacked the authority to act and the State 
could only act by using the Commonwealth facilities and 
overtaxing their capacity. Eventually the Commonwealth 
had to pass an amending Act to enable it to deal with such
cases without bringing the ship within the full quarantine
1programme.
In 1913» another dispute grew out of this division of 
control. There was an outbreak of smallpox in Sydney 
during the winter. On 5 July, the Director of Quarantine, 
on the advice of the Chief Health Officer, declared the 
metropolitan area of Sydney a quarantine area. No one was 
allowed to leave it unless he had been vaccinated against 
the disease recently. At first, control was left in the 
hands of the State Health Department, the Sydney Quarantine 
Station put at its disposal and all officers of the Health 
Departments of all States proclaimed as quarantine 
officers. Administrative problems caused the Commonwealth 
to assume full control of the matter, but further
1
J.H.L. Cumpston, 'The Health of the People. A Study in 
Federalism', typescript, n.d., A.N.L., MS.613, series 2/4, 
pp.48-9• Dr Cumpston was for many years Commonwealth 
Director-General of Public Health.
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difficulties began to arise with the New South Wales
authorities.^ In September, the State asked that the
2quarantine restrictions on Sydney should be lifted and
when the Prime Minister, Joseph Cook, refused to lift what
he regarded as the only means of preventing the spread of
3the disease to other States the Premier, W.A. Holman,
4used the incident to make political capital. The
proclamation was lifted in November 1913 when New South
Wales agreed to adopt certain stringent precautions to5prevent the spread of the disease. The restrictions must 
have been extremely inconvenient to the citizens of Sydney 
and to all having commercial interests there. Much bad 
feeling grew up between the State and Federal Governments 
over the matter.
However, these disputes over divided control were 
still in the future when the Commonwealth system was 
instituted in 1909. The States co-operated readily with 
the actual establishment of the Federal Quarantine 
Department. Permission was willingly given for State 
quarantine officials to confer with the Comptroller- 
General of Customs, Dr Wollaston, on the control of
1
Ibid. , p p . 4-9-50. See also Commonwealth Gazette, 1913 ? 
vol. 2 , p .1683.
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Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 15 September 1913? C .P .P ., 1913? 
vol.3, pp.l24l-2.
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pp.1242-3 •4
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1quarantine stations. In February 1909» a conference of
quarantine officers met, as had been suggested in the
report of the 1904 conference, to draft a comprehensive
set of regulations to be adopted for the whole country.
This conference also advised that it could see no
objection to State quarantine officers working under the
Commonwealth Act and taking the necessary instructions
2direct from the Federal Government.
When the Quarantine Act 1907 came into operation on 1
July 1909, all State officers performing overseas
quarantine work were appointed, with the approval of the3States, as federal quarantine officers. The system did 
not work well. Victoria withdrew in 1910 and New South 
Wales and Queensland in 1912. The Commonwealth terminated 
the arrangement with Western Australia and South Australia4in 1916 while that with Tasmania lasted until 1929* The 
official explanation of the failure was that the
1
P.M. to all Prems., 12 May 1908, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S.
A 33, vol.22, p.729; replies from S.A., 15 May 1908, copy,
S. A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 08/467; Tas., 18 May 1908, copy,
T. S.A., P.D.1/202/16; Vic., 26 May 1908, copy, P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.171, P.93.
2
Cumpston, 'The Health of the People', p.42, A.N.L.,
MS.6l3, series 2/4.
3
See P.M. to all Prems, (except Vic.), telegram, 9 June 
1909, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A‘33 , vol. 27, p.629 (letter to 
Vic., 10 June, ibid., p.64o). Reply from W.A., telegram,
9 June 1909, copy, W.A.752, C.S.O. 4533/09« Announcement 
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administration of federal laws took the officials away
from their State work too much, but a recent writer has
suggested that the real reasons were largely personal.
The more experienced State officials were unwilling to
take directions from Commonwealth supervisors in Melbourne
who, in turn, felt that the State officers were preventing
1the establishment of a truly national quarantine system. 
The two explanations are not mutually exclusive and it 
must be recognized that, even when both parties desire to 
co-operate fully, there are real problems associated with 
arranging for two Governments, whose interests do not 
always co-incide, to share permanently the services of the 
same officials. The attempt had to be made, since 
federation was intended to achieve economy in 
administration, but the failure of the scheme does not 
necessarily imply faults on either side.
No Government ever disputed that Commonwealth control 
of quarantine was desirable, though all States did 
question how far that control should extend. The valuable 
assistance which the States gave in establishing the 
department reflects the seriousness with which they 
approached the subject and is one of the happiest examples 
of co-operation between the Commonwealth and State 
Governments in the first decade.
At the 1891 Convention, it was decided to divide the 
control, of lighthouses, beacons and buoys, giving the 
Commonwealth power over those along the coastline ('ocean*
Provost, 'Intergovernmental Co-operation', p.l44.
1
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lighthouses) and leaving to the control of the States 
those in harbours and rivers. The division was logical 
enough, but the 1897-8 Convention thought the 
difficulties of demarcation too great and extended the 
Commonwealth’s power to cover the whole field of 
'internal1 23 and ’external' lights.^ In effect, when the 
Commonwealth acted, it acted in accord with the I89I 
decision and so avoided further dispute with the States.
For a long time the Commonwealth did not act. The 
story of the transfer of the lighthouse service is 
essentially one of interminable and pointless delay on the 
part of the Commonwealth Government. Kingston hoped to 
take the service over on 1 March 1901 and, as early as 31 
January 1901, he asked the States to advise him on the 
legislation which they thought was necessary to deal 
effectively with the matter. It was more than l4 years 
before the transfer was completed.
As time passed, the States became restive because of
the delays. They had avoided making various appointments
and reforms in the expectation that the service would be
transferred immediately and were placed in an invidious
3position when this did not happen. Queensland began to 
complain late in 1901 that it still had to bear the cost
1
Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, p .5^5*
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Minister for Trade and Customs to Prem. Tas. (and all 
Prems.), 31 January 1901, telegram, T.S.A., P .D .1/137/42.
3
Prem. N.S.W. , to P.M. , 21 August 1901 , C.A.O., C.R.S.
A8, OI/I53/I; A. Prem. S.A. to P.M., 17 February 1902, 
copy, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 02/383-
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of the many lights on its long coastline, although this
was in fact a truly federal work and done as much for the
1benefit of the other States as for Queensland itself.
Philp was displaying his ignorance of the Constitution.
The Commonwealth could not have taken over Queensland's 
lights without taking over those of the other States. In 
any case, the cost of a transferred department was debited 
back to the transferring State under the bookkeeping 
provisions. Queensland would not have gained anything 
financially by the transfer.
The matter died for the time. Nothing was done until
February 1907 when Deakin informed the Premiers that in
view of the probable ’early' transfer of the lighthouse
service £ 1,500 had been put on the estimates for 1906-7 to
pay for inquiries about and plans for additional lights.
He wanted the States to supply details of necessary new
lighthouses so that they could be built as soon as the
2transfer had been effected.
The Commonwealth did not act on the information it 
had sought and, as a result of the urgent request of the
OPremiers at their 1908 Conference, Wade of New South
4undertook negotiations with it. He finally persuaded the
1
Prem. Qld. to P.M., 24 September 1901, C.A.O., C.R.S.
A 8 , 01/153/1.
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3, no.23, pp.113-5.
4
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 13 June 1908 (copy with Prem. 
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Prime Minister to agree that, pending Commonwealth action,
the States might construct any new lights they considered
necessary, provided they first submitted the proposed site
and plans for approval, and might include the cost of them
in the amount of compensation claimed for the transferred
properties.^ Further desultory correspondence, and
2another urgent resolution by the Premiers in 1909 , moved
the Commonwealth Government to introduce a bill for the
transfer. It passed through the Senate and had a first
reading in the House of Representatives but was taken no3further. The lengthy debates on the Financial Agreement, 
and the stonewalling of the Labor Opposition, provided a 
sufficient excuse for this further extension of a 
shameless piece of procrastination.
In mid-1910, the Fisher Government brought another
transfer bill before Parliament but it got no further than
Deakin's had before the session ended. However, in the
I9H  session, the Senate requested that the House take the
bill up again at the point reached in 1910. It eventually
4received assent on 22 December I9H .  The delay had not 
been because of any strong opposition to the move to take 
over lighthouses but simply because very few members had 
any interest in the matter at all.
1
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 20 November 1908, copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A33, vol.25, pp.129-30.
2
See P.D.V.I.L., P12/1857; S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 09/III6 ; 
S .A ,P ♦P ., 1909, vol.3, n o .6 9 , p.vii.
3
The debate is in C.P.D., vols 50-1, passim.
4
The debate is in C.P.D., vols 55» 60-3» passim.
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It might have appeared that all cause lor delay was 
at an end, but this was not so. The Fisher Government did 
act sensibly when it appointed a retired Royal Navy
Olficer, Commander Brewis, to investigate and advise on
1the whole question ol lighthouses and the States readily
provided the Facilities which enabled him to make his 
2inspection. However, it is difficult to see why the
transfer of the existing lights had to wait for the
completion of an investigation which, by its nature, had
to occupy much time. When the inspection was complete,
South Australia at least regarded some of the
recommendations as extravagant and refused to implement
them while the service was administered at the cost of the
3State. This outburst of self-assertion was probably the
result of almost l4 years of waiting and frustration and
should be seen as an attempt to compel the Commonwealth to
act rather than as a refusal by the State to act. In
4fact, the service was taken over on 1 July 1915» although
arrangements for the valuation of the lights transferred5was not completed until the end of the year.
1
A.P.M. to Prem. S.A., 13 June 1911, circular, S.A.A., 
G.R.G.24/6, H / 676.
2
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 19 October 1911» copy, ibid.; Prem. 
Tas. to P.M., 10 October 1911» telegram, copy, T.S.A.,
P.D.1/238/122; A.Prem. W.A. to A.P.M., 24 June I9I I , copy, 
W.A.752, C.S.O. 1431/13; Prem. Vic. to P.M., 13 November 
1912, copy, P.D.V.O.L., vol.191, P.335.
3
Prem. S.A. to P.M. , 17 October 191^-, copy, S.A.A. ,
G.R.G. 24/6, II/676.
4
Commonwealth Gazette 1915» vol.2, p.2580 (appointments); 
W. Anstey Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
Powers in Australia, Sydney, 1962, third edition, p.181.
5
P.M. to Prem. Tas., 16 March 1916, T.S.A., P .D .1/293/122.
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The delay in the transfer of the lighthouse service 
was entirely the fault of the Commonwealth. The States 
were always prepared to give whatever assistance was 
necessary and did not at any stage resist the transfer of 
the service to the Commonwealth. Until 1910, there was no 
financial advantage either way in the matter but after the 
Surplus Revenue Act 1910 came into force it was 
unreasonable to expect the States to pay for the service, 
which the Constitution stipulated should be transferred to 
the Commonwealth, out of the annual grant of 25 shillings 
per capita which they received. The Commonwealth's right 
to adjust the financial relations as it saw fit implied a 
complementary duty to assume the full burden of 
expenditure imposed upon it by the Constitution. The 
trouble was that the question interested no one, except 
the visiting masters of ships, who, for the most part, 
were not enrolled as Australian electors. It did not 
seem urgent. It could be put out of mind while other more 
pressing matters were dealt with and it could easily be 
kept out of mind.
Co-operation over the actual transfer of departments 
from the States to the Commonwealth was not perfect but, 
on the whole, there was no real reason to complain. Much 
help had been given and trouble had been incidental rather 
than endemic. But co-operation was more fundamental and 
widespread than this. On 1 January 1901, apart from the 
officers of the Customs Department, the Commonwealth had 
only the most rudimentary public service, including three
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permanent heads and one acting head of a department. The 
service grew rapidly with the transfer of the postal and 
defence departments and the proper organization of others, 
but for a long time the co-operation of the States was 
essential if many of the functions of government were to 
be carried out satisfactorily.
The States had experienced officers, buildings and
equipment, the Commonwealth did not. It could not hold
its own elections without borrowing schools as polling
booths, teachers as officials and ballot boxes in which
votes might be placed. The States lent the Commonwealth
office space and their officials did much of the work
associated with the introduction of the old age pension
scheme in 1909. When the Commonwealth instituted its
Commerce Act 1905 it relied almost entirely on State
officials to work it. Without these and other small but
vital services the Commonwealth could not have survived
its infancy. Co-operation was reciprocal. There was less
that the Commonwealth could do for the States, but its
post offices continued to sell their duty stamps,
distribute their official forms and carry on the work of
2the State Savings Banks. There were many other services
1
G.E. Caiden, Career Service, Melbourne, 1965 , appendices 
V and XIII.
2 There are literally thousands of references to these 
matters scattered through the Commonwealth and State 
records for 1901-10. A few are offered as examples.
S. A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 03/1001 (use of schools for 
elections); ibid., 03/823, 10/64, IO/76 and W.A. 527,
C.S.O. 3207/03 (ballot boxes); C.A.O., C.R.S. A33 , vol.27, 
p p .250, 340-1 (pensions). W.A. 732. C.S.O. 4892/06;
T.  S.A., P.D.1/190/137 (Commerce Act). W.A. 242, P.D.01/332; 
T.S.A., P.D.1/144/170; S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 07/6o4 (sale
of duty stamps, distribution of official State forms 
through post-offices).
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of a more important nature which merit fuller discussion.
At the conference between the Premiers and Prime Minister
1in November 1901,1 and again when the Premiers met alone 
2in May 1902, it was made clear that all Governments 
desired to extend the reciprocal use of services as far as 
possible in the interests of economy.
Even at that stage the States realized that, while it 
would make no difference during the bookkeeping period, it 
would be wise to establish the practice of charging for 
all State services as the Commonwealth was inclined to 
charge for Everything that it did for the States. At the 
suggestion of, the Commonwealth, a formal system was 
introduced by which one Government might obtain the
4permission of another for the use of one of its officers.
By this means a check could be kept on what was happening.
On these general issues there was accord but there 
were disagreements over aspects of the question of payment 
for services. These matters must be examined along with 
some of the more important areas of co-operation and the 
instances in which co-operation was sought but not attained.
1 Report of Conference, November 1901, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6,
05/519, pp.12-6 .
2 Report of Conference, May 1902, ibid., 02/737, P*5*
3 Minute, Prem. Tas. to Minister for Lands and Works, 23 
December 1901, T.S.A., P .D .l/l42/ll7.
4
A.P.M. to Prem. N.S.W. (and all Prems.), l4 July 1.902, 
N.S.W.A., C.S.I.L., 6687, 02/11974; Prem. Tas. to P.M., 5 
August 1902, T.S.A., P.D.1/153/122; Prem. S.A. to P.M., 6 
August 1902, copy, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 02/915? see also 
P.M. to Prem. Qld., 27 May 1910, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A33, 
vol.33, p.95.
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When Sir George Turner organized the Treasury 
immediately after federation, he needed to have competent 
and reliable officers in each State to co-ordinate the 
Commonwealth's financial transactions. He could have 
placed highly paid federal officers there to do the work 
but they would not have been fully occupied and the 
Commonwealth could ill afford the expenditure while 
section 87 operated. The alternative was to obtain, part- 
time, the services of senior State Treasury officials 
whose own work-load had been reduced to some extent as a 
consequence of federation. There was no difficulty in 
making an arrangement along these lines with each of the 
States. The co-operation seems to have continued until 
the work in any State was sufficient to justify the
1formation of a separate Commonwealth Sub-Treasury there.
Similarly, action was taken to have the State Auditors-
General appointed deputies to the Commonwealth Auditor-
General. That arrangement lasted until 1906 when it was
discontinued because some States, notably Queensland, were
giving undue preference to their own work and allowing
2that of the Commonwealth to fall behind.
1
P.M. to Prem. Tas., 9 December 1901, T.S.A., P.D.l/l42/ 
117; it ended in Victoria in March 1907, see P.M. to Prem. 
Vic., 6 March 1907, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.17,
P • 655 .
2
See Prem. S.A. to Prem. Tas., 3 January 1902, T.S.A.,
P . D . I/I53/ U 7 ; P.M. to Prem. Tas., 7 February 1902, ibid.; 
P.M. to Prem. Qld. (with enclosures), 11 December 1905, 
copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.12, pp.312-8; P.M. to Prem. 
Qld., 6 February 1906, ibid., pp.684-5.
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With the Department of Trade and Customs,
co-operation was reciprocal. The State Government
analysts undertook all analytical work for the Department
to save the Commonwealth the need to equip expensive
laboratories. The largest amount of work was done in
Victoria and the arrangement with that State lasted until
1 August 1908, by which time the bulk of work justified a
Commonwealth laboratory,^ and the State, whose own work
was being 'thoroughly disorganised' by that done for the
2Commonwealth, was happy to see the change made. A threat 
by Deakin in 1903-4 to set up a Commonwealth laboratory in 
Western Australia to do the work of analysis because that 
State was asking far too much remuneration brought an 
angry jibe from the usually friendly Premier, Walter James, 
about 1 23*5the keen desire' of the Commonwealth 'to make 
billets for (no doubt) deserving Easterners'. In Western 
Australia, as elsewhere, the arrangement minimized cost 
and ensured full use of the State facilities which must 
often have been idle without the Commonwealth work. They 
had been designed to meet the needs of the States when the 
customs work was a part of their responsibility.
1
Prem. Vic. to P.M., 27 August 1902, copy, P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.133, p.4l0; A.P.M. to Prem. Vic., 23 August 1907 , copy, 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A33, vol.20, p.101.
2
Prem. Vic. to P„M„, 20 March I9O8 , copy, P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.I69 , p . 6 6 6 5 P,M. to Prem. Vic., 7 and 30 July 1908, 
copies, C.A.O., CeR.S. A33, vol.23, pp.472-3, 720.
3
A.P.M. to Prem. W.A. , 30 December 1 9 0 3 , W.A. 527, C.S.O.
1 6 6 1/0 3 ? Prem. W.A. to P.M., 8 January 1904, copy, ibid.
26?
In return, Customs Department officials in Queensland 
assisted the State Health Department^ and acted as
2paymasters for certain State officials in the outports.
An arrangement was made with New South Wales whereby they
would withhold a customs clearance from any ship which had
3not complied with the State navigation laws.
One of the spheres in which co-operation was least 
effective was public works. The States often undertook 
the construction and repair of buildings for the 
Commonwealth but difficulties arose when they gave their 
own works priority and money voted for Commonwealth works
4was not spent in the year for which it had been voted.
Some States exceeded the estimates which they themselves
had made for doing the work without bothering to obtain5permission to do so. In spite of the unsatisfactory 
nature of the arrangement, it continued at least until
1
P,M. to Prem. Qld., 12 December 1904, copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A33, vol.8 , p.402.
2
P.M. to Prem. Qld., 30 April 1910, copy, ibid., vol.32, 
p p .562-4.
3
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 22 January and 7 March 1907, 
copies, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.17, pp.303, 699.
4
See letters to N.S.W. 18 October 1907, copy, ibid., vol. 
20, pp.600-1; Vic., copy, 30 November 1909> ibid., vol.30, 
pp.488-9; all States, 1 April 1910, copy, ibid., vol.32, 
p.286; Tas. 1 February 1905, T.S.A., P .D 01/180/1175 Tas., 
21 April 1910, ibid., P.D.l/227/l^*
5
W.M. Hughes (for P.M.) to Prem. S.A., 23 April 1909» 
copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.27, pp.43-4.
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1910, probably because the establishment of a full 
department of public works would have been ridiculously 
expensive for the amount of work to be done, especially in 
the smaller States.
The Commonwealth had no office of any kind in London
until 1906 and the first High Commissioner did not
commence duty until 1910. In the interim, the State
2 3Agents-General ordered materials, paid accounts, 
represented the Commonwealth at various international
4conferences and tried to counter any slanders on the
5country in the English press. At the same time, the 
States resolutely maintained that the appointment of a 
High Commissioner would not obviate the need to maintain 
separate Agents-General and there is evidence that when 
Sir George Reid took up his position in London he had 
trouble in getting them to co-operate in any significant
1
See P.M. to all Prems., 1 April L910, copy, ibid., vol.
32, p.286.
2
Chief Secretary N.S.W. to Treasurer N.S.W., 12 June
1902, R.E., N.S.W.A., Treasury, V5886, 02/A5571.
3
See P.M. to Prem. S.A., 7 February 1902, S.A.A., G.R.G.,
24/6, 02/189.
4
P.M. to G.G. (for S. of S.), 28 April 1903, copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A32, vol.l, p.217; G.G. to S. of S., 23 October 
1908, copy, C.A.O., CP.78/8 , vol. 7, P.37.
5
A.W. McLean (for P.M.) to Prem. N.S.W. (and all Prems.), 
15 May 1905, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S.A33, vol.9, P-757.
6
Premiers’ Conference report, April 1903» S .A .P .P ., 1903,
vol.3, no.66, p .34.
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way. Indeed, the first reaction of several of the States
to his appointment was to remind their Agents-General that
Reid was not their superior and had no authority over
them." Later, it became clear that the Agents-General
themselves were more interested in maintaining the
prestige of their own positions than in working with Reid.
A member of the High Commissioner's staff, H.C. Smart,
complained that 'They oppose us at every turn and put
2every obstacle in our way' .
The biggest single service performed for the States 
by the Commonwealth was the conduct of the savings bank 
business in the post offices. At federation, all States 
had State or semi-State savings banks operating through 
the post offices so that they could provide a means of 
saving which would be readily available to ordinary 
people. The work continued uninterrupted after the 
transfer of the postal service, although it took four 
years to settle finally the terms on which it would be 
done, Western Australia being the last State to acquiesce 
in the high charges which the Commonwealth proposed for 
the work. In spite of the bookkeeping clauses, these 
charges did affect the banks as they were paid directly by
1
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 25 February 
1910, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 10/186; Prem. S.A. to Prem. 
N.S.W., 2 March 1910, copy, ibid.; Prem. S.A. to Agent- 
General ScA., 4 March 1910, cable, copy, ibid.
2
See the correspondence between H.C. Smart (High 
Commissioner's Office, London) and Atlee Hunt (Secretary, 
External Affairs Dept.), June-July 1912 , Atlee Hunt 
Papers, A.N.L., M S ,52/16/892, 895.
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those institutions rather than by the State Governments as
1such ,
This arrangement worked smoothly until the Fisher
Government introduced its Commonwealth Bank Bill late in 
21911. The States had no objection to the Commonwealth
entering the field of general banking but strongly opposed
its undertaking savings bank work, not only because they
were already providing an adequate service, but because
the funds of the banks were of great assistance in
developing the lands of the States and in saving the
Governments from the necessity of borrowing on the London3market at inopportune times.
There is no doubt that the Commonwealth action was 
constitutionally justifiable, but it was a regrettable 
incursion into a field already adequately occupied by the 
States. It may well have been that the main object of the 
Commonwealth was to use the savings bank side of its 
activities to provide capital for its general banking 
functions. The Government was bound by Labor Party policy
1
See P.M, to Prem. N.S.W., 23 March 1903 (circular), 
N.S.W.A., C.SnI.L., 6730, 03/5213» Report by Comptroller 
of N . S . S a v i n g s  Bank, 3 April 1903, ibid.5 P 0M. to all 
Prems., 21 September 1903» copy, C oA o0 o, C 0R.S. A33» vol.3» 
p p .200-5» Prem. WiA„ to P.M,, 19 October 1903» copy, V 0A. 
527, C sS„0. II62/O35 PoMo to Prem. W.A., 17 October 1904, 
ibid* 5 Prem. W.A* to P.M. , 12 December 1904, copy, ibid.
2
The second reading in the House of Representatives was 
moved on 15 November 1911» C .P > D „ , vol.62, p.2644.
3
N.S.W. and Vic. made a joint protest to the Commonwealth, 
the text of which is quoted in Prem. N 0S.Wi to Prem. Tas., 
29 November I91I, T.S.A., P .D .1/239/169.
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and could not be turned from its plans. One by one the
if.States transferred their savings bank work to the 
Commonwealth Savings Bank. Tasmania was the first to do
so in 19139 Queensland followed in 1920, and Western
1Australia and New South Wales in 1931» The only State
savings banks remaining are those in Victoria and South
Australia, where they still continue to be the major 
2savings banks.
Payment for reciprocal services had been mentioned
early in relation to specific acts but was not raised
strongly as a general question until the Premiers'
Conference of February 1 9 0 5 . Nothing was settled at that
Conference and it was clear that there was a division of
opinion whether such services should be given free or 
3charged for. At their I.906 Conference, the Premiers made
it quite clear that they believed that these services
should always be paid for and that the payments should be
made to the Treasury of the Government concerned and not
4to the individual officer who performed the service.
1
Australian Encyclopaedia, article on Savings Banks.
2
In February 1 9 6 7 ? the State Savings Bank of Victoria 
held deposits of $9^-2,000,000 against $424,000,000 by the 
Commonwealth Savings Bank in that State, In South 
Australia the figures were $3 5 3 9 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  (State) and 
$1279000,000 (Commonwealth). Figures supplied to the 
author by the Commonwealth Savings Bank, 4 May I9 6 7 . The 
Victorian Bank was never as dependent on the post office 
system as the others0
3
Report of Conference, February 1905» S.AoP.P., 1905? 
vol,2, no.22, pp.129-36.
4
Report of Conference, April 1 9 0 6 , ibid., 1 9 0 6 , vol.2, 
no . 23 9 p . 1.8 ,
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However, most States continued to allow direct payments to
individuals in certain special cases, usually where the
work was done outside normal office hours or where the
payment was necessary to bring the officers concerned
under the discipline of the relevant Commonwealth
1department for some purpose. This was a touchy question 
because such payments tended to divide the officer's 
loyalty and weaken the control of the Government in whose 
full-time employ he was. In general, the Commonwealth 
took a much tougher attitude than did the States and 
insisted on payment for even the most minor services.^
3At Deakin's suggestion, a. conference of the 
permanent heads of the Commonwealth and State departments 
most concerned was held in April 1907 to thrash out the 
matter. The results of the conference represented a 
considerable theoretical advance. It was agreed that, 
since a major purpose of the reciprocal exchange of
1
P.M. to Prem. Tas., 6 November 1905, T.S.A., P.D.I/I89/ 
111 ; Prem. Tas. to P.M., 28 April 1906 , copy, ibid.; P.M. 
to Prem. Vic., 11 September 1906, copy, C.A.O. (Melbourne), 
M.P.341, bundle 43 6 , 06/51535 Prem. Vic. to P.M., 19 
September 1906, ibid.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 7 June 1906 
(with enclosure), S.A.A.,, G.R.G.24/6, 06/518. The 
Commonwealth charged even for military guards of honour 
for State Governors. The States provided police escorts 
for the Governor-General, made arrests under Commonwealth 
law and did much court work for the Commonwealth free.
WoA. did charge for allowing Commonwealth public servants 
to share toilet facilities in a building jointly occupied. 
W.A.752, C„S.0.3593/08.
3
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 6 July 1906, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S.
A100,A07/1818.
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services was to achieve economy in administration, no
profit should be sought in charging for the services but
only re-imbursement for actual expense incurred.
Extension of the principle of individual payments for work
1done in normal office hours was deprecated. In fact,
little was settled by the conference and returns compiled
by the Commonwealth show that all Governments continued to
2make some payments direct to officers. As late as
August 1912 and November 191^-, the Prime Minister, Andrew
Fisher, found it necessary to draw the attention of his
Ministers to the fact that all Commonwealth departments
should follow a uniform procedure in making payments and
that the States generally preferred payment to be made to 
3the Treasury.
In 1910, as in 1901, reciprocal services continued to 
be rendered by the State and Commonwealth Governments and 
continued to be important in maintaining an economical and 
efficient administration, but no general agreement on 
payment existed, or was likely to exist, between the 
Governments. The whole business of co-operation, 
important though it was, continued very much on an ad hoc 
basis.
1
Report of the conference between Commonwealth and State 
officers concerning reciprocal services, April 1907 , ibid.
2
See the various schedules re payment for these services, 
ibid.
3
P.M. to Minister for External Affairs (ministerial 
circular), 15 August 1912 and 12 November 1914 , C.A.O.,
C„R.S.A1, 14/21555.
274
The day to day co-operation between the Governments 
might lack co-ordination and have its unsatisfactory 
aspects but at least it did work. It was almost 
impossible to go beyond this ad hoc co-operation and 
achieve a measure of administrative integration no matter 
how desirable it might seem to be. The most genuine 
attempt was made in the field of electoral legislation and 
administration.
Throughout the whole period 1901-10, the States 
willingly allowed their police to collect names for 
Commonwealth electoral rolls while they were doing it for 
the State and the costs were shared/ but it was desirable 
to co-operate to a much greater extent than that. As 
early as 1905» the Commonwealth and State Ministers agreed 
to try to get some kind of uniformity in the qualifications 
and disqualifications for the franchise, methods of
enrolment, revision of rolls and the other machinery of
2the electoral acts. No one doubted the value of the idea.
The Commonwealth undertook to obtain the information
3necessary for action and used this as the basis for a 
conference of electoral officers in April 1906. The 
conference was not able to do much because the extent to 
which uniformity could be achieved depended, in the main,
1
See S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 02/l46l and 14/245; Q.S.A., 
Pre/A457, 14/0 3 6 4 7• The same co-operation existed in all 
States.
2
Conference report, February 1905, S .A .P .P ., 1905, vol.
2, no .22 , p .84.
3
P.Mo to Prem. Tas. (and all Prems.), 29 March 1905, 
T.S.A., P.D.1/180/111.
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on the policies of the Governments concerned and 
interference with these was not within the province of 
permanent officials. The officers did point out the 
convenience and savings which would result from 
administrative integration and suggested that electoral 
boundaries should be so arranged that Commonwealth 
electoral divisions and State electorates would consist of 
a combination of units giving a common basis for the 
preparation of rolls and that, as far as practicable, the 
same set of officials should be employed to conduct the 
Commonwealth and State elections.^
When the Commonwealth sub-divided its own electoral
divisions it did pay some attention to the State electoral
boundaries so that registration areas suitable for both
Commonwealth and State purposes might be adopted and joint
rolls might be established. It arranged conferences with
individual States to work out the legislative action
necessary to achieve as much co-operation as was 
2possible. The problem lay in the fact that basically it 
was up to the States to take action. The Commonwealth 
could do no more than make its own legislation broad and 
its administrative provisions elastic and then invite the 
States to bring their Acts and regulations within that 
scope. It could not force them. The situation was bad 
enough when Victoria, which did not adopt adult suffrage
1
Report of the Conference between Commonwealth and State 
Electoral Officers, 24-7 April 1906, S.A.P.P., 1906, vol.2 , 
n o .56.
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 9 July 1908 (copy with Prem. N.S.W. 
to Prem. S.A., 15 July 1908), S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6 , O8/665.
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until 1908,' did not co-operate, probably because the
2discrepancies between the Acts were so great. It was
infinitely worse that South Australia, which would have
had to make only minor legislative adjustments, would do
3nothing. Tasmania alone was willing to co-operate. An 
Agreement was made to use the same officials at elections, 
have a common roll, joint regulations and to assimilate 
the State electoral legislation with that of the
4Commonwealth. Some difficulty was experienced in 
obtaining this high degree of integration, which may have 
been in part a response to the State's poor financial
5position and its need to economize at every opportunity, 
but it was a model which might have been followed with 
advantage by the other States.
A further attempt was made by the Commonwealth at the 
Premiers' Conference of 191^- to achieve integration but it 
was without avail. There was jealousy between the
1
E.A. Doyle (Ed.), The Story of the Century 185 1 - 1 9 5 1 . 
Melbourne, 1951» Appendix IV, p.295 •
2
P.M. to Prem. Vic., 24 November 1908, copy, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A 33 , vol.25, P-159; P.M. to Prem. Vic., 26 July 
1909, copy, i b i d . , vol.2 8 , pp.5^8-9 .
3
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 2 March 1909, R.E., C.A.O., C.R.S.
A.48 , vol.,6 , 09/902. The Government had just fought a long 
battle with the Legislative Council on the franchise 
question and it may have thought it unwise to re-open the 
m a t t e r .
4
See especially Prem. T a s . to P . M . , 1 July 1908, copy, 
T.S.A., P.D.1/206/111; P.M. to Prem. Tas., 21 October 1908, 
copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.24, pp.640-1.
5
Prem. Tas. to P.M., 4 November 1907, T.S.A.,
P.D.I/I98/II7 •
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permanent officials of the electoral departments in some 
States, notably Victoria, and that impeded progress.  ^ The 
States would not co-operate, though they might have if the 
Commonwealth had been prepared to allow them to control 
its work, but that was scarcely a practicable suggestion.^ 
Joint rolls were not instituted until 1920 in South 
Australia, 1924 in Victoria, 1930 in New South Wales, and
3still do not exist in Queensland and Western Australia.
At the moment of its inauguration, the Commonwealth 
became the possessor of a number of customs houses. The 
amount of property vested in it increased rapidly as it 
took over the postal and defence departments with their 
attendant post offices, telegraph lines, barracks, forts 
and technical equipment.
This property was not a free gift from the States.
The framers of the Constitution had foreseen the need for 
all property used by a transferred department to be 
transferred with it and, both in 1891 and 1897-8» had made 
provision for this to occur. As accepted, the 
Constitution provided that all property used exclusively 
for the work of a transferred department vested 
automatically in the Commonwealth at the time of transfer.
'1
Conference report, March-April 1914, S .A 0P .P . , 1914,
V0I.3 » no.49, p p •73-5, 166-8 .
2
Premiers* 235 Conference report, I916, S ,A .P .P ., 1916, vol.2, 
no. 28, Appendix A., pp.l04~5.
3 Information from photostats of extracts from the 
Commonwealth Gazette, 23 December 1920 , 13 February 1930,
26 February 19.53» and a. letter to the author by the 
Commonwealth Chief Electoral. Officer, , 5 May 1967.
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Where the use of property was shared (as it often was) 
between transferred and non-transferred departments it 
could be acquired by the Commonwealth at its own 
discretion. In either case, fair compensation was to be 
paid to the States for all property transferred. The 
manner in which the compensation was to be paid was again 
left to the discretion of the Commonwealth Parliament if 
no agreement could be reached with the States.^
Compensation could not be arranged until a mass of
details concerning the properties transferred had been
obtained from the States. The Commonwealth acted quickly
to do this, taking the first step on 24 January 1901. The
response was poor and some of the information was not
2provided for years. Real trouble began later in 1901 
when the Property for Public Purposes Acquisition Bill was 
before the Parliament. It dealt primarily with the 
acquisition of land from private persons but there were 
clauses relating to the transferred properties.
The root cause of the difficulty was the close
interdependence of Commonwealth and State finances during3the first decade of Commonwealth history. Not only did 
section 87 require that the Commonwealth should return to 
the States at least three-fourths of the net customs and 
excise revenue but the apportionment of this surplus
1
See section 85 of the Constitution.
2
Summary of action re valuation of transferred properties, 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A100, A05/4978; Memo., Home Affairs Dept.,
22 November 1904, ibid.
3
This matter is dealt with more fully in the chapter on 
finance.
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revenue was determined by the bookkeeping clauses 
(sections 89 and 93) which provided that expenditure for 
the maintenance of transferred departments should be 
debited directly back to the transferring State, while all 
'new8 (or 'federal') expenditure should be debited in 
proportion to the population of the States (that is, per 
capita). Revenue was credited to the State in which it 
was collected»
The clause in the Bill which caused offence to the 
States had been drafted on the assumption that this 
compensation was not really a payment to the States by the 
Commonwealth but an adjustment among themselves to allow 
for the fact that the value of property transferred by 
each State was not necessarily the same as the per capita 
share of the compensation which the State was liable to 
contribute. This assumption was quite correct provided 
that the compensation was paid, as it was expected it 
would be, during the operation of the bookkeeping 
provisions. The adjustment could have been made by paying 
to each State the value of the buildings it had transferred 
and then debiting it with its full per capita share of the 
total compensation. This would have involved the 
Commonwealth in borrowing a large sum of money and it was 
simpler to debit or credit each State with the difference 
between the value of the buildings it transferred and its 
per capita share of the compensation. The bookkeeping 
clauses prevented the operation from being arranged quite 
so simply and the Commonwealth had to evolve a complex 
method to achieve the same end.^ The Premiers could not
_________
See new clause to follow clause 44 as introduced by 
Senator O'Connor, Government leader in the Senate, C.P.D., 
vol.4, pp.4861-5 5 Barton's speech at the November 
Conference, Report, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 02/519> P*7*
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understand the scheme. Their view of the proposal was 
made clear by Philps the Commonwealth proposed to pay 
Queensland £235,000 for buildings provisionally valued at 
almost £ 1 ,600 ,000 . Worse still, it was attempting to 
determine unilaterally the mode of compensation instead of 
first trying to come to an agreement with the States.^
The complaint was justified only in regard to the second 
point.
The matter was discussed at a Conference in Melbourne
in Cup Week, 1901. It was clear from a memorandum which
See of New South Wales read to the Conference why the
Premiers wanted full compensation paid at once. If the
Commonwealth had paid even interest on the full amount it
would have come from the Commonwealth quarter of the
customs revenue thus ensuring that a large proportion of
the quarter would go to the States. If interest were paid
on the reduced value (or if no immediate payment were
made) a larger amount would be available for the
2Commonwealth to spend on its own purposes.
Only the Tasmanian Treasurer, B.S. Bird, who had 
probably been primed by the able statistician of that 
State, R.M. Johnston, realized that it was better to leave 
the whole question until the end of the bookkeeping period 
as, in the meantime, the revenue earned by the properties 
was credited t*o the States and made up for the non-payment
1
Prem. Ql.d. , to P.M. , 23 September I.9OI (copy with Prem. 
Qld. to Prem. N.S.W. , 27 September I901), N.S.W.A., 
C.S.I.L., 6631, OI/I8563.
2
Report of Conference of Federal and State Ministers, 1-4 
November 1901, S.A0A 0, G.R.G.24/6, 02/519, P-9-
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1of interest. His advice was taken, though by accident
and not design. The Commonwealth did not persevere with
2its scheme.
At their 1902 Conference, the Premiers urged the
immediate payment of compensation and suggested that it
should be paid by the Commonwealth assuming liability for
3an equivalent part of the public debt of each State.
Again and again at the Conferences of 1903-^-3 > they 
passed similar resolutions calling for action and going 
into more and more detail as to the mode of compensation 
and the method of valuing the properties. Always there
4were some differences in the proposals made. Meanwhile,
some of the States were effectively preventing action by
the Commonwealth. As late as November 1904 not all the
information requested in the letter of 24 January 1901 had
5been provided.
The States were trying to dictate to the Commonwealth 
in a matter in which they had no right even to negotiate. 
The Constitution left the whole matter in the hands of the 
Commonwealth Government and Parliament and there was
1
Ibid., p p .37-8.
2
C.P»D., vol.6, pp.7012-8.
3
Resolution of Premiers' Conference 1902, N.S.W.A., 
C.S.I.L., 6701, 02/17076.
4
Reports of Conferences, April 1903, S .A .P .P ., 1903» vol. 
3, no.66, pp.40-l; February 1904, ibid~ 1904, vol.2, no. 
23, p.1395 February 1903 , ibid., 1905 , vol.2, n o .22, p-77- 
3 See memo., Home Affairs Department, 22 November 1904, 
C.A.O., CoR.S. A100, A03/4978.
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simply nothing the States could do about it except talk, 
and that they did at immense length. No doubt a solution 
arrived at by agreement rather than one imposed by the 
Commonwealth had advantages, but the inexcusable 
dilatoriness of the States in providing the Commonwealth 
with basic information did much to prevent this from being 
achieved.
The Premiers' Conference of April 1906, instead of
passing useless resolutions, agreed to the calling of a
full conference of Commonwealth and State officials to
determine details of the procedure for valuation so that a
uniform method could be followed throughout the
Commonwealth and equities could be fairly adjusted between
the States. The officials met in August 1906 and drew up
a sensible, practical report outlining methods of dealing
with property, buildings and technical stores and
suggesting, as a solution to another problem associated
with the transfer of property, that where a building was
occupied jointly by Commonwealth and State departments the
occupier of the main portion should become the owner
2unless otherwise agreed. By January 1907, the decisions
of the conference had been accepted by all States and
3valuers were being appointed.- A major step forward had 
been taken.
1
Conference report, April 1906, S.A.P.P., 1906, vol.2, 
no.23, especially pp.92, 105-7, 139-40.
2
The report is in C.A.O., C.R.S. A 1 , 06/6605*
3
P.M. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 29 January 1907, 
S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, O6/9I6 .
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The quiet work of valuation took time. There were 
many problems. In Queensland, for example, the telegraph 
lines between certain towns had been constructed at the 
joint expense of the Railway and Post and Telegraph
1Departments and the relative shares had to be determined. 
It was not until February 1909 that Colonel Miller, 
Commonwealth valuer and Secretary to the Home Affairs 
Department, could state that the work had been completed 
and the properties valued at almost £9,650,000. Miller 
suggested that an attempt should be made to get the States 
to accept the more than £6,000,000 which they had 
received over and above their three-fourths of the net
2customs and excise revenue as a ’set-off* against the sum. 
There was nothing unfair in the suggestion, indeed it had 
much to commend i t , but the States would never have 
accepted it willingly and it was not proposed publicly.
When the financial settlement of 1910 brought the 
operation of section 87 to an end, nothing had been 
settled with regard to compensation for the transferred 
properties. The changed procedure for the return of 
revenue meant that the whole matter was of far greater 
significance to the States, both because of the reduced 
amount being paid to them and because any payment made 
would not come from their own money. In November 1910, 
McGowen, the Premier of New South Wales, pointed out that 
his State continued to pay interest on properties worth
1
S.M.H., 3 March 1903.
2
Memo., Secretary for Home Affairs to Minister for Home 
Affairs, 12 February 1909, O'Malley Papers, A.N.L., MS.460,
4175-9.
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almost £4,000,000 which were in the possession of the 
Commonwealth and that, pending settlement of the main 
question, he proposed to ask the Prime Minister to pay 
interest from 1 July 1910. He suggested that uniform
action by the States would greatly strengthen their
1 2position. The necessary approaches were made. In June
1911» there was a conference between the Acting Treasurers
of the Commonwealth and New South Wales while Fisher and
McGowen were both away at the Coronation of George V. The
former was ’induced to admit' (the phrase is Holman's)
that a fair settlement must recognize the Commonwealth's
responsibility for the whole amount represented by the
value of the transferred properties and not treat the
revenue in excess of three-fourths of the net customs and
excise revenue paid to the States, before July 1910, as a
'set o f f  against the capital debt. Interest must be paid
on the properties from 1 July 1910. Holman regarded that
as an important step forward but one further difficulty
remained: the Commonwealth wished to pay interest at only
three per cent, whereas the State wanted at least 3‘g' per 
3cent .
1
C. Carmichael (for Prem. N.S.W.) to Prem. S.A. (and all 
Prems.), l4 November 1910, S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 10/1305.
2
See, for example, Prem. Tas. to P . M . , l4 March 1911, 
copy, T.S.A., P.D.1/229/3; Prem. Vic. to P.M., 27 March 
1911, copy, P.D.V.O.L., vol.184, p.276.
3
A.Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), l4 June 
I9H  (telegram and letter), S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6, 11/657»
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What the Commonwealth really wanted to do was to use
the odd half per cent to establish a sinking fund to
liquidate the principal of the debt , ^ but the States felt
that this was just another scheme for paying them for the
properties with their own money and, in effect, getting
2them for nothing. Since the scheme had been proposed by
the Acting Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, they may well have
been justified in their suspicions. Two other factors
made the proposal seem unfair. The States had always had
to pay more than three per cent (and usually more than 3^
per cent) interest on the money they had borrowed to erect
the buildings and the Commonwealth had undertaken a policy
of small loans to the States for which it charged 3-3/^
3per cent. It looked very much as if the rich were 
grinding the faces of the poor.
Queensland was dissatisfied because it had sometimes
received less than three-fourths of the customs revenue4collected in the State during the operation of section 87
and it felt that it should receive interest on its
5properties from the time of transfer. Its case was poor.
1
A.P.M. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 4 July I9 H > 
ibid.
2
Prem. Tas . to P.M., 21 July I9 H  , copy, T.S.A.,
P.D.1/229/3.
3
Ibid.
4
The Commonwealth had to return three-fourths overall, 
not to each individual State.
5
Report of 1912 Premiers* Conference, S .A .P .P ., 1912
(first session), no.2 1 , pp.(v) and 16 (Denham's speech).
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Had interest been paid to the State during the first 
decade, the amount received back under section 87 must 
have been reduced commensurately.
For a time, the States accepted the payment of three
per cent 'without prejudice' to their claims for a higher
rate/ but the Commonwealth was eventually persuaded to
2pay the extra half per cent. The States would have 
preferred to have had the question of the capital debt 
settled, but at least the Commonwealth had relieved them 
of the interest burden for the properties and the matter 
ceased to be important. The settlement was only interim 
but it meant that the matter could be left to be dealt 
with along with the question of State debts in the general 
financial settlement of 1927-
In every State except Tasmania, there were disputes
about whether buildings and property were used exclusively
for the work of a transferred department and if they were
used, but not exclusively used, whether they should be3transferred to the Commonwealth. Two cases only will be
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M. , 13 October 1911 , copy with Prem. 
N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 16 October I9II , S.A.A., G.R.G.24/6,
11/657; Prem. S.A. to P.M., 16 January 1912, ibid.; Prem. 
Vic. to P.M. , 18 December I9H ,  copy» P.D.V.O.L. , vol.187, 
p.l91; Prem. Tas. to P.M., 23 December I9H , copy, T.S.A., 
P.D.1/229/3.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to A.Prem. S.A., 30 June 1913> S.A.A., 
G.R.G.24/6, 09/118.
3 Specimen cases of properties jointly occupied by the 
Commonwealth and States in which there is a dispute re 
treating them as transferred properties, memo, by G.T. 
A[llen], Ik November 1901, C.A.O., C.R.S. A57I, 1/1059.
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discussed here: the case of the Dawes Point Reserve in
Sydney, which was eventually settled relatively 
harmoniously, and that of the General Post Office building, 
Adelaide, which dragged on uneasily for many years.
The Dawes Point Reserve, now situated almost under 
the Sydney Harbour Bridge, had once been the site of a 
military battery, but, after negotiation, the Imperial 
Government had exchanged it for other property on Garden 
Island, though the residence of the Commandant of the 
defence forces in New South Wales remained at Dawes Point. 
The exchange was made formal by Order in Council about the 
year 1900 although it had existed de facto for some time 
before that. The reserve had been vested in the Harbour 
Trust by Act of the Colonial Parliament and, it was 
believed, must remain so vested until the position was 
changed by further legislative action. Dawes Point had 
never been used exclusively as a defence property as it 
had always been available for public recreation and there 
was no reason why it should be regarded as a transferred 
property under section 85 (i) of the Constitution.^ The 
Commonwealth chose to regard it as having been transferred 
automatically with all other defence properties on 1 
March 1901, and, when See of New South Wales indicated that 
the State wanted the buildings on the property for State
1
Article by ’Civis* in S,M.H ., 20 September 1902, with
B.R. Wise to Deakin, 20 September 1902, D.P., A.N.L.,
M S .15^0/5155-6. Wise thought it had been written by A. 
Oliver, President of the N.S.W. Land Court.
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1use, it decided to retain the area and informed the State 
2accordingly.
Each Government had staked a claim and battle had to
be joined as no politician could give way on such an issue
once it had become public, unless he could show himself
beaten only by the inherent strength or cunning of his
opponent. Publicly, New South Wales demanded that the3property should be handed over within two months.
Privately, B.R. Wise, State Attorney-General and a close
personal friend of Deakin, wrote to Deakin, the acting
Prime Minister, and urged him to recognize that New South
Wales occupied the reserve and to pay rent for the
military residence there pending settlement of the
question in the High Court. He indicated that See wished
to avoid a quarrel but that certain local pressures being
brought to bear on him were making his position difficult.
Wise urged Deakin to resume control of the negotiations
from Lyne at the Commonwealth end as See felt that to put
Lyne in charge of them was to attempt to bully him into4abandoning the legal rights of the State. Lyne had upset 
See just before this by threatening, perhaps with heavy- 
handed humour, to send the military to enforce the
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 1 May 1902, R.E., C.A.O., C.R.S. A10, vol.2, Ol/365/l.
2
Deakin's Cabinet Notebooks, entry 18 August 1902, D.P., 
A.N.L., MS.15^0/17/264; A.P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 26 August 
1902, R.E., C.A.O., C.R.S. A10, vol.2, Ol/365/l.
3 Prem. N.S.W. to A.P.M., 8 September 1902, ibid.4
B.R. Wise to Deakin, 20 and 23 September 1902, D.P., 
A.N.L., MS.1540/5155-7.
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Commonwealth’s claim, See had retorted that he would send 
the police to arrest the military'^ As a negotiator,
Lyne lacked a measure of finesse.
The matter remained unsettled until 1905 when
Carruthers and Reid arranged for certain of their Ministers
to confer over this and a number of other issues, mainly
relating to property, which were outstanding between the 
2Governments. At the conference it was proposed that the
State should retain Dawes Point and give in exchange for
3it a water frontage on Darling Island. Carruthers agreed, 
and, although there was a brief dispute, which the State 
won, over the price to be paid for the Darling Island land,
4the matter was settled on that basis. The correspondence
negotiating the exchange illustrated amusingly the
attitudes of the two Governments to the whole affair. The
Commonwealth insisted on regarding the transaction as an
exchange of territory, while the State wrote consistently
of the Commonwealth ’relinquishing its claim’ to Dawes
5Point and being granted territory at Darling Island. The 
double talk made little difference since each party was
1
N.S.W.P.D., 2 Ser., vol.7, p.2722.
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 11 November 1904 , copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A101, B 05/7308.
3
Minister for Home Affairs to Prem. N.S.W., 18 May 1905, 
copy, ibid.4
Crown Solicitor N.S.W. to Treasurer N.S.W., 9 September
1908, N.S.W.A., R.E., Treasury, V 5899, 08/A6559-
5
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 4 July 1905, C.A.O., C.R.S. A101, 
B 05/7308; Minister for Home Affairs to Prem. N.S.W., 12 
September 1905, copy, ibid.
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satisfied with its side of the bargain and each felt that 
it had gained its 'Point*. Commonsense had allowed a 
small but unfortunate dispute to be settled satisfactorily. 
It was one of a very few such settlements made while 
Carruthers was Premier of New South Wales.
In 1903 , the Commonwealth decided to establish a
Public Service inspector at Adelaide and to locate his
office in the General Post Office building. A number of
rooms were still occupied by State departments and Jenkins
was asked to free one for the use of the inspector. He
replied that the Commonwealth could rent one from the
State for ten shillings a week.^ This angered the
Minister for Home Affairs, Sir William Lyne, who issued to
the Press a wildly exaggerated statement that the South
Australian Government had locked the Commonwealth out of
2l4 empty rooms in its own building.
The State Government had turned the key in two doors. 
Jenkins believed that the building was one which was used, 
but not exclusively used, by a transferred department and 
that, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, it 
remained under the control of the State. He was unwilling 
to grant the Commonwealth the use of any larger portion of 
it without rent because of the failure of the Federal 
Government to settle the question of compensation for
1
Summary of action, by Chief Clerk, Home Affairs Dept. , 17 
September 1903, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 100, A05/4426.
2
J.H. Gordon's statement at the 1903 Premiers' Conference,
S .A .P .P ., 1903> vol.3, no.66, p.17.
291
transferred properties. Indeed, he refused to consider
the surrender of any further State property until the
compensation question had been settled.^ At the Premiers'
Conference in 1903» the South Australian Attorney-General,
J.H. Gordon, made it clear that the State wanted to test
the Commonwealth's contention that when a building was
used principally by a transferred department the whole
2building passed to the Commonwealth. Again, as in the 
matter of channels of communication, it appeared that it 
was Gordon rather than Jenkins who was at the bottom of 
the Government's determination to fight for the legal 
rights of South Australia. Later it was agreed by both 
parties that the question might be settled by the High
Court, but they could not agree on what to do in the
(interim. Barton thought that the Commonwealth should be
allowed the use of the room free provided that it promised
3to pay back rent if the decision were adverse to i t , but 
Jenkins, advised by Gordon, refused to allow the 
Commonwealth in unless it agreed to pay at once. He was 
clearly trying to force the Commonwealth into initiating 
any Court action so that it would appear to be the
4aggressor.
1
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 9 March (telegram), 10 March (letter) 
1903, ibid., pp.17-8; Prem. S.A. to P.M., 7 April 1903, 
ibid., p p .18-9•
2
Report of Conference, ibid., pp.13-3* *
3
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 4 May 1903» copy» C.A.O., C.R.S.,
A 33 , vol.2, p p .8-10.
4
Minute by J.H. Gordon to Jenkins, 4 May 1903 , S.A.A., 
G.R.G.24/6, 03/300; Prem. S.A. to P.M., 27 July 1903, 
copy, ibid., 24/29» vol.1, p.85.
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South Australia's general position was clearly 
untenable. There was no justification for an attempt by 
the State to retain property until a just mode of 
compensation was determined, the more so as South 
Australia was one of the most dilatory of the States in
supplying the information which was required before the
1Commonwealth could settle the question. If a property 
were exclusively used by a transferred department it 
vested in the Commonwealth automatically at the date of 
transfer; if it were used, but not exclusively used, by 
such a department, it was for the Commonwealth and not the 
State to say whether it should be transferred. The State 
did have some voice in determining the mode of compensation 
but it was clear from section 85 (iii) that the discussion 
was to take place after the transfer and not before. Even 
then, if agreement could not be reached, the Commonwealth 
had the right to impose a settlement. All the options lay 
with the Commonwealth and the State had no firm ground on 
which to take its stand. That, however, did not prevent 
it from taking such a stand.
This was the kind of argument which gave some
justification for Deakin's view, expressed at the
beginning of 1903 , that 'the attitude of the Jenkins-
Gordon Ministry [had] been aggressively Anti-Federal from 
2the first'. Jenkins and Gordon certainly saw the matter 
differently. They believed that they were merely
1
Memo., Home Affairs Dept., 22 November 1904, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A100, A05/4978.
2
Morning Post, 4 March 1903 (Sydney, 19 January), D.P., 
A.N.L., MS.1540.
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protecting the interests of the State against unwarranted 
assaults on its status and power and would probably have 
argued that it was only by this means that a sure 
foundation for a strong federation could be laid.
The case was never taken to the High Court (where it 
must have been swiftly settled in favour of the 
Commonwealth) but dragged on endlessly. In 1904 , the 
State exchanged a few rooms in the Post Office occupied by
its law officers for some occupied by Commonwealth customs
1officers in the State Treasury building, but Price, the
Labor Premier, refused a similar request in 1906 and even
2tried, unsuccessfully, to get a room back. As a result
of the conference of officials in August 1906 and the
consequent negotiations, Price eventually agreed to the
building being considered as vested in the Commonwealth as3one exclusively used by a transferred department. This 
was a surprising concession in view of the fact that non- 
transferred departments had occupied parts of the building 
since its completion and still did so. It may be that he 
thought that a conciliatory attitude in this small matter 
would help him achieve a more important purpose in the 
Northern Territory negotiations.
1
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 1 December 1904, copy, S.A.A., G.R.G.
24/6, 03/300.
2
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 9 June 1906, ibid.; Prem. S.A. to
P.M., 28 June 1906, copy, ibid.; P.M. to Prem. S.A., 9 
January 1907» copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.l7> p.204.
3
P.M. to Prem. S.A., 11 August 1910, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 
08/1299•
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In spite of this, the Commonwealth continued to have 
trouble in obtaining the use of further rooms when it 
wanted them, and, in 1911, so that it could have more 
space itself, it had to offer to pay the rental for rooms 
for the State Education Department until the new Education 
Building in Flinders Street had been completed.^ In doing 
this, the Commonwealth made a bad bargain. It had 
expected that the new building would be ready within two 
years, but it was not finished until June 1916 and the 
State refused to let the Commonwealth out of an agreement
2which that Government had sought for its own convenience.
The Commonwealth won the constitutional point, as it 
had to, but in a very real sense the State had its own way 
and used the building as long as it needed it. The South 
Australians must have taken great pleasure in keeping the 
Commonwealth to its bargain. It was incredibly naive of 
the Federal Authorities to make such a bargain, without 
any reference to duration, considering South Australia’s 
general record in its relations with the Commonwealth.
Day by day the life of the Federation wore on. 
Opportunities for co-operation were sometimes accepted 
willingly and at other times rejected out of hand or 
accepted with reluctance. The motive for acceptance or 
rejection may have been the fancied rights of a Government 
(State or Commonwealth), economic necessity,
1
P .M. to Prem. S.A., 4 February I9H , ibid.
2
This correspondence is also in S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 
08/1299.
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misunderstanding, or even personal ambition or animosity. 
Whatever the motive, the strange contrast between ready 
assistance on the one hand and reluctance or hostility on 
the other illustrated an aspect of the dilemma facing 
those who have the unenviable task of making a federal 
system of government work. It is a reflection of the 
desire for unity with diversity which is instrumental in 
establishing that system rather than a unitary form of 
government. Even today the spirits of co-operation and 
recalcitrance live together in the same political breasts.
The early years of the Commonwealth saw much genuine 
co-operation, not only as departments were transferred 
from one government to another but also in the general 
life of the administrations. To some extent it was forced 
on the Governments by the desire for economy, but it was 
often readily given. But under no circumstances could any 
form of co-operation be given which suggested the surrender 
of some measure of State autonomy. The Commonwealth was 
busy drawing power to itself and the States did not feel 
it to be any part of their business to assist it in that 
task. In this respect at least, the Premiers of the first 
decade have found worthy successors in men like Sir Thomas 
Playford and Sir Henry Bolte.
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CHAPTER 5
IMMUNITY OF INSTRUMENTALITIES
A federal constitution is essentially a legal 
document and ultimately its meaning can only be 
ascertained by judicial decision. Although recourse to 
the High Court has frequently been necessary in the 
Australian experience, many of the issues between the 
Commonwealth and States in the first decade were resolved 
by other means. The channels of communication dispute was 
determined by the will of the sovereign power, the 
Imperial Government. The capital site question was 
settled by compromise after long and tedious negotiation. 
But the issues discussed in this chapter clearly 
illustrate the necessary truth of the die turn that 
•Federalism...means legalism'.^
Forewarned by experience in the United States, the 
framers of the Constitution attempted in advance to 
prevent aggressive action on the part of either States or 
Commonwealth by the use of their concurrent taxing powers. 
Section ll4 contains a specific provision to prevent the 
State and Commonwealth Governments from taxing each 
other's property. The Commonwealth is further protected 
by section 109» which provides that any State law 
inconsistent with a Commonwealth law is invalid to the 
extent of the inconsistency.
1
A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, tenth edition, 
London, 1959» p.175*
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It was still necessary to determine what actions 
infringed these sections. There was room for genuine 
difference of opinion as to what was meant by the 
'property' of the State and Federal Governments and what 
constituted inconsistency of laws. Clearly these were 
matters which had to be determined by judicial decision. 
Often executive action and legal decision were 
inextricably intermingled. Sometimes executive action 
created the need for judicial decision; sometimes 
judicial decision created a need for further executive 
action to rectify unexpected or undesirable situations 
created by the decisions.
During the first decade, the Commonwealth challenged 
the right of the States to levy stamp duty on documents 
recording transactions to which the Federal Government was 
a party and to levy income tax on the official salaries of 
Commonwealth officials and members of Parliament. It also 
tested the right of municipal councils to charge city, 
water and sewerage rates on Commonwealth buildings. The 
right of the Commonwealth to collect customs duties on 
goods imported or purchased in bond by the State 
Governments was bitterly contested. Important issues were 
involved. The income tax cases raised the question of 
whether the High Court or the Privy Council should be the 
final Court of Appeal in all matters involving federal 
jurisdiction. The customs duty cases endangered the 
effectiveness of the national policy of protection. In all 
these matters, the States saw a threat to their legal 
status and financial position.
In spite of the direct constitutional provisions in 
sections 109 and ll4, the High Court settled most of the
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cases by borrowing the American doctrine of 'immunity of 
instrumentalities', first formulated by Chief Justice 
Marshall in the famous case of McCulloch v . Maryland in 
I8I9 . According to this doctrine, the Constitution had 
established separate, quasi-sovereign Governments and the 
power of each had necessarily to be construed as limited 
so that it did not impair the power and independence of 
the other. If the States could tax the agencies of the 
Federal Government they could cripple its operations. The 
same was true of Commonwealth taxation of State agencies. 
This doctrine, derived by implication from the nature of 
federalism and unnecessary in the Australian context, held 
sway (with modifications) until it was renounced by the 
Court in 1920.^
The liability of the Commonwealth to pay State stamp 
duty on such documents as memoranda for the transfer of 
lands to the Commonwealth and bank drafts transferring 
money from one Commonwealth department to another, and of 
a Commonwealth servant to pay State duty on a receipt 
given by him to the Commonwealth for salary paid to him in 
the course of his official duties, was raised strongly in 
mid-1902. Only Western Australia was inclined to regard 
documents forming part of a transaction with the 
Commonwealth as exempt from stamp duty. Although the 
Commonwealth wanted the States to stamp the documents
1
4 Wheat. 318.
2
In The Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide 
Steamship Company Limited and Others, 28 C,L.R. 129*
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without charge and then attempt to recover the money, it 
eventually agreed to pay the duty under protest and 
subject to refund if it could obtain a favourable decision 
in the courtsJ
Cause for legal action was given in Tasmania in March 
1903 when the Deputy Postmaster-General of the State, Mr 
D 'Emden, refused to affix a twopenny duty stamp to the 
receipt for his salary as required by the State Act, 2 
Edward VII, no.30. He was convicted in the Hobart Court 
of Petty Sessions and fined one shilling, lost an appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Tasmania on a majority decision
2and appealed again to the newly constituted High Court.
The Court unanimously accepted the argument put forward by 
J.G. Drake, Attorney-General for the Commonwealth, on 
behalf of D'Emden, that an officer was a federal agency 
and gave a receipt for his salary in the performance of 
his duty as such an agent and that, therefore, the tax 
which the State desired to impose, being on 'the 
operations, instrumentalities, [or] agencies of the 3Commonwealth', was forbidden by necessary implication.
In delivering the judgement of the Court, the Chief
1
See opinion, Attorney-General N.S.W., 15 April 1902 and 
A.P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 6 August 1902, N.S.V.A., C.S.I.L., 
6698,02/15532; A.P.M. to Prem. S.A., 11 June 1902 and 
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 19 September 1902, copy, S.A.A., G.R.G. 
24/6, 02/745; Prem. Vic. to P.M., 13 June 1902, copy, 
P.D.V.O.L., vol.132, p.l46; Prem. W.A. to P.M., 7 July and 
25 August 1902, copies, W.A. 242, P.D.1162/02.
2
D'Emden v. Pedder, 1 C.L.R. 91 at pp.92-3*
3
Ibid., at p p .93-4.
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Justice, Sir Samuel Griffith, clearly enunciated the 
doctrine of 'immunity of instrumentalities'. He indicated 
that, with regard to State control, the operations of the 
Commonwealth and its agents must be regarded as if they
had not occurred within the territorial limits of any
1State. The appeal was allowed.
Not everyone agreed with the reasoning in the
judgement. P. McM. Glynn, a leading Adelaide barrister, a
member of the House of Representatives and future
Commonwealth Attorney-General, could not see the
applicability of McCulloch v . Maryland. He thought that
the case should have been decided on the ground that the
Tasmanian Act was an interference with the exclusive right
of the Commonwealth to administer its departments as it
saw fit. I.A. Isaacs, a future High Court judge and Chief
2Justice, agreed with him. Their argument was identical
with that of Mr Justice A. Inglis Clark in his dissenting
judgement when the case was before the Supreme Court of3Tasmania. This view made it unnecessary to rely on 
implications from the nature of federalism and would have 
avoided giving protection to the States by reciprocal 
implication.
The Commonwealth believed that it followed logically 
from the judgement in D'Emden v. Pedder that stamp duty
1
Ibid., at pp.Ill, 120.
2
Diary entry, 11 June 1904, Glynn Papers, A.N.L., MS.558.
3 The information re the judgement of Mr Justice A. Inglis 
Clark was provided by Prof. G. Sawer, Australian National 
University.
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was not chargeable on any transaction or any instrument
evidencing a transaction to which the Commonwealth (or one
of its officers, qua officer) was a party.^ This was the
commonsense view, but only the Jenkins Government in South
2Australia was willing to accept it and so it was 
inevitable that further aspects of the question would be 
tested in the High Court. It is difficult to see what the 
States hoped to gain by this determination to fight the 
Commonwealth on each separate issue, as the ground of the 
High Court's judgement left them little hope of favourable 
decisions on other aspects of the question.
New South Wales insisted that the Commonwealth should 
pay stamp duty on a memorandum for the transfer of land to 
the Commonwealth before it could be registered. The 
Federal Government paid under protest and brought an 
action to recover the fee. The case, The Commonwealth v. 
The State of New South Wales, was decided on 2-3 April 
1906 and the Court unanimously re-affirmed the reasoning 
it had adopted in D 'Emden v. Pedder and exempted the 
Commonwealth from the payment of stamp duty. The Justices 
further based their judgement on the ground that the New 
South Wales Act imposing the duty had not been binding on 
the Crown when passed (1898) and could not be taken to
1
P.M. to all Prems., 22 September 1904 , copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A33, vol.7, pp.366-7.
2
Prem. S.A. to P.M., l4 October 1904 , copy, S.A.A., G.R.G. 
24/6, 02/743. Victoria would have accepted the principle 
if the Commonwealth had continued to pay the fees as a 
payment for services rendered. Prem. Vic. to P.M., 3 
November 1904, copy, P.D.V.O.L., vol.l46, p.268.
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have been extended to the Crown as head of the 
Commonwealth. Their reasoning settled the dispute 
concerning stamp duty on Commonwealth documents even in 
the case of taxing Acts passed after I9OI.
In Australia, municipal councils are almost always
poor. It is not surprising that, when it became apparent
that the Commonwealth would resist requests for the
payment of rates on buildings which it owned, the Sydney
Municipal Council should have stressed the importance of
such rates to the councils. The Council also urged that,
even if the Commonwealth were within its legal rights in
refusing to pay such rates, it should make ex gratia
2payments in lieu, as the Imperial Government did.
The New South Wales Government had always paid city 
rates under the Corporations Act (N.S.W.) 1879» section 
I.03 of which made no exemption in favour of the Crown.
The Commonwealth Government relied on section ll4 of the 
Constitution and refused the Council's request for
3payment." The Council brought an action in the High 
Court to recover the rates. The case was not heard until 
April 1904 and, as was to be expected, was decided in
1
The Commonwealth v. The State of New South Wales, 3 
C.L.R. 807 at pp.807-8, 814-5.
2
The correspondence re this incident is in C.A.O., C.R.S. 
A108 , N.S.W,, I.O/6OO unless otherwise stated.
3
Barton told Hughes ( C „ P . D ., vol.7> P *91.53) that, in the 
Attorney-General's opinion, if the Commonwealth could pay 
rates under section ll4, it could only do so with the 
consent of Parliament.
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favour of the Commonwealth. In the view of the Court, 
section 108 of the Constitution did not continue the power 
of the Council to rate buildings which had been ratable 
when under State control, while section ll4 clearly 
provided that the Commonwealth was not subject to such 
taxes. The Justices also relied on the doctrine of 
'immunity of instrumentalities' once again, even though 
this seemed to make section ll4 otiose.
Further requests for ex gratia payments, equivalent
to the full amount of the rates, because of the benefits
which the Commonwealth got from watering, street
maintenance, lighting and the removal of garbage were
refused. The Commonwealth was determined to pay for
direct services only, and the Council threatened that it
would provide only such services as were paid for. It
must be doubted, however, whether this meant that it
intended to allow the streets and footpaths outside
Commonwealth buildings to fall to ruins. The Commonwealth
persisted in its attitude and the only concession that it
was prepared to make was to pay an increased rental to the
State Government in certain special cases where the two
Governments shared a building so that the State would not
2have to bear the full burden of the rates.
This was a problem which could only arise where State 
Governments had paid city rates on their buildings.
1
Municipal Council of Sydney v . The Commonwealth, 1 C .L .R .
208 at pp.208, 233 (Griffith C .J .), 236 (Barton J.),
239-40 (0 » Connor J. ).
2
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 24 September 1909> copy, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A33, vol.29, p.478.
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1Elsewhere, as in Victoria, municipal authorities accepted 
with resignation the privileged position of Commonwealth, 
as well as State, properties. In any event, the doctrine 
of the Sydney case clearly applied all over Australia.
Water, sewerage and electricity charges were on a
different footing. Although they were (and are) often
levied as rates, they could be paid for as services
rendered even though the amount paid might be the same as 
2the rate. What mattered, from a legal point of view, was 
that liability to be rated should not be admitted.
Under section ll4 the right of the Commonwealth 
Government to refuse payment of rates was unquestionable. 
It was unquestionable that it was only fair that the 
Commonwealth should pay for services such as the supply of 
water and electricity and the removal of garbage and it 
did do all that was required of it in this respect. The 
real problem concerned what might be regarded as 'hidden' 
services (street maintenance and the like) for which no 
direct charge could be made but which were still services. 
In refusing to make a contribution toward these, the 
Commonwealth was maintaining its privileged legal position 
at the expense of the councils and of other property 
owners. It was being less than fair, but to no greater 
extent than the State Governments in some other States.
The question of the collection of State income tax on 
the official salaries of Commonwealth servants was first
1
D .T ., 18 January 1902.
2
Again see C.A.O., C.R.S. A108, N.S.W. 10/600; D.T., 19 
July 1902.
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raised at the Premiers' Conference of May 1902» The
Queensland Attorney-General expressed the opinion that the
]States would not be able to tax these salaries. The
Conference? which could do nothing itself, left the matter
in abeyance and asked See, the Premier of New South Wales,
2to investigate the possibility of altering the position. 
There is no indication that he did so.
The first legal action to enforce payment of State 
income tax was taken in the Supreme Court of Victoria in 
June 1902. The Full Court held in Wollaston's Case that 
the proportion of a Commonwealth servant's official salary 
earned by him during the part of the year for which he was 
in Victoria was assessable for Victorian income tax. It 
was further held (D ’Emden v . Pedder was not to be decided 
for another year) that the principle of McCulloch v. 
Maryland had no application in construing the Australian 
Constitution. Its express provisions concerning the 
taxation of the property of one Government by another 
(section ll4) and concerning inconsistent legislation 
(section 109), as well as the power of amendment (section 
128) and the Royal prerogative of disallowance, made 
general implications from the nature of federalism
3unnecessary.
1
His view was founded on such American precedents as 
McCulloch v. M a r y l a n d .
2
Conference report, May 1902, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 02/737» 
especially p »17°
28 V . L . R . 337 at p p .337-8.3
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The Victorian Government was anxious to assess for 
tax the allowances of members of the Commonwealth
Parliament, including those not permanently resident in
1Victoria.. This led to a further series of cases. So
that the matter could be tested, Deakin and Lyne formally
refused to pay."~ In May 1904 , Peakin' s and Lyne 1 s Cases
came before the full bench of the Supreme Court of
Victoria which held that the salary or allowance of a
member of the Commonwealth Parliament, so far as it was
3earned in Victoria, was liable to the State tax, thus 
following its own judgement in Wollaston's Case and 
distinguishing these cases from D'Emden v. Pedder. Deakin 
and Lyne appealed from this decision to the High Court.
The case was argued closely, with H.B. Higgins and I.A. 
Isaacs, both future Justices, appearing as counsel for the 
appellants and respondents respectively. The Court held 
unanimously that the cases fell within the principle of 
'immunity of instrumentalities' enunciated by the Court in 
D'Emden v. Pedder and that the salaries of a minister of 
the Crown for the Commonwealth and of a member of the 
Commonwealth Parliament were exempt from State income tax. 
As the case concerned the powers of the Commonwealth and
1
Prem. Vic. to Commonwealth A.G., 11 June 1903> copy,
P.D.V.O.L., vol.137, p.502.
2
The correspondence between Deakin and Webb (the 
Commissioner of Taxation) is in D.P., A.N.L., MS.134o/l3/ 
222. (There are two box 13s). Lyne's correspondence has 
not been seen.
3
29 V.L.R. 748 at p.748.4
Deakin v. Webb and Lyne v . Webb, 1 C,L.R . 3^3 at
P P .383-6.
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States inter se, appeal to the Privy Council was forbidden 
by section 'jk of the Constitution except by special 
certificate from the High Court itself. In the cases 
under consideration, the Court could see no special reason 
to allow an appeal and refused the certificate.
The Premier of New South Wales, J.H. Carruthers, was
furious. He believed that the principle laid down by the
Court meant that federal property and machinery of
government would contribute nothing to the cost of State
government, although State laws and protection benefitted
Commonwealth officers and property equally with those who
bore the cost. The States would have to appeal against
the decision somehow, but, until they could, unless the
Commonwealth found some way out of the impasse, they would
have to 'retaliate severely* and deny every possible
privilege to Commonwealth persons and property. The whole
position, in Carruthers* opinion, was 'repugnant to the
2sense of justice of the people* of the States.
1
Ibid., at p.631. The Founders, led by Mr (later Sir 
Josiah) Symon, had intended the High Court to be the final 
arbiter in such cases. The Imperial Government was 
unwilling to allow this but finally yielded. See Quick 
and Garran, Annotated Constitution, pp.748-50, A. Deakin, 
(Ed. J.A, La Nauze) , The Federalistory, Melbourne, 1963, 
ch.21.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 2 November 
1904, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 04/758j Prem. N.S.W. to P.M.,
18 November 1904 (copy with Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 18 
November 1904) ibid. It appears that Carruthers knew the 
content of the judgement in Deakin v. Webb the day before 
it was delivered - or else his first letter is wrongly 
dated.
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Carruthers* anger and dissatisfaction were 
understandable and justified. The decision of the High 
Court may have been legally sound but the position created 
by it was socially and politically undesirable. It 
created a privileged class of citizens and depleted the 
resources which the States had available to carry out 
their many essential functions. But there was no point in 
retaliatory measures which could not benefit the States in 
any way.
Bent, the Victorian Premier, expressed grave concern
at the decision of the Court but suggested a friendly
agreement to obviate the need for further legal 
1proceedings. G.H. Reid, Prime Minister at the time,
professed himself anxious to reach such an agreement but
emphasised that his Government had no legal power to make
Commonwealth salaries subject to State income tax and that
it could not force its officers to pay a tax which had
been declared illegal. He wanted Bent to suggest a
2solution to the problem. Bent, apparently equally devoid
of ideas, claimed that it would be unconstitutional for 
3him to do so.
There was a basic difference of attitude between the 
Commonwealth Government and the High Court on the one side
1
Prem. Vic. to P.M., 5 November 1904, copy, P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.l46, p.124.
2
P.M. to Prem. Vic., 7 November 1904, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. 
A33, vol.8, pp.1-2.
3
Prem. Vic. to P.M„, 9 November 1904, copy, P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.146, p .149.
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and the State Governments on the other. The former tended 
to regard Commonwealth officers simply as federal 
officials paid in the course of their departmental duties 
and therefore, for taxation purposes, to be thought of as 
agencies of the Commonwealth Government. On the other 
hand, the State Governments regarded them simply as State 
citizens and therefore without special privileges of any 
kind and subject to the same taxation as their fellow 
citizens. This latter aspect was immensely important and 
not to be neglected but it was because he gave undue 
weight to it that Morgan, the Queensland Premier, argued 
that section 74 did not apply to cases like Deakin v. Webb, 
where the issue was whether the State could compel a 
Commonwealth officer qua State citizen to pay taxation, 
but only in matters between the Commonwealth and State 
Governments.^ His thinking was certainly confused but it 
was not unnatural that the argument should appeal to a 
State Premier at that time.
The Crown Solicitor of New South Wales realized that
if the question were raised again in a State Supreme
Court it would be possible to take it to the Privy Council
2for final settlement. However, it was in Victoria that
the next legal action was taken. In February 1905»
3Out trines Case came before the Victorian Supreme Court.
1
Prem. Qld. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 24 November 
1904, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 04/758.
2
Crown Solicitor N.S.W. to Prem. N.S.W., 12 December 1904, 
R.Eo, N.S.W.A., Treasury, V 5891, 04/A12502.
(1905) 30 V.L,R. 463.
3
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The State Court necessarily followed the judgement of the 
High Court in Deakin v. Webb but allowed an appeal direct 
to the Privy Council, bypassing the High Court in spite of 
the provisions of the Judiciary Act 1903 which were 
designed to prevent this.^ Mr Justice Hodges held that 
the Commonwealth Parliament had no power to take away, 
either by express enactment or by implication, the right 
of appeal given by Imperial Orders in Council on 9 June 
i860 made pursuant to the Imperial Privy Council Appeals 
Acts 1833 and 1844.2
Outtrim1s Case led to an unpleasant exchange between 
the Federal and Victorian Governments. The Commonwealth 
claimed that Victoria had agreed to pay Outtrim’s
3expenses before both the Supreme Court and Privy Council
if he would consent to the action and agree not to argue
that as the State Court was exercising federal
jurisdiction an appeal could lie only to the High Court
whose decision was bound to be favourable to him.
Naturally, Victoria, resented the implications of
4unfairness and collusion behind the charge.
1
The Judiciary Act 1907 was passed to prevent this 
possibilitv. The matter is dealt with fully below.
2
The author’s attention was drawn by Professor Sawer to 
the Acts under which the Orders in Council were made.
3
Outtrim was Deputy Postmaster-General in Victoria.
4
Prem. Vic. to P.M., 30 January 1906, copy, P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.15^» PP•532-4, P.M. to Prem. Vic., 7 February 1906, 
copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A33» vol.12, pp.698-700.
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The exchange was heated but pointless. Whether or
not Victoria had been guilty of any impropriety did not
really matter as the agreement was quite unnecessary. The
State was bound to lose in the Supreme Court, which had to
follow the judgement of the High Court in Deakin v . Webb.
As appellant, Victoria had the initiative, and, even if
leave to appeal, to the Privy Council had been refused by
the State Court, it could have applied to the Council for
special leave. That leave would undoubtedly have been
granted, as the Privy Council under Lord Halsbury was very
hostile to the attempt made in section 39 of the
Commonwealth Judiciary Act 1903 to prevent appeals on
federal issues from State Supreme Courts direct to the 
1Privy Council.
In spite of an urgent request by the States that it
should not do so, the Commonwealth intervened in the
attempt to prevent the appeal being heard. Deakin was
less concerned about the fact that Commonwealth officers
might be compelled to pay State taxation than that they
should have to pay at the direction of the States rather
than the Commonwealth. He was even more concerned that,
if the Privy Council agreed that it was competent to hear
the appeal, section jk would cease to be an operative part
2of the Constitution. Deakin, with Kingston and Barton, 
had fought Chamberlain over the proposed exclusion of this
3clause and was not likely to surrender it lightly so soon.
1 ’
The author is grateful to Prof. G. Sawer for this point.
2
Premiers 5 Conference report, April 1906, S .A .P .P . , 1906, 
vol.2 , n o .2 3 , pp.6l-2 .
3
Deakin, The Federal. Story, ch.21.
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When the Privy Council delivered judgement on 6 
December 1906 its decision was strongly in favour of the 
States. It held not only that it was competent to hear 
the appeal but that the Constitution did not authorize the 
Commonwealth Parliament to take away the right of appeal 
to the King in Council in such a case. It further held 
that Commonwealth officers were liable to pay State income 
tax on their official salaries. This decision was based 
on two grounds? the express provisions in the Australian 
Constitution restricting mutual interference between the 
Governments in the system (section ll4) made it 
unnecessary to draw broad, general implications from the 
nature of federalism, and, under the imperial system, the 
King could prevent interference by use of his power to 
disallow legislation.
The first of these arguments was sound but not the 
second,1 2 because of its obvious inapplicability to State 
Acts assented to before 1901. Even in relation to future 
Acts, it would have required close and detailed 
surveillance. More important than the reasoning was the 
fact that two courts of final appeal had decided similar 
cases in opposing ways and that the Privy Council had 
declared the sections of the Judiciary Act 1903 > which 
purported to block appeals to it from the Supreme Courts 
of the States in such cases, to be invalid and inoperative. 
The intricate machinery of the Judiciary Act had been 
designed to ensure that all federal jurisdiction should be
1
Webb v. Outtrim (sic) (1907) A .C . 81 at pp.8l, 88-91.
2
Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929» 
p.57.
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exercised either exclusively by the High Court or that, so 
far as it was exercised by the State Supreme Courts, it 
should be subject to appeal from them only to the High 
Court. The purpose of this was to prevent the restriction 
imposed by section 74 on appeals from the High Court to 
the Privy Council from being bypassed. The dicta of the
Privy Council suggested the total invalidity of this
1scheme. The worst that Deakin had feared had come to 
pass .
Deakin could not accept defeat in such a matter. He
desired to fight the Privy Council over the question of
appeals but knew that if he fought it on the taxation
issue he would act without the support of the country. It
was necessary first to find a way to legalize the payment
of State income tax by Commonwealth officers and members
of Parliament. He sought the advice of the Chief Justice,
2Sir Samuel Griffith. This was given clearly in 
Griffith's judgement on another taxation case some time 
later.
A Commonwealth officer in New South Wales raised 
another case by refusing to pay his income tax in spite of 
the Privy Council's ruling. Action was taken against him 
in a New South Wales District Court. This Court followed 
the Privy Council's judgement in Webb v. Quttrim and 
decided against Baxter, the officer, who appealed to the
1
The author is grateful to Professor G. Sawer for this 
point.
2
Deakin to Griffith, 4 January 1907» Griffith Papers, 
D.L. , Add. 4.54, p.63.
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High Court. In its judgement in Baxter * s Case, the 
majority (the three original justices) of the now 
augmented High Court held that it was the final arbiter in 
such cases and was not bound to submit to the guidance of 
the Privy Council but should follow its own decision in 
Deakin v. Webb unless, on reconsideration, it came to a 
different conclusion. It did reconsider the question but 
re-affirmed the rule laid down in D'Emden v. Pedder 
because it believed that the Privy Council decision in
Webb v. Outtrim had not thrown any new light on the
2questions involved. Mr Justice Isaacs agreed that the 
Court need not follow the Privy Council but held that, 
considered apart from authority, the Land and Income Tax 
Act of New South Wales did not infringe the rule of non-
3interference laid down in D'Emden v . Pedder. Mr Justice 
Higgins held that the High Court was not a final authority 
on law of any kind and must follow the Privy Council 
decision and that the State Act did not interfere with4federal instrumentalities.
5In another case, Flint v. Webb, before the Court at 
much the same time, the Chief Justice, Sir Samuel Griffith, 
and Justices O'Connor and Isaacs held that the 
inconvenience of having different decisions on similar
1
1
Baxter v. The Commissioners of Taxation, New South Wales, 
4 C , L . R . 1087 at p.1088.
2
Ibid.
3 Ibid., at p.1089•4
Ibid.
5 4 C.L.R. 1178.
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cases by the High Court and Privy Council could be
overcome by the Commonwealth exercising its powers under
section 77 (ii) of the Constitution. This section allowed
it to define ’the extent to which the jurisdiction of any
federal court shall be exclusive of that which belongs to
or is invested in the courts of the States'. Griffith
further suggested that the Commonwealth could make its
grants to its servants subject to the right of the States
to tax them. Mr Justice Higgins queried whether the
Commonwealth Parliament could validate a State income tax
on Commonwealth salaries if it were in fact invalid under
1the Constitution. In both of these cases, the Court
2refused to grant leave to appeal to the Privy Council.
Higgins' reasoning appeals to the non-legal mind, but
something had to be done to overcome the problem created
by the High Court's decisions in the income tax cases.
The Commonwealth Government introduced a Judiciary Bill
and a Commonwealth Salaries and Allowances Bill in the
Senate, taking up the suggestions made by Sir Samuel
3Griffith in his judgement in Flint v. Webb. Section four 
of the Judiciary Act 1907> as it became, excluded the 
State Courts from jurisdiction in matters involving 
questions as to the limits inter se of the constitutional 
powers of the Commonwealth and a State and provided that, 
if such a question arose in a State Supreme Court, the case
1
Ibid.
2
Ibid., at pp.1185-94 and 4 C .L .R . 1087 at p.1089. 
3
The debate on these Bills is in C .P .D ., vols.36-7, 39~40.
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must be removed at once to the High Court. The
Commonwealth Salaries Act 1907» as it became, provided
that State income tax should be payable on the official
salaries of Commonwealth servants and members of
Parliament, provided that rates were no higher, and other
conditions not less favourable, than on other comparable
salaries. Members of Parliament and Senators were deemed
to have earned their allowances in the State in which
they had been elected. The Act did not apply to the
2Governor-General.
The States still pressed on with an attempt to have
the Privy Council hear appeals in Baxter's Case and
Flint 1s Case, in spite of the fact that the High Court had
refused leave to appeal. However, the Council rejected
the application for special leave because the amount at
stake was small and the controversy had been closed by
3legislative action.
Yet one more income tax case was to come before the 
High Court and it illustrated, in part, the working of 
both the Judiciary Act 1907 and the Commonwealth Salaries 
Act 1907» F.W. Chaplin, a Commonwealth employee, failed 
to furnish an income tax return in 1908. He argued before 
an Adelaide Court that the principle of D'Emden v. Pedder 
was applicable to his case and that the Commonwealth 
Salaries Act 1907 was invalid and inoperative. The action
Quick, Legislative Powers, pp.179-80.
2
Ibid., p .179; Commonwealth A c t s , vol.6, 1907-8, no. 7 of 
1907.
3
Commissioners of Taxation for N.S.W. v. Baxter and Webb 
v. (1) Crouch (2 ) Flint, (1908) A . C .214"
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was removed to the High Court where a special case was 
stated. Judgement was delivered on 18 May I9H . The 
Chief Justice, Sir Samuel Griffith, held that the 
principle of 1 2immunity of instrumentalities' had its 
limitations and applied only to prevent interference by 
one Government with the agencies of another. If the 
Commonwealth, in granting a salary, declared it to be 
subject to State taxation then the tax did not interfere 
with the free exercise of federal power. Justices Barton 
and O'Connor concurred and the Commonwealth Salaries Act 
1907 was held valid.1
There can be no doubt that on a strict application of
the doctrine of 'immunity of instrumentalities' the Act
was clearly invalid. To rule it valid, the Court had been
forced into a contradltion which might have been avoided if
it had not previously borrowed from the Supreme Court of
the United States a rule which was quite unnecessary in
2the Australian context.
The question was closed. The aim of the States had 
been to protect themselves against financial loss, to 
prevent the Commonwealth and its servants gaining a 
privileged position and to keep open the right of appeal
1
Chaplin v. The Commissioner of Taxes for South Australia, 
12 C.L.R. 375, especially at pp.376, 379, 381-2.
2
See Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, v o l . 
2, p.635, Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law I9OI- 
1929, p.82; Higgins J. in Flint v. Webb, 4 C.L.R. II78 at 
P.1178; G.H. Reid also shared this view and hence refused 
to introduce such a bill, P.M. to Prem. Vi c . , 7 November 
1904, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.8, pp.1-2.
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to the Privy Council as an additional avenue by which 
their interests might be protected. To prefer the Privy 
Council to the High Court was also a way of indicating 
dislike of all things associated with the Commonwealth and 
was comparable to the tendency exhibited in the channels 
of communication debate to emphasize the Imperial 
connection at the expense of federal ties. Their just 
financial interests were protected and Commonwealth 
servants were prevented from becoming a privileged class. 
Even this, which was all that the States could reasonably 
expect, was gained primarily as the gift of the 
Commonwealth Parliament and not as a constitutional right.
The most difficult of the problems in which the 
Commonwealth and States became involved, relating to the 
taxation of each other's property, concerned the power of 
the Commonwealth to levy customs duties on goods imported 
or purchased in bond by the States. Naturally, in pre- 
federal days, the Colonies had not charged themselves 
duties on their own imports and they assumed that they 
would continue to enjoy this immunity under Commonwealth 
rule. Their confidence was strengthened by section ll4 of 
the Constitution which forbad the taxing of State property 
by the Commonwealth Government.
When the Townsville Harbour Board complained to 
Philp, the Queensland Premier, that it had been charged 
duty on some dredging plant, he asked the Commonwealth to
1remit the tax since the Board performed a State function.
1
Clerk of Townsville Harbour Board to Prem. Qld., 13
January 1902, Q.S.A., Pre/A138,02/09^6; Prem. Qld. to 
P.M., 7 February 1902, copy, Q.S.A., Pre/G28, p.731.
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It was, no doubt, a rude shock to learn that the State
Governments themselves were no longer exempt from paying
duty. Deakin, the Acting Prime Minister, claimed that an
exemption had been made in favour of the States in the
tariff as presented to Parliament but that it had been
struck out in Committee after careful consideration and
that the Minister for Trade and Customs thought that there
1was much to justify the decision. This was misleading.
The exemption had appeared in the schedule but had been
deleted on the motion of the Treasurer and almost without
discussion. Turner wished the right of the States to
2depend on the words of the Constitution alone. This
explanation must be read with an earlier statement by
Barton that in his opinion (and he had expressed the same
view at the Adelaide Convention) section ll4 would not
3allow the States to import goods free of duty. Clearly
it was Government policy to levy such duties. Nor did the
Commonwealth have any sympathy for bodies like the
Townsville Harbour Board. Three-fourths of the duty was
refunded to the State Government (under section 87) which4could pass it on to the Board if it saw fit.
1
A.P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 12 September 1902, N.S.W.A., 
C.S.I.L., 6701,02/17076.
2
C.P.D., vol.8, P.10917.
3
Ibid., vol.7, p.9153; N.A.C.D.A., 1897, p.1002.4
A.P.M. to Prem. Qld., 11 October 1902, Q.S.A., Pre/A138, 
02/09446.
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State concern was only partly economic as the amounts
involved were not usually large' and three-fourths was
returned to the State promptly - according to Turner, the
Commonwealth Treasurer, on a weekly basis, or even more
2rapidly if large sums were involved. During the currency 
of the bookkeeping system and section 87 there could be no 
financial threat, although the long-term position was less 
satisfactory. However, the matter seemed to offer some 
threat to the legal status of the States and to promise a 
dominant, privileged position to the Commonwealth.
By the middle of 1902, New South Wales had decided to
pay duties under protest with a view to bringing a
’friendly action' against the Commonwealth for their
3recovery. The question was tested for the first time in 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 3 April I9O3 . The 
case, Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Collector of
7  ■Customs for the State of New South Wales, concerned the 
duty on some steel rails and fish plates purchased in 
England for use on the State railways. It also concerned 
duty deposited on cement bought in bond by the State
1
For all States £223,000 (1902-3), £136,000 (1903-4), 
£ 68,000 (1904-5 ), £ 62,000 (1905-6 ), £81,000 (1906-7 ), D . T .,
12 April 1905 and Assistant Comptroller General of Trade 
and Customs to Secretary of Treasury, 3 February 1908, 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A571, 08/827.
2
Minute by Sir G. Turner, 7 April 1902, ibid., 02/1315«
3
Prem. N.S.W» to Prem. S.A., 5 September 1902, S.A.A., 
G.R.G. 24/6,02/1122. See also Prem. S.A. to A.P.M., 27 
September 1902, copy, ibid.5 Minute by Treasurer W.A., 9 
October 1902, W.A. 527, C.S.0. 2659/02.
4
(1903) 3 S.R. (N.S.W.) II5 .
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Government. Judgement was given in favour of the State on
the ground that the goods in question were the property of
1the Crown and therefore not liable to pay duty.
R.E. O'Connor, leader of the Senate, Vice-President
of the Executive Council and a future judge in the High
Court, who had assisted counsel for the Commonwealth in
2the case, was unhappy with the outcome but was inclined 
to accept the decision under protest rather than appeal to 
the Privy Council as he thought the matter 'one of those 3which the High Court would feel bound to decide finally'. 
Deakin recognized that the matter was not likely to be 
easily or quickly settled because, while it seemed 
anomalous for Commonwealth departments to enjoy an 
advantage not shared by their State counterparts, the fact 
that the Australian States engaged in a wide range of 
activities not of a strictly governmental character caused4a serious complication.
Each man had pointed to something which was to cause 
trouble: the natural Commonwealth desire to have the issue
settled by the High Court and that alone, as the
1
Ibid., at p.115•
2
O'Connor believed that the three judges involved in the 
case knew nothing of constitutional principles.
3
R.E. O'Connor to Deakin, 4 March 1903» D.P . , A.N.L.,
M S . 15^-0/4076-9 • O'Connor was anticipating a decision 
adverse to the Commonwealth.4
Morning Post, 15 June 1903 (Sydney, l4 April), D.P., 
A.N.L., M S .15^0. For the Australian public, Deakin had a 
different view: it was a matter of 'no moment' which could
easily be arranged. S .M .H ., 7 October 1902.
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Constitution intended; the jealousy which would be aroused 
by any advantage given to the Commonwealth over the States; 
and the importance of the non-governmental functions of 
the Australian States.
The Commonwealth made no appeal but continued to levy
duties. In April 1904 , New South Wales protested strongly
against what it regarded as the repudiation of an
agreement to regard the case already decided as a test
case.  ^ The Commonwealth did not agree with this
interpretation of the facts and R.R. Garran, Secretary of
the Attorney-General's Department, outlined the history of
2the matter in a long memorandum.
According to Garran, New South Wales had wished to 
take legal action early in 1902 but had not been able to 
because the tariff had not then become law. The 
Commonwealth had agreed not to plead that the acts sued on 
had been done more than six months before the issue of the 
writ if it were issued within 28 days of the tariff 
becoming law. On 21 October 1902, the State Crown 
Solicitor had requested that, if the State Government 
brought one or more actions, there should be no need to 
proceed at the same time with the hundreds of other items 
over which notice had been given; pending the 
determination of the test case, time should not run as to 
the remainder. The Commonwealth had accepted this on 31
1
Crown Solicitor N.S.W. to Solicitors for the 
Commonwealth, 8 April 1904 , copy, with items below, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A33, vol.8, pp.121-3.
2
Minute, 7 November 1904, by Secretary to Attorney- 
General’s Department for the Attorney-General re Collector 
of Customs Sydney, Atts Attorney-General of N.S.W., copy 
with P . M . tö Prem. N.S.W., 18 November 1904, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A33, vol.8, pp.108-20.
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October 1902 but had retained the right to consider 
whether the test case governed all or any of the remaining 
cases. The State Crown Solicitor had agreed that either 
party might consider whether the test case governed all or 
any of the other cases and on 5 November 1902 had issued 
the writ which led to the case in the State Supreme Court. 
The Commonwealth believed that the question involved the 
powers of the Commonwealth and States inter se and was one of 
those designed by section jk of the Constitution to be 
decided finally by the High Court. As that Court had not 
then been established, the Commonwealth had kept open the 
right of appeal to the Privy Council. Garran claimed that 
in accepting a request by New South Wales that the 
agreement of October-November 1902 should be extended to 
subsequent cases in which duty had been paid the 
Commonwealth had made it clear that neither the appellate 
tribunal to decide the question finally nor the case to be 
submitted had been selected definitely. The High Court 
had been created in October 1903* Section 35 of the 
Judiciary Act 1903 purported to conserve the right of 
appeal from judgements regarding which leave to appeal had 
been granted by the Court appealed from before the 
commencement of the Act. He claimed, however, that it had 
been thought that there might be doubts about the validity 
of the section and the propriety of making use of it. In 
March 1904, it had been decided to abandon the appeal to 
the Privy Council and to give New South Wales 28 days to 
proceed in the other cases. The State Crown Law officers 
had held that, as the appeal had been abandoned, the case 
should be taken as governing all others. A conference had 
been held on 8 April 1904 and New South Wales had 
contended that the matter should be decided by the Privy
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Council but the Commonwealth had refused to have the High 
Court passed over. It had been understood by the 
Commonwealth at the end of the conference that the State 
would sue for the return of all deposits, except those 
already recovered, but this had not been done. In 
September, the new Premier, Carruthers, had asked the 
Prime Minister to proceed with the appeal to the Privy 
Council and the State Crown Solicitor had again contended 
that, if no appeal were made, the Commonwealth should 
refund the whole amount paid under protest by the State.
Garran believed that the agreement of October- 
November 1902 had been no more than a temporary arrangement 
that time should not run in other cases while one was 
being fought and that there was no agreement to regard the 
first case as a test case. He also made the point that if 
judgement had been delivered after the passing of the 
Judiciary Act 1903 it would, being a matter of federal 
jurisdiction, have been appealable to the High Court alone. 
In his opinion, the fact that the judgement had been given 
earlier did not justify overlooking the High Court.
There is no adequate means of checking Garran's 
account from other sources although, much later, Wade, 
Attorney-General of New South Wales, did claim that it had 
been agreed in October-November 1902 to regard the first 
case as a test case. It is clear that the root of the 
trouble lay in the differing interpretations of the
1
D .T ., 26 August 1907. As Wade's statement was made five
days after the wirenetting 'raid', described below, it 
must be regarded as suspect. Wade, of course, had not 
been a party to the agreement.
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agreement reached between the parties. Commonwealth 
action, or inaction, was open to criticism. It had been 
slow in deciding not to appeal to the Privy Council once 
the case had been decided in the State Supreme Couit . 
Garran’s doubts about section 35 of the Judiciary ^ct 1903 
were lame in the extreme. There was no point in ircluding 
the section if it were not to be used in the very 
circumstances for which it had been designed. If dt had 
been held invalid, no harm would have been done as the way 
would still have been open for other action. It wcS, 
however, unlikely that New South Wales would have teen 
satisfied with an appeal to the High Court, at least after 
September 1904, as Carruthers believed that the previously
expressed opinions of Barton and O ’Connor made it
1impossible for them to sit on the case fairly. For its 
part, if Garran’s account is correct, New South Wa,es 
acted in such a way after it had been notified in April 
1904 that the Federal Government would not appeal :hat it 
did much to destroy its own case for demanding that; the 
appeal should proceed.
Other States became restive. At the Premiers1 2
Conference in February 1905 a resolution was passel
2urging the desirability of testing the matter finaLly.
In August, Bent asked Deakin either to proceed witi the 
appeal to the Privy Council or to act upon the decision of
1
Advertiser, 22 August 1907> see also S »M,H . , 6 April
1903 for Barton’s view.
2
Conference report, February 1905? S uA .P .P . , 1905» vol.2,
n o .22 , p p .103-9.
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1the Supreme Court of New South Wales. But the
Commonwealth law officers were confident that the duties
were legal and the Federal Government continued to insist
2that they should be collected. No further action of any 
significance was taken for almost two years.
In the early afternoon of 21 August 1907» a team of 
carters arrived at the wharf at Darling Island and began 
loading rolls of wirenetting which had been imported from 
England by the New South Wales Government. No duty had 
been paid on the wire nor had free entry been passed. The 
Collector of Customs in New South Wales, Mr Baxter, 
protested, but a State Crown Law Officer with the party 
insisted that they were acting under a decision of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales and by the authority of 
the State Premier, J.H. Carruthers. Under the protection 
of four State policemen, led by Superintendent Mitchell, 
the carters continued to load. A larger party of perhaps 
50 police was kept out of sight at some distance in case 
trouble should arise.
Baxter informed his superiors in Melbourne of the 
events taking place in Sydney and, apparently under 
instructions, later gathered 60 or JO men from the staff 
of the Customs House. Without telling them what was 
afoot, he led them to a tram which took them to Market
1
Prem. Vic. to P.M., 25 August 1905, copy» P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.1 5 1 , p <, 422 .
2
P.Mo to Prem. Vic., 20 November 1905» copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A.3 3 , vol.12, pp.149-50.
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Street. From there, they marched in a straggling body to 
Darling Island where they Found that all but 150 of the 
1,500 rolls of wirenetting had been loaded. The scruffy 
brigade of clerks, enjoying the situation immensely, the 
more so as a crowd had gathered, stopped the loading by 
standing or sitting on the remaining rolls. The 
policemen, outnumbered, gave up and made no attempt to 
remove them. A motley collection of clerks and 
wharflabourers removed the remaining wirenetting to a 
Customs shed, which was securely locked, while the carters 
drove off with the State's share of the spoils.^
When the Acting Prime Minister reported the incident
to Parliament that afternoon there was a considerable stir
and cries of ’Why not arrest Mr Carruthers?', but Sir
William L y n e , sensing an opportunity to discredit the
country’s most determined anti-federalist, was anxious to
act calmly so that the Commonwealth would not be placed in
2a false position. He informed Carruthers during the 
afternoon that he had instructed the Collector of Customs 
to retain possession of the remaining wirenetting 'at all 
hazards' and expressed the hope that the State Government
1
This account has been compiled from the stories in D . T . 
and S.M„H ., 22 August 1907, and differs in certain
respects from that given by Sir R.R. Garran in Prosper the 
Commonwealth, Sydney, 1958, p.179- Garran was wrong on at 
least one point - he thought that steel rails had been 
removed - and it is thought that the contemporary reports 
are probably generally more reliable than the memories of 
an old man,
2
C.P.D . , vol.38, p.2120.
328
would not persist in an illegal act which must have
serious consequences.1 The Premier coolly replied that he
was acting to vindicate 'the lawful rights of the State'
under section ll4 of the Constitution and a decision of
the Supreme Court of New South Wales which had affirmed
that goods the property of His Majesty’s Government were 
2not dutiable.
When another steamer arrived the next day with a
cargo of steel rails for the New South Wales railways,
Lyne had the Captain instructed to keep the hatches
fastened until entries had been passed so that there could
3be no further similar trouble.
The removal of the wirenetting by the State 
Authorities had been carefully contrived. On l6 August, 
the Crown Solicitor informed Carruthers that duty-free
4admission of the wire had been demanded and refused and
on 18 August Carruthers informed the Press of this,
indicated that there were ’the germs of a very nice little
row in this matter’ and expressed strong resentment of the
fact that 'the Commonwealth Government will not set an
5example and obey the law'. On 19 August, he received a 
telegram from Kidston enquiring what action he intended to
1
A.PoM. to Prem. N.S.W., 21 August 1907? telegram, copy,
C.A.O., C „R .S . A 2 , 07/3808.
2
Prem. N CS.W. to A.P.M., ibid.
3
Mercury, 23 August 1907*
4
Crown Solicitor N,S„W. to Prem. N.S.W., 16 August 1907? 
R . E . , N.S.W.A., Treasury, V5897, 07/A9001.
5
S.M.H., 19 August 1907.
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take over the continued levying of duty by the
Commonwealth. He replied simply, ’I propose [to] take
2the goods and [to] refuse [to] pay duties’.'' The
3following day a meeting of the Executive Council was held. 
The Governor was away in Queensland and Wade and Ashton, 
two of the ablest of the Ministers, were making election 
tours in the country. Besides Carruthers, only the 
Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Frederick Darley, who was also 
Chief Justice but had State right tendencies, and two
4Ministers, both nonentities, were present. It was a 
brief but busy meeting and the authorization of Carruthers 
to take possession of the wirenetting was only one of 
several items settled. The evidence of the minutes of the 
meeting is that the decision was made on the basis of a 
memorandum, drawn by Carruthers, which did not make clear 
that duty had not been paid on the goods or that they were 
to be taken without the consent of the Customs officials.
1
Prem. Qld. to Prern. N.S.W. , telegram, 19 August 1907 , 
N.S.W.A., Treasury, P17108, 07/8635.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. Qld., 20 August 1907 , telegram, 
copy, ibid.
3
Executive Council Minutes, 1907» vol.2, pp.133-50»
N.S.W.A., S.B. 621.
4
The Ministers were Hon. J. Hughes (Vice-President of the 
Executive Council) and Mr S.W. Moore (Secretary for Mines).
5
Admittedly, some irregularity may have been implied by 
the mere fact that Carruthers thought it necessary to 
obtain authority, but this could easily have been glossed 
over in the meeting. It is also possible that the minutes 
of the Council meeting, being a summary, make Carruthers’ 
minute seem more inadequate than it was. But it is felt 
that, given Carruthers’ general attitude to the 
Commonwealth, it is at least reasonable to suggest that he 
was less than frank with the Chief Justice.
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It was on this authority that Carruthers had acted on 21 
Augus t .
When the Governor, Sir Harry Rawson, returned from
Brisbane, he informed the Secretary of State for Colonies
that the action had been taken to bring about a test case
on the right of the State to import goods duty free. He
stressed that, as a result of the unwillingness of the
Commonwealth either to accept the decision of the State
Supreme Court in 1903 or to bring the question to a fresh
trial before either the High Court or the Privy Council,
it had been necessary to take action to force an issue.^
The Commonwealth Ministers thought this version of events
'incomplete and inaccurate'. They pointed out that the
action in question had not been necessary to raise a test
case on the point in dispute and that it did not raise the
real point at issue. Since the seizure, the State
Government had brought two actions for refund of duty
against the Commonwealth. Neither arose from the seizure
and both might have been brought at any time during the
previous three years. They considered the raid
unnecessary, fruitless and provocative and dismissed it
2as an election stunt.
Apart from the Colonial Office officials who were
3inclined to regard the incident with amused tolerance 
_  —  ■
Gov. N.S.W. to S. of S . , 27 August 1907, cable, A.N.L., 
A.J.C.P. 2184, C.O. 418/33, no.30772.
2
Minute from Commonwealth Ministers, 10 September 1907, 
copy with G.G. to S. of S. , 10 September I.907 , C.A.O. ,
C.P. 78/10 , p.530.
3
Minute, 27 August 1907, for Mr Cox, on Gov. N.S.W. to 
S. of S. , 27 August 1907, A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 2184, C.O. 
418/53, no.30772.
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(they could do nothing about it in any case) and the 
Hobart Mercury which thought Carruthers* action only 
’technically wrong’, ^ opinion was generally against the 
Premier. The Sydney Morning Herald supported the 
Commonwealth, fearing that ’force will bear fruit as civil 
war’. In spite of the wrongs inflicted on New South
2Wales, it did not feel that that extreme was justified.
3The usually friendly Daily Telegraph was hostile. The 
Queensland Premier, Kidston criticized Carruthers publicly,
4saying that his action had invited ridicule.
Carruthers had not expected this re-action: he had
5expected support. New South Wales was traditionally-
opposed to protective policies of any kind and the duty on
wirenetting had just been proposed for the first time and
was 30 per cent ad valorem. Furthermore, it had been
discovered that the only wirenetting manufactured in7Australia was produced by Victorian prison labour. The 
wirenetting which he had seized had been imported to aid 
the farmers of the State in their perpetual warfareg
against the rabbit. He must have felt that he had some 
reason to expect support.
1
Mercury, 23 August 1907*
2
S.M.H., 22 August 1907- 
3 D.T . , ibid.
5 D.T., ibid.6
S.M.H., 19 August 1907» Mercury, l4 August 1907*
7 Ibid.
8
Ibid.
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Carruthers had misjudged either the extent of anti- 
federal feeling in New South Wales or, more probably, the 
lengths to which men were prepared to go in showing it.
In any case, he could scarcely have acted more unwisely. 
The wirenetting was not, in the normal sense, a 
Government import as it was to be sold to farmers and not 
used by Government departments. It was a bad case on 
which to take such a dramatic stand. Even if the goods 
had not been subject to customs duty, they had to be 
cleared in the official manner before the importer could 
remove them and their unauthorized removal was necessarily 
an illegal act. Had general importers followed the 
Premier’s example and removed goods which they thought 
were not subject to duty without waiting for a clearance, 
chaos would have been created in the Customs Department. 
The Commonwealth Ministers were correct in their 
memorandum for the Secretary of State when they pointed 
out that the action in question had not been necessary to 
obtain a decision on the right of the State to import 
goods free of duty and that it would not even raise that 
question. When this question was settled it was on an 
entirely different case.
Carruthers was a capable lawyer and an experienced 
Minister of the Crown and he must have known all this.
Even with the expectation of support which he professed, 
it is difficult to see why he persisted in his lawless 
course. The explanation offered by the Commonwealth 
Ministers, and also by J.C. Watson,^ that it was an 
election stunt, is unconvincing. It was done in the midst
D .T ., 22 August 1907.
1
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of an election campaign, but, if Ca.rruth.ers had not
altogether lived up to the promises on which he had come
to office, by reforming the administration and finances of 
1the State, he had done no worse than his predecessor and 
the contemporary newspapers do not suggest that he was in 
serious danger of defeat. He certainly did not make the 
raid to ensure a. proper legal settlement of the customs 
duty question.
Soon after the incident, he made a number of wild and 
emotional statements at election meetings and it is in 
these that the explanation of his action must be found.
At Goulburn, he told a meeting that his action had started
a movement which would not cease until New South Wales got
2her rights under the federal compact and he told his own
constituents (appropriately, in the electorate of St
George) that the raid had 'struck consternation into the
3hearts of the federal tyrants1 . At Kogarah he went 
further and spoke of the spirit within the British race 
which ensured that !if even at the risk of bloodshed they 
had to overcome tyranny and pull tyrants down it would be
hdone in Australia". The delay over the customs duty was 
frustrating, the channels of communication argument was 
not going well, alarm was growing over the financial 
future of the States as the period of operation of section 
87 drew towards a close and the capital site dispute was 
hopelessly entangled. He seemed to be enmeshed by the
1D/T. , 2k September I9 0 6 .
2
Ibid,, 29 August 1 9 0 7 *
3Argus, 2 September 1907« 
k
Advertiser, 3 September 1907*
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growing- power of the Commonwealth. Carruthers1 2345
temperament would not let him accept this position so he 
took violent action in the hope that he could cut the 
Gordian knot and free himself from an intolerable 
situation.
He did. On Sunday 29 September, Carruthers suffered
a nervous collapse and heart attack and immediately
1retired from the Premiership and, shortly afterwards,
from politics. However, his recovery was swift and he was
soon able to take a trip to England on a mission for the
State and then return to the quieter atmosphere of the
2Legislative Council.
The legality of the removal of the wirenetting was 
tested before the High Court in The King and Minister of 
State for the Commonwealth Administering the Customs v .
OEdwin Frederick Sutton (the Wirenetting Case), but it was
another case, The Attorney-General of New South Wales v.
The Collector of Customs for New South Wales (the Steel 
x 4Rails Case ) , heard at much the same time, which settled 
the question of the liability of the State to pay duty on 
its imports. This was an action by the State for the 
recovery of duty paid under protest on some rails for the
1
D , T ., 1 October 1907- His Attorney-General, C.G. Wade,
succeeded him as Premier.
2
Australian Encyclopaedia. article on Carruthers.
3
5 C ,L o R . 789* Sutton was one of the unfortunate carriers
engaged by Carruthers to remove the wirenetting.
4
5 CoL.Pe 818.
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State Railway Department. They had arrived the day after
the wirenetting raid.1 The Court held that the rule laid
down in D 1Emden v. Pedder had no application to powers
which had been conferred on the Commonwealth in express
terms and which, by their nature, involved control of some
operation of the State Governments. It had to be assumed
that it had been intended that the rights of the State
Governments should be restricted as far as was necessary
for the effective use of such powers. The regulation of
trade and commerce with other countries by means of
2customs duties was one of them. The Chief Justice, Sir
Samuel Griffith, and Justices Barton, O'Connor and Higgins
held that customs duties were not a tax on property in the
sense in which the expression is used in section ll4 as
they were imposed on the act of importation and not on the
3goods themselves. Mr Justice Isaacs believed that the 
duties were imposed on the goods but were not a tax within 
the meaning of section ll4.^ The State was therefore 
liable to pay duty.
The reasoning was not convincing. The limitation of 
the doctrine of ’implied prohibition' or 'immunity of 
instrumentalities' did not involve any major difficulty 
’since the doctrine itself had the flexibility of most 
judge-made rules', but the interpretation of section ll4 
'was achieved in the teeth of formidable difficulties' as 
all judges agreed that the imposition of customs duties on
1
M e rcury, 23 August 1907*
2
5 C,L.R. 818 , at pp . 818-9-
3Ibid., at p .819.
4
Ibid.
336
goods owned by the State infringed the ordinary literal 
interpretation of the section.^ Professor Sawer believes, 
and the arguments used in the judgements strongly support 
his view, that the framers of the Constitution had not 
anticipated the difficulties which would arise in applying 
nineteenth century concepts of public law to conditions in 
which Governments actively carried on industry and 
commerce and that the Court, 'aghast1 23 at the possibility 
of a trading State Government nullifying exclusive federal 
control of import policy if the States were not bound by 
federal customs laws, was 'prepared to supply by judicial 
legislation an evident omission of the draftsmen of the 
Constitution'
The Court had been reduced to the most desperate
straits to avoid the possibly unfortunate consequences
of a logical interpretation of section ll4 and of adherence
to its own principle of 'immunity of instrumentalities',
first enunciated so clearly in the Commonwealth's favour
in D 'Emden v . Pedder and later made reciprocal in the
3Railway Servants' Case.
1
Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929»
p . 84 .
2
Ibid. In view of Barton's remarks on the constitutional 
position of the States re customs duties, already referred 
to, C.P.D. , vol.7 j P.9153 and N.A.C.D.A. , 1897, p.1002, 
this comment probably needs some slight modification with 
regard to him. He would not have acknowledged an omission 
by the draftsmen, of whom he was one.
3
The Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway 
Service Association v . The New South Vales Railway Traffic 
Employee's Association.4 C.L.R. 4 8 8 . T h e c a s e i s n o t  
discussed in this thesis.
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Queensland raised the issue again at a Premiers' 
Conference as late as 1914, but it was clear from the 
discussion that, while resentment still existed, there was 
no desire to re-open the question. The Premiers were 
content to try to even the score with the Commonwealth by 
insisting that it pay them for all the many services that 
the States performed for it.^
A minor variation on the customs duty theme was
played out in late 1907* When the new tariff was
promulgated in mid-August, it was noticed that the
exemption previously made in favour of State Governors had
been omitted and the omission was found to be 
2intentional.
The Governors themselves naturally protested against
what they saw as a derogation from the status of their
office and a serious curtailment of the emoluments of the
position which were not supposed to be altered during the3tenure of a Governor.
The State Governments protested strongly against the 
breach of faith with the Governors but agreed to pay the
1
Conference report, March-April 19l4 , S . A . P . P . , 1914 ,
vol.3, no.49, pp.17-25*
2
Acting Under-Secretary to Prem. N.S.W., 20 August 1907>
N.S.W.A., Treasury, P17108, 07/A8635- 
3
See Gov. T a s . to G.G., 21 August 1907> T.S.A.,
P.D.1/195/41; Gov. N.S.W. to G.G., 28 August 1907 , ibid.; 
Gov. S.A. to S. of S . , Gov. S.A. to G . G . , and Gov. S.A. to 
Prem. S.A., 30 August 1907> T.S.A., G.0.4/2 (all copies).
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duties subject to refund if they were declared illegal.
Both the Secretary of State and the Governor-General
2supported the States' position, but the Commonwealth
Government was inclined to leave the settlement of the
3question to Parliament.
By the time the question came before Parliament (l2 
December 1907), Deakin had realized the extent to which 
feeling was against the change and moved the re-insertion 
of the exemption. His claim that it had been struck out 
under the direction of a previous Minister 'in some other 
connection' and not noticed until the tariff was on the
4table was exceedingly lame in view of the fact that in 
August it had been stated that the omission was 
intentional.
The exemption dated from 12 December and duties paid3between August and December were not refunded.
Technically this procedure was right, but it was petty and
1
See Sir ¥. Lyne (for P . M .) to Prem. Qld., 7 September
1907, C.A.O., C.R.S. A33, vol.20, p .202. Also the 
extensive correspondence during October-November 1907 in 
S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 07/997.
2
S. of S. to G.G., 10 October 1907» cable, copy, T.S.A., 
G.O. 4/2; G.G. to S. of S., 11 October 1907 , cable, copy, 
ibid.
3
P.M. to Prem. T a s . , 12 November 1907, copy, C.A.O.,
C.R.S. A33, vol.21, pp.44-6.
4
C,P.D., vol.42, P.7419.
5
See P.M. to Prem. Vic., 18 December 1907» copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A 3 3 > vol.21, p.398; P.M. to Prem. Vic., 21 January
1908, copy, ibid., p.632.
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an unwise provocation to the States at a time when the 
great need was to reduce to a minimum all excuse for anti- 
federal feeling.
Some of the individual causes of action in the 
disputes discussed in this chapter were trivial in the 
extreme; others were of considerable intrinsic importance. 
All involved constitutional principles which demanded 
early settlement. That was why they were so keenly 
contested, whether by executive negotiation or in the 
Courts.
The use of the concept of ’implications from the 
nature of federalism’ by the original justices of the High 
Court generally strengthened the protection given the 
States by section ll4. Yet the Court's inconsistent 
interpretation of the Constitution in the customs duty 
cases, politically desirable and necessary though it was 
to prevent the collapse of the national policy of 
protection and confusion in the whole customs system, 
counterbalanced this and re-inforced the effect of section 
109 which gave the States an inferior legal status.
The Commonwealth Parliament itself came to the aid of 
the States to redress the financial loss caused by the 
Court's decisions in the income tax cases, but it did 
nothing to make up for the loss caused by the payment of 
customs duties once a system of per capita returns 
replaced section 87 and the bookkeeping clauses. Nor did 
the Commonwealth try to strengthen the States' legal 
position. The Judiciary Act 1907 forbad the hearing of 
cases involving inter se questions in the State Supreme
3^0
Courts and thereby ensured that the States could not 
bypass the High Court and appeal directly to the Privy 
Council in the hope that it would view their cause more 
favourably than did the High Court. Their subordinate 
position was clearly implied at this stage, although it 
was not made explicit until 1920 when the judgement of the 
High Court in the Engineers' Case  ^ left them without any 
protection save that given by section ll4.
1
28 C.L.R. 129.
CHAPTER 6
PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL FINANCE
Finance is at the heart of all government. Municipal 
councils and national governments alike are limited in the 
range of their policies by their ability to pay for them. 
The power and prestige of a government is to a considerable 
degree determined by the extent of its financial resources 
and its independence in controlling them.
Under the federal system, the importance of finance 
is accentuated by the problems associated with the need to 
divide the financial resources. These national financial 
resources are not enlarged ipso facto by the act of 
federation but they have to support yet another 
establishment. Because the duties of government are 
divided between a central and regional governments, the 
resources must also be divided; but it is not easy* to 
divide financial obligations and resources in the same 
proportion.
At the Australian Federal Conventions, no question 
was as intractable as that of the financial relations 
between the Commonwealth and States. It proved impossible 
to find a permanent or even a long-term solution and the 
provisions finally embodied in the Constitution, after 
weeks of debate, did little more than establish a 
temporary modus vivendi and give the Commonwealth 
Parliament power to make further provision, of either a 
temporary or permanent nature, when it could review the 
question in the light of several years of practical
experience. Time has shown that it was fortunate that the 
Founders did not impose a solution which would have stood 
unshakeable, barring the way of progress when changed 
conditions had rendered it obsolete.
Not the least important problem confronting the 
Founders was their own ignorance. The effects of 
interstate freetrade and a new uniform tariff (the nature 
of which had to remain unknown until some time after the 
first Parliament had assembled) on the revenue were 
matters for mere conjecture. Even the past did not 
provide a solid basis for constructive planning. Most of 
the continent had been in the grip of a severe depression 
for the greater part of a decade and the effects of this 
had been compounded by the drought which began in 1.895 and 
was to last until 1902. For contrast, Western Australia 
had experienced a spectacular gold rush and consequent 
rapid but unbalanced development which was in itself a 
disturbing factor of considerable magnitude.
One of the main benefits expected from federation was 
interstate freetrade. If that was to become a reality, 
the control of customs and excise administration had to 
pass to the Commonwealth. This change would create 
further difficulties. Five of the Colonies had come to 
depend heavily on the revenue from customs and excise.
New South Wales, which had adopted a policy of freetrade, 
depended more on direct taxation. The five Colonies 
could not surrender the customs revenue entirely without
1
Moore, Commonwealth of Australia, second edition, p o530*
3^ 3
seriously dislocating their revenue because, under the 
proposed distribution of powers, those involving the 
greatest net expense (development, railways, police, 
education, quarantine) were left with the States, either 
temporarily or permanently. Almost the only major
unremunerative expense of which the States were relieved
■|was that for defence, a matter of some £800,000 a year.
They also retained, temporarily at least, the obligation
to service their huge debts, the interest on which
accounted for more than 25 per cent of their consolidated 
2revenue. It was politically impracticable for them to 
make a sudden switch to the use of heavy direct taxation. 
This aspect of the problem was seen in its most acute form 
in Western Australia which, because of the peculiar nature 
of its development and the mobility of its population 
would have found it difficult to collect revenue in any
3other way than through customs and excise.' The five 
Colonies needed some kind of guarantee of their solvency 
written into the Constitution, something which would 
assure them that they would not lose the whole of the 
customs and excise revenue while retaining many of their 
largest items of expenditure and so be left to face 
financial dislocation or even bankruptcy.
1 Quick, Legislative Powers, p.7 6 0 .
2
R.S. Gilbert, 'The Australian Loan Council. Its Origin 
and Function in the Australian Economy', D.Phil, thesis, 
Oxford, 1 9 6 7 , p.2. In fact the interest was approximately
£7,500,000 out of a consolidated revenue of £28,000,000.
Moore, Commonwealth of Australia, second edition, p.531*
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New South Wales saw the situation quite differently. 
Any form of guarantee seemed to imply the necessity for 
raising a large sum by means of customs and excise duties. 
This involved the reversal of the traditional policy of 
that Colony. Consequently, New South Wales was opposed to 
the inclusion of the guarantee which was absolutely 
essential to the other Colonies.
Western Australia complicated the picture in yet 
another way. Not only was it almost completely dependent 
on customs and excise duties for its revenue, but an 
unduly large proportion of the duties was raised from 
tariffs on intercolonial trade. Those duties would cease 
on the imposition of the uniform tariff and the consequent 
establishment of interstate freetrade. This alone would 
be serious enough to dislocate Western Australian finances.
Given that some form of guarantee was necessary, a 
part of the customs and excise revenue collected by the 
Commonwealth had to be distributed among the States, The 
manner of that distribution constituted another major 
obstacle. The revenue yielding capacity of the Colonies 
varied greatly. The obvious method of distribution, an 
equal per capita return, would have seriously embarrassed 
Western Australia whose contribution to customs was 
unusually high, and, to a lesser extent, New South Wales, 
whose citizens could be expected to contribute heavily 
during the transitional period while trade was re­
adjusting itself to the changed conditions. Some way had 
to be found which would be fair to all, but not too complex 
and onerous in its application,
The problems were great and the solution satisfied 
no one completely. At least it had the distinction of
being original and unique. It contrasted strongly with 
the solution in the American Constitution which made no 
provision for the return of customs revenue, the States 
having to rely entirely on direct taxation to meet their 
needs, and with that in the Canadian Constitution which 
provided for the return of a fixed sum with an additional 
per capita grant.
The main guarantee to the States is found in section 
87, sometimes known as the 1Braddon section’ or 'Braddon 
blot’ after the man who secured its inclusion, Sir Edward 
Braddon, Premier of Tasmania. As finally accepted, it 
provided that for a. period of ten years after the 
establishment of the Commonwealth (and then until 
Parliament made other provision) not more than one-fourth 
of the net revenue from customs and excise duties should 
be used by the Commonwealth for its own purposes. The 
remainder was to be returned to the States. ’Net revenue' 
meant the residue after the cost of collection had been 
deducted from the gross revenue. The Commonwealth was to 
return three-fourths of the net revenue in aggregate not, 
as some State Ministers expected, three-fourths of the 
net revenue collected in each State.
The Draft Bill of I89I had contained no guarantee 
clause of any kind, though the idea had been present in 
the minds of some of the members of the Convention, 
notably Sir John Bray of South Australia, who had sought 
to compel the Commonwealth to assume the liability for the
Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, p.832,
1
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States* debts. At Adelaide in 1897, F.W„ Holder, Premier 
of South Australia, had wanted a. guaranteed return of 70
2per cent of the customs and excise duties to the States,
but after firm opposition from the representatives of New
South Wales it was decided to impose a limit on the
spending of the Commonwealth instead. This was fixed at
£ 300,000 in the exercise of new powers and £1,230,000 for
3transferred powers. In addition, the aggregate returned 
to the States for the first five years after the 
imposition of uniform duties was to be not less than the
4aggregate for the year last preceding their imposition.
At Sydney, Deakin suggested the Canadian system but it was
5not adopted and it was not until late in the Melbourne 
session of 1898 that Braddon was able to force through his
zr
clause. In its original form, it was perpetual in 
operation,but, when the Constitution Bill failed to obtain 
the statutory majority in the 1898 referendum in New South 
Wales, the Parliament of that Colony asked to have the
1
N . A „ C . D ., 1891, p p .836-49; Quick and Garran, Annotated 
Constit u t i o n , p .8 2 5•
2
Ibid .
3
The figure refers to net expenditure on these powers, 
not gross expenditure, that is it was to represent the 
maximum allowable excess of expenditure over revenue,
4
Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, p.170.
3
N .A .C .D .S ., 1897, P*36; Gilbert, 'Loan C o u n c i l ’, p.33* 
The ’Canadian s ystem’ meant a fixed sum plus variable per 
capita grants.
6
N . A . C . D . M . , 1898, pp.2378-9, 2422-31, 2436-7; Quick and 
Garran, Annotated Constitution, pp.198-9, 823-
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clause expunged. A Premiers’ Conference in 1899 would 
have agreed if any suitable alternative guarantee could 
have been found but finally decided to limit its operation 
to ten years.' This was a major concession to the desire 
of the 'Mother Colony5 to keep all guarantees out of the 
Constitution, but it was a concession that some New South 
Wales politicians lived to regret.
The last sentence of the clause provided that if the 
Commonwealth took over the debts of the States it might 
apply the States5 share of the customs and excise revenue 
to paying the interest on the debts. This was inserted at 
the request of Deakin, who feared that otherwise the
Commonwealth would not be financially able to take over
2the debts, and it provided a link with section 105 which
authorized the transfer of the public debts of the States
to the Commonwealth either completely or in part (that is,
a ratable proportion according to the population of the
States). The fact that the total interest burden of the
six Colonies was roughly equal to three-fourths of the net
revenue from customs and excise at the time made the
transfer of the debts seem to many to be a convenient way
of obviating the necessity to return surplus revenue to3the States. In fact, such a system would have operated 
unequally between the States. As accepted, section 105 
did not add to the guarantee given to the States. It
1
Ibid., pp.219, 825.
2
N.A.C.D.M., I898, pp.2430-31; Gilbert, 'Loan Council5,p.yr '
3
Figures on the debts and interest burden are in Appendix 
E,Table 2.
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provided that they must indemnify the Commonwealth for the 
principal and interest of the debts, and, once section 87 
had become inoperative, if the Commonwealth had chosen to 
use all the customs and excise revenue for other purposes 
of its own, the States would still have been liable for 
the principal and interest, even though the Commonwealth 
had assumed control of the debts.
The other clause which offered some form of general
guarantee was section 9 6 . It gave power to the Federal
Parliament to grant assistance to any State and to attach
any conditions which it thought fit. A similar clause had
been proposed at the Melbourne Convention by a Tasmanian
representative, Mr Henry, who thought it necessary that
the Commonwealth should have power to help a State which
became financially embarrassed, but it was rejected on the
ground that it cast a slur on the solvency of the States
and might lead to a scramble by the States for ’better
terms’. At the Premiers’ Conference of 1899» the clause
was inserted (with a limitation to ten years and
thereafter until Parliament otherwise provided) partly to
meet any difficulties which might occur during the first
few years of the uniform tariff as a result of the
rigidity of the distribution clauses, partly to remove any
necessity for a. high tariff and partly, in the view of
Quick and Garran (the latter attended the Conference as
adviser to Reid), to compensate the smaller States for the
2limitation imposed on section 87«
T —
Gilbert, ’Loan Council’, pp.5^-6.
Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, p.869*
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These were the general guarantee clauses. In 
addition, section 95 gave special short-term security to 
Western Australia. It empowered that Colony, should it 
become an original State, to collect, during the first 
five years after the imposition of uniform duties, customs 
duties on goods produced or manufactured in other 
Australian States and passing into Western Australia for 
consumption. These duties were not permitted to exceed 
the duty imposed on the same goods by the State tariff in 
operation at the date of the imposition of uniform duties 
and were to decline by one-fifth each year, disappearing 
after five years. If duties under the section exceeded 
those imposed by the Commonwealth on similar goods 
imported from abroad, the higher duty had to be charged on 
the imported goods as well. The need for a provision to 
meet the abnormal dependence of Western Australia on 
intercolonial duties had been recognized throughout the 
Conventions of 1897-8 but none was inserted until the 
Melbourne session when several complex clauses were 
discussed, mostly in the face of opposition from Sir John 
Forrest, who objected to Western Australia being singled 
out for special consideration.1 The clause accepted was
passed against the passionate and united opposition of the
2 _South Australian delegation. That Colony stood to gain 
much from freetrade with the goldfields of Western 
Australia and it was unwilling to be robbed of what it 
regarded as one of the main benefits of federation.
1
Ibid., pp.866-7*
N ,A .C ,D ,M ., I898, pp,1228 (Kingston), 1238 (Symon).
2
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ln 1891, Sir Samuel Griffith drew attention to the 
extreme difficulty the Drafting Committee had had in 
preparing the financial clauses of the Bill it had drawn 
up. He suggested that, until it became possible to 
transfer to the Federal Parliament obligations which would 
absorb all its surplus revenue, the only fair method by 
which to distribute it would be the basis of 
contribution. This expedient was adopted, and, although 
other methods were discussed at later Conventions, the 
final solution was not vastly different from, that 
suggested by Griffith. It was generally assumed that
sooner or later, most thought within ten years and the
2most pessimistic estimate was 25 years, the taxable 
capacity of the States would reach a common level and it 
would become fair to distribute any surplus by equal per 
capita grants. At Melbourne, a South Australian 
representative, P. McM Glynn, tried to insert a clause 
making this obligatory after ten years. While most 
thought the system would be adopted as soon as practicable, 
Glynn's motion was held to be too rigid and it was decided 
to leave the question to the Federal Parliament.
The distribution of the surplus revenue of the 
Commonwealth was arranged in three periods of time.
Section 89 provided for the first period, from the 
inauguration of the Commonwealth to the imposition of the
1
N oA.C.D. , I89I, pp.529-30.
2 *
Gilbert, 'Loan Council', p.60.
3
Ibid. , p p .42-3• Figures showing the relative 
contributions of the States per capita to the customs and 
excise revenue are in Appendix E, Table 1.
351
uniform tariff. It laid down that each State was to be 
credited with the revenue collected within its borders and 
debited with the actual cost of the maintenance of 
transferred departments 'as at the time of transfer* and a 
proportion according to its population (that is, a per 
capita share) of the expenditure incurred in the exercise 
of new powers. The balance, if any, was to be paid to the 
State at the end of each month. This system had to 
terminate within two years of the inauguration of the 
Commonwealth, the time limit which section 88 placed on 
the imposition of the uniform tariff. In fact, it 
terminated on 8 October 1901.
The second period extended for five years from the 
imposition of uniform duties (until 8 October 1906) and 
was governed by section 93 * Revenue was credited and 
expenditure debited in the same manner as in the first 
period. There was an additional proviso that the duties 
levied on goods imported into one State and consumed in 
another should be credited to the consuming State. This 
meant that the border customs houses, so long the bane of 
Australian commercial life, would have to remain in 
existence a little longer to ensure that duties were 
credited with reasonable accuracy. The purpose of the 
clause was to protect the interests of those States for 
which Sydney and Melbourne acted as distributing centres 
for goods imported from overseas. There was an 
additional condition, in the second paragraph of section 
92, whereby when goods imported into a Colony or State 
before the imposition of uniform duties passed after that 
date into another State the difference, if any, between 
the colonial duty paid on their original importation and
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the uniform tariff was to be charged against them. This 
was to prevent 'loading up' in New South Wales under the 
freetrade system and subsequent transference to other 
States once interstate freetrade had been established.
The additional duty was to be credited to the State into 
which the goods passed.
These clauses were all temporary provisions and 
together made up what was known as the 'bookkeeping 
system5. It was antagonistic to the whole spirit of the 
federal system as, except for the expenditure by the 
Commonwealth in the exercise of its new powers, the 
finances of the Commonwealth had to be dealt with in six 
State sections. There was no common purse. It was 
designed to meet the difficulties caused by the varying 
dependence of the States on the customs and excise 
revenue and was especially suited to the needs of Western 
Australia and New South Wales. The former State, almost 
entirely dependent on the customs revenue, contributed 
far more per capita than any other State - in 1900 its 
customs and excise duties amounted to £5. 9s 2d a head 
compared with Queensland (next highest) £3. 6s 9d and New 
South Wales (lowest) £1. 5s 10d^ - and an equal per
capita return would have left its Treasury in a sorry 
plight. In New South Wales the situation was different. 
Because it had a freetrade system, any new tariff was 
bound to increase its customs taxation disproportionately 
and its per capita contribution was likely to be high 
while trade re-orientated itself under the new system.
As well as risking its cherished policy, that Colony did
T
See S .A ,P ,P ., 1907» vol.3, no.75? P*90.
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not wish to bear the financial burdens of the whole 
country. Unsatisfactory and clumsy though the system was, 
it was the only way to meet the situation which existed.
The third period could begin at any time after 8 
October 1906 named by the Parliament and was governed by 
section 9^• This section, a permanent clause, enabled 
Parliament to provide, on any basis which it regarded as 
fair, for the monthly payment of all the surplus revenue 
of the Commonwealth to the States. It seemed to 
anticipate that there would always be ‘surplus revenue 8 to 
return, even when the guarantee offered by section 87 
expired. However, the significance of the difference 
between the term 'surplus revenue3 in section tyk and the 
term ’balance8 (that is, of revenue over expenditure) used 
in section 89 was something for the lawyers to ponder and 
explore.
Even without the limitation on the guarantee given by 
section 87» there would almost certainly have been 
negotiation and discussion between the States and the 
Commonwealth over the transfer of the State debts and the 
means of distribution to replace the bookkeeping systenj 
when it ceased to be mandatory. It was the limitation in 
section 87 which produced in the States an increasing 
sense of urgency as time passed and the end of their ten 
year guarantee drew near without the need for it declining. 
It was this, and the growing tendency for the Commonwealth 
to assume additional expensive responsibilities, such as 
old age pensions and more elaborate defence schemes, which 
made them wonder whether the Federal Government might not, 
without relieving them of their debts, keep most or all of 
the customs and excise revenue for its own purposes.
leaving the States the necessity of turning more and more 
to direct taxation to meet their commitments.
Negotiation arid discussion were almost inevitable and 
there is little doubt that the Founders intended that this 
method should be used when changes became necessary. But 
the Commonwealth did not have to negotiate. It was 
endowed with power to settle the whole business 
unilaterally, without consultation with or consideration 
of the States. Its power was absolute. This fact must, be 
kept clearly in mind as the actual discussions of the 
first decade are considered.
When the Commonwealth came into being on 1 January 
I9OI, it immediately assumed control of the Customs 
Departments of the States, but the systems under which the 
Departments had been administered continued to function in 
the new circumstances. The systems for the collection of 
revenue required only minor modifications to adapt them to 
the new conditions. The method for the return of revenue 
to the States was clearly outlined in the Constitution, 
though the details of the bookkeeping system had still to 
be organized. The one real area of difficulty was to 
devise a system which would register effectively the
transfer of goods from State to State after the imposition
2of the uniform tariff so that duties could be credited to 
the consuming State as required by section 93* It- was 
impossible to allow at once the complete freedom of
T ~ ~  “  ~
Gilbert, “Loan Council*, p,62.
Actually 8 October 1901,
2
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interstate trade which had teen a main object of 
federation, A system of interstate certificates was 
instituted A merchant despatching goods to another State 
had to pass an entry stating the value of the goods and 
the duty paid,and the Collector of Customs at the port of 
despatch had to certify the payment of duty. This 
certificate had to be produced at the port of entry if 
free entry was to be allowed.
The system was as good as could be devised but was 
weak in that there was no special reason for the despatcher 
to take care over valuations which were not likely to be 
scrutinized too closely at the port of entry to the 
consuming State. There was no sense of defrauding the 
customs and no punishment for error. Much trouble was to 
arise from this system, especially in relation to 
Tasmania. The matter is discussed fully in a section 
dealing with the special problems of that State.
The first attempt to alter the mechanics of the 
system of revenue adjustments was in mid 1903- Under the 
second paragraph of section 9 2 , duties had to be collected 
at the borders until two years after the imposition of the 
uniform tariff (namely, until 8 October 1903) on goods 
imported to one State before the uniform tariff and later 
transferred to another. The arrangement was inconvenient 
and brought in little revenue (£13*000 in 1902 but only 
£1,600 in the first five months of 1903) and Barton 
suggested in June that it might be discontinued at once by 
agreement. Unanimity w^ as not forthcoming and the
Memo, by H.W. Wollaston, Comptroller-General of Customs, 
2 May 1901, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 5 7 1 , I/I9O6 .
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suggestion was dropped. Another suggestion that where 
duty on interstate transfers amounted to less than five 
shillings it should not be collected had already been 
agreed to in 1902, but it had to be dropped in 1905 on the
complaint of Tasmania which felt it could not afford to
2lose even this small amount of" revenue.
Such matters belong to the mechanics of the system.
More important are the general principles of Commonwealth-
State financial relations. No important action was taken
on these for some time after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth. But, even at the start, there were those
who realized what the future held. Deakin had taken part
in the Convention debates and was thoroughly familiar with
the provisions of the Constitution. The question of
finance was often brought up in his anonymous M o rning Post
articles, where he argued that it would ultimately give
the Commonwealth a supremacy over the States which the
Constitution had not intended. They had been left legally
free but ’financially bound to the chariot wheels of the
central Government'«■ This dependence would eventually
allow the Commonwealth to acquire a general control over
3the States while the Constitution remained unaltered.
1
See the correspondence in T.S.A., P.D. l/l58/4l, 
especially P.M. to Prem. T a s 0s 12 June and 6 July 1903 *
2
P.M, to Prems. Q l d . and S.A., 22 May and to Prems. N„S.W, 
and Vic., 2? July 1905, copies, C.A.O., C.R.S., A33> v o l . 
10, pp.90-1 and 677-9 *
3
Morning Post, 12 May 1902 (Sydney, 1 April 1902), D.P., 
A.N.L., MS.1540.
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The States appeared likely to be brought to their
knees early in the life of the Commonwealth. In part,
their troubles were of their own making. In the immediate
pre-f'ederal period all had either enlarged their defence
establishments increased the pay of officers about to be
transferred or had begun new postal buildings, apparently
oblivious of the fact that during the bookkeeping period
the cost of this expansion would be charged back to them.
Far more damaging was the intense drought which gripped
much of the continent and it was only after it had broken
that the difficulties of most of the State Governments
2lifted and treasuries began to fill again.
In September 1902, a private member of the South 
Australian Parliament made the first move to have the 
Commonwealth take over the State debts as they fell due.
3As with most private members* motions, nothing came of it, 
but it was perhaps this move which stimulated the Federal 
Treasurer. Sir George Turner, to ask the States for full, 
information regarding their debts. His aim was to frame 
legislation for the gradual conversion of the debts as
4they matured. He did not follow the matter up.
A more serious move was made in March 1Q03» The 
Victorian Treasurer, Mr Shiels, made a formal request 
that the Commonwealth should take over a loan for
_____ -
Ibid., 8 November 1902 (Sydney, 30 September 1902), ibid.
2
Ibi d.°9 ReL. Reid, * South Australia and the First Decade 
of Federation*, pp.186-90.
3 S.AcPcD. (LA.,), 1902 , pp , 502-3 , 9 34 . Motion by Mr
Dixson.
4
D ,T o , 8 October 1902.
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£5,000,000, due on 1 January 1904, He re-iterated 
arguments which many representatives had used at the 
Federal Conventions, The Commonwealth iwould be able to 
convert on better terms than a State could because its 
security would be better. He believed that the State had 
a right to expect the Commonwealth to act as the past 
loans had been raised on the security of“ consolidated 
revenue, the most lucrative and elastic part of which had 
since been transferred to the Commonwealth.
The correspondence, which was fruitless, raised some 
important issues. Not only did Turner show that he could 
be expected to act with extreme caution so that there 
would be no risk of depreciating the credit of the 
Commonwealth but he made it clear that all States must be 
dealt with at once and on the same terms. The 
Constitution did not allow separate bargains to be made. 
When he insisted that any transfer would have to be 
accompanied by an arrangement concerning future borrowing 
which would prevent ruinous competition between the seven 
Governments and that the States would have to provide some 
indemnity with regard to Interest payments, he was
pointing at once to problems which were to bedevil this
2question for years. These were issues on which States 
and Commonwealth would divide.
The Victorian Premier, W.H. Irvine, raised the issue 
at the Premiers* Conference of April 1903 and presented a.
1
Treasurer of Vic. to Commonwealth Treasurer, 18 March 
1903, C oP.P., I9 0 3 , vol.2, p.9^1.
2
Commonwealth Treasurer to Treasurer Vic., 25 March and 
19 May I9 0 3 , ibid., pp.9^2, 9kk.
resolution and explanatory memorandum for consideration. 
The Premiers were asked to resolve that section 105 should 
be implemented as soon as possible. This was necessary 
since the State debts had been incurred on the security of 
revenue much of which had been transferred to the 
Commonwealth. Their continued financial security depended 
on the application of the main part of that revenue to the 
payment of interest on the debt or on the imposition of 
largely increased direct taxation. In his memorandum, he 
explained that if the Commonwealth were left with an 
overflowing Treasury, political pressures would be exerted 
to have it spend the money and leave the States to pay the 
interest bill by the unpopular method of increasing direct
taxation. The Premiers passed the resolution unanimously
2after minimal discussion.
Irvine was not looking for a direct benefit resulting 
from the actions of transfer or conversion such as had 
been anticipated at the Conventions or even by Shiels.
His action was a political manoeuvre to secure his State 
against possible loss as a result of the weakness of some 
Commonwealth Government prepared to buy popularity for 
itself at the expense of the States.
The transfer of the debts came under full discussion 
at a Conference of Commonwealth and State Treasurers in
7~
The relative importance of direct taxation and the 
returns from the Commonwealth are illustrated, for the 
second half of the decade, in Appendix E , Table 3*
2
The final form of the resolution is in the report of the 
Conference, S A. „ P „ P „ , 1903, vol.3» no.66, pp.96-7.
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Melbourne in February 1904.^ Like all the conferences 
between 1904 and 1909, it was convened by the States and 
the Commonwealth was invited to meet the State Ministers 
to discuss certain matters. No doubt the States saw 
themselves as meeting to reach certain decisions which 
were then passed on to their political protege for action. 
In financial matters, in particular, the procedure appears 
the very reverse of what was reasonable.
Turner prepared a memorandum as a basis for
, 3discussion. The whole pre-federal debt must be taken 
over and managed by the Commonwealth until it could be 
profitably converted to Commonwealth stock and the 
Constitution must be amended to allow for the transfer of 
post-federation debts. The States must indemnify the 
Commonwealth for the interest on their debts by giving it 
control of their gross railway revenue, any surplus being 
paid back to them weekly. The Commonwealth should not 
interfere with the reasonable loan requirements of the 
States, but there must be some agreement to regulate 
future borrowing.
The Treasurers were aghast at these suggestions. The 
request for a lien on the gross railway revenues appeared 
to some to be an attempt to gain control of the railways
1
The report is in S .A .P .P ., 1904, vol.2, n o .23•
2
In later years the Premier of N.S.W. reported to each 
Conference the action, if any, taken by the Commonwealth 
on the resolutions of the previous Conference.
3
Report of Conference, S .A .P .P ., 1904, vol.2, no.23, 
appendix A.
361
themselves, and the idea of some regulation of future 
borrowing was little less disagreeable. It would have 
been bad enough had it been possible to consider the debts 
question entirely apart from all others, but this was 
scarcely possible. The States had long since become 
sensitive to the inroads, real and supposed, of the 
Commonwealth on their powers and they were naturally 
suspicious of any suggestion which appeared to extend the 
Commonwealth’s power at the expense of their own.
There is little point in looking at the counter­
suggestions of the State Treasurers in detail. They were 
deeply divided on the value of transfer and on the method 
by which the debts might be transferred. They had not 
moved from the position taken by Irvine in 1903 and were 
only interested in the transfer in so far as it could 
help provide additional security for their revenue in the 
future. Western Australia was prepared to use the 
prospect of transfer openly and unashamedly as a lever to 
get the transcontinental railway built quickly. All of 
them were far more interested in the distribution of 
revenue and made the perpetuation of section 87 a prior 
condition.^ Already the 'Braddon blot’ had begun to 
appear as a 'blessing' and there was great anxiety to get 
back to the position which had existed before the 1899 
Premiers' Conference. This was a theme which was to re­
appear many times at conferences, but one which could 
hardly be expected to meet with the approval of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. Once given power to determine 
the financial relations after 1910, the Parliament was
1
Ibid., Appendix B 1 .
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hardly likely to surrender it permanently. Turner’s offer 
to try to give the States a security similar to that 
offered by section 87 for an additional 15 years was 
unacceptable to the Treasurers,
In the early part of 1904. some of the States, 
notably Queensland, became dissatisfied with the level of 
Commonwealth spending. Queensland sometimes got back less 
than three-fourths of the customs and excise revenue which 
it contributed. In addition, it was suffering because 
interstate freetra.de had displaced trade to the south a.s a 
result of the undeveloped condition of Queensland’s 
industries. Kidston asked Turner to keep expenditure on
public works low to enable the State to get back three-
2fourths of its net customs revenue. The protest was 
largely unjustified and Turner pointed out that, apart 
from essential defence works, only £4,500 had been spent 
on new works in Queensland in the previous year. The 
State’s problem was not the result of the extravagance of 
the Commonwealth Government but arose because the tariff 
passed by the Parliament imposed no duties on tea and 
kerosene, whereas Queensland's pre-federal duties on those
items had been high. The State’s revenue had fallen by
3£105,000 as a consequence. Other States also made 
charges of extravagance, but Turner was always able to 
answer them satisfactorily, often by showing that the
1
Gov. Q l d . to S. of S. , 31 March 1904, A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 
2166, C.O. 418/32, no.l6501 (appendix).
2
S.M.H., 11 October 1904.
A g e , 24 October 1904.
3
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increased expenditure on transferred departments was due 
to State action taken immediately prior to federation.
Turner's record, both in Victoria and the 
Commonwealth, lends itself more easily to charges of 
parsimony than of extravagance. He was clearly in 
sympathy with the State Treasurers and considered that the 
Commonwealth should manage as economically as possible and 
pay as much over the statutory three-fourths of the net 
customs and excise revenue as possible to the States. To 
do this, he sometimes starved Commonwealth services. It 
is possible that this excessive consideration, so valuable
to the States at the beginning of federation, led them to
2expect too much later. He even instructed his Treasury
officials to inform State Treasurers whenever any special
charge was about to be made which would substantially
3reduce the surplus returnable to them.
The system of interstate certificates operating under 
section 93 proved to be 'a. great hindrance to free 
intercourse, and a source of considerable annoyance to 
traders'. Early in 1904 , the Commonwealth suggested that, 
since the course of trade seemed, to be fairly constant, 
the certificates might be abolished and a system of lump 
sum payments substituted. It believed that the
1
See C.A.O., C R . S .  A571, 05/1250, statement of Sir G. 
Turner in an unknown paper, probably the A rgus, apparently 
late in March 1905*
2
Sawer, Australian Federal P olitics and Law 1901-1929;
p .28 .
3
Minute by J.C; ollins ], 21 September 1904 , C.A.O., C 0R.S.
A571, 04/4086.
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adjustments made under such a. system would be sufficiently 
accurate to meet the needs of the States. The smaller 
States, especially Queensland and Tasmania, which depended 
to a large extent on these transfers, were not prepared to 
risk even the possibility of a loss, but Victoria and New 
South Wales agreed and from 1 April 1904 they began to
1enjoy one of the most important benefits of federation. 
This change was made two and a half years earlier than 
could have been expected under the Constitution.
The States held another Conference at Hobart in
2February 1905 • The Commonwealth Prime Minister, G.H. 
Reid, and Treasurer, Sir George Turner, were invited to 
meet the Premiers at some sessions. Initially the 
Premiers took up an even more extreme position than the 
Treasurers had done a year before. Once more they 
insisted unequivocally that the important question, as far 
as they were concerned, was the guaranteed return of a 
fixed proportion of customs and excise revenue to protect 
them against the dislocation of their finances. The 
perpetuation of section 87 was no longer sufficient to 
satisfy them. The Premiers regarded it as an interim 
measure only, until some better provision, which would also 
protect them against a shrinkage of customs revenue, could
1
See P.M. to Prems. N.S.W. and Vic., 25 February 1904, 
copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A.33 5 v o l . 4, pp.626-7? 64l ; Prem. Vic. 
to P. M . , 1 March 1904, copy, P.D.V.O.L., vol.l4l, p.222; 
D . T ., 31 March 1904.
2
The report of the Conference is in S .A .P .P ., 1905? vol.2,
n o .22.
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be embodied in the Constitution. The transfer of the 
debts was subsidiary to and dependent on this.^
Negotiators usually ask for more than they expect to 
get. The Premiers were seeking more than had ever been 
seriously offered or sought at the Conventions. Their 
position with regard to the debts was intelligible on the 
view that this was the only point on which the States 
could bargain. Even then it was a poor lever, since the
Commonwealth had power to take over the debts of its own
accord if it wished, but the States must have relied, 
rightly, on the fact that this was unlikely, at least 
while Turner was Treasurer. Their position was extreme, 
even regarded as the first statement of a negotiator in a 
strong position: since the enemy controlled the main
supply lines, it was mere folly.
Turner adopted a stand very similar to that which he
had taken in 1904, although he did offer the States one
important concession. He no longer demanded a lien over
the gross railway revenue of the States before he would
take over the debts (though he still favoured the method)
but was prepared to be satisfied if the States passed
special irrevocable appropriations to provide for any
2shortage of interest. In the light of the Premiers' 
views, it did not matter much what Turner was prepared to 
concede. His proposals were discussed only because he 
insisted that, even if the debts were not transferred at 
once, the way must be prepared so that the Commonwealth
1
Ibid., appendix F.
2
Ibid., appendix J.
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could act when a suitable opportunity arose. More 
trenchantly, he made the important point that the 
Commonwealth Parliament would probably require some 
concession in that direction before it would be prepared 
to limit its Treasurer's power by an extension of section
87.
Before the end of the Conference, there was a marked 
drawing together and the Premiers did amend their 
proposals with regard to the debts quite drastically and 
agreed to a number of Turner's requirements. They even 
expressed willingness to accept an extension of section 8 7  
for a further 20 years (instead of in perpetuity), subject 
to the Commonwealth's joining the States in the attempt to 
find some better security. Since they still wanted 
security against a decline in the customs revenue, the
result of an effective system of protection, this
1concession was more apparent than real.
There were still wide divergencies but the parties
had come closer together than had appeared possible at the
beginning of the Conference. Later, there was some
further correspondence on the basis of Turner's final 
2proposals and, as a result, South Australia, Victoria,
Western Australia and Tasmania accepted his terms, but New
3South Wales and Queensland held out. It must be
1
Ibid., appendices 0, P, R.
2
Ibid., appendix R. The effect of Turner's revenue 
scheme is compared with other later schemes in Appendix E, 
Table 4 to this thesis.
3
The correspondence is in C.A.O. , C.R.S. A.571 > 05/3473;
see also Moore, Commonwealth of Australia, second edition,
p .5 0^.
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considered doubtful whether complete agreement would have 
brought successful action in a Commonwealth Parliament 
which was beginning to test its strength and where there 
was no strong party majority.
In August 1905, Carruthers invited his fellow
Premiers to join him in an approach to the Commonwealth to
have the Constitution amended to allow the return to each
State of an adequate fixed amount from the customs revenue
when section 87 terminated. He also wanted the operation
of the bookkeeping clauses made coterminous with section
87. All States except Queensland indicated their support
for the fixed sum concept and three for the extension of
the bookkeeping arrangements. Tasmania and Queensland
were both hostile to the latter because they believed that
2they lost substantially by it.
The fixed sum concept was not new as it had been
was also the basis of the financial provisions of the
suggestion lies in the fact that it was the first post­
federation proposal for some solution other than an 
extension of section 87 and that it did command some 
attention during the following years.
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 3 August 
1905, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 05/682.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A. (and all Prems.), 19 
September 1905, ibid.
N.A.C.D.S., 1897, p.56.3
suggested by Deakin at the Sydney Convention It
3Canadian Constitution. The importance of Carruthers’
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In spite of the lack of unanimity among the States,
1Carruthers approached Deakin. Forrest, the new Treasurer,
had himself brought forward the idea in his Budget 
2speech, after Carruther's initial approach to the States
but before that to Deakin. He told Deakin that he was
convinced that this plan was the only one which would be
permanently satisfactory to both Commonwealth and States.
The Commonwealth Parliament was unlikely to extend section
87 in the manner Turner had wanted and it was not necessary
to link the return of surplus revenue with the transfer of
debts as the latter would not in any way limit the
3spending power of the Commonwealth.
The adoption of Carruthers' proposal would have 
meant that the States were no longer under any financial 
obligation to the Commonwealth and would have known 
exactly what they would receive annually. The 
Commonwealth would have been saddled with the 
responsibility of making its own financial arrangements 
and raising the revenue to meet its obligations. Under 
section 87, only the States had to face this task in any 
real way.
By the time Deakin approached the other States, those 
which had formerly supported Carruthers had grown cool.
1
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M. , I9 September 190.5 , copy, Groom 
Papers, 'Letters from Deakin to Groom', A.N.L., MS.236, 
folder 1.
2
C.P.D., vol.25, P.1217.
3
Memo, by Forrest, 25 September 1905, copy, C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A571, 07/5^0.
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South Australia wanted to consider the matter at a
conference' and Victoria had decided to adhere to the
2arrangement made at the Conference of February 1905•3Western Australia alone remained enthusiastic. No doubt 
the bait of an extension of the bookkeeping provisions was 
attractive to a State which would lose heavily by any 
other method of return.
In the Parliamentary recess, between the 1905 and 
1906 sessions, Forrest travelled to London, on his own 
suggestion, to consult financiers and get information 
which he regarded as essential if the debts were to be
4transferred. He returned convinced that there was 1 no
help for the Commonwealth until we get rid of the states
5by a fixed sum & take over their debts'. This would have 
ensured the financial independence of both parties, 
provided the fixed sum was adequate. Of course, the whole 
concept of a fixed sum (whether in toto or per capita) was 
possible only in a generation which had relatively stable 
prices. To those accustomed to inflation, it is little 
short of astonishing that a responsible Treasurer could 
suggest such an idea.
1
Prem. S.A. to P.M., 24 November 1905» copy, S.A.A.,
G.R.G. 24/6, 05/682.
2
Prem. Vic. to P.M., 27 October 1905» copy, P.D.V.O.L., 
vol.153, P.13.
3
Prem. W.A. to P.M., 23 November 1905, C.A.O., C.R.S.
A571, 07/5^0.4
Forrest to Deakin, 15 October 1905» D.P., A.N.L.,
MS.1540/1721.
5
Forrest to Deakin, 23 March 1906, ibid., 1731»
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The Agent-General for New South Wales had also 
reported on the consolidation and conversion of the debts 
for his Government. His report would have done little to 
encourage the States to surrender the debts as he pointed 
out strongly that a necessary concomitant of this must be 
the restriction of the London money market to the 
Commonwealth alone.^
Two conferences were held in I.9 0 6 . The first was at 
Sydney in April and Deakin and Forrest represented the
Commonwealth for the first time as Prime Minister and
2Treasurer. The proposal to return, for a stated period, 
a fixed sum based on the average returns of past years 
came clearly before the Conference and was rejected. The 
Premiers regarded it as a temporary expedient only, 
generally re-affirmed the resolutions of February 1905 and 
urged the removal of the time limit on section 8 7 . It was 
a disappointing response to the first suggestion which had 
had some air of practicality about it. Apparently the 
Premiers felt that while a fixed sum would give them a 
permanent revenue safe against decline it would not allow 
for any increase. The States were too eager to make their 
own position fully safe and too little cognizant of the 
almost certain growth of Commonwealth needs. There was,
1
Memorandum re conversion of State debts, by T.A. Coghlan, 
28 March 1 9 0 6 , N .S .W.P.P ., I9 0 8 , second session, vol.2,
P P •539-^9•
2
The report of the Conference is in S .A .P „P ., 1 9 0 6 , vol.2, 
n o .23 and the resolutions are on p p .(iv) and (v). Forrest 
had attended in 1904 as Minister for Home Affairs.
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as might have been predicted, division over the 
continuance of the bookkeeping system, which ceased to be 
obligatory after 8 October I906. In fact, the 
Commonwealth allowed the system to continue until section 
87 terminated.
It was Deakin's view that the Conference had achieved 
nothing. The Commonwealth Parliament would not accept the 
1905 scheme, but the more practicable scheme which he and 
Forrest had proposed had been 'peremptorily' set aside by 
the Premiers. He desired an agreement so that all 
Governments could assist in securing the necessary changes 
in the Constitution, but it appeared to him that the 
Commonwealth would have to grapple with 'these great 
problems' unaided.
Deakin probably saw his part in the discussions as a 
continuation of his work at the Federal Conventions. The 
strongly felt desire for a settlement by co-operation, if 
possible, not only harks back to 1897-8 but also looks 
forward to the final Conference of the decade in 1909« 
There was also a note of warning in his comment. The 
Commonwealth could deal with the matter alone. If State 
demands were unreasonable, it would. The States thought 
they were equal parties to a. kind of arbitration. They 
were not. They were being allowed to assist the 
Commonwealth to reach a satisfactory settlement.
Forrest continued to try to find a way to satisfy the 
States. In his 1906 Budget speech, he outlined to the
1
Age , 14 April. I906.
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House a modified version of the fixed sum plan. He 
proposed that for ten years after the termination of 
section 87 (until 31 December 1920) each State should be 
paid a fixed sum equal to the average of three-fourths of 
the net customs and excise revenue which that State had 
contributed for the five years before 31 December 1910.
If three-fourths of the net customs and excise revenue in 
any year exceeded the aggregate fixed payment to the 
States, the excess would be returned to them on a per 
capita basis. Subject to the payment of the fixed sum, 
the Commonwealth would have a right to a full one-fourth 
of the net revenue. In addition, it was to be allowed to 
levy special duties earmarked for specific purposes and to 
keep the whole of them. The effect of the bookkeeping 
system would be felt until 1920 although it would actually 
cease to operate after 1910. There were other conditions 
with regard to debts.
Forrest got little encouragement from the House. The
Victorian radical, H.B. Higgins, expressed the feeling of
many members when he pointed out that it was unreasonable
to expect the Commonwealth to bear the whole of any
diminution of revenue while the States shared in any
increase, although he admitted that a fixed sum payment
would reduce friction in the relations between the 
2Governments. Reid detected in the continuing influence
of the bookkeeping system an undue tenderness on Forrest’s
3part for Western Australia.' Forrest’s old State
1
C.P.D., vol.32, pp.2037-9.
2
Ibid., p.2429•
Ibid., vol.33, p.2688.
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loyalties did at times show through the veneer of his
Commonwealth office. When the Government introduced two
measures to allow it to take over post-federal debts and
to levy duties for special purposes, both failed to get
the requisite two-thirds majority at their last stage in
1the Senate and had to be laid aside.
Another Conference, attended by Leaders of the
Opposition as well as Premiers, was held in Melbourne in
October 1906. In part, at least, it was held in response
to the demands of Queensland that some method should be
found to ensure that it always received back its full
3three-fourths of the net customs and excise revenue. As 
usual, the States asserted that the transfer of debts was 
subsidiary to the financial settlement and should be left 
in abeyance to be dealt with at a special conference when 
the more important question had been settled. On the 
question of the distribution of surplus revenue, they 
drew closer to the Commonwealth proposals than ever before 
There were a number of differences between the parties but 
only one of significance. Forrest would have made his 
modified proposal unalterable until 31 December 1920 and 
then alterable by the will of the Commonwealth Parliament. 
The States wanted it to be alterable, even after 1920, 
only by amendment of the Constitution.
1
See the debates on (a) Constitution Alteration (Special 
Duties) Bill 1906, C.P.D., vols. 33-5> (b) Constitution
Alteration (State Debts) Bill 1 9 0 6 , ibid., vols.33-5*
2 The report of the Conference is in V . P . P ., 1 9 0 6 , vol.2, 
n o .48 .
3 See Prem. Qld. to Prem. T a s ., 20 August 1 9 0 6 , T.S.A., 
P.D. I/I8 9 /II 7 ; reply by Senator Playford to Senator Higgs 
(Qld.), C .P .D ., vol.3 4 , p .4623; P.M. to Prem. Qld., 26 
September 1 9 0 6 , copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3, vol.l6 , pp.77-81
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It was an important difference* which summed up the 
attitudes of the parties. The Commonwealth wished, in the 
spirit of the Constitution as accepted, to give the States 
an adequate guarantee against the dislocation of their 
finances while it was necessary. It was not prepared to 
be bound forever by an arrangement which would inhibit 
Commonwealth development after the need for a guarantee 
had passed. The States felt it necessary to try to 
confine the influence of the Commonwealth so that their 
own would be undiminished. The best way to achieve this 
was by a constitutional arrangement which could be 
preserved from alteration by a minority of the people.
1At the Brisbane Conference of May 1907 , the Premier
of Tasmania, Captain Evans, fought strongly for the
adoption of a system of per capita grants with special
treatment for Western Australia. Tasmania believed that
it lost heavily through any system of returns which
depended on the bookkeeping arrangements and that the per
capita method was the only one likely to be fair to it.
The case for the proposed system had been fully argued by
the Tasmanian Statistician, R.M. Johnston, in a pamphlet
2issued just before the Conference. Neither Forrest, 
Acting Prime Minister while Deakin was in England, nor the 
other Premiers were interested in the scheme although it 
really only harked back to an idea that had been popular 
at the Conventions when it had been assumed that it would 
be adopted sooner or later.
1
The report is in S .A ,P .P ., 1907 , vol.3» no.75*
2
•The Federal Finance Problem and the Way Out* , 9 May 
1907, R.M. Johnston, Tas. J. & P . of P ., 1907, vol.57> 
n o .34.
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Eventually the Conference came close to accepting 
Forrest’s modified fixed sum scheme. Only the Western 
Australians dissented from a resolution accepting the 
proposal that the arrangement should be fixed for ten 
years and thereafter alterable at the will of the 
Commonwealth Parliament and not put in the Constitution as 
the States had always demanded before. In part, this must 
be regarded as a personal triumph for Sir John Forrest, 
who was largely responsible for making the States see that 
the Commonwealth also had rights. In part, it was the 
result of the feeling, which was growing stronger as time 
passed, that it was in the interests of the States to 
secure some agreement before section 87 terminated, even 
if it did not meet their requirements fully. The Premiers 
were probably aware that no alternative Commonwealth 
Treasurer was likely to be as favourably disposed towards 
the States as Forrest was. The Western Australians 
thought that Forrest's scheme did not offer them adequate 
special consideration. However, their revenues had 
increased since federation and consequently they got small 
sympathy from Queensland and Tasmania whose returns had 
been much lower.'
The growing pressures to institute a national system 
of old age pensions and to extend defence arrangements, as 
well as its continued dependence on the Labor Party for 
support in the Parliament, were bound to make the 
Commonwealth Government take a harder line with the States. 
Add to this the resignation of Forrest in mid-1907 and
1
The effects of Forrest's scheme are compared with those 
of other official, schemes in Appendix E, Table 4.
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Lyne’s subsequent assumption of the position of Treasurer 
and it is clear that there was little hope of an agreement 
being reached on the basis sought by the States.
Lyne administered a serious shock to the States on
22 November I.907 • In response to a parliamentary question,
he indicated that the Commonwealth was considering means
by which it might constitutionally retain the unspent
portion of its one-fourth of the customs and excise
revenue instead of emptying the Treasury each month by
returning all unspent revenue to the States. This
necessity, created initially by the bookkeeping clauses,
had been extremely inconvenient and had made forward
planning difficult. It is small wonder that a Deakin
Government, which was always prepared to push the
constitutional powers of the Commonwealth to the farthest
possible limits, should be trying to find a way out of
this impasse. The Government was almost certainly
encouraged to take a risk in this matter by the strongly
expressed view of W.H. Irvine, an able constitutional
lawyer not generally favourable to expansionist tendencies,
that under section 9^ the 'surplus revenue' which had to
be returned after the bookkeeping system ceased to be
mandatory was only that revenue which had not been
appropriated and not the whole balance of revenue over
expenditure. There was no limit on the Commonwealth's
power of appropriation. It could appropriate from the
current year's revenue to meet future obligations,
provided it did not exceed its one-fourth of the net
2customs and excise revenue.
1
C.P.D., v o l .4l , p.6420.
2
Ibid., p p . 6161-3.
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The States protested vigorously early in 1908,^ but a 
bill was already in preparation and Deakin refused to 
delay its consideration until after a Premiers’ Conference, 
on the justifiable ground that it did not interfere with
the three-fourths of the net revenue returnable to the
2States under section 87*
A memorandum circulated with the Surplus Revenue Bill
followed Irvine's reasoning as to the difference in
conditions existing under sections 93 and 9^* It defined
'surplus revenue' as 'all revenue which it [the
Parliament] does not require for Commonwealth purposes'
and stated that the Parliament could legislate to retain
revenue which, although not actually spent at the end of
any given month, had been appropriated to the public
purposes of the Commonwealth. The Bill provided for the
transfer of this money from Consolidated Revenue to trust3accounts. The object of the Bill was to allow 
unexpended moneys to be put aside to provide for old age 
pensions and coastal defence.
A formidable array of legal opinion supported the 
Commonwealth's position. As well as Irvine, the Attorney-4General, L.E. Groom, believed the Bill was constitutional.
_
See Prem. W.A. to P.M., 20 February I9O8 (copy with 
Prem. W.A. to Prem. Tas. , 20 February I.9O8 ), T.S.A.,
P.D.1/207/117•
2
P.M. to Prem. S.A., l6 March 1908, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6,
08/270.
3
Memorandum circulated with Surplus Revenue Bill I9O8 , 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A571, 08/1947.
4
Opinion by L.E. Groom, I9 March I9O8 , copy, Groom Papers, 
A.N.L., MS.236, folder 22.
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So too did Professor W.H. Moore, whom the Victorian 
Government had appointed to be its 'watchdog' to ensure
that the Commonwealth did not encroach on the rights of
1the State, and the Tasmanian Crown Solicitor advised his
Government that the Commonwealth was acting within its 
2powers. The Bill was introduced into the Parliament in 
March 1908 but had not become law by the time the
3Premiers' Conference convened in Melbourne in late April. 
Lyne submitted his financial scheme first to
4Parliament and then to the Premiers. He sought to balance 
the loss of customs and excise revenue to the States by a 
gradual assumption of the State debts and to separate 
completely the Commonwealth and State finances as soon as 
possible. A Council of Finance was to undertake the 
management of the debt and the raising of new loans. 
£6,000,000 was to be allotted to the States to be divided 
among them by whatever method they wished. For the first 
five years, the States would pay the difference between 
the amount allotted to them and their share of the
1
Report by Professor W.H. Moore, 26 March 1908, P.D.V.I.L., 
P08/4754.
2
Opinion by Crown Solicitor of Tasmania, 22 April I9O8,
T.S.A., P.D.1/207/117.
3
The debate is in C . P . D . , vol.s.44-6, passim. The history 
of the Bill as outlined makes it clear that Gilbert is 
incorrect ( 'Loan Council’, p.104) in suggesting that it 
was a response to the refusal of the Premiers to accept 
Lyn e 's proposals at the 1908 Conference.
4
'Memorandum by the Hon. Sir W. Lyne on the subject of 
the transfer of State debts to the Commonwealth and 
financial arrangements connected therewith', 5 May 1908,
S .A .P .P . , 1908, vol.3, n o .23> Appendix A.
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interest burden. After that, the amount payable by the 
States would be reduced on a sliding scale over thirty 
years, by which time they would be free of all liability 
for the debts taken over. In consideration for being 
relieved of their indebtedness, the States were to 
surrender the transferred properties free of charge.
This was the first complete scheme proposed by a
responsible Minister for the permanent settlement of the
finance and debt questions (though Lyne did recognize his
indebtedness to a private member, Robert Harper, M.H.R.,
for some of its main features) and it foreshadowed to a
remarkable degree the Financial Agreement of 1927«
Although it was apparently not derived directly from them,
it had obvious links with the Canadian system and the
ideas expressed by Deakin at the Sydney Convention
concerning the payment of a fixed sum with marginal
1additional grants. Its great value was that it offered 
the Commonwealth complete freedom of financial action in 
return for the assumption of the debts. The States were 
given the certainty of a fixed sum and, after the fifth 
year, a gradual increase in the amount allotted to them 
from £6,000,000 to £8 ,750,000 over thirty years.
With the exception of Tasmania, which could see at
least a temporary advantage for itself in the scheme, the
2States were bitterly hostile. The scheme was destructive 
of the financial independence and solvency of the States
1
N.A.C,D,S., 1897, p.56.
2
The report of the Conference is in S „ A „ P . P ., 1908, vol.3, 
n o .23.
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and took no account of their heavy responsibilities. The
1Premiers objected to the irresponsible Council of Finance
which was to be given control over their borrowing and
hence their developmental programmes. It appeared as
another attempt to belittle the States. Because of this,
they again insisted that the debt question be allowed to
stand over until the finance question had been settled.
They were little better satisfied with Lyne1 2s proposals on
that score. The increases that would come to the States
were, in their view, quite inadequate. The States must
receive a proportionate part of all increases in revenue
as well as a fixed basic sum. The only concession they
were prepared to make was to agree to accept a proportion
of the customs and excise revenue which was less than
three-fourths, so that the Commonwealth would be able to
2initiate an old age pension scheme.
The situation bordered on the ludicrous. With regard 
to the distribution of revenue, the thinking of the 
Premiers had scarcely advanced in spite of the obviously 
genuine and growing needs of the Commonwealth for money 
for pensions and defence and in spite of the clear 
determination of the Federal Government and Parliament to 
get the money it needed. On the debts question, they had 
actually retreated beyond their 1 9 0 7 position as they were 
no longer prepared to surrender any control over future 
borrowing. This obduracy was not likely to be in the
1
In a technical, political sense.
2
The effects of Lyn e 's scheme are compared with those of 
other official schemes in Appendix E, Table 4.
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long-term interest of Governments which had no real 
bargaining power. Their almost total refusal to consider 
proposals which were quite in keeping with sections 87 and 
105 of the Constitution could only harden the 
Commonwealth’s attitude to them,'
2The Surplus Revenue Act 1908~ did not become law 
until 13 June I9O8 ; the Old Age Pensions Appropriation Act
O1908J and Harbour and Coastal Defence (Naval)
4Appropriation Act 1908, under which the appropriations
allowed under the first Act were made to specially
designated trust accounts, not until 10 June, but already,
at the end of April and again at the end of May, Lyne had
given instructions that the balances due to the States
5should be withheld.' On each occasion the instruction was 
withdrawn. When challenged, Lyne explained that he had 
expected that the Surplus Revenue Bill would become law in 
time for the Commonwealth to retain the money.^ This was 
applying pressure with a vengeance and it was small wonder 
that the conservative Hobart Mercury, which recognized that 
it was only a matter of time before the instruction would 
be repeated successfully, should urge strong action to
1
Gilbert, 'Loan Council', p.l04.
2
Act no.15 of 1908.
3
Act no.18 of 1908.4
Act no.19 of 1908.
5
See Mercury, 30 May I9O8 ; Prem. W.A. to Prem. S.A., 29 
May I9O8 (and subsequent correspondence), S.A.A., G.R.G. 
24/6, 08/514.
6
Mercury, 30 May I9O8 .
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prevent ’this cool and unblushing steal’. Lyne's action 
was perhaps an unfortunate provocation since the Bill 
could not have been anticipated by the States.
In Parliament, Lyne explained the matter both clearly
and bluntly. Even if the Surplus Revenue Bill did not
become law, the Commonwealth's one-fourth of the customs
and excise revenue for June would be insufficient to meet
its commitments, swollen as they were by the appropriation
of £250,000 for naval defence, and to make the adjustments
customary at the end of the financial year. During the
first eleven months of the financial year, the States had
received £ 992,000 more than their three-fourths and even
if they got nothing for June would still be £220,000 above
their share for the whole year. If the Bil.1 were not
passed, he expected to pay £222,000 to the States but
otherwise the amount would go to the trust fund for old age
pensions. The States knew that adjustments were made in
June (a procedure followed by both Turner and Forrest as
Treasurers) and that they would not receive three-fourths 
2in that month.
Lyne, probably advised by the Attorney-General, was 
apparently acting on the view that the Commonwealth had to 
return the unexpended portion of its one-fourth annually 
and not, as most people believed, and as had been done in 
the past, monthly. The Mercury blamed the 'bad' behaviour 
of the Deakin Government on the 'fact' that it was ruled
1
Ibid.
Ibid., 2 June I9O8 ; C T . D . , vol.46, pp. 11737-9.
2
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by the Labor caucus. It was dependent on the Labor Party 
for supports but nothing done or threatened to be done was 
in any way antagonistic to the views of either Lyne or 
Deakin themselves. There is no need to assume that they 
were merely responding to pressure.
Early in June I.9O8 , Tasmania and Queensland protested
against the Bill, but it was already through Parliament and
2only waiting for assent. Western Australia wanted the
3States to send a joint memorial to the King, but, as Wade 
pointed out , there was no reason why he should intervene 
in a domestic matter of this kind and New South Wales 
preferred to wait until the Commonwealth acted and then
4test the matter in the High Court. Meanwhile, the Sydney 
Morning Herald hinted darkly at the need for the State 
Parliament to prepare the people for the next federal 
election.^
Late in June, Wade tried to bluff the Commonwealth 
out of putting the Surplus Revenue Act 1908 into 
immediate effect. On 27 June, he asked Deakin not to make 
the proposed payments to the trust accounts but to wait 
for further negotiations with the States on the basis of
1
M e rcury, 10 June I9O8 .
2
Prem. Tas. to Prem. Qld., 3 June 1908, copy, T.S.A.,
P.D.1/207/117 and A. Prem. Qld. to P.M., 5 June 1908, 
telegram, C.A.O., C.R.S. A.5 7 1 , 08/4286.
3
Prem. W.A. to Prem. S.A., I3 June 1908, telegram, S.A.A., 
G.R.G. 24/6, 08/514.
4
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 15 June I9O8 , ibid.
S.M.H. , 16 June 1908.
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their offer at the Conference to accept less than three- 
fourths of the net customs and excise revenue to enable 
the Commonwealth to institute its pension system from
1 July 1909•1 At the same time, Wade appealed to the
2other States to renew the offer.
Deakin was not to be caught by such a transparent
device. If the sum were not paid to the trust funds by 30
June, it would revert to the States and be lost. There
would then be no prospect of having sufficient money to
begin the pension payments on 1 July 1909 as planned
unless the Parliaments of all States authorized an offer
along the lines proposed by Wade - no Premier had accepted
it at the time Deakin wrote. On the other hand, if the
money were paid to the trust funds, it would not pass out
of the control of the Commonwealth and would still be
available to the States if they were prepared to support
Wade's offer unconditionally and not make it subject to
the return of a fixed sum and a proportionate part of all
3increases in revenue as they had at the Conference.
As Deakin had expected, the States were not able to
4agree unanimously to Wade's proposal. The Commonwealth 
went ahead and arranged for an estimate to be made of the 
total sum to be set aside in trust funds during 1908-9 so
_
Prem. N.S.W. to P.M., 27 June I9O8 (copy with Prem. 
N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 18 July 1908), S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 
08/514.
2
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 27 June I9O8 , ibid.
3
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W., 30 June 1908, telegram, copy, 
P.D.V.I.L., P08/4754.
4
See A. Prem. S.A. to Prem. N.S.W., 2 July 1908, copy, 
S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 08/514.
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that the transfer could be spread over the whole year toIavoid dislocation of the State finances. When Lyne
delivered his Budget speech on l4 October, he revealed
that, in spite of the June deductions, the States had
received £330,000 more than their legal entitlement under
section 87 during 1907-8. Only Queensland and Tasmania
had received less than three-fourths of the customs and
2excise revenue collected within the State, but this was 
not a novel experience for them.
New South Wales initiated a test case in the High 
Court on behalf of all the States. Judgement was 
delivered against the States on 21 October 1908. The 
Court held unanimously that the Commonwealth Parliament 
had authority to appropriate money out of Consolidated 
Revenue for a specific purpose. Money so appropriated, 
although not actually disbursed, was expenditure within 
the meaning of section 89 of the Constitution. It could 
not form part of the surplus revenue distributable to the 
States under section 94 until the actual disbursement of 
it for that purpose was no longer lawful or no longer 
thought necessary by the Government. The sums 
appropriated by the Old Age Pensions Appropriation Act 
1908 and the Coast Defence Appropriation Act I9 O8 had been 
properly deducted from the revenues of the year in which 
the appropriation was made in order to ascertain the
1
A g e , 3 August 1908.
2
C.P.D., vol.4 7 , p.1158.
3
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 21 July 1908, telegram, and 
subsequent correspondence, in S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 08/514.
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surplus revenue payable to the States under section tyk for 
that financial year.
The judgement went far beyond merely declaring the 
Surplus Revenue Act to be valid. It declared that the 
Commonwealth already had all the power necessary to achieve
its ends under the Constitution without the additional
2legislation. The importance of such a judgement was 
immense. Immediately, the Commonwealth could retain 
substantial extra sums for its own purposes. Once section 
87 had terminated, it could, if it so desired, arrange for 
there to be no surplus revenue at all to hand over to the 
States. Its freedom would be absolute.
In making deductions from the returns to the States 
during 1907--8, although the Surplus Revenue Act had not 
been mentioned until the financial year was well under way, 
and not passed until it was almost complete, the Deakin- 
Lyne Government had removed the velvet glove and revealed 
the mailed fist to the States. Its action was 
constitutional and politically justifiable and it could 
even be argued that it was necessary unless the 
Commonwealth was to enter the field of direct taxation, an 
action which the States would probably have resented even 
more bitterly. The possibility had not been publicly 
discussed before late 1907 and it is unlikely that the 
Founders intended the situation to arise where the 
Commonwealth could, by a simple expedient, avoid having
1
The State of New South Vales v. The Commonwealth, 7 
C.L.Ro 179 at p.179'
2
Moore, Commonwealth of Australia, second edition, p.537*
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any surplus revenue to return to the States. Deakin was
always prepared to insist on the ’bond' as it stood when
it suited the Commonwealth, as it did in this case, though
he was much less adamant when such an approach worked in
favour of the States [as in aspects of the question of
channels of communication). The incident was a clear
indication to the States what could be expected when
section 87 terminated unless some prior agreement was 
1reached.
2The Premiers heid another Conference in March 1909*~ 
The Labor Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, attended at their 
invitation and stressed both the necessity for heavy 
Commonwealth expenditure in the near future and the 
advisability of settling the debt question at the same 
time as the finance question. He refused to be drawn into 
proposing any particular settlement, saying that he would 
not be prepared to commit himself until much later.
Fisher was in fact telling the Premiers, politely but 
firmly, that he was not interested in discussing the terms 
of a settlement with them. He intended that the 
Commonwealth should settle its own business as provided by 
the Constitution. Such an attitude was not a new 
development, as it was fundamentally similar to that 
adopted by Barton in 1901 over the attempt by Queensland
1
Professor Sawer has argued (Australian Federal Politics 
and Law 1901-1929, p.7^) that by I9O8 these surpluses over 
the three-fourths were of only marginal importance to the 
States but vital to the Commonwealth. This is true, but 
neglects the point that the foundation of the States* case 
was not need but right. The States were more concerned 
over what was implied by the Commonwealth claim to the 
money than over the money itself,
2
The report is in S „A u P „P . , I909» vol.3, no.52.
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to intervene in the expulsion of the Kanakas, but it was 
the first time it had been taken with regard to the 
finance question,
Fisher's refusal to outline a scheme forced the 
Premiers to be constructive for the first time. They were 
not well cast in the role. They did recognize, to a very 
limited extent, the growing needs of the Commonwealth and 
proposed the amendment of section 87 to give the States 
three-fifths of the gross customs and excise revenue in 
perpetuity, provided that amount did not fall below 
£6,750,000. So that the Commonwealth might have its 
increased revenue as soon as possible, they proposed that 
the necessary amendment of the Constitution should be made 
at once. Of the amount returnable to the States a special 
payment of £250,000 (decreasing yearly by £10,000) was to 
be made to Western Australia and the rest distributed per 
capita.^
The per capita distribution with special 
consideration for Western Australia was an important 
advance on that side of the financial arrangements which 
was the concern of the States rather than the Commonwealth. 
The other demands were disappointing and unrealistic, 
since they would have left the finances of the parties 
entangled in perpetuity.
Deakin commented unfavourably in his anonymous
2Morning Post articles and the Prime Minister analysed the
_
The effects of the Premiers' scheme are compared with 
those of other official schemes in Appendix E, Table 4 .
2
Morning Post, 24 April 1909 (Sydney, 15 March), D.P.,
A.N. L., MS.1540.
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question fully in a policy speech, Fisher showed that on 
the estimated figures for 1908-9 the Premiers' scheme 
would give the Commonwealth an extra £1,300,000 but that 
the additional amount required for pensions, defence, 
bounties, lighthouses, the High Commissioner and 
quarantine would be £3,000,000 a year within a few years.
He objected to the proposal to continue the nexus between 
Commonwealth and State finances and felt that the Premiers 
had lost sight of the advantages of transferring the 
State debts. He stood by the scheme which had been 
devised by the Labor Conference and which, on the basis of 
past revenue and expenditure and the future needs of the 
Commonwealth, proposed to pay the States £1.205 per capita 
each year. If it had operated in 1909 the States would 
have got £5,230,000 (compared with at least £6 ,750,000 
under the Premiers' scheme). In addition there would be a 
diminishing special payment to Western Australia.
The Labor Government fell in June 1909 and was
succeeded by Deakin's Fusion Government, and it was Deakin, 
2Cook and Forrest who took the next steps towards a 
negotiated settlement of the problem.
In mid-June,Wade told a meeting of his constituents 
that he hoped that there would be 'sufficient sympathy'
1
Policy Speech of the Prime Minister, 30 March 1909, 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A57I 5 O9/2517. This is apparently a 
summary and another version appears in D.P., A.N.L.,
MS.15^0/476 (Commonwealth Papers).
2
Joseph Cook (N.S.W.) who had succeeded Reid as leader of 
the freetrade group in the Parliament largely to increase 
the chances of a fusion with the Forrest and Deakin 
groups. (See La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, vol.2, p p .535-6).
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between the new Federal Government and the States to 
enable a settlement. He still favoured the Hobart 
proposals but would consider a per capita arrangement.^
The fall of the Labor Government had given the States
new hope in financial matters and, towardte the end of
June, Wade opened negotiations with Deakin to drrange a
conference to settle the question. Deakin was happy to
agree, but made it clear that the kind of settlement his
Government was willing to negotiate was a 'preliminary
financial arrangement' for a period of years for which the
financial circumstances could be forecast with reasonable
certainty. Should this be approved by the 1909 session of
the Federal Parliament, his party would include in their
platform at the next election a general statement
2concerning a future permanent agreement.
Deakin's proposal was in harmony with the formal 
statement of the basis of union issued at the time the 
fusion had been made. This spoke of 'an interim
3arrangement' pending the preparation of a complete scheme. 
It was also in harmony with the attitude taken by the 
Commonwealth at previous Conferences where it had always 
resisted the States' demands for a permanent settlement.
The Conference, which was held in Melbourne in mid- 
August, creates a problem as it was held entirely in 
secret - 'Even the blotting paper used by the Premiers was
1
A g e , 15 June 1909*
2
The correspondence is in C .P .P . , 1909, vol.2, no.26,
pp.49-52.
A g e , 29 May 1909.
3
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burnt on the spot’ - and only the final resolutions made 
public. Not all is mystery. A careful combing of the 
day-by-day reports of the newspapers and a comparison of 
them with later comments by the participants (guarded 
though they usually were) and with one or two documents in 
the Deakin Papers, as well as the brief comments in 
Deakin’s diary, allows the general trend of negotiations 
to be established quite clearly.
Sir John Forrest began the negotiations the day
before the Conference opened when he delivered the
2Commonwealth Budget for 1909-10. He indicated that on 
the estimated revenue and expenditure for the year, even 
after allowing for more than £ 650,000 already transferred 
to trust funds, the Commonwealth would face a deficit of 
£1,200,000 after paying the States their full three- 
fourths of the customs and excise revenue (£7 >9 0 0 ,000). 
Expenditure could not be reduced without abandoning 
urgently needed new works in the Postal and Defence 
Departments and old age pensions as well. He proposed to 
meet the difficulty until the termination of section 87 by 
issuing short-dated Treasury bonds to be repaid over four 
years, beginning in 1911-12. This meant abandoning the 
Commonwealth's previous policy of not borrowing.
When the Premiers met on 13 August, they began by 
forwarding to Deakin a copy of their Hobart resolutions 
and by inviting him to address them on the subject of
1
A g e , 20 August 1909.
c.P.D., vol.5 0 , pp.2413-7.
2
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financial relations. No one supposed that this was any
more than a formal means of obtaining the presence and
views of the Federal Ministers. Most of the Premiers had
already publicly intimated their willingness to accept a
per capita agreement, although their ideas of a suitable
amount varied from Kidston’s 28 shillings to Lewis’ 31
shillings. Only Western Australia was still totally
opposed to a form of distribution by which it expected to
lose heavily.' The Victorian Treasurer, W.A. (later Sir
William) Watt, was also dubious as he believed that
customs revenue increased more rapidly than population.
This view also led him to favour an interim settlement and
3it was feared that he might support Deakin.
Deakin and Forrest attended the Conference on 16-17 
August and went carefully through the federal estimates 
with the Premiers and submitted to close questioning about
4them. Some of the Premiers believed that Forrest had 
underestimated the revenue that he was likely to receive 
and also argued that many new works (such as naval 
constructions, railways and telephones) should be financed 
from loans rather than revenue. In this matter they faced 
the difficulty that if they forced the Commonwealth into a 
loan policy they would probably have to agree to the
1
J. Murray (President of the Conference) to P.M . , 13
August 1909, with enclosure, D.P., A.N.L., MS.154-0/4-77 
(Commonwealth Papers).
2
West Australian, l4 August 1909»
3
Mercury. 16 August 1909*
4
Diary, entries for I6-I7 August 1909, D.P., A.N.L., 
MS.1540, box 47.
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transfer of their debts if they did not want their stocks 
to be depreciated by Commonwealth competition. Nor could 
they gain a substantial reduction of the works proposed. 
When these were gone through item by item, each Premier 
supported those for his own State while opposing many of 
those in other States as unnecessary.^
'Divide and conquer’ is a good policy for the central 
Government in a federation. The failure of the States to 
shake either the forecasts of revenue or of expenditure 
was a major victory for the Commonwealth and compelled 
them to yield some ground. The Premiers were aided by the 
fact that the Commonwealth negotiators felt their position 
to be delicate because a number of members of their own 
party had expressed displeasure with the Budget and
especially with Forrest's proposal to issue short-dated
2Treasury bonds to cover the deficit.
On 18 August, the States submitted a definite 
proposal. They wanted an annual return of 29 shillings 
per capita beginning on 1 January 1911. From this amount, 
the Commonwealth was to deduct a sum sufficient to redeem 
Treasury bills to the value of £650,000 (for the 1909-10 
deficit) over ten years. An additional grant of £250,000 
for Western Australia (diminishing by £1.0,000 a year) was 
to be contributed jointly by Commonwealth and States in 
proportion to the share of customs and excise revenue 
allocated to each. With a view to making the agreement 
permanent, the Federal Government was asked to embody the
1
Argus, 17 August 1909? Register, 18 August 1909-
Mercury, 18 August I9 0 9 .
2
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proposals in its policy at the next election and submit an 
amendment of section 87 to the new Parliament and people 
as soon as practicable. After the Conference that day, 
Forrest wrote to Deakin that he thought the proposal for 
29 shillings per capita too high,but that 27 shillings 
would be satisfactory if the agreement were temporary but 
that if it were permanent the amount should be only 25 
shillings.~
At this stage (Wednesday, 18 August), the Conference
was in difficulties and even Forrest was believed to
despair of reaching an agreement that year. One of the
Premiers, when asked how they were getting on, replied,
'Niggling! Niggling! Niggling all day!' Most Premiers
had made known their intention to leave at the weekend
3whether or not a settlement had been reached.
The breakthrough came on 19 August, but it was not 
achieved without difficulty. Deakin refused to pay 29 
shillings but insisted on a lower sum. In return, the 
Premiers appear to have stood out for permanence and an 
agreement independent of the transfer of debts and control
1
A paper embodying this plan and marked 'confidential' 
appears in D.P., A.N.L., MS.1540/477 (Commonwealth Papers) 
and, in view of its contents, the entry in Deakin*s Diary 
for 18 August and the letter from Forrest, referred to 
below, is clearly the plan submitted by the States on that 
d a y .
2
Forrest to Deakin, 18 August 1909, D.P., A.N.L.,
MS.1540/1813.
Mer cury, 19 August 1909? S.M.H , , ibid.
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1of future borrowing. The Commonwealth was anxious to
2deal with the debts at the same time if it could and
wanted to make the agreement operative at once so that it
could avoid the necessity of having a deficit of
3£1,200,000 that year. Late in the day, after a very hard
4fight, Deakin made the offer which was accepted and 
embodied in a formal agreement the next day.
The instrument of agreement was a simple one
5consisting of a. preamble and five clauses.' It provided 
that all Governments should undertake a joint 
investigation of the debt transfer question 'forthwith* 
and that they should, at the same time, inquire into the 
actual amount of loan money spent by the States on the 
transferred properties. From 1 July I9IO, the Commonwealth 
was to pay to the States (in monthly instalments) an 
annual sum of 25 shillings per capita.. During 1909-10, 
because of the heavy cost of old age pensions, it was 
permitted to withhold not more than £ 600,000 to provide 
for the actual shortage of revenue at the end of the year. 
The States already providing pensions were to pay a larger 
share of this than the others. There was to be a special
1
A g e , 19 August 1909*
2
Advertiser, 19 August 1909-
3
Diary, entry for 19 August 1909? D.P. , A.N.L. , MS. 15^-0, 
box 47.
4
Ibid.
5
Agreement on Commonwealth and State Finance, S .A .P .P ., 
1909? vo1.35 no. 69, pp.(v) and (vi). The Agreement is 
printed as Appendix F to this thesis.
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grant for Western Australia, beginning at £250,000 and 
diminishing by £10,000 a year, the cost to be divided 
equally between the Commonwealth and States, The agreement 
was to be embodied in the Constitution.
Provided that the necessary alteration could be made
in the Constitution, the agreement gave the States the
permanent financial security which they had so long
sought. Once inserted, the amendment could be retained by
a minority of the people and there was little likelihood
that it would be expunged. The agreement would allow the
States to plan their financial measures without reference
to Commonwealth schemes and with a fairly accurate
knowledge of what their return for a given year would be.
The Premiers had managed to get this permanent settlement
without agreeing to the transfer of the debts - indeed,
that had been put off indefinitely. The question was to
be investigated 'forthwith', but a comparison of the final
agreement with earlier drafts in the Deakin Papers shows
that the Commonwealth had sought to have the investigation
made ‘during the next ensuing Parliament* by a royal
2commission appointed by the Commonwealth. ‘Forthwith’ 
was much vaguer as to time, and an investigation by the 
Governments of the Commonwealth and six States more 
favourable to the States than one by a Commonwealth royal 
commission. In addition to these major gains, Tasmania
1
The effects of the Financial Agreement are compared with 
those of other official schemes in Appendix E, Table 4.
See also Table 5- 
2
For the drafts see D.P., A.N.L., MS.1540/477 (Commonwealth 
Papers).
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and Western Australia, had made special gains. The per 
capita return would ensure that the former could no longer 
suffer from the real or fancied inadequacies of the 
bookkeeping system while the latter got a special grant 
because of its peculiar revenue situation.
The Commonwealth had also made some gains. It had
persuaded the States to forego the requirement of a
minimum return, a concept to which they had long clung,
and it had agreed to pay a sum much lower than any State 
1had sought. Section 87 was to terminate six months 
earlier than expected and the States had agreed to assist 
it out of its temporary financial difficulties so that it 
could avoid issuing the unpopular Treasury bonds.
Opinion was divided as to who had won the day. The
Sydney Morning Herald headed its editorial, 'Mr Deakin's
Triumph', and said that all the honours of diplomacy were 
2with him. The Age believed Deakin had been overreached
by negotiators cleverer than himself and had bartered away
3the 'sacred rights' of the Federation.
In spite of the immediate financial sacrifices made 
by the States in accepting a sum as low as 25 shillings, 
the Premiers accepted the terms of the Agreement as the
1
The returns to the States under the Financial Agreement 
are compared with those under schemes proposed earlier in 
Appendix E, Table 4. The projected return at 25s Od per 
capita, is also compared with projected payments under 
section 87 in Table 5*
2
S,M ,H. , 21 August I9 O9 .
A g e , ibid.
3
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best they could hope to obtain under the circumstances,
though Wade was unhappy that New South Wales had to make
by far the largest sacrifice. Kidston thought Deakin had
done no greater service to the country than in helping to
obtain this Agreement (though he did not think 25 shillings
was enough for the States). N.J. Moore of Western
Australia declared it to be ’the financial Magna Charta of 
2these States’ . Had Moore understood them, he may even 
have agreed with the historical implications of his remark.
Several factors operated to make this particular 
Agreement acceptable to the various Governments in August 
1909* From the point of view of the States, it was clear 
that some agreement had to be reached before the 
termination of section 87 on 31 December 1910 when the 
whole matter would become open to alteration by the 
Commonwealth Parliament without reference to them. The 
Premiers were aware that, in a short period, the 
Commonwealth had assumed responsibility for quarantine and 
old age pensions and that considerable expansion of 
defence expenditure was planned. It was probable that 
lighthouses would be taken over in the near future, a 
transcontinental railway built (and perhaps two), an 
attempt made to overcome the deficiencies of the Postal 
Department, the Northern Territory taken over, a High 
Commissioner established in London and an Interstate 
Commission instituted as part of a modified system of New 
Protection. All of these services were expensive and to
1
Argus, 21 August 1909•
2
West Australian, ibid.
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delay settlement of the financial question was almost to 
guarantee harder conditions. Delay would have meant 
sacrificing the only bargaining power the States had, the 
offer of an early end to section 87 and of assistance to 
the Commonwealth in its temporary difficulties. This was 
the only thing that the Commonwealth wanted which it did 
not have power to take for itself.
It is harder to understand why the Commonwealth 
Government accepted the Agreement. The temporary 
financial pressure upon it and the dissatisfaction of some 
of its own supporters with its Treasury bond proposal must 
certainly be taken into account. The somewhat cryptic 
entries in Deakin's diary indicate that he was anxious to 
obtain help in the immediate difficulties.^ Even in the 
days when Deakin was most eager to extend Commonwealth 
power, he had always thought that an agreement between the 
parties was better than a forced settlement. To him the 
negotiations were perhaps a continuation of the debates in 
which he had shared at the Conventions. The fusion of his 
group with the Cook and Forrest groups would have served 
to reinforce these already existing tendencies.
At the time, the newspapers stressed party political
reasons for the Agreement. There was much in their view.
All the Governments represented at the Conference called
themselves 'Liberal' and all were faced by solid Labor
oppositions. Some of them, especially those of 
2Queensland and South Australia, had only tiny majorities.
1
Diary entry for 19 August 1909» D.P. , A.N.L. , MS.15^-0, 
box 47.
2
Kidston had, by this time, broken with the Labor Party.
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It was unlikely that any future conference would bring
together seven Governments so homogeneous in political
outlook. A change in the Commonwealth would certainly
spell trouble for the States. They could not hope that a
Labor Government would consider their interests as
tenderly as a Fusion Government. Fisher had indicated at
the March 1909 Conference that he did not even consider it
necessary to discuss with the Premiers what he would do.
A.H. Peake, the South Australian Premier, saw the
Agreement as a victory for the Fusion^ and Wade held that
disagreement would have strengthened the case for 
2unification. Deakin told the readers of the Morning Post
that the effect of the Fusion had been to bring ’a quite
unwonted harmony into the relations between the
Commonwealth and States'. From 1901 the attitude of the
Premiers to the Commonwealth Parliament had been one of
'unmistakable hostility' - they had regarded it as 'the
common enemy'. Since the Fusion this had changed and it
was the change which had led the States to accept as 'the
best possible' an Agreement far worse, from their point of
3view, than any previously suggested.
The signing of the Agreement was only the beginning 
of trouble for the Commonwealth. On 23 August, Deakin 
advised Wade that his Government was likely to strike 
heavy weather over the Agreement unless it had the help of
1
A r g u s , 21 August I9 O9 .
2
S.M.H., 25 August 1909.
3
Morning Post, 2 November 1909 (Sydney, 20 September), 
D . P . , A.N.L., MS.1540.
4oi
the Premiers. He wanted campaigning to begin in every 
State at once and he urged Wade to communicate with the 
other Premiers by cypher and bring them into ’fighting 
line’. Wade refused. His Government had lost prestige 
through the Agreement, which the public considered a 
’rotten bargain’, and he was lucky to have disarmed 
hostile criticism. He could not urge acceptance of the 
Agreement publicly until the Commonwealth Parliament had 
declared itself.^
The Constitution Alteration (Finance) Bill 1909 was
introduced into the Federal Parliament early in September
3and ran into trouble immediately. Hughes pointed 
directly and forcibly to Labor's objection to it. To make 
the Agreement permanent was to bind the Commonwealth 
forever 'in fetters not less intolerable and vexatious 
than those of the Braddon section i t s e l f . The customs 
revenue would not increase per capita and the net result 
would be to hinder national development and prevent
4Parliament from giving effect to the New Protection.
Some of Deakin's own supporters were hostile to the idea 
of permanence. Robert Harper (Mernda, Victoria), who had
himself published a detailed scheme, led this opposition
5skilfully. In October, it appeared for a time that
1
Deakin to Wade, 23 August 1909» draft, D.P., A.N.L.,
M S .1540/4923•
2
Wade to Deakin, 31 August 1909, ibid., 4924.
3
The debate is in C.P.D., vols. 51-4, passim.
4
Ibid., vol.51, PP*3334-47.
5
Ibid., vols.51-2> PP-3637-53.
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Deakin would crack under pressure from within the Fusion
party and allow amendments to the Agreement. He even
sounded out Wade cautiously on the probable attitude of
the States to an amendment to make the Agreement last for
a term of years. The States left him in no doubt that
1they wanted it complete and unaltered. An attempt by
Harper to amend the permanence clause failed by a single 
2vote and the Bill eventually passed.
The effort of steering the Bill through Parliament
was wasted. The referendum was held in conjunction with
the general election on 13 April 1910 and the amendment
3of the Constitution was not approved. At the same time,
the Deakin Government was swept from office, the second of4the 'Liberal' Governments to go. A simultaneous
referendum, to which Labor was not opposed, to enable the
Commonwealth to take over the post-federal as well as the
5pre-federal debts, was passed. From the States' point of 
view, the Agreement of August 1909 was a wreckage.
1
Copies of the correspondence are in S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 
09/842 and D.P., A.N.L., MS.1540/474.
2
C.P.D., v o I.53, p .5646.
3
There was an overall majority of 25,324 for 'No'. N.S.W.,
Vic. and S.A. voted 'No'; Queensland, W.A. and Tas. voted 
'Yes', Quick, Legislative Powers, p.21.
4
Although it did not actually resign until 3 June,
Peake's Government had been defeated in S.A. shortly before 
the federal election. Wade's in N.S.W. followed a few 
months later.
5 The results of the referenda suggest the electorate's 
dissatisfaction with the Fusion and its works, not, as 
Gilbert claims ('Loan Council', p.117), its desire for a 
permanent financial settlement by transfer of the debts 
rather than by revenue grant.
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In May 1910, Wade, apparently at the instigation of
Murray, the Victorian Premier, tried to negotiate a
meeting with Fisher to discuss financial relations. Wade
himself held the view that they should not meet until
Fisher had submitted a proposal for discussion^ as it was
for the States to adopt the role of critics rather than of 
2suppliants. Kidston thought that there was nothing to
discuss. The new Government was pledged, by election
promise, to pay 25 shillings a year per capita for ten
years and had only to pass a bill through Parliament to3carry this out. Fisher was not prepared to formulate a 
scheme for the Premiers to criticize because the 
Constitution left the whole matter to the Federal4Parliament. This was a point which the Premiers had 
consistently forgotten. Possibly Deakin had tended to 
show them too much consideration by always being prepared 
to consider the matter with them.
When it became clear early in July that Fisher 
intended to keep strictly to all the terms of the 
Agreement, except that it was to be implemented for ten 
years (and until Parliament otherwise provided) instead of 
permanently, Wade tried to organize opposition. He wanted
1
P r e m . N.S.W. to P.M., 26 May 1910 (copy with Prem. N.S.W.
to Prem. T a s . , 26 May 1910), T.S.A., P .D .1/227/163•
2
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. Tas., l4 May 1910, telegram, ibid.
3
Advertiser, 20 May 1910.
4
P.M. to Prem. N.S.W.,
A33, voI.33, p.158.
2 June 1910, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S.
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the Premiers to join him in a protest to the effect that 
the Agreement had intended that for each pound that the 
revenue for 1909-10 increased above the forecast amount, 
the liability of the States (to meet £600,000 of the 
expected deficit) was to be reduced by one pound. He 
regarded Fisher's proposal that the States should
contribute the whole actual shortage of £445,000 as a
1departure from the Agreement.
He drew no support from South Australia where the
Labor Premier, Mr Verran, pointed out that his Government
had not been a party to the Agreement and could not join
in the protest as the published report of the Conference
2did not support Wade's contentions. Tasmania also
3doubted whether the protest would be justified. It was 
not made as there was no point in it if it were not 
unanimous .^
At the same time, Wade tried to enlist Deakin's
support, asking him to uphold Wade's view of the Agreement
5in the House of Representatives. Deakin was clear that 
this view was wrong and when he consulted Murray and Watt 
of Victoria they agreed that the printed Agreement could
/T
not be interpreted as Wade wished.
1
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 6 July 1910, telegram, S.A.A., 
G.R.G. 24/6, 10/638.
2
Prem. S.A. to Prem. N.S.W., 7 July 1910, copy, ibid.
3 Prem. T a s . to Prem. N.S.W., 7 July 1910, telegram, copy, 
T.S.A., P . D .1/225/117•4
Prem. N.S.W. to Prem. S.A., 13 July 1910, telegram,
S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 10/638.
Wade to Deakin, 5 July 1910, D.P., A.N.L., M S .1540/4927. 
Deakin to Wade, 7 July 1910, draft, ibid., 4929-
6
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Wade should not have been surprised at Fisher’s 
desire to enforce the whole Agreement except for the 
proposal to make it permanent. That was the only ground 
on which Labor had opposed it in Parliament and at the 
referendum.^ Wade had an election in a few months in 
which he had to fight a strong Labor Party and it is 
probable that this protest was to be used to assist him in 
his campaign.
When Fisher introduced the Surplus Revenue Bill 1910, 
he pointed out that the States had the right to insist on 
the payment of three-fourths of the customs and excise 
revenue until the end of 1910, but that, if they did, the 
Government would simply reduce the amount payable in the 
second half of the financial year so that the overall
2payment for I9IO-II amounted to 25 shillings per capita.
Deakin did not cavill at the terms, they were not much
different from those which he would have liked to have3made. Others, like Sir John Forrest, were less happy4than Deakin, but with Labor's substantial majority in 
each House there was never any doubt that the Bill would
5pass .
1
Advertiser, 19 July 1910.
2
C.P.D., vol.55, p.^ 15.
3 '
Ibid., pp.421-4.4
Ibid., p .46l. The whole debate is in C.P.D., vols.55-6.
5
The working of the Surplus Revenue Act 1910 is 
illustrated in Appendix E, Table 6 . Payments at £1. 5s Od 
per head are contrasted with actual payments under section 
87 in Table 7 .
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Not all the Premiers were unhappy. The attitude of
Kidston and Verran has already been mentioned. Wilson of
Western Australia expressed disappointment that the
Financial Agreement had failed but was relieved to have
the matter disposed of for ten yearsJ The Treasurer of
Victoria, W.A. Watt, refused to criticize what Fisher had
done because he thought ’the force of dire necessity’ had
2compelled him to act in that way.
It was true that under the Surplus Revenue Act 1910
the States lost one of the main advantages gained in the
Agreement of August 1909: permanence. In its place, they
3were given reasonable security for ten years. They 
continued to retain control of their debts. Although the 
possibility of transfer was referred to at length at two 
conferences in 1914, the only result was to refer the 
matter to the consideration of the Federal and State 
Governments with a view to discussing it again later at
4 .yet another conference - as good a way as any of shelving 
it. The question remained unsettled until the general 
Financial Agreement of 1927*
The Surplus Revenue Act 1910 remained in force until 
1927 but not because it continued to give satisfaction.
Far from the Commonwealth customs revenue declining under 
the effects of a protective policy so that it was unable
_
W.A.P.D., N.S., vol.38, P.1129.
2
V.P.D., vol.124, P.454.
3
’Reasonable’ not ’absolute’ because the possibility of 
the Act being amended or superseded always existed.
4
Report of the 1914 Treasurers’ Conference, S . A . P . P . ,
1914 , vol.3> n o .48, p p .73-4.
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to meet the payments to the States, it expanded rapidly 
after 1910. The strains imposed by the war made it still 
insufficient for the needs of the nation and obliged the 
Federal Government to enter the field of direct taxation. 
Rapid rises in prices in the period 1911-20, after a long 
period of relative stability, nearly halved the value of 
the pound and made the per capita grant of 25 shillings 
inadequate for the needs of the States. It became 
characteristic for them to show a deficit on their 
financial transactions.^
But these were matters which could not have been 
foreseen in 1910 and the States were no worse off under an 
agreement for ten years than they would have been under a 
permanent one. Not only were the chariot wheels of the 
Commonwealth turning faster and dragging the States 
uncomfortably in their wake, but the external forces of 
war and inflation were taking a hand to help reduce them 
to financial vassalage.
The special position of Western Australia at the turn 
of the century, with its large unsettled mining population, 
the excessive proportion of adult males in that population, 
the relative lack of development of its other resources 
and its unusual dependence on intercolonial customs duties, 
together with the solution to them offered in section 95 
of the Constitution, have already been discussed at length. 
The difficulties arising from this special provision and
1
Commonwealth Grants Commission, Third Report, 1936,
especially pp.21-5? 'Federation and Financial Adjustment'.
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its success in providing for Western Australia's needs 
must be looked at briefly.
Section 95 gave Western Australia power to impose 
duties on goods produced or manufactured in other States 
for five years after the imposition of uniform duties, 
provided that the special duties did not exceed those in 
force in the State at the time the uniform tariff was 
imposed. If goods imported from abroad were similar to 
those manufactured in Australia duty was to be paid at the 
old State rate, if it were higher than the uniform tariff, 
so that the foreign goods would not have an advantage over 
their Australian made counterparts. The special duties 
were to decline by 20 per cent a year. Thus Australian 
produced spirits might be subject to an excise duty of 
nine shillings a gallon under the federal tariff but have 
to pay 16 shillings under the special tariff. After a 
year this would decline to 12s 9d > after two years to 
9s 6d and after three years to nine shillings, at which 
level it would remain. The procedure would operate in the 
same way for customs duties on imported goods. The 
clause was a genuine restriction on the freedom of 
interstate trade and was sufficiently complex to make some 
problems of interpretation and application almost certain.
In March 1902, C.C. Kingston, the Minister for Trade 
and Customs, directed that all goods imported into Western 
Australia from abroad must pay duty at the higher rate,
1
Memo, by H.W. Wollaston (Comptroller-General of Customs) 
on the bookkeeping sections of the Constitution, 2 May 
1901, C.A.O., C.R.S. A571, 01/1906.
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1whether State or Commonwealth. The Western Australians
believed that the higher State duty should only be levied
when the goods were similar to goods produced or
manufactured within Australia. They protested vigorously.
The State did not want the additional taxation and did not
believe the Constitution could be interpreted in the way
Kingston required. It was willing to assist the merchants
2to test the question in the Courts.
Deakin, Acting Prime Minister in Barton's absence,
supported Kingston and unhelpfully suggested that Western
Australia could solve the problem by reducing or
3abolishing the special tariff. Western Australia could 
not afford to do that, so Deakin's ruling left the 
importers in the unfair position of having to pay the 
higher duty or show in a court which of the many imported
4items were not like Australian goods.
James believed that the matter could be cleared up
quickly in a few minutes conversation with the Collector
of Customs for Western Australia, but Deakin and Kingston
would not allow him to have dealings with an official and5insisted on settling the matter by telegram and letter.
1
Ruling of Minister for Trade and Customs, 26 March 1902,
w .a .242, p .d .655/0 2 .
2
Prem. W.A. to A.P.M. (telegrams), 4 and 11 July 1902, 
copie s , ibid.
3
A.P.M. to Prem. W.A., 8 July 1902, telegram, ibid.
4
Prem. W.A. to A. P.M,, 9 July 1902, telegram, copy, ibid.
5
A. P.M. to Prem. W.A., 23 July 1902, ibid.
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It was another example of the way in which Western 
Australia suffered by its distance from the seat of 
government.
Not only did Deakin maintain his view on this 
question, but he also gave a ruling opposed to Western 
Australian interests on another matter. He ruled that 
special duties collected under section 95 formed a part of 
Commonwealth revenue and had to be dealt with under section 
87 - that is, only three-fourths of them came to the Stated 
No doubt this decision by the Commonwealth law authorities 
was a reasonable and justifiable interpretation of the 
Constitution, but it may be doubted whether the Founders 
intended that the Commonwealth should be able to claim for 
itself up to one-fourth of the special duties which had 
been made constitutional chiefly to ensure Western 
Australia's solvency.
It was important to Western Australia that section 95 
should fulfil its function of bolstering the revenue of 
the State until the expected levelling down of its per 
capita contribution to the customs and excise revenue 
should occur. In 1906, E.T. Owen, Registrar of Friendly 
Societies in Western Australia, made an elaborate 
calculation of the duty which would have been collected on 
goods imported during the period 1901-1906 (31 August) had 
the State tariff and excise duties continued to operate 
and compared it with that actually collected under the
1
A. P.M. to Prem. W.A., 21 August 1902 (with enclosure), 
ibid.
4li
1uniform and special tariffs. He found that in the five
years and eight months almost £350,000 more had been
collected under the actual tariff than would have been
collected under the old colonial tariff on the same volume
of imports. This was an increase of about 5"S' per1 23 cent.
Equally interesting was the fact that all the gains
occurred in the period 1901-3 and that thereafter the
colonial tariff would have given the higher yield. Owen
felt that the big gains of the earlier years and the
rapid decline later had seriously dislocated the State
finances and he blamed the Governments of the State for
having spent the gains at once, instead of saving them to
meet the fall in revenue as the special duties declined.
In this he shared the view which Deakin later expressed
with regard to all States and the amounts over three-
fourths of the customs revenue which the Commonwealth had
2returned to them.
Owen’s figures, which the Commonwealth Statistician
3was prepared to accept as accurate, revealed that the 
special tariff protected the State as it had been intended 
to do for the first two years, while it was high, but that 
it declined too rapidly to give that protection after 1903 
Once the special tariff terminated, there was a further
1
E.T. Owen, ’Western Australia and Federation - the 
losses and gains’, a paper, W.A. 752, C.S.O. 6025/06.
Owen had to assume that the same volume of goods would 
have been imported under each tariff.
2
Morning Post, l4 November 1908 (Sydney, 5 October), D.P. 
A.N.L., MS.1540.
3
Memo, by G.H. Knibbs, 23 January 1907, C.A.O., C.R.S.
A 571, 07/559.
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decline in revenue which did not level out until I9H
under the influence of the per capita payments and special
grant. By I9H , the Commonwealth was returning to the
State £590»000 compared with a maximum of £1,260,000 in
1903.^ That the Commonwealth and all States recognized in
1909-10 that some special treatment was necessary for
Western Australia indicates that the expected levelling
down of the State’s contribution to the customs and excise
2revenue had not occurred as rapidly as had been expected.
A number of minor questions affected Tasmania's
financial relations with the Commonwealth in the period
1901-10. They included the loss of revenue due to the
attempted suppression (by the Commonwealth) of
3Tattersalls, the continued payment for some years by
Tasmania alone of the whole subsidy for the telegraph4cable linking it with the mainland and various items of 
Commonwealth policy (the trans-continental railway, the
1
Report by the Commonwealth Grants Commission, 1933, 
Appendix 9*
2
See Appendix E, Table 1.
3
The Tattersalls organization for gambling had been 
refused permission to operate in all mainland Colonies but 
had been legalized in Tasmania. Commonwealth postal 
legislation allowed regulations to be made prohibiting the 
delivery of mail to the organization and so made its 
operation difficult. The Tasmanian Government was hostile 
because a lucrative source of revenue was thus greatly 
diminished in value. See C.A.0., C.R.S. A 6, 0l/l492; 
C.A.O. (Melbourne), M.P.341, bundles 330-1; T.S.A.,
P.D.1/147/27, P.D.1/176/27 Tor the bulk of the
correspondence.4
See W.A. 527, C.S.0. 328/02 (with I873/0 3 .
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capital site and penny postage in particular). These
seemed likely to reduce the revenue returned to the State
1without bringing it any material benefit. There were two 
matters of supreme importance to Tasmanian minds - the 
alleged leakage of customs revenue and the ’iniquitous* 
bookkeeping system. These two matters were a continual 
source of irritation between Tasmania, the Commonwealth, 
Victoria and New South Wales from 1902 to 1913*
Tasmania's first problem with customs revenue 
concerned the duties collected under the second paragraph 
of section 92 on goods imported into another State before 
the imposition of uniform duties but transferred to 
Tasmania for consumption later. The State believed that 
the whole of the duty on such goods (that is, the duty 
levied under the colonial tariff in, say, Victoria as well
as any additional duty paid on transfer) should be credited
2 3to it. The Commonwealth accepted the claim, but
Victoria, which stood to lose about £11,000, contested it
vigorously and persuaded Barton not to pay the money to
Tasmania until the question could be tested in the High
Court .^
1
See C,P.P. , 1906, vol.2, pp.1053-6; T.S.A., P.D.l/l46/l9, 
P.D.I/I8 9 /II7 and G.O. 27/1.
2 Treasurer Tas. to Minister for Trade and Customs, 24 May
1902, Tas. J . & P . of P ., 1 9 0 3 , vol.4 9 , no.l4; Treasurer 
Tas. to Commonwealth Treasurer, 27 August 1902, ibid.; 
Treasurer Tas. to Commonwealth Treasurer, 24 November 1902 
(with opinion by Solicitor-General of T a s . , 22 October 
1 9 0 2 ), ibid.
3 P.M. to Prem. Tas., 18 May 1903, T.S.A., P .D .l/l58/4l.
4
Prem. Vic. to P.M., 23 June 1903 and 8 August 1903»
C.A.O., C.R.S. A 1 , o 4/5170; P.M. to Prem. Vic., 20 August
1 9 0 3 , copy, ibid.
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The Tasmanians found it strange that, when the 
Commonwealth had accepted their arguments, it should
continue to withhold the money. They urged that it should
1be paid and Victoria left to contest the payment. As
Attorney-General, Deakin had accepted Tasmania's claim but
now, as Prime Minister, he refused to take this action
2although Turner urged him to authorize the payment.
Tasmania was forced to sue in the High Court, which found
that the State was entitled to receive only the additional
3duty paid on the transfer of the goods to it.
In October 1903 , Sir William Lyne, who had succeeded 
Kingston as Minister for Trade and Customs when the latter 
resigned, suggested to all States that a system of lump 
sum payments should be substituted for the transfers under 
the interstate certificates which were a nuisance to the 
business community. He suggested a payment of £110,000 to
4Tasmania. Propsting, the Premier, refused the sum as
5inadequate. Two years later the State would have been 
prepared to accept such a system, though it would have 
preferred a pooling of the customs and excise revenue of 
all States except Western Australia with a per capita
1
Treasurer Tas. to Commonwealth Treasurer, 7 and 16 
September 1903 , ibid.
2
Minute by Turner, 7 December 1903 , on above, and P.M. to 
Prem. T a s . , 13 January 1904 , ibid.
3
The State of Tasmania v. The Commonwealth of Australia 
and the State of Victoria, 1 C.L.R. 329 at pp.329-30.
3 —
Minister for Trade and Customs to Prem. Tas . , 27 October 
1903, T.S.A., P.D.1/158/41.
5
Prem. Tas. to Minister for Trade and Customs, 17 
November 1903, copy, ibid.
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distribution of it. It was convinced that the bookkeeping 
and interstate certificate systems were not protecting it
adequately and that there was a substantial leakage of
1customs duties which was costing it dearly.
This question of the leakage of customs revenue
remained a live issue until the Surplus Revenue Act 1910
2made it irrelevant. If there was a leakage, the source
of the problem lay in the fact that Tasmania received the
bulk of its dutiable imports on transfer from other States
(mainly from Victoria) rather than directly from overseas.
The figures reveal that there was ample opportunity for
leakage. Tasmania got 45.68 per cent of its dutiable goods
by interstate transfer, compared with Queensland 25*46 per
cent, South Australia 23*4l per cent, Western Australia
21.44 per cent, New South Wales 9*03 per cent and Victoria 
37.39 per cent. The main opportunity for leakage in 
commercial transactions was with goods manufactured in 
Australia from components some of which had been imported
1
Memo., apparently by T a s . Treasurer, with Prem. T a s . to 
P . M ., 30 September 1905 (originally dated 10 October, 30 
September substituted later. Acknowledged by P.M. on 23 
October as of 29 September 'just to han d ’), copy, T.S.A.,
P.D.I/I8O/II7 .
2
The correspondence on the issue was long and tedious and 
large in bulk. The matter is dealt with only in brief 
outline here, with minimal references, as most of the 
arguments used on both sides are somewhat dubious and it 
is the fact that a grievance existed which is important. 
Detailed references are given in a special note at the end 
of the chapter so that an interested reader may pursue the 
subject further.
3
Report of the Royal Commission on Tasmanian Customs 
Leakage, C . P .P . , I9II, vol.3, n o .23> p.(xi) [p.863].
4l 6
from abroad. The Tasmanian Government felt that there
was also a substantial loss incurred because many of the
States’ citizens made large retail purchases in Melbourne
and did not think to obtain interstate certificates. As
these goods were brought in as passengers’ baggage there
2was no check on them at the Tasmanian end. The
Tasmanian case was not strengthened by the fact that the
leakage was estimated at different times at figures
avarying between £ 20,000 and £ 8 0 ,000.
Commonwealth Ministers, except Sir William Lyne who
4had spent the first 30 years of his life in Tasmania,
usually denied the existence of the leakage. One basis
for their view was that there was no written evidence of5it,' but this hardly deserved consideration as there could 
hardly be written evidence of the unrecorded entry of goods 
into the State. Weightier, but inconclusive, arguments 
emanated from Treasury officials. It was suggested that
1
Prem. T a s . to P . M . , 4 November 1907» copy, T.S.A.,
P.D.1/198/117.
2
Gov. Tas. to Commonwealth Treasurer, 21 January I9O8 , 
copy, T.S.A. , P . D . I/207/ H 7 » P.M. to Prem. Tas., 30 
October 1907, copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 , vol.20, pp.700-2.
3
Notes of Conference 1-2 May 1907 between Captain Evans 
and Sir J. Forrest, T.S.A., P . D .I/198/II7 » ’Notes on 
Tasmanian share of customs revenue', by Sir G.S.
Strickland, 6 November 1907, copy, T.S.A., P .D .1/207/117•
4
Australian Encyclopaedia, article on Lyne.
5
P.M. to Prem. T a s . , 30 October 1907» copy, C.A.0., C.R.S. 
A3 3 , vol.20, p.700.
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the lower per capita return from customs duties in
Tasmania was due to a lower standard of livings, a lower
consumption of alcohol and a greater percentage of the
population being either old or very young and therefore
1not in the main earning and spending age group.
In 1907, Forrest tried to persuade New South Wales
and Victoria to make a lump sum payment of £150,000 a
year to Tasmania in lieu of the transfers under the
bookkeeping system but New South Wales thought the amount
2too large and nothing was done. The matter remained in 
this unsatisfactory condition until 1910, with Tasmania 
resentful of the treatment it had received. When the per 
capita system of returns was eventually adopted under the 
Surplus Revenue Act 1910 the possibility of future loss 
was removed and Tasmania put on even terms with the 
mainland States, but the grievance resulting from past 
treatment still remained.
In July I9IO, Mr Jensen (Bass, Tasmania) asked the
House of Representatives to vote Tasmania £25?000 a year
for nine years to make up for the supposed customs
3leakage." The Government was not prepared either to admit 
a leakage or to make a grant unless facts could be 
discovered to justify it. A Select Committee was
4appointed to investigate the question.
7 _
Memo, by J. Collins (Commonwealth Treasury), 7 January 
1908, T.S.A., P.D.I/207/II7 .2
A. P.M. to Prems. N.S.W. and Vic., 25 July 1907} copy, 
CoA.O., C.R.S. A 33, vol.19, pp.573-5; P.M. to Prem. T a s ., 19 September 1907} copy, ibid., vol.,20, p.362*
3
See C .P „D ., vol.55} especially pp.625-30, lll4.
See ibid., vol.56, especially pp.l443} 1446-7»
4l8
The Select Committee undertook its duties but proved
inadequate for the task and was transformed into a Royal
Commission. As such, it reported on 23 September 1911*^
The report outlined the history of the leakage dispute and
concluded that the evidence tendered showed that goods had
been taken into Tasmania without the State being
protected by interstate certificates and had also been
carried in as passengers' baggage without the knowledge of
customs officials. Tasmania had suffered more than any
other State from the faulty system because of the high
percentage of dutiable goods received on transfer from
other States. The Commission could not estimate definitely
the full loss by leakage but believed it had not been less
than £10,000 a year for the last seven years of the
2bookkeeping system. It also found that the uniform tariff
had reduced Tasmania's receipts from customs and excise
duties from almost £480,000 in 1900-1 to an average of
£360,000 for the period 1901-2 to 1909-10. It suggested a3payment of £900,000 to the State, spread over ten years.
Fisher did not act in full accordance with the report, 
but asked Parliament to contribute £500,000 over ten years,
4beginning in 1912-3* The Tasmanian Press was
1
Report of the Royal Commission on Tasmanian Customs 
Leakage, C „ P , P . , I9H  , vol.3 , no . 23 •
2
Ibid. , p .(xi), [p .863 ] *
3
Ibid., pp.(xii)-(xiii) [pp.864-5] and appendix E to 
report.
4
C.P.D. , vol.63 5 p * 4504.
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disappointed and thought that the offer did not show a
proper federal spirit.^ In view of the report of the
Royal Commission, Tasmania did have reason to hope for a
bigger grant, yet, considering the generally hard attitude
of the Fisher Government towards the States, a grant of
£500,000 was a reasonably generous one for it to make. On
8 October 1913» Forrest, Treasurer in a new Fusion
Government led by Cook, introduced the Tasmania Grant
Bill 1913 to give the State the further £400,000
2recommended by the Royal Commission. The Bill became law
and the payments under it were added to those under the
3initial, grant. Only when this had been done did 
Australia’s financially weakest State feel that it had 
received justice at the hands of its federal partners.
How far Tasmania's losses were directly attributable to 
federation may still be regarded as an open question.
There can be no doubt that it was wise to remove this 
sense of grievance and cause of serious discontent.
One of the most interesting aspects of this dispute 
was the part played in it by the Governor of Tasmania, Sir 
Gerald Strickland. While in Australia, Strickland, a 
member of the Maltese aristocracy, showed the 
determination, the will to interfere and the lack of 
balance which later led him to a stormy career in Maltese
4politics. During his governorship in Tasmania he, on one
7~
M e rcury, 16 December I9H .
2
CoPcD,, vol.71» p .1866.
3 '
Quick, Legislative Powers, p.849.
4
Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-40, Oxford, 1949, 
article on Strickland.
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occasion, undertook a tour of some of the mainland States
1to stir up trouble for the Commonwealth. Late in
Strickland's term of service in Tasmania, the Governor-
General became so afraid that he would (as he wished) be
transferred to New South Wales, where he could do real
damage to the Commonwealth, that he appealed to the
2Secretary of State not to allow this.
Governors often wrote to the Secretary of State, and
even privately to each other, in the strongest and most
unguarded terms about the politics and politicians of the
State. This did not content Strickland in the customs
leakage dispute. He descended into the market place of
local politics and corresponded, without a shred of
constitutional right to support him, with Forrest and Lyne.
He obtained figures from the State Statistician, R.M.
Johnston, and wrote elaborate memoranda, which were passed
3on to Commonwealth Treasury officials to answer. Clearly
1
Northcote to Deakin, 17 March 1907 , D.P., A.N.L.,
MS.1540/3937.
2
G.G. to S. of S., 4 November I9O8, cable, A.N.L.,
A .J .C .P .2190, C.0.4l8/6l, n o •4o4l4. Lord Crewe set 
Dudley's mind at rest in a private letter, 4 December 1908, 
ibid. After a term in W.A. (1909-1,3). Strickland did move 
to N.S.W. (1913-7).
3
Strickland to Forrest, 4 July 1907, copy, T.S.A.,
P.D.I/I98/II7? 'Notes on the Tasmanian share of customs 
revenue' by Sir G.S. Strickland, 6 November I907. copy, 
T.S.A., P .D .I/207/II7j two undated and unsigned documents 
appear in ibid, along with a, document entitled 'Memo in 
reply to points raised in private letter of His Excellency 
the Governor of Tasmania, dated 3 December 1907s by J. 
Collins. From their contents they are evidently 
Strickland’s work and one, at least, is under reply in the 
Collins' memo., and they are apparently copies of part of 
the 'private letter' referred to. Strickland to Lyne, 21 
January 1908, ibid.
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his Ministers knew what he was doing, for copies of some 
of his letters appear in the records of the Premier's 
Department. They must also have known that he should not 
have done it. Probably, they were so happy to have the 
support of so forceful and able an advocate in their 
dispute that they chose to disregard the constitutional 
aspect of the matter. Normally, Ministers could have been 
expected to resent such interference bitterly. It is 
perhaps fortunate that the Commonwealth Ministers did not 
record their views of his conduct.
By the end of the first decade, the financial 
superiority of the Commonwealth, implied in the 
Constitution, had become a reality. It could hardly have 
been otherwise. There was no hope of settling the question 
of the division of revenue permanently at the Conventions. 
The best that could be done was to make an interim 
settlement and leave the final solution to the Federal 
Parliament. The superior negotiating position thus given 
to the Commonwealth did much to ensure its final 
dominance. The undertaking of new responsibilities by the 
Commonwealth in the fields of pensions and defence made 
this dominance even more necessary. The States did little 
to help their own position with their constant refusal to 
recognize federal needs, their futile attempts to persuade 
the Commonwealth to limit its financial strength in 
perpetuity and their unwillingness to surrender control of 
their debts and future borrowing. The basic importance of 
the finance question was recognized by all parties. Along 
with the channels of communication, customs duty and 
capital site questions it was one of the most troublesome
422
aspects of Commonwealth-State relations in the decade 
1901-10. No question was of greater ultimate significance, 
for finance is still the major cause of dispute between 
the seven Governments of Australia.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 6
Tasmanian Customs Leakage
This grievance was the cause of an immense 
correspondence. The points at issue were very complex.
Some were probably insoluble through lack of statistics 
and others possibly had no real existence (that is, they 
were fallacies). At times it is probable that the 
Tasmanian and Commonwealth officers were not clear what 
they were talking about. Yet for years it constituted a 
real political grievance. A demonstration of whether 
there was a real economic problem, and, if so, how it 
should be measured, could make a good exercise for a 
student with patience and some training in economic 
analysis.
The references given below afford some guide through 
the labyrinth of arguments used.
1. General account of the history of the incident;
Report of the Royal Commission on the Tasmanian Customs 
Leakage, C . P . P . , I9H  , vol. 3 , no . 23 •
2 . Documents arguing the Tasmanian point of view:
Prem. T a s . to Minister for Trade and Customs, 17 November 
1903, copy? T.S.A., P .D .1/158/4i ; Memo, by Tas. Treasurer, 
with Prem. Tas. to P . M . , 30 September 1905? copy, T.S.A.,
P.D.1/180/117; Gov. Tas. to S. of S., 1 October 1906, 
copy, T.S.A., G.O. 27/2, pp.20-8; Notes of Conference, 1-2 
May 1907? between Premier Evans and Sir J. Forrest, T.S.A., 
P .D .I/I98/II7 ; Mercury, 24 June and 3 July 1907?
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Strickland to Forrest, 4 July 1907» copy, T.S.A.,
P .D .I/198/II7 ; Prem. T a s . to A. P . M . , 9 July 1907» copy, 
ibid.; Prem. Tas. to Minister for Trade and Customs, 9 
July 1907> copy, ibid.; Memo, by J.H. Keating (with his 
letter to Secretary to Treasury), 4 November 1907 , C .P .P . , 
19075 vol.3, no.31» Prem. Tas. to P . M . , 30 September 1907> 
copy, T.S.A., P .D .I/198/II7 ; Prem. Tas. to P.M., 4 
November 1907» copy, ibid.; 'Notes on the Tasmanian share 
of customs revenue', by Sir G.S. Strickland, 6 November
1907, copy, T.S.A., P . D . I/207/ H 7 5 two undated unsigned 
memos, in ibid., apparently Strickland's work (from 
internal evidence and the fact that they are with a reply 
by J. Collins of the Commonwealth Treasury to a Strickland 
letter of 3 December 1907); Strickland to Lyn e , 21 January
1908, ibid.; Commonwealth Treasurer to P.M., 6 February 
1908, C .P.P. , 1911, vol.3, no.23; Gov. Tas. to S. of S.,
19 March 1909» copy, T.S.A., G.0.25/26; Prem. Tas. to P . M . ,
1 June 1910, T.S.A., P .D .1/225/117; 'Considerations 
regarding the federation of states which differ 
materially, at the initial stage, in the magnitude of 
population or development’, by R.M. Johnston, T a s ., J . & P .
of P ., 1910, v o l .6 3 , no.5 0 .
3. Documents arguing a Commonwealth point of view:
Minister for Trade and Customs to Prem. T a s . , 27 October 
1903, T.S.A., P .D .I/158/4I ; P.M. to Prem. Tas., 30 October 
1907> copy, C.A.O., C.R.S. A 3 3 » vol.20, pp.700-2; 'Memo, 
in reply to points raised in private letter of His 
Excellency the Governor of Tasmania, dated 3 December 1907'» 
by J. Collins (Secretary to Treasury), P .D .1/207/117; P.M. 
to Prem. Tas. , l4 January 1908 , copy, C.A.O. , C.R.S. A 3 3 » 
v o l .21, p .612.
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4. Documents relating to the attempt to ^et N.S.W. and 
Victoria to make a lump sum payment to Tasmania 
(other than incidental references in the above 
material):
A. P.M. to Prems. N.S.W. and Vic., 25 July 1907, copy, 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A33, vol.19, pp.573-5; P.M. to Prem. Ta s . , 
19 September 1907, copy, ibid., vol.20, p.3^2; P.M. to 
Prems. N.S.W. and Vic., 27 February I9O8 , copy, ibid., 
vol.22, pp.l63-4; Prem. Vic. to P.M . , 23 March I9O8 , copy, 
P.D.V.O.L., vol.169, pp.686-9; Prem. Tas. to Prem. N.S.W., 
18 May 1908, copy, T.S.A., P .D .1/207/117; Prem. N.S.W. to 
Prem. Tas., 27 May I9O8 , ibid.; Gov. Tas. to S. of S . , 5 
January 1909, copy, T.S.A., G.O. 27/2, pp.98-102.
5• Main Parliamentary references to Royal Commission 
etc . :
(a) Motion by Mr Jensen for a grant to Tasmania, 21 July 
1910, C . P .D . , vols. 55-6, passim (Select Committee 
established as a result of this); (b) Motion by Mr Jensen, 
l6 November I9H , seeking approval of Royal Commission 
Report, ibid., vols.62-35 passim; (c) Tasmania Grant Bill 
1912, ibid., v o l .67, passim; (d) Tasmania Grant Bill 1913?
ibid., vols.71-72, passim.
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REVIEW
The story of the problems which arose between the 
Commonwealth and State Governments in the first decade 
could easily obscure the essential fact that the federal
system did work. There was a great deal of wrangling in
1public and private and even talk of secession but this
did not come about, and, in fact, there was no serious move
towards it. By means of argument and counter-argument, of
executive action and court decision, the Constitution had
been transformed from a scrap of paper into a living,
functioning instrument of government. While a good deal
of pettiness and jealousy were involved, in some respects
the story shows an important and creditable aspect of
democracy: the concern with the formal rights of
contracting parties which ’responsibility' brings, respect
for the law, while hoping for favourable interpretations,
2and acceptance without question of the verdict.
The Constitution intended the various Governments to 
be equal in status and independent within their own 
spheres. This position had not been, and perhaps could 
not have been, maintained when one Government had
1
Secession motions were introduced into various State 
Parliaments on a number of occasions, e.g. Queensland, 1902, 
1906, 1907, see Q.P.D., vols.89, 97, 99, and in W.A., 1906, 
see W.A .P .D ., N.S., vol.29*
2
The events surrounding the wirenetting raid are an 
exception to this 'rule'.
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jurisdiction over the whole territory occupied by the 
other six and when the same Government controlled what was 
then regarded as the main source of revenue. Certainly 
Deakin foresaw in 1902 that these factors would lead to 
the eventual dominance of the Federal Government in spite 
of the fact that the Constitution apparently safeguarded 
the rights of self-government of the States. He believed 
that without formal alteration of the Constitution a 
’vital change’ would take place in the relations between 
the Commonwealth and States. The Commonwealth would 
acquire ’a general control over the States' and every 
extension of political power would be made 'by its means 
and [would] go to increase its relative superiority'.^
His prophecy was largely fulfilled.
By 1910, the broad outlines of the future development
of relations were becoming clear. As a result of the
solution forced on them in the seemingly endless debate
about channels of communication, the States had been made
to accept a subordinate political status. Yet, clearly,
they were not as completely subordinated as they would
have been if the Commonwealth Government and Colonial
Office had had their way entirely and had been able to
compel all communications to be sent through the Governor-
General or, at least, in copy to him regardless of their
subject matter, or if they had lost all rights over
adherence to trade treaties and recognition of consuls.
There was a real sense in which 'The independent Governor2. . .[was ] the sign and symbol of the sovereign state' .
"l
Morning Post, 12 May 1902 (Sydney, 1 April 1902).
Argus, 13 June 1902.
2
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Legally their status was dubious. Theoretically (and, 
in respects not considered in this thesis, practically) 
the High Court doctrine of immunity of instrumentalities 
gave them a better position than they could have hoped for 
from the strict application of sections 109 and ll4 of the 
Constitution. But the Court's failure to insist on the 
same principle with regard to customs duties on State 
imports, as well as its peculiar interpretation of section 
114 as applied to this matter, in fact gave them an 
inferior status, although they were better off than they
were to be after 1920 when the decision in the Engineers '
1Case swept away reciprocity in immunity from 
interference, except as provided for by section ll4.
The interim financial settlement under the Surplus
Revenue Act 1910 also left the States subject to the
Commonwealth power. This was in accord with the decision
of the 1899 Premiers' Conference, which had limited the
operation of section 87 to ten years, although not with
2the original intentions of the Convention of 1897-8. If 
the final position had not then been determined, it was at 
least clear that the growing needs of the Commonwealth, 
and the total lack of real bargaining power held by the 
States, would ensure that it would not change to the 
benefit of the States.
1
The Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide 
Steamship Company Limited and Others, 28 C,L.R . 129- 
2
Of course, the aim of the Premiers' Conference had not 
been to make the States subject to Commonwealth power, but 
to meet the wish of N.S.W. which desired that the 
Commonwealth should not be forever committed to a high 
tariff policy to meet the revenue needs of the States.
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To some extent, the States had initially regarded the
Commonwealth as their agent. This was most clearly shown
in Price's memorandum concerning the exclusion of the
States from the Colonial Conference of 1907» when he wrote
that 'the Commonwealth Government is practically an agency
for the management, under a united control, of the three
departments...[Customs, Post Office and Defence] of all
the six States....'  ^ It was also implicit in the
attitude of the Premiers in arranging conferences annually
and inviting the Prime Minister to attend to discuss
certain matters with them and in the forwarding to him for
action of such resolutions as concerned the Commonwealth.
By 1910, they were certainly not prepared to regard it as
their master but they had to acknowledge its power. Most
of them would probably have agreed (the words had been
written by Deakin in I903) that they were becoming aware
of 'their incapacity to assail the infant Federation even
in its cradle, and of the weakness of their defences
2against its future aggressions'. They would certainly 
have denied that it had ever been intended that the 
Federal Government should work in as wide a sphere as it 
had assumed by then. But a national Government has 
certain advantages in the attempt to extend its power, 
simply because it is a national Government with 
jurisdiction over the whole territory and is the only 
Government which represents, and controls, all the people.
1
Memo, by Prem. S.A. to Gov. S.A. (for S. of S.), 12 
December 1906, S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 06/519.
2
Morning Post, 26 June 1903 (Sydney, 21 April), D.P., 
A.N.L., MS.1540.
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The ability of State Governments to resist is necessarily 
inhibited by the occasional conflict of their own interests 
and their natural tendency to concern themselves primarily 
with those supposed pieces of aggression which affect them 
individually. This was shown at the Premiers' Conference 
of August 1909, already referred to, when, in questioning 
the need for Commonwealth public works expenditure, each 
Premier supported the works proposed for his own State but 
opposed many of those to be carried out in the other States.
No one party or cause was solely responsible for the 
disputes which afflicted the first decade of the 
Commonwealth of Australia. Some were difficult to avoid 
because of inherent factors. The geographical position of 
Tasmania, coupled with the smallness of its population, 
put it in a position of commercial dependence on Melbourne 
which made it possible for the customs leakage dispute to 
arise. The isolation of Western Australia made it feel 
totally neglected. In 1902, it even asked that a Federal 
Resident, an official with powers akin to those of a prime 
minister and an ambassador combined, should be appointed 
there to be in liaison with the State Government and to 
make decisions on behalf of the Federal Government.^ It 
was the unusual nature of Western Australian development 
which made necessary the provision for a special tariff, 
with the complications that it caused. The drought of the 
early years intensified the clash with Queensland over
1
W.A. 527» C.S.O. 1742/02. The Western Australians appear 
to have pressed this ludicrous proposal quite seriously.
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black labour and made both that State and New South Wales 
resentful over duties charged on animal fodder.^
The nature of the Constitution made the discussion of 
other matters necessary, though it did not make inevitable 
the bitterness which at times surrounded them. Among such 
matters were the selection of the capital site, the 
transfer of departments and property and the distribution 
of revenue.
Interstate jealousy clearly influenced such problems 
as the capital site, the Governor-General's residence, the 
transfer of the Northern Territory and the encouragement 
of immigration. In the dispute surrounding the expulsion 
of the Kanakas, regional interests, the traditional 
Queensland suspicion of the south and the assumption, 
possibly correct, that no 'southerner' could understand 
the problems of a tropical area, played a significant part.
The Commonwealth was eager to increase its own power
and sphere of action. As early as May 1902, Hopetoun
expressed the opinion, privately, that it was too inclined
2to centralize and grab power while in I9O8 the retiring
Governor of Victoria, Sir Reginald Talbot, publicly, if
politely, expressed a similar view and pointed out that
the nature of the continent and population of Australia
made too great a degree of centralization undesirable at 3that time. This eagerness was first evidenced in the
_
See T.S.A., P.D.l/l48/4l and W.A. 242, P.D. 1037/02.
2
Entry for 11 May 1902 in Lord Tennyson's diary, Tennyson 
Papers, A.N.L., MS.479/2.
3
Advert!ser, 3 July I9O8.
432
channels of communication dispute, although in some 
aspects of that case its attitude made political sense, 
and it was again seen in the way it continued to collect 
customs duties on State imports, while refusing to appeal 
against the decision which had been given against it by 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales. It was also well 
illustrated by the determination of the Commonwealth to 
secure control of adequate funds to further its objects, 
both in the Surplus Revenue Act 1908 and later 
negotiations. Other matters, such as its determination to 
bring State railway servants under its arbitration power 
and the desire to use its excise power to control 
conditions of employment, outside the scope of this thesis, 
illustrate the point even more clearly.
Deakin was always ready to extend the bounds of
1Commonwealth power at least to its constitutional limits.
The ’Australian Correspondent’ of the Morning Post noted
in 1 9 0 2 that he was taking 'the largest views of the
2powers and immunities of the Commonwealth'. The West 
Australian, in 1 9 0 6 , expressed the view that 'There is no 
more ardent advocate of the extension of the Federal
Odomain than the Prime Minister [Deakin]'. There is no
1 While he was reasonably satisfied with those limits, as 
he interpreted them, a memo, prepared in I9 O8 for use in 
South Africa shows that there were some areas (mainly 
industrial powers) in which he believed that the 
Constitution did not give the Commonwealth sufficient 
power. C .P .P ., 1912, vol.3> n o .8 5 , P P •579-88.
2
Morning Post, 12 March 1902 (Sydney, 4 February), D.P., 
A.N.L., MS.154o . The 'Australian Correspondent' was, of 
course, Deakin himself. See La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, vol. 
2, ch.1 5 .
3
West Australian, 23 April 1 9 0 6 .
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doubt that he was one of the 'tyrants’ whom Carruthers,
in an emotional outburst soon after the wirenetting
incident, hoped to 'pull down* even at the risk of 
]bloodshed. He was assisted by others, notably Lord 
Northcote, who took up the Commonwealth's cause very 
strongly in the general debate on channels of 
communication, and by such lesser men as Sir William Lyne.
Some thought that Deakin was largely under the thumb
of the Labor Party, which held the balance of power in the
Parliament, and that it was this which inclined him to
2take so large a view of Commonwealth power. It is true
that he showed a greater inclination to consider the
interests of the States over the Financial Agreement in
1909, when he was allied to the conservative forces in the
Parliament, than he had on other matters in 1906-7 when he
was dependent on Labor support. But other factors were
involved and there is no indication that Deakin the
nationalist had ever to be pressured into adopting the3large view of Commonwealth power. It may, in this 
context at least, be better to see the role of the Labor
1
Advertiser, 3 September 1907*
2
See, for example, Sir Samuel Way to Bishop of Bath and 
Wells, 29 June I9O8 , S.A.A., P.R.G. 30/5, vol.12, p.135; 
Way to Lord Tennyson, 9 January 1906, Tennyson Papers, 
A.N.L., M S .479/5/181. In 1907j Forrest resigned over 
Labor dominance, La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, vol.2, pp.423-4. 
See also Mercury, 10 June I9O8 .
3
It is not possible to point to a small group of 
references which 'prove' this point, but the view seems 
more acceptable than any alternative from the evidence to 
be found in La Nauze, Alfred Deakin.
Party not as one of dominance but as one of 'supporting 
the Commonwealth against the particularists of the 
States'.
The States were often unwilling to accept the 
reasonable and constitutional requests of the Commonwealth 
and Barton's eloquent comment on a despatch written by Sir 
Samuel Griffith, as Lieutenant-Governor of Queensland, in 
early 1902, had more general application;
Provincialism dies a slow death, and all that is 
possible for a Federal Government, which must 
not nurse it, is to ease the pangs of its 
passing.^
The unreasonableness of New South Wales over the capital 
site and the wirenetting incident needs no further comment. 
South Australia's attitude over the rooms it occupied in 
the Post Office building and over the Northern Territory 
was perverse in the extreme. Most of the States were 
intractable over immigration and the assimilation of 
electoral laws, where co-operation would have been to 
their benefit. Their insistence on retaining control of 
the States debts, as a means of ensuring that they also 
retained control of future borrowing, revealed more 
jealousy of Commonwealth power than statesmanship. But it
1
B.R. Wise to J.H. Catts, 5 January 1907, Catts Papers,
A . N . L ., MS.658/1/1/6.
2
Minute for G.G. by P.M., 3 April 1902 (with G.G. to S. 
of S . , 5 April 1902), A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 2150, C.0.4l8/l8, 
no.I8503. The whole of this despatch, and that on which 
it comments (Lt. Gov. Qld. to S. of S . , 21 March 1902, 
A.N.L., A .J 0 C „P . 2152, C.0.418/21, no.16463), repay study 
as able expressions of provincialism and considerate 
nationalism.
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is probably true that, in the early years of a federation, 
the regional governments must be more concerned than the 
central government about their rights and privileges: 
nothing that they let go can be recovered. Adoption of 
the federal system at all implies willingness to 
surrender only a limited range of powers.
Sometimes there was a genuine conflict of interests, 
as in the disputes with Western Australia over statistics 
and meteorology, though, there, empire-building by 
officials played its part as well. All States probably 
sought to retain control of land quarantine out of a 
genuine belief that it was in the best interests of the 
public for them to do so.
While the most important arguments concerning 
channels of communication, mutual non-interference and 
finance involved all States, there do seem to have been 
some small differences in the attitudes of the States.
Victoria was perhaps the most co-operative State in 
the early years, while Peacock and Irvine were Premiers, 
although the situation deteriorated considerably after Sir 
Thomas Bent, a man massive in body, small in mind and 
given to intrigue and ill-judged public clowning, took 
office. Victoria had the advantage of having 'captured' 
the Parliament and Government of the Commonwealth and the 
adoption of its system of protection must also have 
counted for something. Above all, both of these 
considerations gave it an immense advantage over its 
rival, New South Wales, and there can be no doubt that 
this added much to the sourness of the latter State. In
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September 1903 , Tennyson wrote to his successor, Lord 
Northcote, that 'The jealousy between Victoria and New 
South Wales [was ] stronger than any feeling against the 
Commonwealth.. . . ' ^ Possibly, New South Wales tended to 
identify the Commonwealth with Victoria and this may 
explain much of its bitterness over the capital site 
question, a dispute which seems to have been the basis of 
so much of the dissatisfaction felt by New South Wales.
The indiscreet Age fed the flames of this jealousy from 
time to tirrie .
New South Wales had Carruthers for its Premier for 
several crucial years. He had always been a States right 
man to the core, even at the Conventions of 1897-8, where
he fought the South Australians bitterly over the Murray
2waters question. Deakin thought that part of his 
opposition to the Commonwealth sprang from the desire to
3divert attention from the defects of his own policy, 
while T.R. Bavin, who wrote Deakin's column in the Morning 
Post while the Prime Minister was at the Colonial 
Conference of 1907, commented that he was 'a hopeless 
irreconcilable as far as the Commonwealth is concerned' 
and that he saw 'a Commonwealth assassin behind every
4political bush'. Add to this that he was an able lawyer,
1
Tennyson to Northcote, 16 September 1903> copy, Tennyson 
Papers, A.N.L., MS.479/3> PP*73~5* The whole letter is an interesting comment on the state of the Federation at that 
time .
2
Quick and Garran, Annotated Constitution, p. 196.
3
Morning Post, 16 January I906 (Sydney, 4 December I905), 
D.P., A.N.L., MS.1540.4
Ibid., 4 June 1907 (Sydney, 10 April 1907)i ibid.
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long trained in the turbulent politics of New South 
Wales, and he appears as a man well qualified to cause 
trouble.
New South Wales was the most difficult of the States,
but it was unfair, and provocative, of the Age to say, in
1908, that 'Hitherto New South Wales has stood alone as
2the recalcitrant State'. In the early years, South
Australia was not far behind. Its high degree of self-
consciousness and arrogant assurance of the rightness of
its cause made it particularly sensitive to matters
involving the question of status, as in the arguments over
3channels of communication, honours and precedence. The 
Attorney-General of South Australia in the Jenkins 
Government, J.H. Gordon, was the very man who had joined 
battle with Carruthers at the Conventions over the Murray 
waters and he also was well qualified by training and 
predilection to guard the interests of his State. So was 
Sir Samuel Way, Chief Justice and Lieutenant-Governor of 
South Australia, who administered the Government of the 
State during a long and vital period between the time when 
Tennyson became Acting Governor-General in mid-1902 and 
the arrival of his successor, Sir George Le Hunte, about a 
year later. Deakin, never a lover of South Australians,
1
Australian Encyclopaedia, article on Carruthers. Like 
Deakin, Carruthers would have claimed that he believed in 
'co-ordinate federalism' - but his view of the sphere to 
be occupied by each Government differed markedly from that 
taken by the Prime Minister.
2
A ge, 26 May 1908.
3
See D.P., A.N.L., MS.1340/443 (Commonwealth Papers) and 
S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 02/356.
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believed that South Australia, under the Jenkins-Gordon 
Ministry, had been from the first 'consistently hostile' 
to the Commonwealth and had seized every opportunity to 
try to limit its power. By the end of 1902, he saw the 
South Australians, through their own fault, locked in 
conflict with not only the Commonwealth, but every other 
State.^
It deserves notice that, in spite of the creation of 
the Senate for the special purpose of protecting State 
rights, so many issues were settled by other means. No 
attempt can be made here to judge how effectively the 
Senate fulfilled its intended purpose. But the fact that 
the Premiers, in their annual conferences and by 
correspondence, defended their rights directly indicates 
the relative importance of executive government vis-a-vis 
parliamentary legislation in this field. On many of the 
key issues, which did so much to determine the pattern of 
future relations, there was no opportunity for the Senate 
to act as guardian of the real or supposed interests of 
the States. The annual Premiers' Conference was the best 
opportunity to develop a united front of opposition to the 
Commonwealth and it was used to the full. It was more 
difficult, but still possible, to achieve the same result 
by correspondence during the year.
The immensity of the Australian continent, the 
smallness of the population of each of the six Colonies,
1
Morning Post, 6 February 1903 (Sydney, 30 December 1902),
4 March 1903 ("Sydney, 19 January), D.P., A.N.L., MS.154-0. 
The problems included Murray waters, preferential railway 
rates and the transcontinental railway.
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their separate histories and the problems of communication 
made unification impossible emotionally and empirically in 
1901. Complete disunity had also become intolerable. It 
was dangerous and inefficient from the point of view of 
practical politics and it was emotionally shameful since 
all six Colonies sprang from a common origin and owed 
allegiance to the same Sovereign. The only way out of the 
dilemma was to federate, the way of compromise. Yet, 
simply because federation is a compromise between unity and 
disunity, disputes were made inevitable. Where the limits 
of power were clear, there were no disputes - the States 
staked no claims to the defence power and the Commonwealth 
did not intervene in education. Until national desires 
and policies, the fulfilment of which required the 
resources of the dominant government, began to emerge, most 
of the life of Australia under the federal system went on 
without awareness of disputes, which existed on the 
uncertain boundaries of power. The States were proud of 
having federated and there was no likelihood that they 
would have braved the jeers of a scornful world by 
breaking up the arrangement, uneasy though they might have 
felt at times about its working. The constant tension 
between willingness to co-operate and unyielding 
maintenance of Commonwealth or State rights reflected the 
forces which had led to the adoption of a federal system.
It was only with the passing of the years that it could be 
hoped that the sense of strangeness and dissatisfaction 
which accompanied it would pass into acquiescence and 
sympathy.
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APPENDIX A
List of minor cases, with references, of disputes 
or acts of co-operation not included in the text.
a . Channels of Communication.
1. Extradition, 1902-4. Whether requests for 
extradition should be made to Governor-General or State 
Governors etc. C.A.O., C.P. 78/8* vol. 3, pp.26-26c,
435? C.P. 78/15, vol. 3, p.620; C.R.S. A33, vol. 3,
PP • 553-4 ; V.S.A. , G.O. , Despatches from S. of S ., vol. 80; 
ibid., Despatch Book, vol. 15, p.5? T.S.A., P .D .I/I6O/8 9 ? 
ibid. P.D. 1/161/107; W.A. 527, C.S.O. 3725/03.
2. Netherlands Indian Murders, 1903. Concerns
S .A . - very like Vondel, A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 2159, C.O.
418/26, no. 27881; S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/29, vol. 1, p.792; 
C.A.O., C.P. 78/8, vol. 3, pp.174-5-
3. Horne case, 1 9 0 6 . Claim for compensation 
for a Victorian, pressed directly by Commonwealth.
A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 2176, C.O. 418/44, no. 23560; ibid.,
C.O. 418/45, no. 30540; ibid., no. 45374; C.A.O., C.P. 
78/8, vol. 5, P.435.
4. Board of Trade incident, 1906-7* The Board 
sought information from the Commonwealth which should 
have been sought from the States. A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 2 1 7 8 , 
C.O. 418/46, no. 47968; ibid. C.O. 418/47, no. 1590; 
ibid. 2179, C.O. 418/48, no. 2 5 8 9 ; ibid., no, 2592; ibid., 
2183, C.O. 418/52, no. 9736; ibid., 2186, C.O. 418/55,
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no. 10601. T.S.A., P.D. 1/185/19; N.S.W.A., G.O., 
Despatches, I907, vol. 3, no. 47; V.S.A., G.O.,
Despatches from S. of S., vol. 84; P.D.V.O.L., vol. 161, 
P.699-701.
5. Presgrave incident, 1907• Similar to 
Benjamin and Weigall cases. A.N.L., A.J.C.P. 2183, C.O. 
418/52, no. 14227; ibid., 2184, C.O. 418/53, no. 6163; 
ibid., no. 6164; C.A.O., C.P. 78/8, vol. 5, pp.629-305
b . Attempted Co-operation.
1. Hallmarking of Jewellery. Attempt to bring 
under Commonwealth control or get uniform legislation.
See reports of Premiers' Conferences 1905-9» especially 
S .A .P.P., 1909, vol. 3, no. 52, appendix A.
2. Revenue Collection - wharfage dues.
Commonwealth refuses to collect for Tasmania because of 
higher rate for interstate ships, 1904-7• T.S.A., P.D.
1/166/33; ibid., P.D. 1/186/33; ibid., P.D. 1/194/33; 
C.A.O., C.R.S. A33, vol. 16, pp.372-3, 635-7.
c . Transferred Property, Departments and Officers.
1. Customs House, Sydney, 1901-9* Ownership
and use of rooms, cf. G.P.O. Adelaide. N.S.W.A., 
C.S.I.L., 6636, 01/21145; ibid., 6753, 04/4745; C.A.O., 
C.R.S. A33, vol. 7, p.355; ibid., vol. l4, pp.230-2; 
ibid., vol. 23, p.8l; ibid., vol. 26, p.175? ibid., vol. 
29, pp.148, 430-1; ibid., A101, B05/7308.
2. Victoria Barracks, Sydney, 1905-7* State 
desire to keep part of frontage of land transferred to 
Commonwealth. C.A.O., C.R.S. A101, B05/7308; ibid., A33,
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vo1. 1 5 , p.700§ N.S.W.A., Treasury, R.E., V 5 8 9 3 , 05/A7563*
CoA.O. 'Melbourne), M.P.84, series I, 1953/5/62.
3. Retiring allowances for transferred 
officers. Dispute with S.A. over who was to pay and how 
the allowances were to be calculated, 1902-6. S.A.A., 
G.R.G. 24/6, 02/839.
d . Other.
1. Junior Cadets. Problems raised by 
Commonwealth control of cadets within State schools, 
1905-7. S.A.A., G.R.G. 24/6, 05/1214; C.A.O., C.R.S.
A33, vol. 1 9 , pp.555-7; ibid. vol. 20, pp.424, 4 5 2 .
2. Centralization in Melbourne, 1902-3. Fear 
that printing for all States (for Commonwealth purposes) 
would be done in Melbourne. N.S.W.A., C.S.I.L., 6704, 
02/18758; T.S.A., P.D.1 / 1 6 3 / 1 9 W.A. 5^7, C.S.O. 224/03.
3. ’Act of war’ against Commonwealth by S.A., 
re landing of Chinese at Darwin, 1904, cf. wirenetting 
incident. D.P., A.N.L., MS. 1540, Morning Post, 18 July 
1 9 0 4 (Sydney 10 May 1904).
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APPENDIX B
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia
Relevant Clauses.
Chapter I. Part V. - Powers of the Parliament.
51. The Parliament shall, subject to this 
Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, 
order, and good government of the Commonwealth with 
respect to ■=•
(i) Trade and commerce with other countries, 
and among the States;
(ii) Taxation? but so as not to discriminate 
between States or parts of States;
(iii) Bounties on the production or export of 
goods, but so that such bounties shall be 
uniform throughout the Commonwealth;
(iv) Borrowing money on the public credit of 
the Commonwealth;
(v) Postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other 
like services;
(vi) The naval and military defence of the 
Commonwealth and of the several States, 
and the control of the forces to execute 
and maintain the laws of the Commonwealths
(vii) Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys;
viii) Astronomical and meteorological 
observations ;
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(ix) Quar a n t i n e :
(x) Fisheries in Australian waters beyond 
territorial limits:
(xi) Census and statistics:
(xii) Currency, coinage, and legal tender:
(xiii) Banking, other than State banking; also 
State banking extending beyond the limits 
of the State concerned, the incorporation 
of b a n k s , and the issue of paper money:
(xiv) Insurance, other than State insurance: 
also State insurance extending beyond the 
limits of the State concerned:
(xv) Weights and m e a s u r e s :
(xvi) Bills of exchange and promissory notes:
(xvii) Bankruptcy and insolvency:
(xviii) C o p y r i g h t s , patents of inventions and 
designs, and trade marks:
(xix ) Naturalization and a l i e n s :
(xx) Foreign corporations, and trading or 
financial corporations formed within 
the limits of the Commonwealth:
(xxi) M a r r i a g e :
(xxii) Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in 
relation thereto, parental rights, and 
the custody and guardianship of infants:
(xxiii) Invalid and old-age pensions:
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(xxiv) The service and execution throughout the 
Commonwealth of the civil and criminal 
process and the judgements of the courts 
of the States?
(xxv) The recognition throughout the Commonwealth 
of the laws, the public Acts and records, 
and the judicial proceedings of the States?
(xxvi) The people of any race, other than the 
aboriginal race in any State , for whom it 
is deemed necessary to make special laws?
(xxvii) Immigration and emigration:
(xxviii) The influx of criminals:
((xxix) External affairs?
1 (X X X ) The relations of the Commonwealth with the 
islands of the Pacific:
(xxxi) The acquisition of property on just terms 
from any State or person for any purpose 
in respect of which the Parliament has 
power to make laws:
(xxxii) The control of railways with respect to 
transport for the naval and military 
purposes of the Commonwealth?
(xxxiii) The acquisition, with the consent of a 
State, of any railways of the State on 
terms arranged between the Commonwealth 
and the State?
(xxxiv) Railway construction and extension in any 
State with the consent of that States
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(xxxv)
(xxxvi)
(xxxvii)
(xxxviii)
(xxxix)
Conciliation and arbitration for the 
prevention and settlement of industrial 
disputes extending beyond the limits of 
any one State;
Matters in respect of which this 
Constitution makes provision until the 
Parliament otherwise provides;
Matters referred to the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth by the Parliament or 
Parliaments of any State or States, but 
so that the law shall extend only to States 
by whose Parliaments the matter is 
referred, or which afterwards adopt the 
laws
The exercise within the Commonwealth, at 
the request or with the concurrence of the 
Parliaments of all the States directly 
concerned, of any power which can at the 
establishment of the Constitution be 
exercised only by the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom or by the Federal Council 
of Australasia;
Matters incidental to the execution of 
any power vested by this Constitution in 
the Parliament or in either House thereof, 
or in the Government of the Commonwealth, 
or in the Federal Judicature, or in any 
department or officer of the Commonwealth.
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52. The Parliament shall, subject to this 
Constitution, have exclusive power to make laws for the 
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth 
with respect to ~
(i) The seat of Government of the Commonwealth, 
and all places acquired by the Commonwealth 
for public purposess
(ii) Matters relating to any department of the 
public service the control of which is by 
this Constitution transferred to the 
Executive Government of the Commonwealth?
(iii) Other matters declared by this Constitution 
to be within the exclusive power of the 
Parliament.
Chapter II. - The Executive Government.
61. The executive power of the Commonwealth is 
vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor- 
General as the Queen’s representative, and extends to the 
execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of 
the laws of the Commonwealth.
69. On a date or dates to be proclaimed by the 
Governor-General after the establishment of the 
Commonwealth the following departments of the public 
service in each State shall become transferred to the 
G ommonwealth -
Posts, telegraphs, and telephones?
Naval and military defences
Lighthouses, lightships, beacons, and buoys?
Quarantine.
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But the departments of customs and of excise in each 
State shall become transferred to the Commonwealth on its 
es tablishment.
70. In respect of matters which, under this 
Constitution, pass to the Executive Government of the 
Commonwealth, all powers and functions which at the 
establishment of the Commonwealth are vested in the 
Governor of a Colony, or in the Governor of a Colony 
with the advice of his Executive Council, or in any 
authority of a Colony, shall vest in the Governor- 
General, or in the Governor-General in Council, or in the 
authority exercising similar powers under the 
Commonwealth, as the case requires.
Chapter III. - The Judicature.
74. No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in 
Council from a decision of the High Court upon any 
question, howsoever arising, as to the limits inter se 
of the Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and 
those of any State or States, or as to the limits inter 
se of the Constitutional powers of any two or more 
States, unless the High Court shall certify that the 
question is one which ought to be determined by Her 
Majesty in Council.
The High Court may so certify if satisfied that for 
any special reason the certificate should be granted, 
and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in 
Council on the question without further leave.
Except as provided in this section, this 
Constitution shall not impair any right which the Queen 
may be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal
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prerogative to grant special leave of appeal from the 
High Court to Her Majesty in Council. The Parliament 
may make laws limiting the matters in which such leave 
may be asked, but proposed laws containing any such 
limitation shall be reserved by the Governor-General for 
Her Majesty’s pleasure.
75* In all matters -
(i) Arising under any treaty?
(ii) Affecting consuls or other representatives 
of other countries?
(iii) In which the Commonwealth, or a person 
suing or being sued on behalf of the 
Commonwealth is a party?
(iv) Between States, or between residents of 
different States, or between a State and 
a resident of another State?
(v) In which a writ of Mandamus or 
prohibition or an injunction is sought 
against an officer of the Commonwealths
the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.
76. The Parliament may make laws conferring 
original jurisdiction on the High Court in any matter -
(i) Arising under this Constitution, or 
involving its interpretations
(it) Arising under any laws made by the 
Parliaments
(iii) Of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction?
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(iv) Relating to the same subject-matter
claimed under the laws of different States.
77» With respect to any of the matters mentioned in 
the last two sections the Parliament may make laws -
(i) Defining the jurisdiction of any federal 
court other than the High Court:
(ii) Defining the extent to which the
jurisdiction of any federal court shall 
be exclusive of that which belongs to or 
is invested in the courts of the States:
(iii) Investing any court of a State with 
federal jurisdiction.
Chapter IV. - Finance and Trade.
81. All revenues or moneys raised or received by 
the Executive Government of the Commonwealth shall form 
one Consolidated Revenue Fund, to be appropriated for 
the purposes of the Commonwealth in the manner and subject 
to the charges and liabilities imposed by this 
Constitution.
85. When any department of the public service of a 
State is transferred to the Commonwealth -
(i) All property of the State of any kind, 
used exclusively in connexion with the 
department, shall become vested in the 
Commonwealth^ but, in the case of the 
departments controlling customs and 
excise and bounties, for such time only 
as the Governor-General in Council may 
declare to be necessary:
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(ii) The Commonwealth may acquire any property 
of the State, of any kind used, but not 
exclusively used in connexion with the 
department; the value thereof shall, if 
no agreement can be made, be ascertained 
in, as nearly as may be, the manner in 
which the value of land, or of an interest 
in land, taken by the State for public 
purposes is ascertained under the law of 
the State in force at the establishment 
of the Commonwealth:
(iii) The Commonwealth shall compensate the State 
for the value of any property passing to 
the Commonwealth under this section; if no 
agreement can be made as to the mode of 
compensation, it shall be determined under 
laws to be made by the Parliament:
(iv) The Commonwealth shall, at the date of the 
transfer, assume the current obligations 
of the State in respect of the department 
trans ferred.
86. On the establishment of the Commonwealth, the 
collection and control of duties of customs and of 
excise, and the control of the payment of bounties, shall 
pass to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth.
87. During a period of ten years after the 
establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter until 
the Parliament otherwise provides, of the net revenue of 
the Commonwealth from duties of customs and of excise not
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more than one-fourth shall be applied annually by the 
Commonwealth towards its expenditure.
The balance shall, in accordance with this 
Constitution, be paid to the several States, or applied 
towards the payment of interest on debts of the several 
States taken over by the Commonwealth.
88. Uniform duties of customs shall be imposed 
within two years after the establishment of the 
Commonwealth.
89. Until the imposition of uniform duties of 
customs -
(i) The Commonwealth shall credit to each
State the revenues collected therein by 
the Commonwealth.
(ii) The Commonwealth shall debit to each 
State -
(a) The expenditure therein of the 
Commonwealth incurred solely for the 
maintenance or continuance, as at the 
time of transfer of any department 
transferred from the State to the
C ommo nwe a1th $
(b) The proportion of the State, 
according to the number of its 
people, in the other expenditure of 
the Commonwealth.
(iii) The Commonwealth shall pay to each State 
month by month the balance (if any) in 
favour of the State.
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92. On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, 
trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether 
by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall 
be absolutely free.
But notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, 
goods imported before the imposition of uniform duties of 
customs into any State, or into any Colony which, whilst 
the goods remain therein, becomes a State, shall, on 
thence passing into another State within two years after 
the imposition of such duties, be liable to any duty 
chargeable on the importation of such goods into the 
Commonwealth, less any duty paid in respect of the goods 
on their importation.
93. During the first five years after the imposition 
of uniform duties of customs, and thereafter until the 
Parliament otherwise provides -
(i) The duties of customs chargeable on goods 
imported into a State and afterwards 
passing into another State for consumption, 
and the duties of excise paid on goods 
produced or manufactured in a State and 
afterwards passing into another State for 
consumption, shall be taken to have been 
collected not in the former but in the 
latter States
(id.) Subject to the last sub-section, the
Commonwealth shall credit revenue, debit 
expenditure, and pay balances to the several 
States as prescribed for the period
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preceding the imposition of uniform 
duties of customs.
94. After five years from the imposition of 
uniform duties of customs, the Parliament may provide, 
on such basis as it deems fair, for the monthly payment 
to the several States of all surplus revenue of the 
Commonwealth.
95* Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, 
the Parliament of the State of Western Australia, if 
that State be an original State, may, during the first 
five years after the imposition of uniform duties of 
customs, impose duties of customs on goods passing into 
that State and not originally imported from beyond the 
limits of the Commonwealth; and such duties shall be 
collected by the Commonwealth.
But any duty so imposed on any goods shall not 
exceed during the first of such years the duty chargeable 
on the goods under the law of Western Australia in force 
at the imposition of uniform duties, and shall not exceed 
during the second, third, fourth, and fifth of such 
years respectively, four-fifths, three-fifths, two- 
fifths, and one-fifth of such latter duty, and all duties 
imposed under this section shall cease at the expiration 
of the fifth year after the imposition of uniform duties.
If at any time during the five years the duty on 
any goods under this section is higher than the duty 
imposed by the Commonwealth on the importation of the 
like goods, then such higher duty shall be collected on 
the goods when imported into Western Australia from 
beyond the limits of the Commonwealth,
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96. Dux'ing a period of ten years after the 
establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter until 
the Parliament otherwise provides, the Parliament may 
grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and 
conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.
105- The Parliament may take over from the States 
their public debts as existing at the establishment of 
the Commonwealth, or a proportion thereof according to 
the respective numbers of their people as shown by the 
latest statistics of the Commonwealth, and may convert, 
renew . or consolidate such debts, or any part thereof; 
and the State shall indemnify the Commonwealth in respect 
of the debts taken over, and thereafter the interest 
payable in respect of the debts shall be deducted and 
retained from the portions of the surplus revenue of the 
Commonwealth payable to the several States, or if such 
surplus is insufficient, or if there is no surplus, then 
the deficiency or the whole amount shall be paid by the 
several States.
Chapter V. - The States.
106. The Constitution of each State of the 
Commonwealth shall, subject to this Constitution, 
continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth,
or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as 
the case may be, until altered in accordance with the 
Constitution of the State.
107. Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which 
has become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by 
this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of 
the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the
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States continue as at the establishment of' the 
Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment 
of the State, as the case may be.
108. Every law in force in a Colony which has 
become or becomes a State, and relating to any matter 
within the powers of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, 
shall., subject to this Constitution, continue in force in 
the States and, until provision is made in that behalf by 
the Parliament of the Commonwealth, the Parliament of the 
State shall have such powers of alteration and of repeal 
in respect of any such law as the Parliament of the Colony 
had until, the Colony became a State.
109* When a law of a State is inconsistent with a 
law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and 
the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
invalid.
111. The Parliament of a State may surrender any 
part of the State to the Commonwealth; and upon such 
surrender, and the acceptance thereof by the Commonwealth, 
such part of the State shall become subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.
11.4. A State shall not, without the consent of 
the Parliament of the Commonwealth, raise or maintain 
any naval ox* military force, or impose any tax on 
property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth, nor 
shall the Commonwealth impose any tax on property of any 
kind belonging to a State.
II9. The Commonwealth shall protect every State 
against invasion and, on the application of the Executive 
Government of the State, against domestic violence.
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Chapter VII. - Miscellaneous.
125. The seat of government of the Commonwealth 
shall be determined by the Parliament, and shall be 
within territory which shall have been granted to or 
acquired by the Commonwealth, and shall be vested in 
and belong to the Commonwealth., and shall, be in the 
State of New South Wales, and be distant not less than 
one hundred miles from Sydney.
Such territory shall contain an area of not less 
than one hundred square miles, and such portion thereof 
as shall consist of Crown lands shall be granted to the 
Commonwealth without any payment therefor.
The Parliament shall sit at Melbourne until it meet 
at the seat of Government.
126. The Queen may authorize the Governor-General to 
appoint any person, or any persons jointly or severally, 
to be his deputy or deputies within any part of the 
Commonwealth,* and in that capacity to exercise during the 
pleasure of the Governor-General such powers and functions 
of the Governor-General as he thinks fit to assign to 
such deputy or deputies, subject to any limitations 
expressed or directions given by the Queen? but the 
appointment of such deputy' or deputies shall not affect 
the exercise by the Governor-General himself of any 
power or function.
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APPENDIX C
Senior Executive Officers of the Commonwealth and States.
1 . Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Treasurers.
a. Sir Edmund Barton, 1 January 1901 to 23 September
1903. (Treasurer, Sir George Turner).
b. Alfred Deakin, 23 September 1903 to 26 April 1904. 
(Treasurer, Sir George Turner).
c. John Christian Watson, 26 April 1904 to 17 August
1904. (Treasurer, J.C. Watson).
d. (Sir) George Houston Reid (in coalition with Allan 
McLean), 17 August 1904 to 4 July 1905.
(Treasurer, Sir George Turner).
e. Alfred Deakin, 4 July 1905 to 12 November I9O8 . 
(Treasurers, Sir John Forrest to 29 July 1907 and 
Sir William Lyne to 12 November 1908).
f. Andrew Fisher, 12 November 1908 to 2 June 1909* 
(Treasurer, A. Fisher).
g. Alfred Deakin, 2 June 1909 to 29 April 1910. 
(Treasurer, Sir John Forrest).
h. Andrew Fisher, from 29 April 1910. (Treasurer,
A . Fisher).
2. Commonwealth Governors-General
a. Lord Hopetoun (later Marquis of Linlithgow), 1 
January 1901 to 9 January 1903*
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b. Lord Tennyson, Acting Governor-General 17 July 
1902 to 9 January 1903? Governor-General, 9 
January 1903 to 21 January 1904.
c. Lord Northcote, 21 January 1904 to 9 September
1908.
d. Lord Dudley, 9 September 1908 to 31 July I9H.
3. State Premiers
Any other Ministers of significance are named in 
brackets after the Premier.
a. New South Wales
(i.) Sir William Lyne, to 10 April 1901.
(ii) Sir John See, 10 April 1901 to 15 June 1904. 
(T. Waddell, Treasurer).
(iii) Thomas Waddell, 15 June 1904 to 29 August 
1904.
(iv) (Sir) Joseph Carruthers, 29 August 1904 to
30 September 1907. (C.G. Wade, Attorney-
General ) .
(v) (Sir) Charles Gregory Wade, 2 October 1907 
to 21 October 1910.
(vi) James McGowen, from 21 October 1910. (W.A.
Holman, Attorney-General).
b . Queensland
(i) (Sir) Robert Philp, to 9 September 1903*
(ii) (Sir) Arthur Morgan, 17 September 1903 to 19
January 1906. (w. Kidston, Treasurer).
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(iii) William Kidston, 19 January 1906 to 12 
November 1907*
(iv) (Sir) Robert P h i l p , 19 November 1907 to 18 
February 1908.
(v) William Kidston, 18 February 1908 to 7 
February 1911.
(vi) Digby Denham, from 7 February 1911.
c. South Australia
(i) (Sir) Frederick Holder, to 15 May 1901.
( ü ) John Greeley Jenkins, 15 M a y  1901 to 1 March 
1905. (j.H. Gordon, Attorney-General).
(iii) (Sir) Richard Butler, 1 March 1905 to 26 
July 1905.
(iv) Thomas Price, 2 6 July 1905 to 4 June 1909. 
(A.H. Peake, coalition partner and Treasurer).
(v) Arthur Peake, 4 June 1909 to 3 June 1910 (in 
coalition with Richard Butler from 22 
December 1909)*
(vi) John Verran, from 3 June 1910.
d. Tasmania
U ) Sir Neil Lewis, to 8 April 1903.
( Ü ) William Propsting, 9 April 1903 to 11 July 
1904 .
(iii) Captain John Evans, 12 July 1904 to 19 June 
1909.
(iv) Sir Neil Lewis, 19 June 1909 to 20 October 
1909.
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(v) John Earle, 20 October 1909 to 27 October 
1909.
(vi) Sir Neil Lewis, from 27 October 1909•
e. Victoria
(i) Sir George Turner, to 12 February 1901.
(ii) (Sir) Alexander Peacock, 12 February 1901 to 
10 June 1902.
(iii) (Sir) William Irvine, 10 June 1902 to 16 
February 1904.
(iv) Sir Thomas Bent, l6 February 1904 to 8 
January 1909*
(v) John Murray, from 8 January I9O9 .
f. Western Australia
(i) Sir John Forrest, to 15 February 1901.
(ii) George Throssell, 15 February 1901 to 27 May
1901.
(iii) George Leake, 27 May 1901 to 21 November 
I9OI .
(iv) Alfred Morgans, 21 November 1901 to 24 
December 1901.
(v) George Leake, 24 December 1901 to 24 June
1902.
(vi) Frederick Illingworth, 24 June 1902 to 1 
July 1902.
(vii) (Sir) Walter James, 1 July 1902 to 10 August 
1904.
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(viii) Henry Daglish, 10 August 1904 to 25 August
1905.
(ix) (Sir) Cornthwaite Rason, 25 August 1905 to 
7 May 1906.
(x) Sir Newton Moore, 7 May 1906 to l6 September 
I9IO.
(x i ) Frank Wilson, from l6 September 1910.
When a title appears in brackets, it signifies that 
it was granted after the recipient had completed his term 
in office.
(This information was compiled from the following 
sources: Australian Encyclopaedia; Quick, Legislative 
Powers; Doyle, The Story of the Century; Journals and 
Proceedings of Parliament (Tasmania), and various State 
Parliamentary Debates.)
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APPENDIX D
Sketch Map showing main suggested 
capital sites in relation to 
Sydney and Melbourne.
(See next page.)
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TABLE 3
This table illustrates the relative importance of direct 
taxation and the surplus revenue returned by the Commonwealth in 
the total revenue of the States.
[Adapted from Commonwealth Year Books for the appropriate 
years. ]
Percentage of Total State Revenue
State
1906-7 1907-8 1908-9 1909-10 1910-11
7o % % 1 7o
N.S.W. Taxation
Commonwealth return
10.31
22.57
7.72
25.72
6.65
24.75
8.41
23.02
7.42
14.04
Vic. Taxation
Commonwealth return
13.31
26.27
11.76
29.46
13.00
23.39
12.66
22.36
15.83
17.57
Old. Taxation
Commonwealth return
12.55
21.88
11.71
22.36
11.22
22.24
11.42
20.93
12.54
12.93
S.A. Taxation 
Commonwealth return
12.66
19.83
12.83
21.30
12.54
19.71
11.93
19.91
13.05
12.21
W. A. Taxation
Commonwealth return
7.83
22.94
8.22
22.31
9.07
18.93
9.20
19.24
8.45
14.79
Tas . Taxation
Commonwealth return
28.48
27.02
26.43
29.27
26.84
24.92
30.07
23.77
29.38
23.52
Average Taxation
Commonwealth return
11.84
23.30
10.33
25.48
10.19
23.01
10.87
21.89
11.23
14.87
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TABLE 5
A comparison between the return to the States under section 87 
and the Financial Agreement of August 1909.
I
[Adapted from C.P.P,, 1909, vol.2, no.44, p.57. ]
[Figures to nearest £10,000. ]
[Minor details not taken into consideration. ]
Year
Estimated amount 
payable und^r 
section 871
Estimated amount 
payable under 
Financial 
Agreement 
1909
Difference
to
States
£ £ £
1910-1 8,040,000 5,670,000 -2,370,000
1915-6 8,550,000 6,140,000 -2,410,000
1920-1 9,260,000 6,620,000 -2,640,000
Under the existing tariff.
1
Th
e 
wo
rk
in
g 
o
f 
th
e 
Su
rp
lu
s 
Re
ve
nu
e 
A
ct
 
19
10
.
^470
X
W
hJ
PQ
<
H
4-J
o£
CÖe
co
r—I
cti
4-J
o
H
O
O
o
o
r-4
U4
4-1
CO
cu£
c0
0)£
o
4-1
CO
0)
£
3
b0
• £
pt4
en
r-4
m
r -
m
<
co
od
u
o
<
0
CJ
0
o
£
4-1
XU 1----1
£1 °
CX Sn
CO r —I
x  ^
<  co
1___ 1 4J
i
b££
• £££
X )
CO
0)
4-J
CO
4-J
CO
0)
- £
4J
o
4J
0)
1—4
£0
CO
CO
a
T
o
ta
l
~ i
U4
5
,6
0
0
,0
0
0
2
5
0
,0
0
0
5
,9
0
0
,0
0
0
1
3
0
,0
0
0
5
,
7
3
0
,0
0
0 XD
D
O
n
<r
5
,2
8
0
,0
0
0
0 0  0 0 0 O
CO O 0  0 0 0 0
H 0 0  0 0 0 0
CN CN CN CN
O  O O  O O O O
<3 O  O O  O O 0 O
O __ O 0  9 O 0 O
c o  CM X X m
0 0  0 0 0 O
<3 O O  O 0 0 0
CO 0 0  0 0 0 O
m m m m
0 0  0 O 0 O
X 0 0  0 O 0 0
O ' 0 0  0 0 0 O
n - X
0 O  0 O 0 O
O O  O O 0 0
•H (4-1 0 O  0 O 0 0
X X r-H
T—1 r—l r—l r-H
O 0  0 0 O O
0 E O 0  O 0 0 0
CO U4 O O  0 0 0 O
55 O 0 0 r —1 0 0
CN CN CN rH
£
O
< 4 J CO
3 O r-4 QJ r-H
c O *H £ 0
a  <u 4J  C/3 O
c w w < w  £ O' r-H r-H
1  1 "<U 44 3 C X ^  1
X I  CO CO  ^ C Q  3 u CÖ fH
£  CO 4J
P
cd T3 r—<
Ou ex 4J  • £  C 4J  CU 4-J C/3
1 C.
a
O O CL
3  0  E
X  >
3  X  
X  £
a
>
3  4-1 
O co
m  a .  <u 44 co a) • £
cN  co Q  0  a  « 3
a.
a
i  JJ 
<  co
A 
co
mp
ar
is
on
 o
f 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
s 
pa
ya
bl
e 
at
 £
1.
 
5s
 O
d 
pe
r 
he
ad
 w
it
h 
am
ou
nt
s 
pa
id
 t
o 
th
e 
St
at
es
 
an
d 
wi
th
 t
hr
ee
-f
ou
rt
hs
 o
f 
th
e 
ne
t 
cu
st
om
s 
an
d 
ex
ci
se
 r
ev
en
ue
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
, 
fo
r 
th
e 
ye
ar
s 
19
02
- 
to
 1
90
9-
10
.
471
w
r—HcO
4-1O
4-1
ooo
oo
r— I
UA
4-J
CO
CUCi
CO<UG
O
4J
XI<U
4-)
CLc0X)
C
CO
CU > 1
X  r— I
G r-t T— I CO 
O  4JXW +J1-1 Oc
cOe
00
Di
ff
er
en
ce
 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
ls
. 
4 
&
 
6
UA
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CN| r—1 r—1 t—1 r—1 CO CNJ CNI
r".
Di
ff
er
en
ce
 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
ls
. 
3 
&
 
6
UA
3.
10
0.
00
0
2.
30
0.
00
0 
2,
00
0,
00
0
2.
20
0.
00
0
2.
70
0.
00
0
3.
60
0.
00
0 
2,
60
0,
00
0 
2,
40
0,
00
0
vO
Am
ou
nt
 a
t 
25
/-
 
pe
r 
he
ad UU
4.
80
0.
00
0
4.
90
0.
00
0 
5,
00
0,
00
0
5.
10
0.
00
0
5.
10
0.
00
0 
5,
20
0,
00
0
5.
30
0.
00
0
5.
40
0.
00
0
LO
3/
4 
ne
t 
cu
st
om
s 
an
d 
ex
ci
se
 
re
ve
nu
e 
pe
r 
he
ad
u-t
v o o r ^ - O r — 'CNi 
in fO p -tc N s j-o N ^ o
t—4 t—1 r—H r—i r —i r—1 r-H
t-H r—1 t—1 t-H r—I CNI r-H r—\
3/
4 
ne
t 
cu
st
om
s 
an
d 
ex
ci
se
 
re
ve
nu
e
i* a
6.
90
0.
00
0
6.
50
0.
00
0
6.
30
0.
00
0
6.
50
0.
00
0 
7,
00
0,
00
0
8.
50
0.
00
0
7.
90
0.
00
0
7.
90
0.
00
0
<T)
Am
ou
nt
 
Pa
id
 t
o 
St
at
es
UA
8,
00
0,
00
0
7,
20
0,
00
0
7,
00
0,
00
0
7.
30
0.
00
0
7.
80
0.
00
0
8.
90
0.
00
0
7.
90
0.
00
0
7.
90
0.
00
0
CNI
Po
pu
la
ti
on
at
31
 D
ec
em
be
r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
r\ rx r\ #\ r\ r\ r\
O O O O O O O O
O O O O O O O O
Q 'vC ^O r-lr-4 C'JCO<l-
r\ c\ r\ rs r\ c\ r\ r\
H
Ye
ar
19
02
- 
3
19
03
- 
4
19
04
- 
5
19
05
- 
6
19
06
- 
7
19
07
- 
8
19
08
- 
9
19
09
- 
10
472
APPENDIX F
Commonwealth and State Finance. -- Agreement Between The 
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth and the Premiers of the
Several States.
In the public interests of the people of Australia, 
to secure economy and efficiency in the raising and the 
spending of their revenues, and to permit their 
Governments to exercise unfettered control of their 
receipts and expenditure, it is imperative that the 
financial relations of the Federal and State 
Governments - which under the Constitution were 
determined only in part, and for a term of years - should 
be placed upon a sound and permanent basis.
It is therefore agreed by the Ministers of State of 
the Commonwealth and the Ministers of the Component 
States in conference assembled to advise: -
1. That to fulfil the intention of the 
Constitution by providing for the 
consolidation and transfer of State debts, 
and in order to insure the most profitable 
management of future loans by the establishment 
of one Australian Stock a complete investigation 
of this most important subject shall be 
undertaken forthwith by the Governments of the 
Commonwealth and the States. This investigation 
shall include the question of the actual cost to 
the States of transferred properties as defrayed 
out of loan or revenue moneys.
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2. That in order to give freedom to the 
Commonwealth in levying duties of Customs and 
Excise, and to assure to the States a certain 
annual income, the Commonwealth shall after
the first day of July One thousand nine hundred 
and ten pay monthly to the States a sum 
calculated at the rate of One pound five 
shillings per annum per head of population 
according to the latest statistics of the 
Commonwealth.
3 . That in recognition of the heavy obligations 
incurred in the payment of Old-age Pensions, 
the Commonwealth may, during the current 
financial year, withhold from the moneys 
returnable to the States such sum (not exceeding 
Six hundred thousand pounds) as will provide 
for the actual shortage in the revenue at the 
end of the said year. If such shortage amounts 
to Six hundred thousand pounds the basis of 
contribution by the States shall be Three 
shillings per head of population in the 
Pension States (viz., New South Wales, Victoria, 
and Queensland) and Two shillings per head of 
population in the Non-pension States (viz.,
South Australia, Western Australia, and 
Tasmania). If such shortage be less than Six 
hundred thousand pounds the contributions shall 
be reduced proportionately per head of 
population as between the Pension and the Non- 
pension States.
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4. That in view of the large contribution to the 
Customs revenue per capita made by the State 
of Western Australia the Commonwealth shall 
(in addition to the payment provided for in 
paragraph No. 2) make to such State special 
annual payments, commencing at Two hundred and 
fifty thousand pounds in the financial year 
One thousand nine hundred and ten and One 
thousand nine hundred and eleven, and 
diminishing at the rate of Ten thousand pounds 
per annum. The Commonwealth shall in each year 
deduct on a per capita basis from the moneys 
payable to the States of the Commonwealth an 
amount equal to one half of the sum so payable 
to the State of Western Australia.
5- That the Government of the Commonwealth bring 
before the Parliament during this session the 
necessary measure to enable an alteration of 
the Constitution (giving effect to the 
preceding paragraphs, Nos. 2, 3. and 4) to be 
submitted to the electors.
Alfred Deakin, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth
of Australia.
C.G. Wade, Premier of the State of New South Wales.
J. Murray, Premier of the State of Victoria.
W. Kidston, Premier of the State of Queensland.
A.H. Peake, Premier of the State of South Australia.
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N.J. Moore, Premier of the State of Western Australia 
N.E. Lewis, Premier of the State of Tasmania.
Conference Chamber,
State Parliament House,
Melbourne, 20th August, 1909•
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